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THE 


ANALOGY OF RELIGION, 

NATURAL AND REVEALED, 

TO THE 

CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE. 


BY 


JOSEPH BUTLER, L. L. D., 

LATE LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM. 

Ejus (Analogize) haec vis est, ut id quod dubium est ad aliquid simile, de quo non 
quaeritur, referat; ut incerta certis probet. —Quint. Inst., Orat. 1 , i, Chap. 6. 

WITH AN 

ANALYSIS OF THE WORK. 


BY 


REV. B. F. TEFFT, A. M., EDITOR. 


i * 


Cincinnati: 

PUBLISHED BY L. SWORMSTEDT AND J. H. POWER. 

FOR THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH, AT THE WESTERN BOOK CONCERN, 
CORNER OF MAIN AND EIGHTH-STREETS. 

R. P THOMPSON, PRINTER. 

1848 . 


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437 


Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1847, by L. Swormstedt & 
J. T. Mitchell, in the Clerk’s Ofhce for the District Court of Ohio, 


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PREFACE. 


No eulogy need be written on Butler’s Analogy of 
Religion. It is known to be the ablest production, of its 
class, extant in any language. It is the master-piece of 
one of England’s greatest minds. It has ever been regard¬ 
ed, since its first publication, as a perfectly unanswerable 
defense of Christianity against the most plausible of all its 
opposers. 

Butler’s Analogy should be read by all Christians, exam¬ 
ined critically and repeatedly by every minister, and faith¬ 
fully studied by the students of our schools and colleges. 
That family, which makes it a fireside reading-book, will 
scarcely be troubled with doubts in religious matters, or 
rear up skeptics from its circle. Those ministers of the 
Gospel, who most frequently consult its pages, will be best 
prepared to meet and master the subtil cavils of the wicked. 
The pupils of that seminary of learning, where this Analogy 
is made a prominent text-book, under whose influence all 
must pass prior to graduation, will receive a bias to religion, 
which subsequent years will serve only to strengthen. 

To these three classes of readers this edition has been 
carefully adapted. It is expressly intended for the use of 
families, ministers, and students; and under the latter class 
are included young ministers during their course of prepar¬ 
atory study. 

The Analysis, prepared by the Editor expressly for this 
edition, is to be met with in no other. It contains the argu¬ 
ment of every chapter, and furnishes, in every place, a key 
to the author’s meaning. From the antiquity or obsolete¬ 
ness of Bishop Butler’s style, much perplexity often arises 


4 


PREFACE. 


to the most patient reader. Sometimes he can scarcely tell 
what is the sense of a passage. In all such cases, the 
Analysis, it is hoped, will prove of service. It will, also, be 
very convenient to students in reviewing. Teachers, who 
wish to be complete and thorough in their instruction, will 
doubtless derive some aid by following the plan of it in 
their questions. In preparing it, the actual divisions and 
subdivisions of the author have been preserved in his own 
modes of marking them. The figures surrounded by paren¬ 
theses indicate paragraphs, and were added by the Editor 
for the sake of reference and greater perspicuity. The 
Analysis, in a word, is nothing less, in design at least, than 
Bishop Butler’s Analogy in miniature, which, though it 
might have been reduced to a mere table of contents, or 
swelled to a much larger compass, was intended to meet 
exactly the wants of students and of the general reader. 

The text is based on the last English edition, the Ameri¬ 
can reprints being generally disfigured by numerous errors. 
Several typographical mistakes, detected even in the En¬ 
glish standard, have been corrected. The punctuation has, 
also, been carefully revised and amended. 

This edition is sent out without note or comment. No 
preliminary essay has been prefixed, no elaborate annotations 
have been added, to give it a sectarian character. A work 
like this, as it is the common defense and boast, ought cer¬ 
tainly to be the common property, of all Christendom. 

B. F. T. 




/! . t - 







ANALYSIS 


OF 


BUTLER’S ANALOGY 


Page. 

37. Introduction. 


OF NATURAL RELIGION 


PART I. 





CHAPTER I. 

OF A FUTURE LIFE. 


PRELIMINARY REMARKS. 


A Future Life shown, 

49. I. From the different states of the present life. 

50. II. From the fact that death is not known to be the destruction 

of our living powers, which neither the reason of the thing, 
nor the analogy of nature, indicates, but which is contra¬ 
dicted, 

53. (1) By the oneness of our mental essence, as shown by our 


perception of identity; 

55. (2) By our mental integrity after the loss of every particle 

of our present bodies; 

56. (3) By several minor considerations: 


1. If the soul be no larger than an atom of matter, it 
may not be capable of dissolution; 

2. All our members are only instruments of the soul, 
and can be in part dispensed with, 

3. And supplied again, without touching our sense of 
personal identity. 


65. III. From our mental operations, especially reasoning and 
reflecting, being independent of the body, which can be 
carried on, not only as well, but even better, without than 
with the aid of the senses. The analogy, so often insisted 
on, between the decay of vegetables and the death of our 
living powers, does not exist, and, hence, no argument can 
be drawn from it against a future life. 



5 



6 


ANALYSIS OF BUTLEr’s ANALOGY. 


CHAPTER II. 

OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS, AND 
PARTICULARLY OF THE LATTER. 

Page. 

The question concerning a future life of great importance to us. 

68. (1) Because of our capacity for happiness and misery, and, es¬ 

pecially, as that happiness and misery may depend upon 
our present conduct. 

(2) But, in this life, we know that all our happiness, and a 
great part of our misery, are put in our own power. 

69. (3) There are many very probable reasons, why the Author of 

nature should make our happiness and misery to depend on 
our own actions. 

70. (4) And this connection between our actions and our present 

happiness and misery is certainly to .be ascribed to the 
course of nature, that is, to Him who makes nature to be 
what it is. 

71. (5) But we cannot infer from this, that we are, therefore, 

called upon to gratify every passion which may give us 
present pleasure, any more than we are to see every object 
capable of being beheld by our natural vision. 

71. (6) But we are to conclude, from this natural connection 
between our conduct and our condition, that we are under 
the government of Him who formed the connection. 

73. (7) The true conception, then, of the Author of nature is that 
of a master or governor, even prior to the consideration 
of his moral attributes. 

73. (8) And there is, consequently, nothing incredible in the gen¬ 
eral doctrine of religion, that God will reward and punish 
men for their actions hereafter. 

The doctrine of future punishment sustained. 

73. (9) By our present experience, when we suffer the evil con¬ 
sequent upon a course of wickedness, which, in many 
instances, is inflicted on us a long time after the wicked 
actions have been performed. 

77. (10) These punishments are not to be considered accidental, 

because, sooner or later, they always follow our trans¬ 
gressions of the laws of nature. 

78. (11) They sometimes break in upon us irresistibly, like armed 

forces, against which there is no relief from repentance. 


ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. 


7 


Page. 

78. (12) Men are not always punished, in this life, in proportion to 

their misbehavior, but the punishments we see inflicted 
show what the constitution of nature, both here and here¬ 
after, may admit of, and answer all objections to the doc¬ 
trine of future punishments. 

79. (13) Reflections of this kind are not without their terror, but it 

is our business to see and state things exactly as they are. 


CHAPTER III.. 

OF THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 

80. (1) The nice adaptation of pleasure and pain to virtuous and 
vicious conduct, as clearly indicates an intelligent Gov¬ 
ernor of the universe, as other final causes demonstrate a 
Maker of it. 

80. (2) But this does not prove God to be a moral governor. 

80. (3) The constitution of nature shows God to be the righteous 
Ruler of the world, punishing and rewarding men accord¬ 
ing to their actions. 

82. (4) But this moral government, under which we now live, is 
allowed not to be perfect, and is only an earnest, that, in 
another state of existence, it will be carried out and com¬ 
pleted. 

82. (5) After making allowance for every objection, it cannot be 

considered doubtful, whether virtue is not more happy 
than vice even in the present world, where we behold the 
beginnings of the more perfect state. 

83. I. If the Ruler of the world, then, governs by any settled 

method, it is most natural to suppose his method to be 
that of distributive justice—of rewarding and punishing 
us according to our works. 

84. II. The fact that God governs by fixed laws, which we are 

capable of understanding, and thus foreseeing the con¬ 
sequences of our behavior, is a proof of a moral govern¬ 
ment. 

85. III. From the natural course of things, vice is actually pun¬ 

ished, and the punishment, foreseen by the wicked, is 
dreaded, which facts show that mankind universally ap¬ 
prehend themselves to be under a moral government. 

(1) For it cannot be objected that vice is sometimes 


8 


ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. 


Page. 

rewarded and virtue punished, because they are not 
so punished and rewarded in their proper characters. 
86. IV. In the natural course of things, virtue, as such, is actually 
rewarded, and vice, as such, punished. 

88. (1) An instance is found in the fear with which a wicked 

man looks upon the future, contrasted with the tran¬ 
quility of mind enjoyed, by a man of virtuous life, in 
looking forward to another state of being. 

88. (2) All honest and good men are, also, disposed to succor 

those of their own character, and to discountenance 
the vicious. 

89. (3) That God has given us a moral nature, and scope for 

its exercise, is a strong proof of a moral government. 

90. (4) Virtue is here rewarded by men, and vice punished, 

because God has given us a moral nature, and great 
influence on each other’s happiness. 

91. (5) It is confessed, that happiness and misery are not 

always distributed according to merit and demerit, but 
frequently by way of discipline. 

92. (6) God, then, has declared himself to be on the side of 

virtue, and against vice, in the general administration 
of the world, and he who falls in with this administra¬ 
tion is rewarded by a peculiar pleasure. 

93. V. Vice and virtue tend to produce more misery and happiness 

than they actually do produce, and thus afford a proof, that 
the moral government of God is going on to a state of per¬ 
fection. 

93. (1) Virtue tends, for example, to procure superiority and a 

growth of power, though it may not acquire all that it 
aims at. 

95. (2) Several respects in which virtue has the advantage over 

vice in society. 

95. (3) So, we have reason to conclude, the invisible world 

may be either analogous to the one we see; or it may 
form the conclusion of the present scheme, and be 
carried on according to the same general principles. 

98. (4) But, returning to the earth, a nation of perfectly good 

men, governed by absolutely wise laws, would hold avast 
advantage over other nations, and might become univer¬ 
sal in its dominion—which shows the natural superior¬ 
ity of virtue, and, consequently, a moral government. 


ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. 9 

Page. 

100. (5) If any one should think these small considerations, 

what would be thought if vice were seen to have the 
above advantages! 

100. (6) Should it be objected, that, notwithstanding these 

natural tendencies of virtue, it may never gain the 
ascendency, the objection may be met by several prom¬ 
inent considerations: 

101. 1. The Author of nature is known to be on the side 

of virtue. 

101. 2. Should the divine Being, in the next life, actually 

reward and punish virtue and vice, as such, that dis¬ 
tributive justice will not differ in kind, but only in 
degree, from what we now witness. 

102. 3. We have reason to believe, that, as the natural 

course of all things is to increase, so the rewards 
and punishments set opposite to virtue and vice, in 
this world, may, in the next, be found more perfect 
both in degree and kind. 

102. 4. There is sufficient ground to think so from the good 

and bad tendencies of virtue and vice, their tenden¬ 
cies being essential and founded in the nature of 
things, whereas their hinderances are only artificial. 

103. (7) The notion, then, of a moral scheme of government, 

much more perfect than what is here seen, is not a fic¬ 
titious, but a natural and rational notion, derived from 
the visible constitution and course of things. 


CHAPTER IV. 

OF A STATE OF PROBATION, AS IMPLYING TRIAL, DIFFICULTIES, AND 

DANGER. 

105. (1) It is a doctrine of religion, that, in this life, we are in a 
state of probation, having scope for both good and bad 
actions, for which we are to be held accountable hereafter. 

105. (2) The parallel to this moral probation is seen in the natural 

probation under which we are now living. 

106. (3) We are to consider what constitutes these probations. 

107. (4) That which constitutes this state of trial must be some¬ 

thing, either in our nature, or in our circumstances. 

108. (5) There is a close analogy between our conduct under the 

natural and under the moral probation. 


10 


ANALYSIS OF BUTLEIt’g ANALOGY. 


Page. 

109. (6) The analogy is not only close but complete. 

109. (7) There is a perfect analogy, also, in the influences exerted 

Upon us by others under these two probations. 

110. (8) In both these probations, we have common difficulties, 

arising from our rank in the scale of creation. 

111. (9) This state of moral trial, or probation, is, therefore, ren¬ 

dered credible, by its being consistent with the general con¬ 
duct of Providence toward us, in every thing within the 
compass of our knowledge. 

112. (10) This continued analogy between the natural and the moral 

government of God answers all objections, drawn from 
Divine benevolence, against this state of moral probation; 
for, if probation is allowable in the one, it may be equally 
allowable in the other. 


CHAPTER Y. 

OF A STATE OF PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR MORAL DISCIPLINE AND 
IMPROVEMENT. 

113. (1) The known end why we are placed in this state of proba¬ 

tion, pressed by temptations and trials, is, that we may 
work out for ourselves the requisite qualifications for a 
future state of security and happiness. 

(2) The early part of our present life, considered as an intro¬ 
ductory education for the future, is evidently analogous to 
this trial under which we live in reference to the next state 
of being. 

114. I. In the next state of existence, as in this, there must be a 

correspondence between our capacities and our condition, 
or we could enjoy no happiness. 

115. II. We find, also, by experience and observation, that men, as 

well as other creatures, can be qualified for certain condi¬ 
tions, for which they were once entirely unqualified. 

119. III. Without the formation of certain characters, it is evident, 
men, in this life, could not fulfill the end for which they 
are created. 

122. IV. Now, taking into account God’s moral government, and 
that the character of virtue and piety is necessary for hap¬ 
piness in a future state, we can clearly see in what respects 
the present life may be a preparation for it. 


ANALYSIS OF BUTLEr’s ANALOGY. 


11 


CHAPTER VI. 

OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, CONSIDERED AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 
Page. 

137. (1) Propriety of examining the doctrine of necessity. 

137. (2) We should know, whether the supposed necessity, existing 

in nature, is reconcilable with the natural government 
of God, before we pronounce it irreconcilable with his 
moral government; and if we find no fatality or foreordina¬ 
tion which excludes free deliberation and choice in our 
natural relations, we may not expect to find any thing of 
this kind to hinder or limit our freewill in respect to our 
moral conduct. 

138. (3) Though God is said to exist by a kind of necessity, it 

cannot be said that all othfer things exist in the same man¬ 
ner. 

139. (4) Necessity as much demands a necessary agent, as freedom 

demands a free agent, to be the former of the world, and 
proves nothing against the intelligence and design manifest¬ 
ed in creation. It supposes, then, an intelligent Designer, 
who acts from choice, that is, acts freely, and virtually 
destroys the idea of necessity. In other words, the doc¬ 
trine of necessity, or fatality, or fixed foreordination, is 
self-destructive. 

140. (5) But, if the doctrine of a supposed necessity does not destroy 

the proof of there being an intelligent and free natural 
Governor of the world, we are prepared to believe it may 
not exclude the idea of a free and intelligent moral Gov¬ 
ernor of it. 

140. (6) The doctrine of necessity, or of fixed foreordination, when 
applied to the conduct of this life, becomes a dangerous 
absurdity, leading us into summary mistakes and misery; 
from which we have a right to conclude, that, applied to 
our conduct in reference to a future state of being, it will 
not be less fallacious. 

143. (7) The doctrine of necessity proved to be untrue, because it 
cannot be reasonably applied to the practice of the present 
life. 

143. (8) If the supposed idea of necessity does not destroy the free¬ 

dom of human actions, so it may not destroy it in the 
Creator and moral Governor of the universe. 

144. (9) Nor does the supposed necessity destroy the proof of 


12 


ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. 


Page. 

religion. If, in the present life, notwithstanding foreordi¬ 
nation, or fate, our condition is known to be, in general, 
the consequence of our conduct, it may be equally so, so 
far as necessity hinders, in reference to our future state. 

145. (10) But as necessity is the basis of all infidelity, it is expedient 
to show that the obligations of religion are in no way 
affected by it. 

145. (11) The proof, from final causes, of an intelligent Author of 

nature, is not affected by this notion of necessity, granting 
this necessity a thing possible in itself, or reconcilable with 
the constitution of things. The existence of a moral sense 
proves, that there is a distinction between wrong and right, 
and that there is a rule of life, by which we must govern 
our conduct, or be self-condemned. But this moral faculty 
is the gift of God, and must be regarded as an expression 
of his judgment, so far as it goes, of right and wrong. 

146. (12) We have, then, the utmost reason to conclude, that God 

will certainly punish and reward us according to the guilt 
or innocence of our life, as they are made known to us 
from the discernment of this moral faculty. 

148. (13) But the external evidence of the general scheme of relig¬ 
ion, here insisted on, is worthy of consideration; and the 
more so, because it is not at all affected by this notion of 
necessity. It has been professed by a great part of the 
human family from the beginning of authentic history, 
and tradition carries it back even to the first ages; from 
which we are naturally led to conclude, either that it lies 
stamped upon the very frame-work of nature, and so comes 
naturally, and easily, and universally into the human mind, 
or that it was given at the first by revelation. 

150. (14) We ought, however, to rest with due caution, not only on 
the deductions of human reason, a faculty so liable to be 
perverted, but, also, on this moral sense, equally capable of 
being depraved, prejudiced, or neglected. 

150. (15) If the objector still insists, that, without answering the 
above arguments, it is enough to deny the consistency 
between a state of trial, which implies freedom, and the 
doctrine of necessity, which precludes such a state, it will 
be a sufficient reply to say, that if the two things are 
irreconcilable, then the doctrine of necessity must fall, 
since nothing is more a matter of fact and observation, 


ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. 


13 


Page. 

than the probatory state of man, and the freedom of will 
on which it is plainly founded. 

152. (16) The analogy of nature, therefore, shows us, that the opin¬ 
ion of necessity, as applicable to the present life, is a false 
opinion; but which, if it does not destroy the proof of 
natural religion, certainly makes no alteration in the proof 
of that which is revealed. 

152. (17) But, finally, the opinion of necessity, or fatality, is destruc¬ 
tive of all religion, first, because atheistical men, by this 
notion, set aside all religion, and encourage themselves in 
vice; and, secondly, because it is a contradiction of the 
whole constitution of nature, and of all personal con¬ 
sciousness of moral obligation, and thus overturns every 
thing. However, if this notion of necessity, supposing it 
to be well-founded, is consistent with the present constitu¬ 
tion of things, as atheists assert, it must be equally so with 
that scheme of religion revealed to us, and based on the 
moral government of God, and the essential freedom of the 
human mind. 


CHAPTER VII. 

OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME, OR CONSTI¬ 
TUTION, IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 

154. (1) Objections may be made against the wisdom, equity, and 

goodness of the moral government of God, as set forth by 
revealed religion, which analogy may not be able to meet 
directly. Nor is it called to defend the scheme of religion, 
but to show it to be a matter of fact, the proofs of which 
are so clear in nature Yet analogy can suggest answers 
which may be made to the objections offered. 

154 (2) It is, for example, easy to see from the analogy of nature, 
that the moral government of God, considered as a scheme 
of universal law and order, must be beyond our perfect 
comprehension, so that we are unable to decide peremptorily 
on its wisdom, equity, and goodness. Besides, from anal- 
ogy we can show these objections to be of but little conse¬ 
quence. 

155. I. The natural universe, so vast and complex, is entirely be¬ 

yond the comprehension of man, from the analogy of which 

2 


14 


ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. 


Page. 

we are allowed to infer, that the moral world, covering 
all time, and including all intelligent moral beings, is 
equally incomprehensible. Nor does any man pretend to 
deny this fact in the ordinary affairs of life, but only when 
he argues against religion. 

159. II. From certain particular analogies, we may learn how little 

weight is to be given to these objections: 

1. We find, by experience, that some very desirable ends 
are brought about only by the most undesirable of 
means; and, in the same manner, it may be supposed, 
the apparent ills of the present life are conducive to 
good results in a future state. 

160. 2. The world is governed by general laws, with which it 

might not be either benevolent or wise to interfere; and, 
if these general laws permit some irregularities to exist, 
they may, nevertheless, be productive of more good than 
evil in the end. 

162. But it may be objected, that this argument from igno¬ 

rance would apply equally against the proofs of religion, 
and that we must reason only from what we know. To 
this it may be replied, 

162. 1. That this objection would be good if our ignorance 

were total, but not if only partial, as it is known to be. 

163. 2. But were this objection valid, a sense of moral obli¬ 

gation would still arise from our own minds. 

163. 3. The particular analogies, heretofore presented, de¬ 

monstrate the fallacy of these objections against 
religion; for, could we see the whole plan of God’s 
government, these apparent discrepances might ap¬ 
pear to be only consistent parts of it. 

164. Lastly. We are undeniably incompetent judges of the pres¬ 

ent scheme of things—much more of that which 
covers the entire scope of the world to come. 

conclusion. 

165. (1) Recapitulation. 

169. (2) Practical application of the subject. 


ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. 


15 


PART II. 

OF REVEALED RELIGION. 

CHAPTER I. 

OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. 

Page. 

173. Introductory observations, going to show, that, though natu¬ 
ral religion is the foundation and principal part of Chris¬ 
tianity, it is not, in any sense, the whole of it. 

175. I. Christianity is, 

(1) A republication of natural religion. 

176. (2) An authoritative republication of it. 

176. (3) There can be no objection, practically considered, 

against the miracles wrought to attest the authenticity 
of revelation. 

177. (4) Shown by a pertinent example. 

177. (5) Life and immortality brought to light by the Gospel, 

and the doctrine of future rewards and punishments 
established. 

177. (6) The Church of Christ intended to perpetuate this 

work of Christianity to all ages. 

179. (7) The benefit thus derived to natural religion very ob¬ 

vious and important. 

179. (8) The objection, that Christianity has been corrupted, 

of no value; for the ill effects of Christianity are not 
natural fruits, but perversions of it. 

180. (9) The importance of Christianity seen from these con¬ 

siderations. 

181. II. Christianity is a revelation of a system of facts and pre¬ 

cepts beyond the reach of our reasoning and reflecting 
powers. 

182. (1) Religion, both internal and external, founded on reve¬ 

lation, and enforced by reason. 

183. (2) The obligation to reverence the Son of God, when his 

relations have been revealed, as reasonable and as much 
moral as charity to mankind, or any other virtue found¬ 
ed on relations made known by reason itself. 

184. (3) No one can say what may follow a disregard of this 

obligation in the future life. 

184. (4) A renewal of the heart, by the agency of the Holy 

Spirit, a rational inference from our revealed relations to 
another life, and confirmed by the analogy of this world. 


ANALYSIS OF BUTLEr’s ANALOGY. 


16 


Page. 

185. 

185. 

186. 

187. 

187. 

188. 
188. 
190. 

190. 


(5) Presumptuous, then, to treat religion as a light matter. 

But to prevent mistake, the two following deductions 

are added: 

1. Respecting the distinction between positive and 
moral precepts. 

2. From this distinction is shown the reason of God’s 
preference for what is moral over what is merely 
positive. 

(1) Care to be exercised in comparing them. 

(2) Of two conflicting precepts, the one moral, the 
other positive, we are to obey the former. 

(3) Moral precepts are to be preferred, because writ¬ 
ten upon our hearts. 

(4) No great necessity, after all, for the determina¬ 
tion of such questions. 

(5) We are under no less obligation to obey positive 
precepts, because they yield, in importance, to 
moral. 

(6) Every consideration enforces the duty of search¬ 
ing the Scriptures to see what its doctrines are, 
rather than to pronounce, from reason or na¬ 
ture, what they should be. 


CHAPTER II. 

OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST A REVELATION CONSIDERED AS 

MIRACULOUS. 

The subject proposed, and the presumption against a revela¬ 
tion stated. But the answer to it is very easy: 

192. I. Analogy raises no objection against Christianity, either as 

a scheme not discoverable by reason, or as a scheme op¬ 
posed to it; for, 

193. 1. From the vast extent of God’s dominion, there must be 

some things beyond our comprehension, and the Chris¬ 
tian scheme may be one of them. 

193. 2. If, in the natural world, we all the while see one thing 

differing very greatly from another, it is not incredible 
that there should be some difference between things 
natural and things spiritual. 

194. II. There is no presumption, from analogy, against some 

things now called miraculous. 


ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. 


17 


Page. 

196. III. But, it is again objected, that miracles are incredible after 
the settlement and during the continuance of a course 
of nature. This objection is invalid, because, first, we do 
not know the analogy between our world and those around 
us; secondly, leaving out the consideration of religion, we 
are so ignorant of the character and condition of our own 
world, that no inferences, against miracles, can be made 
from our partial knowledge of it; lastly, miracles must not 
be confounded with other common events, but with the 
extraordinary phenomena of nature. 

198. Concluding remark. 


CHAPTER III. 

OF OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING WHAT WERE TO BE EXPECTED IN A 
REVELATION, AND THE CREDIBILITY FROM ANALOGY, THAT IT MUST 
CONTAIN THINGS APPEARING LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 

199. (1) Numerous small objections, not to the evidence, but to the 

scheme of Christianity, taken as a whole, recapitulated. 

200. (2) Now, if, as is clear, we should not have supposed, before 

experience, that nature would be precisely what it is; so 
equally, revelation may properly declare some things, 
against which we may raise objections, as being different 
from what might have been expected. 

202. (3) These observations, respecting the whole of Christianity, 

are applicable to inspiration in particular. 

203. (4) It is said, that an unwritten revelation would not have 

answered God’s purpose; but that depends on the kind 
of purpose he had in view—a thing, possibly, beyond our 
scope. 

203. (5) But, if we could not have told, beforehand, what would be 

most suitable for a revelation to make known, neither are 
we any better able to decide, after the revelation has been 
made. 

204. (6) There are some ways of arguing, which, though applicable 

to other things, are not admissible in respect to some parts 
of Scripture. 

205. (7) “But is it not self-evident, that internal improbabilities 

of all kinds weaken external probable proof?” Of course, 
but in revelation, we cannot say what would be probabili¬ 
ties, or improbabilities. 

2* 


18 


ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. 


Page. 

205. (8) These very objections, considering the analogy between 
natural and revealed religion, were to have been expected; 
for they are precisely the same as those raised against the 
course of nature. 

207. (9) By applying this principle to a particular instance, such as 

the miraculous powers exercised by individual apostles at 
the first, it will be more clearly seen how they may apply 
to others of the same kind. 

208. (10) There is a great resemblance between the light of nature 

and of revelation, in the manner of our acquiring knowl¬ 
edge by them. 

209. (11) The slight value of natural knowledge no objection to the 

above view of the subject. 

210. (12) The late appearance and partial dissemination of revelation 

no objection, since the same may be brought against many 
of the most valuable instructions of nature. 

211. (13) It cannot be inferred, from these arguments, that reason 

is not the judge of revelation in some respects; for, what¬ 
ever should be said, the same could be equally alledged 
against nature. 

213. (14) We are not, then, to consider what objections may be 

brought against the scheme, but only what can be said 
against the morality of revelation. 

214. (15) Finally, if a revelation have a more direct tendency to the 

promotion of virtue than any scheme of mere enthusiasm 
or policy, this is a high presumption of its truth. 


CHAPTER IV. 

OF CHRISTIANITY, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME, OR CONSTITUTION, IM¬ 
PERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 

The same objections, alledged against the constitution of nature, 
are preferred also against the scheme of Christianity, and are 
to be answered just as they were answered. 

216. I. Christianity proved to be a scheme entirely beyond our 
comprehension. 

218. II. As in nature, so in Christianity, means are made use of to 
accomplish ends. 

218. III. The Christian dispensation has been always carried on by 
general laws. 

220. It is here objected against the entire scheme of Christianity, 


ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. 


19 


Page. 

that it supposes God was reduced to the necessity of using 
means to the accomplishment of certain ends. But the ob¬ 
jection is fully met by the analogy of nature; for, in the 
course of nature, we behold God employing the most intri¬ 
cate system of means in every thing performed. 


CHAPTER V. 

OF THE PARTICULAR SYSTEM OF CHRISTIANITY, THE APPOINTMENT OF A 
MEDIATOR, AND THE REDEMPTION OF THE WORLD BY HIM. 

Nothing in Christianity has been more objected to than the 
mediation of Christ, though nothing is less liable to objection. 

223. I. The entire visible government of the world is carried on 
by a system of mediation. 

223. II. The moral world is under the moral government of God, 
by which ends are accomplished by the intervention, or 
mediation, of moral means. 

225. III. There seems to have been made, in nature, a provision, 
that, by certain means, the natural consequences of evil 
can be avoided; and, by analogy, we should be led to 
expect a similar provision in God’s moral government, or 
the scheme of Christianity. 

227. IV. But, in the use of these natural remedies, we are con¬ 
stantly impelled, by our own ignorance or weakness, to 
call in the aid of others; so, 

229. V. In the Christian system, we not only have reason to ex¬ 
pect, but actually find, the proffered services of a Mediator. 

232. VI. The manner of this mediation is fully and clearly set 
forth in Scripture. 

The office of Christ, as mediator, treated of under three 
heads: 

235. 1. He was God’s prophet, coming into the world to de¬ 

clare his will; 

2. He established a “kingdom not of this world”—a 
Church, which is to be the memorial and depository 
of religion for ever; 

3. He offered himself as a propitiatory sacrifice for the 
sins of the world; though it is difficult, perhaps im¬ 
possible, to tell precisely how it is efficacious. 

237. VII. From our manifold ignorance we are incompetent judges 


20 


ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. 

Page. 

of the question, whether a Mediator was necessary to ob¬ 
tain for us pardon, happiness, and heaven. 

Lastly, We have no reason to expect to be as well informed by 
revelation respecting the Divine conduct, as concerning 
our own duty. 


CHAPTER VI. 

OF THE WANT OF UNIVERSALITY IN REVELATION, AND OF THE SUP¬ 
POSED DEFICIENCY IN THE PROOF OF IT. 

243. (1) It is objected against Christianity, that it comes to us on 

doubtful evidence, and that it has not been given to all 
men equally. 

(2) There is no force in either of these objections, because, 
first, we all enjoy blessings not given in their highest 
degree, and many have favors not granted to all others. 

(3) We daily act upon doubtful evidence in all the common 
concerns of life. 

244. (4) If neither the Jewish nor the Christian revelation has ever 

been universal, and if both have had different degrees of 
evidence, in different ages and to different persons, this 
variety is easily paralleled from the daily course of Provi¬ 
dence. 

247. (5) Nor is there any thing shocking in this arrangement, since 

every one is to be judged by the light he has had given him. 

248. (6) It was, undoubtedly, by a wise and good principle, common 

to both the natural and moral governments of God, that 
this variety of disposition was permitted. 

248. (7) A system, like that of the present world, requires great va¬ 

riety. But the foregoing positions may be strengthened by 
a few practical reflections: 

249. 1. The doubtfulness of some things in the moral govern¬ 

ment of God may be a part of the trial of the present 
state. 

250. 2. The very doubtfulness of religion puts us under a gen¬ 

eral state of moral probation. 

253. 3. This state of doubt in which some men are placed, 

should be no more a matter of complaint, than the state 
of temptation into which others are thrown by Provi¬ 
dence. 


ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. 


21 


Page. 

255. (8) Nor is there any impropriety in supposing, that the specu¬ 

lative difficulties, in which the evidences of Christianity 
are involved, may constitute the principal part of some 
men’s trial. 

256. (9) But dissatisfaction with the evidences of religion may be, 

after all, the fault of the dissatisfied person; for, 

256. (10) They who do not examine them, or look only at difficulties, 
or only make sport over religion altogether, cannot expect 
ever to see the evidences on which it is founded. 

258. (11) Yet, the general proof of natural and revealed religion lies 

on a level with the capacities of common men. 

259. (12) A prince, or a common master, in sending directions to a 

servant, if he wishes to test the motives of that servant’s 
conduct, might be expected to give his directions precisely 
as God, the great Master, has given them to us in Scripture. 

260. (13) That we are under a moral government implies that we 

are also in a state of probation; and, consequently, there is 
no difficulty in supposing our probation to be exactly what 
it is, notwithstanding all objections. 

261. (14) Some respectable men, it may be, will deem these consider¬ 

ations singular; but all such are requested to consider, 
whether their sentiments are derived from a careful ex¬ 
amination of the subject, or taken up without sufficient 
study and reflection. 


CHAPTER VII. 

OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIANITY. 

263. (1) Having, in the foregoing chapters, considered the objec¬ 
tions to Christianity, both general and particular, we now 
look into the evidences for it, in order to see how far they 
are supported by the analogy of nature. 

263. (2) There are two kinds of evidence, first, that of miracles 

and prophecy; and, secondly, that of the general import 
of all the circumstances attending revelation from the be¬ 
ginning. 

264. First, The direct proof of Christianity from miracles and 

prophecy, including the objections raised against them. 

264. I. The following considerations, relating to the miracles, 
seem to possess great weight. 


ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. 


1. The Bible furnishes the same historical evidence, that 
miracles were wrought by Moses, by the prophets, and 
by Jesus and his apostles, as of the common civil his¬ 
tory of the times of Moses, of the kings of Israel, or of 
the closing period of Jewish history; nor are we to sup¬ 
pose the Bible wanting in authenticity, until it is clearly 
shown to be otherwise than what it professes. 

2. The testimony of St. Paul, in his epistles, is to be con¬ 
sidered by itself, and possesses great weight. 

3. It is acknowledged, that Christianity at first offered itself 
for belief, in the very age when it was produced, on the 
evidence of miracles then claimed to be wrought; and, 
on this claim, it was received by multitudes of the ablest 
minds then in the world, and in the face of the severest 
persecutions. 

(1) It lies, now, upon unbelievers to show, why this 
evidence is not to be admitted; but that they may 
have no excuse, their main objections are here pro¬ 
duced and answered. 

(2) They assert, for example, that, in other ages, en¬ 
thusiastic people have exposed themselves to perse¬ 
cution for the most idle follies in the world; but, ad¬ 
mitting this objection, it does not deny, that the 
early Christians believed in the miracles as historic 
facts. 

(3) But enthusiasm, it is said, greatly weakens the evi¬ 
dence of testimony even for facts, in matters relating 
to religion; though this objection is of no force when 
applied to great numbers of persons of the highest 
respectability, testifying concerning facts seen and 
witnessed by their own eyes, and facts shown to be 
credible in themselves. 

(4) If it wa3 not pure enthusiasm, it might have been 
enthusiasm mixed with knavery in the life of the 
early witnesses to Christianity; but this objection, 
though valid in many cases, is not considered good 
against the natural and general honesty of human 
testimony, nor can it apply to the apostles, till they 
are proved to have been enthusiasts and knaves by 
good authority. 

(5) But the fact is, it is added, that mankind have been 


ANALYSIS OF BUTLEr’s ANALOGY. 23 

often deluded by pretended miracles; and yet not 
oftener than by many other pretenses. 

(6) It is said, also, that many pretended miracles, ap¬ 
parently somewhat attested by historical evidence, 
have turned out to be fabulous; but this proves noth¬ 
ing against the miracles related in the Bible. 

(7) The general honesty, therefore, of human testimony 
remains, notwithstanding these objections, and, con¬ 
sequently, the testimony of the apostles. 

(8) The great importance of Christianity, also, and the 
weighty obligations for veracity it imposes on its 
followers, are both strong proofs of the carefulness 
and honesty of the first witnesses. 

(9) The general conclusion, to be admitted by all reason¬ 
able skeptics, is, that the evidence for miracles is at 
least considerable, if not satisfactory, which, as there 
is no proof offered to rebut it, and as Christianity 
is a system in itself entirely credible, must be regard¬ 
ed as sufficient. 

276. II. The evidence* from prophecy is now to be compared with 
the general analogy of nature, so far as evidence of a simi¬ 
lar character is found in it. 

276. 1. The obscurity of one part of a prophecy does not at all 

invalidate the proof, that another part, clearly under¬ 
stood, has been fulfilled. 

277. 2. A long train of prophecies, seen to be plainly applicable 

to known events, is a strong proof, that they were 
intended to foretell them. 

278. 3. Admitting, even, that the prophets may have had in 

their thoughts events not now attributed to their words 
by Christians, or that there may have been events, 
included under their language, not thought of by them¬ 
selves, there would, even then, be no proof against the 
actual fulfillment of prophecies, as maintained by the 
friends of revelation. Nor is it to any purpose, that 
some persons endeavor to confine the import of the 
prophecies to the ages when they were written, or to 
ages previous to them; though there are many, who 
have neither modesty nor integrity enough to be gov¬ 
erned by evidence of this nature. 

282. Secondly, An account is to be given of the general argument 


Page. 

273. 

274. 

275. 

275. 


24 


ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’s ANALOGY. 


Page. 

283. 

283. 

285. 

286. 

288. 
289. • 


290. 

291. 

292. 


for the truth of Christianity, as collected from a great va¬ 
riety of particulars; for this is precisely the course pur¬ 
sued in ordinary matters. 

(1) The thing asserted is, that God has revealed to us 
natural religion, and, in that revelation, has given us 
an account of a particular dispensation of Providence, 
and an institution of religion founded on it, entirely 
above the reach of reason. 

(2) This revelation may be regarded as a history of the 
world from the beginning to the end of it. 

(3) It, therefore, offers a wide field for skeptical criticism, 
which, so far from invalidating the proof of revelation, 
has thus far only strengthened and confirmed it. 

(4) It contains a history of the whole human family, and 
of one chosen nation in particular, foretelling the 
coming of a Messiah, who, expected a long time be¬ 
fore his appearance, though rejected when he did come, 
spent his life in the manner foretold in setting up a 
religion sanctioned by miracles, to be propagated to 
the end of time by persons commissioned and endowed 
for this service. 

(5) Should a person, ignorant entirely of the claims of 
Scripture, be told, 

(6) In the first place, that the establishment of natural 
religion is chiefly owing to this revelation; that many 
whole nations acknowledge the authority of it; and 
of what immense importance is religion to our present 
and future well-being; the person, so informed, would 
naturally declare, that such a revelation is worthy the 
most careful consideration. 

(7) Let this person be informed, in the second place, 
of the antiquity of the first part of this revela¬ 
tion, and of its chronological agreement with well- 
knownhistory. 

(8) Let him next be told the remarkable history of the 
Jewish nation; 

(9) Let him be informed of the actual appearing of a 
person, claiming to be the foretold Messiah, at the 
precise time when he was universally expected, who, 
by miracles, established his credit with many witnesses, 
both Jews and Gentiles, at first prejudiced against 


ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. 


25 


Page. 

him, until his doctrines finally became, in spite of op¬ 
position, the religion of the world. 

293. (10) The standing miracle of the continued dispersion of 

the Jews, and of their distinctness as a people, agree¬ 
ing so perfectly with the prophecies respecting them, 
cannot be answered. 

294. (11) The fulfillment of certain known prophecies confirms 

our confidence, that all of them will be eventually 
fulfilled. 

295. (12) The argument from fulfilled prophecy, though requir¬ 

ing considerable historical learning to comprehend it, 
is really conclusive. 

295. (13) A person, by comparing the known prophecies of 

Scripture with the recorded events of history, corres¬ 
ponding to these prophecies, would be naturally in¬ 
clined to take the one as foretelling the other. 

296. (14) All these particulars require separate and critical ex¬ 

amination; and, when carefully studied, must be con¬ 
fessed to have great weight in them. 

297. (15) The truth of Christianity, like truth in ordinary mat¬ 

ters, is to be determined by comparing all the points 
for and against it; and the duty of making this com¬ 
parison is enjoined on every reasonable person. 

299. (16) It is, nevertheless, easy to talk flippantly against 

Christianity, and difficult to sum up the vast amount 
of evidence in its favor. 

299. (17) The positive evidence for Christianity is such, that, 

though it may seem to be lessened, it cannot be de¬ 
stroyed by any sort of opposition. 

CHAPTER VIII. 

OF THE OBJECTIONS WHICH MAY BE MADE AGAINST ARGUING FROM THE 
ANALOGY OF NATURE TO RELIGION. 

300. (1) If all persons, who make objections, would take the pains 

to be informed respecting what they write against, the 
occasion of this chapter would be, in part, superseded; 
but, as it is, the following particulars require some notice: 
300. (2) “It is a very unsatisfactory way,” says the objector, “to 
solve difficulties in revelation, by pointing out similar ones 
in nature; to show the obligations of religion by proving 
3 


26 ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. 

Page. 

that we have as little reason for our worldly pursuits; to 
vindicate the goodness and justice of the Author of nature 
by showing that similar objections lie against natural and 
revealed religion—a mode of answering objections in no 
way satisfactory in behalf of a religion so revolutionary 
in its bearings on all the affairs and pleasures of the present 
life.” 

301. (3) This way of speaking, though plausible, is owing to partial 
views, and may be answered in the following manner: 

301. 1. It is a sufficient answer to the objections raised against 

revealed religion, to show that the very things objected to 
are found also in the known constitution and course of 
nature; for if God can permit the things objected to in 
his natural government, there is no absurdity in the 
belief of a moral government permitting the very same 
difficulties, as there can be no contradiction in his con¬ 
duct. 

2. Religion is a practical thing, and, if it is shown to lie 
under the same principles by which ordinary affairs of 
life are governed, the objection is of no force, nor is the 
doubtfulness of its proof less than that on which our 
common everyday conduct is based. 

304. 3. Nor is it the business of this treatise to vindicate the gov¬ 

ernment of God, but to show what it is, and thus ex¬ 
plain the obligations under which we live, though sev¬ 
eral considerations are added, by which it is entirely de¬ 
fended against skeptical assaults. 

306. 4. It is conceded, that the treatise is not entirely conclusive 

or satisfactory; but it is enough so to answer the end for 
which it is intended; for it shows the evidence of relig¬ 
ion to be sufficient to prove and discipline the virtue 
which it presupposes and wishes to encourage. 

308. 5. It is no objection to the evidence of religion, that men 

will not be likely to yield to it in their conduct, for we 
see them daily living against their best judgment in 
other matters. 

309. (1) It should be observed, also, that the argument of 

this treatise has been carried on from the principles of 
others, and contains only that evidence for religion 
left after all objections are met and answered. It 
has been conducted, also, under the disability of 


ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. 27 

Page. 

admitting the doctrine of necessity, and of neglect¬ 
ing the helps arising from the doctrine of liberty, 
and moral fitness, from the latter of which great 
advantages might have been derived. 

311. (2) The result of the whole treatise will be, to clear the 

minds of believers of numerous objections raised 
against the scheme of Christianity, and to convince 
many unbelievers of the truth of it, who may 
never have been so convinced before. 

312. (3) And, finally, though some may ridicule the argument 

of analogy as a whole, yet it must be considered, by 
all candid minds, and especially persons dissatis¬ 
fied with abstract reasoning, to have some force. 

CONCLUSION. 

313. (1) It would seem incredible, that, in Christian nations, Chris¬ 

tianity should be so generally neglected; for the proof of 
it is so readily seen, at least of its principal doctrines, and 
it has been so long and so sedulously inculcated. Nor do 
skeptics, in general, pretend, that there is no weight in the 
evidence for religion, but reject it as being a thing clearly 
incredible in spite of all evidence, not having been suffi¬ 
ciently attentive to it to know what amount of force is in it. 

315. (2) To such persons, in particular, this treatise is adapted, as 
is shown by a recapitulation of the propositions estab¬ 
lished in the course of the argument. 

320. (3) Concluding remarks, by which it is clearly shown, that 
those men, who can evade the force of arguments so prob¬ 
able for the truth of Christianity, undoubtedly possess dis¬ 
positions to evil, which would cause them to reject it, were 
it based on the most absolute demonstration. 


TWO BRIEF DISSERTATIONS. 

DISSERTATION I. 

OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 

323. (1) Strange perplexities have been raised respecting the mean¬ 
ing of identity, as applied to the future state. 

323. (2) Yet there is no difficulty in ascertaining the idea of identity. 

324. (3) Consciousness, by which we discover ourselves, from time 


28 


ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. 


Page. 

to time, to be the same persons, by no means constitutes 
that identity. 

324. (4) Though consciousness is necessary to our personality, it is 
not at all necessary to our identity. 

324. (5) Identity, as applied to vegetables, say a tree, is totally dif¬ 

ferent from the same term as applied to persons. 

325. (6) Mr. Locke, in defining a person to be a thinking intelli¬ 

gent being , and personal identity as the sameness of a rational 
being, has furnished the ground of a perfect answer to the 
objections against personal identity; for, though the acts 
of consciousness, by which we successively establish our 
identity, are different acts, yet they are all mentally per¬ 
ceived to refer to one and the same person. 

326. (7) Yet Mr. Locke’s observations on the subject are hasty, and 

seem to have proved unsatisfactory even to himself; and 
they have been pushed to a length still more extravagant 
by others, who, following Mr. Locke, assert, “ that person¬ 
ality is not a permanent but a transient thing, and con¬ 
sciousness itself is different at each successive step of life.” 
To this it is replied, 

328. 1. This position is repugnant to the common sense of 

mankind. 

328. 2. It is not an idea, but a being, of which this identity is 

predicated, and all being remains the same during its 
entire existence. 

329. 3. All men are conscious, that they are, at any given mo¬ 

ment, the same persons they were at any former period 
as far back as they can remember; this consciousness 
includes, either directly or indirectly, the substance of 
ourselves, whatever that substance may be; and it is 
idle to ask, at the end of such a demonstration, whether, 
after all, we may not be deceived by memory; for the 
same question may be raised upon every subject, and 
can be answered only by the help, one way or another, 
of the very suspected faculty itself. 

DISSERTATION II. 

OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 

331. (1) Mankind have a moral nature, on which virtue has its basis, 
and a faculty by which that virtue is approved in ourselves 


ANALYSIS OF BUTLEr’s ANALOGY. 


29 


Page. 

and others. Concerning this faculty, proved to exist by 
consciousness, by observation, by the daily exercise of it 
on both real and feigned objects, by language, by many 
written treatises, by our sense of gratitude, and by our 
distinguishing between injury, harm, and punishment, sev¬ 
eral things are to be distinctly noted: 

332. 1. The object of this faculty is actions, including active or 

motive principles. 

333. 2. Our perception of actions, as morally good or evil, 

implies in it a sense of them as of good or ill deserving. 
335. 3. This perception of vice and ill desert, arises from a 

comparison of actions with the nature and capacities 
of the agent. 

335. 4. It should be considered, whether we have more right to 

make ourselves miserable without reason, than to make 
others so. It is this consideration by which prudence is 
seen to be a virtue. 

337. 5. Benevolence, so great a part of virtue, is not the whole 

of it; and benevolence to one person, rather than, or 
more than to another, may be a virtue, and falsehood, 
violence and injustice, vice in us, independent of either 
the good or evil consequences respectively produced by 
them. 

339. ( 1) If, now, we are endowed with such a moral fac¬ 

ulty, the natural object of which is moral actions, 
moral government must consist in rendering us 
happy or unhappy, by rewarding or punishing us, 
according as we follow or abandon this rule of ac¬ 
tion recorded in our nature. 

339. (2) It is, then, a great error, though committed by 

many good men, to make virtue to consist merely in 
promoting the greatest amount of happiness in oth¬ 
ers, and vice in doing that which tends evidently to 
an overplus of evil. 

340. (3) Veracity, as a rule of life, means the use of the va¬ 

rious methods of communication with no intention 
to deceive. 


3* 










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THE 


LIFE OF BISHOP BUTLER. 

BY THE EDITOR. 


If the reader has pleasure in tracing the steps taken by 
a great mind, in rising from obscurity to fame the most 
exalted, he can not fail to enjoy that pleasure, in its highest 
degree, in reviewing the life of Bishop Butler. 

Joseph Butler was the son of Mr. Thomas Butler, a 
respectable shop-keeper of Wantage, England, and the 
youngest of eight children. He was born in the year 1692. 
Evincing, at an early age, a genius of a superior order, he 
was sent to study under the care of the Rev. Philip Barton, 
a clergyman of the Church of England, and afterward at 
an academy belonging to the Presbyterians at Tewksbury. 

At this school, young Butler is said to have made an ex¬ 
traordinary progress in the study of divinity. It was during 
his residence at this seminary, that he wrote the celebrated 
letters to Dr. Samuel Clarke, reviewing that great man’s 
work in demonstration of the being and attributes of God. 
The first letter is dated November 4, 1713, when its author 
was in the twenty-first year of his age, and at once excited 
Dr. Clarke’s unqualified admiration. The Doctor, then in 
the height of his own glory, replied to the young man’s 
strictures, and thus encouraged him to continue them. Four 
letters were successively written, which, manifesting the most 
uncommon penetration, were yet couched in such proper 
language, that they were immediately annexed to the great 
treatise itself, and that by its author, where they have ever 
since maintained their first reputation. This was a great 


32 


THE LIFE OF BISHOP BUTLER. 


achievement, certainly, for a boy of twenty, and gave the 
most striking evidence of future promise. 

While at school, he formed a lasting attachment to young 
Thomas Seeker, afterward the celebrated Archbishop of 
Canterbury, but then his fellow-student at Tewksbury, and a 
year younger than himself. They lived together like two 
brothers, reading, writing, and studying together, each 
regarding the other’s welfare dearer than his own. Seeker, 
having studied medicine in addition to his regular course, 
went to Paris with a view to his profession, where, meeting 
with Edward Talbot, son of the Bishop of Durham, he was 
prevailed upon by his new friend to abandon physic and 
devote himself to the Church. Passing over into England, 
he was soon after ordained by Bishop Talbot, received the 
degree of Doctor of Laws at Oxford, and accepted the 
living of St. James’, Westminster, offered him by his 
patron. During all this time, and through the whole 
course of his brilliant and successful career, he retained 
the strongest affection for his old class-mate, and served 
him on all occasions. It is difficult to say, whether Mr. 
Butler received or gave the greater honor by this connec¬ 
tion. They were both worthy of their distinction. 

Mr. Butler, unlike his fellow-student, had always intended 
to enter the ministry; but, like him, he was the son of a 
Dissenter. At a mature age, when the period of decision 
came, for his own satisfaction, he undertook to examine the 
doctrines and discipline of the Church to the bottom. With 
what ability a duty of this kind could be done by Joseph 
Butler, the reader will have, in the following treatise, a suf¬ 
ficient demonstration. After the most profound investiga¬ 
tion, he rejected Presbyterianism, and joined the Church of 
England. His father, naturally dissatisfied with the young 
man’s decision, called to his aid a number of dissenting 
ministers; but it was impossible, as might have been fore¬ 
seen, to move such a mind from its deliberate determinations. 


THE LIFE OF BISHOP BUTLER. 


33 


About this period, Joseph was removed, by consent of 
his father, to the University of Oxford, where he imme¬ 
diately took the highest rank in all the studies of his antic¬ 
ipated profession. 

Edward Talbot, the gentleman before mentioned as the 
patron of Mr. Seeker, must have taken great satisfaction in 
giving encouragement to merit. He was the man to whom, 
not only Seeker, but also Butler and Benson owed their 
preferments; but he himself lived and died contented with 
the small living of Hendred. On his very death-bed, as 
if he could not die without giving a fresh instance of his 
generosity and kindness, he remembered Mr. Butler, and 
recommended him to one of the richest settlements in Eng¬ 
land. 

The first preferment, to which Mr. Butler was appointed, 
was that of being preacher at the Rolls, where he produced, 
in the year 1726, at the age of thirty four, fifteen very cel¬ 
ebrated sermons. His next benefice was that of Haughton, 
which was followed, soon after, by that of Stanhope. The 
rectory of Haughton was given to him in 1722, and that of 
Stanhope, one of the best in all England, in 1725; so that, 
while preacher at the Rolls, he enjoyed no less than three 
appointments procured by his benefactors, Edward Talbot, 
Samuel Clarke, and Thomas Seeker. His friends, in fact, 
seem to have multiplied rapidly upon him, outstripping 
every thing but his merit. 

While preacher at the Rolls chapel, Mr. Butler is said to 
have divided his time between town and country; but, as 
rector of Stanhope, he spent seven years exclusively with 
his people. His time, as might be expected, was divided 
between his studies and. his duties as a pastor. Indeed, to 
such a mind as that of Butler, every thing is a study. Not 
an hour is spent in idleness. Every moment must con¬ 
tribute something to the one great work of his earthly mis¬ 


sion. 


34 


THE LIFE OF BISHOP BUTLER. 


But Joseph Butler was naturally possessed of a discon¬ 
solate disposition. He needed the exhilarating effect of 
social intercourse. He began to grow melancholy, and 
spent, it was thought, many hours in gloomy meditation. 
Here, again, the angel of his life, now the renowned 
Thomas Seeker, who had watched, esteemed, and admired 
him from the beginning, came to his relief. In conversa¬ 
tion, one day, with Queen Caroline, he made an honorable 
allusion to the name of Mr. Butler. The Queen replied, 
that she supposed him to be dead; but the eulogies of 
his friend assured her, that he not only lived, but lived 
in the heart of a good and great man. It was Arch¬ 
bishop Blackburn, however, and not Mr. Seeker, who made 
the famous reply to her majesty, so often quoted. The 
Queen, on a certain occasion, asked the Archbishop, if 
Mr. Butler were not dead? “No, madam,” responded 
the benevolent but witty prelate, “but he is buried.” 
The Queen comprehended the ingenious reproof, and be¬ 
came, at once, Mr. Butler’s patron. His friend, Dr. Tal¬ 
bot, was made Lord Chancellor, and, at the instance of 
Mr. Seeker, Butler became his chaplain. On his way to 
London, he spent a little time at Oxford, where he received 
the degree of Doctor of Laws. This occurred on the 8th 
of December, 1733, in the forty-first year of Mr. Butler’s 
age. 

But the year 1736 is one of the most memorable of his life. 
Having, in addition to his other honors, received the ap¬ 
pointment of Clerk of the Closet to Queen Caroline, he 
spent his time, excepting two hours a day devoted to her 
majesty, in patient study; and, as a fruit of his literary 
retirement, he soon presented to her a copy of his cele¬ 
brated Analogy of Religion. This great work was imme¬ 
diately hailed with a sort of triumph. It was glory enough 
for one man to be acknowledged as its author. 

Through the influence gained by this book, seconded by 


THE LIFE OF BISHOP BUTLER. 


85 


the joint recommendation of the Queen and the Lord 
Chancellor Talbot, he was at once raised to the See of 
Bristol, to which he was consecrated on the 3d of Decem¬ 
ber, 1738. To this honor, George II soon after added the 
deanery of St. Paul’s. Next, on the death of Dr. Egerton, 
Bishop of Hereford, he was appointed Clerk of the Closet 
to the King. Four years after this last event, namely, on 
the 16th of October, 1750, he was translated to the rich 
and powerful bishopric of Durham, in which high dignity 
he died. His death took place at Bath, on the 16th of 
June, 1752, when he was in the sixtieth year of his age. 
It need not be said, that such a man, so honored in life, was 
lamented in death by every friend of religion in the world. 

The intellectual powers of Bishop Butler were of the 
highest order, penetrating, profound, and comprehensive. 
In examining his works, especially the Analogy, the reader 
will be impressed, not with the extent of his researches, or 
the subtilty of his metaphysics, so much as the depth, the 
candor, and the comprehensiveness of his reasoning. He 
seems to see every use, which the most ingenious opposer 
might make of his expressions; and he everywhere guards 
his language with a caution indicative of his perfect mastery 
of his subject. Endowed with a truly wonderful insight 
into the philosophy of humanity, in its broadest significa¬ 
tion, he makes both the knowledge and the ignorance of 
mankind contribute equally, and with equal facility, to the 
progress and success of his great argument. His style is 
always close, correct, and expressive, though never light, 
easy, or beautiful. The Analogy, the greatest of his works, 
is a perfect chain of conclusive reasonings, every link of 
which is forged and fitted with a skill ever to be admired. 
His essays and sermons, though characterized by originality 
and strength, have received only a less amount of praise. 

The moral character of Bishop Butler is without a blem¬ 
ish. Though praised, admired, flattered, and promoted; 


THE LIFE OF BISHOP BUTLER. 


.16 

though the associate of every great man of his times, in¬ 
cluding statesmen, nobles, princes, and even his King and 
Queen; never did the voice of envy, even, say one word 
against a moral character so pure. 

His religious character, however, was once impugned. In 
his celebrated sermon on External Religion, he was thought 
to lean too far toward outward forms of piety, and thus to 
favor the suspected Papal cause. There was a story, also, 
much related about the time of his decease, of his having 
erected, in the manner of the Catholics, a crucifix in his 
private chapel, which roused the jealousy even of his 
friends. But Thomas Seeker, then the Archbishop of Can¬ 
terbury, the earliest, and latest, and truest, of all of Butler’s 
friends, stood forth before the public, defended him tri¬ 
umphantly against the charge, and wiped out the only blot 
ever cast upon the reputation of this illustrious man. 

The good Bishop was buried in the cathedral church of 
Bristol, a flat marble slab indicating the spot where he lies. 
A Latin epitaph, composed by Dr. Nathaniel Forster, is 
written on the stone. 

But the Bishop’s best monument is his immortal work, 
the Analogy of Religion, which must continue to be read, 
and studied, and admired to the very latest age. 


INTRODUCTION. 


Probable evidence is essentially distinguished from de¬ 
monstrative by this, that it admits of degrees, and of all 
variety of them, from the highest moral certainty, to the 
very lowest presumption. We cannot, indeed, say a thing 
is probably true upon one very slight presumption for it; 
because, as there may be probabilities on both sides of the 
question, there may be some against it; and though there 
be not, yet a slight presumption does not beget that degree 
of conviction, which is implied in saying a thing is probably 
true. But that the slightest possible presumption is of the 
nature of a probability, appears from hence, that such low 
presumption, often repeated, will amount even to moral cer¬ 
tainty. Thus, a man’s having observed the ebb and flow of 
the tide to-day, affords some sort of presumption, though 
the lowest imaginable, that it may happen again to-morrow; 
but the observation of this event for so many days, and 
months, and ages together, as it has been observed by 
mankind, gives us a full assurance that it will. 

That which chiefly constitutes probability , is expressed in 
the word likely; that is, like some truth,(l) or true event; 
like it, in itself, in its evidence, in some more or fewer of 
its circumstances. For when we determine a thing to be 
probably true, suppose that an event has or will come to 
pass, it is from the mind’s remarking in it a likeness to some 
other event, which we have observed has come to pass. 
And this observation forms, in numberless daily instances, a 
presumption, opinion, or full conviction, that such event has 
or will come to pass; according as the observation is, that 


(1) Verisimile. 
4 


87 


38 


INTRODUCTION. 


V 


the like event has sometimes, most commonly, or always, 
so far as our observation reaches, come to pass at like dis¬ 
tances of time, or place, or upon like occasions. Hence 
arises the belief, that a child, if it live twenty years, will 
grow up to the stature and strength of a man; that food 
will contribute to the preservation of its life, and the want 
of it for such a number of days be its certain destruction. 
So, likewise, the rule and measure of our hopes and fears 
concerning the success of our pursuits; our expectations 
that others will act so and so in such circumstances; and 
our judgment that such actions proceed from such prin¬ 
ciples; all these rely upon our having observed the like 
to what we hope, fear, expect, judge; I say, upon our 
having observed the like, either with respect to others or 
ourselves. And thus, whereas the prince,(l) who had 
always lived in a warm climate, naturally concluded, in the 
way of analogy, that there was no such thing as water’s 
becoming hard, because he had always observed it to be 
fluid and yielding, we, on the contrary, from analogy, con¬ 
clude, that there is no presumption at all against this; that 
it is supposable there may be frost in England any given 
day in January next; probable, that there will, on some 
day of the month; and that there is a moral certainty, 
that is, ground for an expectation, without any doubt of it, 
in some -part or other of the winter. 

Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but an im¬ 
perfect kind of information, and is to be considered as rela¬ 
tive only to beings of limited capacities. For nothing which 
is the possible object of knowledge, whether past, present, 
or future, can be probable to an infinite intelligence; since 
it cannot but be discerned absolutely as it is in itself cer¬ 
tainly true, or certainly false. But to us probability is the 
very guide of life. 

(1) The story is told by Mr. Locke in the chapter of Probability. 


INTRODUCTION. 


39 


From these things it follows, that in questions of difficulty, 
or such as are thought so, where more satisfactory evidence 
cannot be had, or is not seen, if the result of examination 
be, that there appears, upon the whole, any the lowest 
presumption on one side, and none on the other, or a greater 
presumption on one side, though in the lowest degree 
greater, this determines the question, even in matters of 
speculation; and, in matters of practice, will lay us under 
an absolute and formal obligation, in point of prudence and 
of interest, to act upon that presumption, or low probability, 
though it be so low as to leave the mind in very great 
doubt which is the truth. For surely a man is as really 
bound in prudence to do what upon the whole appears, ac¬ 
cording to the best of his judgment, to be for his happiness, 
as what he certainly knows to be so. Nay, further, in ques¬ 
tions of great consequence, a reasonable man will think it 
concerns him to remark lower probabilities and presump¬ 
tions than these; such as amount to no more than showing 
one side of the question to be as sup posable and credible 
as the other; nay, such as but amount to much less even 
than this. For numberless instances might be mentioned 
respecting the common pursuits of life, where a man would 
be thought, in a literal sense, distracted, who would not act, 
and with great application, too, not only upon an even 
chance, but upon much less, and where the probability or 
chance was greatly against his succeeding. (1) 

It is not my design to inquire further into the nature, the 
foundation, and measure of probability; or whence it pro¬ 
ceeds, that likeness should beget that presumption, opinion, 
and full conviction, which the human mind is formed to 
receive from it, and which it does necessarily produce in 
every one; or to guard against the errors to which reason¬ 
ing from analogy is liable. This belongs to the subject of 


(lj See Part 2, Chap. vi. 


40 


INTRODUCTION. 


logic, and is a part of that subject which has not yet been 
thoroughly considered. Indeed, I shall not take upon me 
to say, how far the extent, compass, and force of analogical 
reasoning, can be reduced to general heads and rules, and 
the whole be formed into a system. But though so little 
in this way has been attempted by those who have treated 
of our intellectual powers, and the exercise of them, this 
does not hinder but that we may be, as we unquestionably 
are, assured, that analogy is of weight, in various degrees, 
toward determining our judgment and our practice. Nor 
does it, in any wise, cease to be of weight in those cases, 
because persons, either given to dispute, or who require 
things to be stated with greater exactness than our faculties 
appear to admit of in practical matters, may find other 
cases, in which it is not easy to say, whether it be, or be 
not, of any weight; or instances of seeming analogies, 
which are really of none. It is enough to the present pur¬ 
pose to observe, that this general way of arguing is evi¬ 
dently natural, just and conclusive. For there is no man 
can make a question but that the sun will rise to-morrow, 
and be seen, where it is seen at all, in the figure of a circle, 
and not in that of a square. 

Hence, namely from analogical reasoning, Origen(l) has, 
with singular sagacity, observed, that “he who believes the 
Scripture to have proceeded from him who is the Author 
of nature, may well expect to find the same sort of difficul¬ 
ties in it, as are found in the constitution of nature.” And, 
in a like way of reflection, it may be added, that he who 
denies the Scripture to have been from God, upon account 
of these difficulties, may, for the very same reason, deny 
the world to have been formed by him. On the other hand, 

(l)Xp» [MY TO/ yt TOV a.7ra.^ •TctpstJ'lj'd/UlVOV tow xtjWvtoc TOV H.CC/UCY tivsu 
TotwTitf Tic ypetpa; 7rt7rtioScu, on otrct Trip) t»c xncrteoc aTretvTy. to/{ fy - 
vovn toy 7 rip) ctwT»? xoyov, t stvret xsu 7rm t£>v ypxqZv. Philocal. p. 23. 
Ed. Cant. 


INTRODUCTION. 


41 


if there be an analogy, or likeness, between that system of 
things and dispensation of Providence, which revelation 
informs us of, and that system of things and dispensation 
of Providence, which experience, together with reason, 
informs us of, that is, the known course of nature, this is a 
presumption that they have both the same author and cause; 
at least, so far as to answer objections against the former’s 
being from God, drawn from any thing which is analogical, 
or similar to what is in the latter, which is acknowledged to 
be from him; for an Author of nature is here supposed. 

Forming our notions of the constitution and government 
of the world upon reasoning, without foundation for the 
principles which we assume, whether from the attributes of 
God, or any thing else, is building a world upon hypothesis, 
likf Des Cartes. Forming our notions upon reasoning from 
principles which are certain, but applied to cases to which 
we have no ground to apply them, (like those who explain 
the structure of the human body, and the nature of diseases 
and medicines, from mere mathematics, without sufficient 
data,) is an error much akin to the former: since what is 
assumed, in order to make the reasoning applicable, is 
hypothesis. But it must be allowed just, to join abstract 
reasonings with the observation of facts, and argue from 
such facts as are known, to others that are like them; from 
that part of the Divine government over intelligent crea¬ 
tures, which comes under our view, to that larger and more 
general government over them which is beyond it; and, 
from what is present, to collect what is likely, credible, or 
not incredible, will be hereafter. 

This method, then, of concluding and determining being 
practical, and what, if we will act at all, we cannot but act 
upon in the common pursuits of life; being, evidently, con¬ 
clusive in various degrees, proportionable to the degree and 
exactness of the whole analogy or likeness, and having so 
great authority for its introduction into the subject of 


42 


INTRODUCTION. 


religion, even revealed religion; my design is to apply it 
to that subject in general, both natural and revealed, taking 
for proved, that there is an intelligent Author of nature, 
and natural Governor of the world. For, as there is no 
presumption against this, prior to the proof of it, so it has 
been often proved with accumulated evidence: from this 
argument of analogy and final causes, from abstract rea¬ 
sonings, from the most ancient tradition and testimony, and 
from the general consent of mankind. Nor does it appear, 
so far as I can find, to be denied by the generality of 
those who profess themselves dissatisfied with the evidence 
of religion. 

As there are some, who, instead of thus attending to 
what is, in fact, the constitution of nature, form their 
notions of God’s government upon hypothesis, so there are 
others, who indulge themselves in vain and idle speculations, 
how the world might, possibly, have been framed other¬ 
wise than it is: and upon supposition that things might, in 
imagining that they should, have been disposed and carried 
on after a better model, than what appears in the present 
disposition and conduct of them. Suppose, now, a person 
of such a turn of mind to go on with his reveries, till he 
had, at length, fixed upon some particular plan of nature, 
as appearing to him the best. One shall scarce be thought 
guilty of detraction against human understanding, if one 
should say, even beforehand, that the plan which this spec¬ 
ulative person would fix upon, though he were the wisest 
of the sons of men, probably would not be the very best, 
even according to his own notions of best; whether he 
thought that to be so, which afforded occasions and motives 
for the exercise of the greatest virtue, or which was 
productive of the greatest happiness, or that these two 
were necessarily connected, and run up into one and the 
same plan. However, it may not be amiss, once for all, to 
see what would be the amount of these emendations and 


INTRODUCTION. 


43 


imaginary improvements upon the system of nature, or how 
far they would mislead us. And, it seems, there could be 
no stopping, till we came to some such conclusions as these: 
that all creatures should at first be made as perfect and as 
happy, as they were capable of ever being; that nothing, 
to be sure, of hazard or danger should be put upon them 
to do—some indolent persons would, perhaps, think nothing 
at all; or certainly, that effectual care should be taken, 
that they should, whether necessary or not, yet eventually 
and in fact, always do what was right and most conducive 
to happiness, which would be thought easy for infinite 
Power to effect, either by not giving them any principles 
which would endanger their going wrong, or by laying the 
right motive of action, in every instance, before their minds 
continually, in so strong a manner as would never fail of 
inducing them to act conformably to it; and that the whole 
method of government by punishments should be rejected 
as absurd—as an awkward, round-about method of carry¬ 
ing things on—nay, as contrary to a principal purpose, for 
which, it would be supposed, creatures were made, namely, 
happiness. 

Now, without considering what is to be said in particular 
to the several parts of this train of folly and extravagance, 
what has been above intimated is a full, direct, general 
answer to it, namely, that we may see beforehand, that we 
have not faculties for this kind of speculation. For, though 
it be admitted, that, from the first principles of our nature, 
we unavoidably judge or determine some ends to be abso¬ 
lutely in themselves preferable to others, and that the ends 
now mentioned, or if they run up into one, that this one is 
absolutely the best, and, consequently, that we must con¬ 
clude the ultimate end designed in the constitution of 
nature and conduct of Providence, is the most virtue and 
happiness possible; yet, we are far from being able to 


44 


INTRODUCTION. 


judge what particular disposition of things would be most 
friendly and assistant to virtue, or what means might be 
absolutely necessary to produce the most happiness in a 
system of such extent as our own world may be, taking in 
all that is past and to come, though we should suppose it 
detached from the whole of things. Indeed, we are so far 
from being able to judge of this, that we are not judges 
what may be the necessary means of raising and conducting 
one person to the highest perfection and happiness of his 
nature. Nay, even in the little affairs of the present life, 
we find men of different educations and ranks are not com¬ 
petent judges of the conduct of each other. Our whole 
nature leads us to ascribe all moral perfection to God, and 
to deny all imperfection of him. And this will for ever be 
a practical proof of his moral character, to such as will 
consider what a practical proof is; because it is the voice 
of God speaking in us. And from hence we conclude, 
that virtue must be the happiness, and vice the misery, of 
every creature; and that regularity, and order, and right, 
cannot but prevail finally, in a universe under his govern¬ 
ment. But we are in no sort judges what are the necessary 
means of accomplishing this end. 

Let us, then, instead of that idle, and not very innocent 
employment, of forming imaginary models of a world, and 
schemes of governing it, turn our thoughts to what we 
experience to be the conduct of Nature with respect to 
intelligent creatures; which may be resolved into general 
laws or rules of administration, in the same way as many 
of the laws of nature, respecting inanimate matter, may be 
collected from experiments. And let us compare the known 
constitution and course of things, with what is said to be 
the moral system of nature, the acknowledged dispensations 
of Providence, or that government which we find ourselves 
under, with what religion teaches us to believe and expect, 


INTRODUCTION. 


45 


and see whether they are not analogous and of a piece. 
And, upon such a comparison it will, I think, be found that 
they are very much so—that both may be traced up to the 
same general laws, and resolved into the same principles 
of Divine conduct. 

The analogy, here proposed to be considered, is of pretty 
large extent, and consists of several parts, in some more, in 
others less, exact. In some few instances, perhaps, it may 
amount to a real practical proof: in others not so; yet, in 
these it is a confirmation of what is proved otherwise. It 
will undeniably show, what too many want to have shown 
them, that the system of religion, both natural and revealed, 
considered only as a system, and prior to the proof of it, 
is not a subject of ridicule, unless that of nature be so too. 
And it will afford an answer to almost all objections against 
the system, both of natural and of revealed religion, though 
not, perhaps, an answer in so great a degree, yet in a very 
considerable degree an answer, to the objections against 
the evidence of it; for, objections against a proof, and 
objections against what is said to be proved, the reader will 
observe, are different things. 

Now, the Divine government of the world, implied in the 
notion of religion in general, and of Christianity, contains 
in it: that mankind is appointed to live in a future state;(l) 
that there every one shall be rewarded or punished ;(2) 
rewarded or punished respectively for all that behavior 
here which we comprehend under the words, virtuous or 
vicious, morally good or evil:(3) that our present life is a 
probation, a state of trial,(4) and of discipline,(5) for that 
future one; notwithstanding the objections which men may 
fancy they have, from notions of necessity, against there 
being any such moral plan as this at all;(6) and what¬ 
ever objections may appear to lie against the wisdom and 

(1) Ch. i. (2) Ch. ii. (3) Ch. iii. (4) Ch. iv. (5) Ch. v. (6) Ch. vi. 


46 


INTRODUCTION. 


goodness of it, as it stands so imperfectly made known to ns 
at present :(1) that this world, being in a state of apostasy 
and wickedness, and consequently of ruin, and the sense 
both of their condition and duty being greatly corrupted 
amongst men, this gave occasion for an additional dispen¬ 
sation of Providence; of the utmost importance ;(2) proved 
by miracles ;(3) but containing in it many things appearing 
to us strange, and not to have been expected ;(4) a dis¬ 
pensation of Providence, which is a scheme or system of 
things ;(5) carried on by the mediation of a Divine person, 
the Messiah, in order to the recovery of the world ;(6) 
yet not revealed to all men, nor proved with the strongest 
possible evidence to all those to whom it is revealed; but 
only to such a part of mankind, and with such particular 
evidence, as the wisdom of God thought fit.(7) The 
design, then, of the following treatise will be to show, 
that the several parts principally objected against in this 
moral and Christian dispensation, including its scheme, its 
publication, and the proof which God has afforded us of 
its truth; that the particular parts principally objected 
against in this whole dispensation, are analogous to what 
is experienced in the constitution and course of Nature, or 
Providence; that the chief objections themselves, which 
are alledged against the former, are no other than what may 
be alledged with like justness against the latter, where they 
are found, in fact, to be inconclusive; and that this argu¬ 
ment from analogy is, in general, unanswerable, and, un¬ 
doubtedly, of weight on the side of religion,(8) notwith¬ 
standing the objections which may seem to lie against it, 
and the real ground which there may be for difference of 
opinion, as to the particular degree of weight which is to be 
laid upon it. This is a general account of what may be 

(1) Ch. vii. (2) Part 2, ch. i. (3) Ch. ii. (4) Ch. iii. (5) Ch. iy. 
(6) Ch. v. (7) vi., vii. (8) Ch. viii. 


INTRODUCTION. 


47 


looked for in the following treatise. And I shall begin it 
with that which is the foundation of all our hopes, and of 
all our fears—all our hopes and fears, which are of any 
consideration—I mean a future life. 








THE 



ANALOGY OF RELIGION 

TO THE 

CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE. 

PART I. 

OF NATURAL RELIGION. 

CHAPTER I. 

OF A FUTURE LIFE. 

Strange difficulties have been raised, by some, concern¬ 
ing personal identity, or the sameness of living agents, im- 
pbed in the notion of our existing now and hereafter, or in 
any two successive moments; which, whoever thinks it 
worth while, may see considered in the first Dissertation at 
the end of this treatise. But, without regard to any of 
them here, let us consider what the analogy of nature, and 
the several changes which we have undergone, and those 
which we know we may undergo without being destroyed, 
suggest, as to the effect which death may, or may not, 
have upon us; and whether it be not from thence probable, 
that we may survive this change, and exist in a future state 
of fife and perception. 

I. From our being born into the present world in the 
helpless, imperfect state of infancy, and having arrived 
from thence to mature age, we find it to be a general law 
of nature in our own species, that the same creatures, the 
same individuals, should exist in degrees of life and percep¬ 
tion, with capacities of action, of enjoyment and suffering, 

period of their being, greatly different from those 
5 49 


in one 


50 OF A FUTURE LIFE. [PART I. 

appointed them in another period of it. Ana in other 
creatures the same law holds. For the difference of their 
capacities and states of life at their birth (to go no higher) 
and in maturity; the change of worms into flies, and the 
vast enlargement of their locomotive powers by such 
change; and birds and insects bursting the shell of their 
habitation, and by this means entering into a new world, 
furnished with new accommodations for them, and finding 
a new sphere of action assigned them; these are instances 
of this general law of nature. Thus, all the various and 
wonderful transformations of animals are to be taken into 
consideration here. But the states of life in which we our¬ 
selves existed formerly, in the womb and in our infancy, are 
almost as different from our present, in mature age, as it is 
possible to conceive any two states or degrees of life can be. 
Therefore, that we are to exist hereafter in a state as differ¬ 
ent (suppose) from our present, as this is from our former, 
is but according to the analogy of nature—according to a 
natural order or appointment, of the very same kind with 
what we have already experienced. 

II. We know* we are endued with capacities of action, of 
happiness and misery; for we are conscious of acting, of 
enjoying pleasure, and suffering pain. Now, that we have 
these powers and capacities before death, is a presumption 
that we shall retain them through and after death; indeed, 
a probability of it abundantly sufficient to act upon, unless 
there be some positive reason to think that death is the de¬ 
struction of those living powers; because there is, in every 
case, a probability that all things will continue as we expe¬ 
rience they are, in all respects, except those in which we 
have some reason to think they will be altered. This is 
that hind{l) of presumption, or probability, from analogy, 

(1)1 say kind of presumption, or probability; for I do not mean to 
affirm, that there is the same degree of conviction that our living 
powers will continue after death, as there is, that our substances will. 


OF A FUTURE LIFE. 


51 


CHAP. I.] 

expressed in the very word continuance , which seems onr 
only natural reason for believing the course of the world will 
continue to-morrow, as it has done so far as our experience 
or knowledge of history can carry us back. Nay, it seems 
our only reason for believing, that any one substance, now 
existing, will continue to exist a moment longer, the self- 
existing substance only excepted. Thus, if men were as¬ 
sured that the unknown event, death, was not the destruc¬ 
tion of our faculties of perception and of action, there would 
be no apprehension that any other power or event, uncon¬ 
nected with this of death, would destroy these faculties just 
at the instant of each creature’s death; and, therefore, no 
doubt but that they would remain after it: which shows 
the high probability that our living powers will continue 
after death, unless there be some ground to think that 
death is their destruction. (1) For, if it would be in a 
manner certain that we should survive death, provided it 
were certain that death would not be our destruction, it 
must be highly probable that we shall survive it, if there 
be no ground to think death will be our destruction. 

Now, though I think it must be acknowledged, that prior 
to the natural and moral proofs of a future life commonly 
insisted upon, there would arise a general confused sus¬ 
picion, that, in the great shock and alteration which we shall 

(1 ) Destruction of living powers, is a manner of expression una¬ 
voidably ambiguous; and may signify either the destruction of a 
living being, so as that the same living being shall be incapable of ever 
perceiving or acting again at all; or the destruction of those means and 
instruments by which it is capable of its present life, of its present state 
of perception and of action. It is here used in the former sense. 
When it is used in the latter, the epithet present is added. The loss 
of a man’s eye is a destruction of living powers in the latter sense. 
But we have no reason to think the destruction of living powers in 
the former sense, to be possible. We have no more reason to think a 
being, endued with living powers, ever loses them during its whole 
existence, than to believe that a stone ever acquires them. 


52 OF A FUTURE LIFE. [PART I. 

undergo by death, we, that is, our living powers might be 
wholly destroyed; yet even prior to those proofs, there is 
really no particular distinct ground, or reason for this 
apprehension at all, so far as I can find. If there be, it 
must arise either from the reason of the thing , or from the 
analogy of nature. 

But we cannot argue from the reason of the thing, that 
death is the destruction of living agents, because we know 
not at all what death is in itself; but only some of its 
effects, such as the dissolution of flesh, skin, and bones: 
and these effects do in no wise appear to imply the destruc¬ 
tion of a living agent. And, besides, as we are greatly in 
the dark upon what the exercise of our living powers de¬ 
pends, so we are wholly ignorant what the powers them¬ 
selves depend upon—the powers themselves, as distin¬ 
guished, not only from their actual exercise, but also from 
the present capacity of exercising them, and as opposed to 
their destruction; for sleep, or, however, a swoon, shows 
us, not only that these powers exist when they are not 
exercised, as the passive power of motion does in inanimate 
matter; but shows, also, that they exist, when there is no 
present capacity of exercising them; or that the capacities 
of exercising them for the present, as well as the actual 
exercise of them may be suspended, and yet the powers 
themselves remain undestroyed. Since, then, we know not 
at all upon what the existence of our living powers depends, 
this shows further, there can no probability be collected 
from the reason of the thing, that death will be their 
destruction; because their existence may depend upon 
somewhat in no degree affected by death—upon some¬ 
what quite out of the reach of this king of terrors. So 
that there is nothing more certain than, that the reason of 
the thing shows us no connection between death and the 
destruction of living agents. Nor can we find any thing 
throughout the whole analogy of nature, to afford us even 


CHAP. I.] 


OP A FUTURE LIFE. 


53 


the slightest presumption, that animals ever lose their 
living powers; much less, if it were possible, that they 
lose them by death; for we have no faculties wherewith to 
trace any beyond or through it, so as to see what becomes 
of them. This event removes them from our view. It 
destroys the sensible proof, which we had before their 
death, of their being possessed of living powers, but does 
not appear to afford the least reason to believe, that they 
are then, or by that event, deprived of them. 

And our knowing, that they were possessed of these 
powers, up to the very period to which we have faculties 
capable of tracing them, is itself a probability of their 
retaining them beyond it. And this is confirmed, and a 
sensible credibility is given to it, by observing the very 
great and astonishing changes which we have experienced; 
so great, that our existence in another state of life, of per¬ 
ception, and of action, will be but according to a method of 
Providential conduct, the like to which has been already ex¬ 
ercised, even with regard to ourselves—according to a course 
of nature, the like to which we have already gone through. 

However, as one cannot but be greatly sensible, how 
difficult it is to silence imagination enough to make the 
voice of reason even distinctly heard in this case; as we are 
accustomed, from our youth up, to indulge that forward 
delusive faculty, ever obtruding beyond its sphere—of some 
assistance, indeed, to apprehension, but the author of all 
error; as we plainly lose ourselves in gross and crude con¬ 
ceptions of things, taking for granted that we are acquainted 
with what indeed we are wholly ignorant of ; it may be 
proper to consider the imaginary presumptions, that death 
will be our destruction, arising from these kinds of early 
and lasting prejudices; and to show how little they can 
really amount to, even though we cannot wholly divest 
ourselves of them. And, 

I. All presumption of death’s being the destruction of 
5* 


54 OF A FUTURE LIFE. [PART I 

living beings, must go upon supposition that they are com¬ 
pounded, and so discerptible. But, since consciousness is a 
single and indivisible power, it should seem that the subject 
in which it resides, must be so too. For, were the motion 
of any particle of matter absolutely one and indivisible, so 
as that it should imply a contradiction to suppose part 
of this motion to exist, and part not to exist, that is, part 
of this matter to move, and part to be at rest; then its 
power of motion would be indivisible; and so, also, would 
the subject in which the power inheres, namely, the particle 
of matter: for if this could be divided into two, one part 
might be moved and the other at rest, which is contrary to 
the supposition. In like manner, it has been argued,(l) 
and, for any thing appearing to the contrary, justly, that 
since the perception, or consciousness, which we have of 
our own existence is indivisible, so as that it is a contradic¬ 
tion to suppose one part of it should be here and the other 
there, the perceptive power, or the power of consciousness, 
is indivisible too; and, consequently, the subject in which it 
resides, that is, the conscious being. Now, upon supposi¬ 
tion that living agent each man calls himself, is thus a sin¬ 
gle being, which there is, at least, no more difficulty in con¬ 
ceiving than in conceiving it to be a compound, and of 
which there is the proof now mentioned, it follows, that 
our organized bodies are no more ourselves, or part of our¬ 
selves, than any other matter around us. And it is as easy 
to conceive how matter, which is no part of ourselves, may 
be appropriated to us in the manner which our present 
bodies are, as how we can receive impressions from, and 
have power over any matter. It is as easy to conceive, 
that we may exist out of bodies, as in them; that we might 
have animated bodies of any other organs and senses wholly 
different from these now given us, and that we may here¬ 
after animate these same or new bodies variously modified 
(1) See Dr. Clarke’s Letter to Mr. Dodwell, and the defences of it. 


CHAP. I.] OF A FUTURE LIFE. 55 

and organized, as to conceive liow we can animate such 
bodies as our present. And, lastly, the dissolution of all 
these several organized bodies, supposing ourselves to have 
successively animated them, would have no more conceiva¬ 
ble tendency to destroy the living beings, ourselves, or de¬ 
prive us of living faculties, the faculties of perception and 
of action, than the dissolution of any foreign matter, which 
we are capable of receiving impressions from, and making 
use of for the common occasions of life. 

II. The simplicity and absolute oneness of a living agent 
cannot, indeed, from the nature of the thing, be properly 
proved by experimental observations. But as these fall 
in with the supposition of its unity, so they plainly lead us 
to conclude certainly, that our gross organized bodies, with 
which we perceive the objects of sense, and with which we 
act, are no part of ourselves, and, therefore, show us, that 
we have no reason to believe their destruction to be ours, 
even without determining whether our living substances be 
material or immaterial. For we see by experience, that 
men may lose their limbs, their organs of sense, and even 
the greatest part of these bodies, and yet remain the same 
living agents. And persons can trace up the existence of 
themselves to a time when the bulk of their bodies was ex¬ 
tremely small, in comparison of what it is in mature age; 
and we cannot but think, that they might then have lost a 
considerable part of that small body, and yet have remained 
the same living agents, as they may now lose great part of 
their present body, and remain so. And it is certain, that 
the bodies of all animals are in a constant flux, from that 
never-ceasing attrition which there is in every part of them. 
Now, things of this kind unavoidably teach us to distin¬ 
guish between these living agents, ourselves, and large 
quantities of matter, in which we are very nearly inter¬ 
ested : since these may be alienated, and actually are in a 
daily course of succession, and changing their owners; 


56 


OF A FUTURE LIFE. 


[part. I. 

whilst we are assured, that each living agent remains one 
and the same permanent being. (1) And this general obser¬ 
vation leads us on to the following ones. 

1. That we have no way of determining by experience, 
what is the certain bulk of the living being each man calls 
himself; and yet, till it be determined that it is larger in 
bulk than the solid elementary particles of matter, which 
there is no ground to think any natural power can dissolve, 
there is no sort of reason to think death to be the dissolu¬ 
tion of it, of the living being, even though it should not be 
absolutely indiscerptible. 

2. From our being so nearly related to, and interested 
in certain systems of matter, suppose our flesh and bones, 
and afterward ceasing to be at all related to them, the living 
agents, ourselves, remaining all this while undestroyed, 
notwithstanding such alienation; and, consequently, these 
systems of matter not being ourselves; it follows fur¬ 
ther, that we have no ground to conclude any other, 
suppose internal systems of matter, to be the living agents, 
ourselves; because we can have no ground to conclude this, 
but from our relation to, and interest in such other systems 
of matter: „and, therefore, we can have no reason to con¬ 
clude, what befalls those systems of matter at death, to be 
the destruction of the living agents. We have already, 
several times over, lost a great part, or perhaps the whole 
of our body, according to certain common established laws 
of nature; yet we remain the same living agents: when we 
shall lose as great a part, or the whole, by another common 
established law of nature, death, why may we not, also, 
remain the same? That the alienation has been gradual 
in one case, and in the other will be more at once, does 
not prove any thing to the contrary. We have passed 
undestroyed through those many and great revolutions of 
matter, so peculiarly appropriated to us ourselves: why 

(1) See Dissertation I. 


CHAP. I.] *0F A FUTURE LIFE. 57 

should we imagine death will be so fatal to us? Nor can 
it be objected, that what is thus alienated, or lost, is no part 
of our original solid body, but only adventitious matter; be¬ 
cause we may lose entire limbs, which must have contained 
many sobd parts and vessels of the original body: or, if 
this be not admitted, we have no proof that any of these 
solid parts are dissolved or alienated by death; though, by 
the way, we are very nearly related to that extraneous or 
adventitious matter, whilst it continues united to and dis¬ 
tending the several parts of our solid body. But, after all, 
the relation a person bears to those parts of his body to 
which he is the most nearly related, what does it appear to 
amount to but this, that the living agent and those parts of 
the body mutually affect each other ? And the same thing, 
the same thing in kind, though not in degree, may be said 
of all foreign matter, which gives us ideas, and which we 
have any power over. From these observations the whole 
ground of the imagination is removed, that the dissolution 
of any matter is the destruction of a living agent, from the 
interest he once had in such matter. 

3. If we consider our body somewhat more distinctly, 
as made up of organs and instruments of perception and 
of motion, it will bring us to the same conclusion. Thus, 
the common optical experiments show, and even the observa¬ 
tion how sight is assisted by glasses shows, that we see with 
our eyes in the same sense as we see with glasses. Nor 
'is there any reason to believe, that we see with them in any 
other sense—any other, I mean, which would lead us to 
think the eye itself a percipient. The like is to be said of 
hearing: and our feeling distant solid matter by means of 
somewhat in our hand, seems an instance of the like kind, as 
to the subject we are considering. All these are instances 
of foreign matter, or such as is no part of our body, being 
instrumental in preparing objects for, and conveying them 
to the perceiving power, in a manner similar, or like to the 


58 


OF A FUTURE LIFE. 


[part I. 

manner in which our organs of sense prepare and convey 
them. Both are, in a like way, instruments of our receiving 
such ideas from external objects, as the Author of nature 
appointed those external objects to be the occasions of 
exciting in us. However, glasses are evidently instances of 
this; namely, of matter, which is no part of our body, 
preparing objects for, and conveying them toward the per¬ 
ceiving power, in like manner as our bodily organs do. 
And if we see with our eyes only in the same manner as 
we do with glasses, the like may justly be concluded from 
analogy, of all our other senses. It is not intended, by 
any thing here said, to affirm, that the whole apparatus of 
vision, or of perception by any other of our senses, can be 
traced, through all its steps, quite up to the living power 
of seeing, or perceiving; but that, so far as it can be traced 
by experimental observations, so far it appears, that our 
organs of sense prepare and convey on objects, in order to 
their being perceived, in like manner as foreign matter does, 
without affording any shadow of appearance, that they 
themselves perceive. And that we have no reason to think 
our organs of sense percipients, is confirmed by instances 
of persons losing some of them, the living beings them¬ 
selves, their former occupiers, remaining unimpaired. It is 
confirmed, also, by the experience of dreams; by which we 
find we are at present possessed of a latent, and what would 
otherwise be an unimagined unknown power of perceiving 
sensible objects, in as strong and lively a manner without 
our external organs of sense, as with them. 

So, also, with regard to our power of moving, or direct¬ 
ing motion by will and choice: upon the destruction of a 
limb, this active power remains, as it evidently seems, 
unlessened; so as that the living being, who has suffered 
this loss, would be capable of moving as before, if it had 
another limb to move with. It can walk by the help of an 
artificial leg, just as it can make use of a pole or a lever, to 


CHAP. I.] OF A FUTURE LIFE. 59 

reach toward itself, and to move things beyond the “length 
and the power of its natural arm: and this last it does in 
the same manner as it reaches and moves, with its natural 
arm, things nearer and of less weight. Nor is there so 
much as any appearance of our limbs being endued with a 
power of moving or directing themselves; though they are 
adapted, like the several parts of a machine, to be the 
instruments of motion to each other, and some parts of 
the same limb, to be instruments of motion to other parts 
of it. 

Thus, a man determines that he will look at such an ob¬ 
ject through a microscope; or, being lame suppose, that he 
will walk to such a place with a staff a week hence. His 
eyes and his feet no more determine in these cases, than 
the microscope and the staff. Nor is there any ground to 
think they any more put the determination in practice, or 
that his eyes are the seers, or his feet the movers, in any 
other sense than as the microscope and the staff are. Upon 
the whole, then, our organs of sense and our limbs are 
certainly instruments, which the living persons, ourselves, 
make use of to perceive and move with. There is not any 
probability, that they are any more; nor, consequently, that 
we have any other kind of relation to them, than what 
we have to any other foreign matter formed into instru¬ 
ments of perception and motion, suppose into a microscope 
or a staff—I say, any other kind of relation, for I am not 
speaking of the degree of it; nor, consequently, is there 
any probability, that the alienation or dissolution of these 
instruments is the destruction of the perceiving and moving 
agent. 

And thus our finding, that the dissolution of matter in 
which living beings were most nearly interested, is not their 
dissolution, and that the destruction of several of the organs 
and instruments of perception and of motion belonging to 
them, is not their destruction, shows, demonstratively, that 


60 OF A FUTURE LIFE. [PART I. 

there is no ground to think, that the dissolution of any 
other matter, or destruction of any other organs and instru¬ 
ments, will be the dissolution or destruction of living agents, 
from the like kind of relation. And we have no reason to 
think we stand in any other kind of relation to any thing 
which we find dissolved by death. 

But, it is said, these observations are equally applicable 
to brutes; and it is thought an insuperable difficulty, that 
they should be immortal, and, by consequence, capable of 
everlasting happiness. Now, this manner of expression is 
both invidious and weak: but the thing intended by it is 
really no difficulty at all, either in the way of natural or 
moral consideration. For, first, suppose the invidious thing, 
designed in such a manner of expression, were really im¬ 
plied, as it is not in the least, in the natural immortality of 
brutes; namely, that they must arrive at great attainments, 
and become rational and moral agents; even this would be 
no difficulty, since we know not what latent powers and 
capacities they may be endued with. There was once, prior 
to experience, as great presumption against human crea¬ 
tures, as there is against the brute creatures, arriving at 
that degree of understanding which we have in mature age; 
for we can trace up our own existence to the same original 
with theirs. And we find it to be a general law of nature, 
that creatures endued with capacities of virtue and religion, 
should be placed in a condition of being, in which they are 
altogether without the use of them for a considerable length 
of their duration, as in infancy and childhood. And great 
part of the human species go out of the present world, 
before they come to the exercise of these capacities in any 
degree at all. But, then, secondly, the natural immortality 
of brutes does not in the least imply, that they are endued 
with any latent capacities of a rational or moral nature. 
And the economy of the universe might require, that there 
should be living creatures without any capacities of this 


CHAP. I.] OF A FUTURE LIFE. 61 

kind. And all difficulties, as to the manner how they are 
to be disposed of, are so apparently and wholly founded in 
our ignorance, that it is wonderful they should be insisted 
upon by any, but such as are weak enough to think they 
are acquainted with the whole system of things. There is, 
then, absolutely nothing at all in this objection, which is so 
rhetorically urged against the greatest part of the natural 
proofs or presumptions of the immortality of human minds— 
I say the greatest part; for it is less applicable to the fol¬ 
lowing observation, which is more peculiar to mankind: 

III. That, as it is evident our present powers and capaci¬ 
ties of reason, memory, and affection, do not depend upon 
our gross body, in the manner in which perception by our 
organs of sense does, so they do not appear to depend 
upon it at all in any such manner, as to give ground to think, 
that the dissolution of this body will be the destruction of 
these our present powers of reflection, as it will of our 
powers of sensation; or to give ground to conclude, even 
that it will be so much as a suspension of the former. 

Human creatures exist, at present, in two states of life 
and perception, greatly different from each other, each of 
which has its own peculiar laws, and its own peculiar enjoy¬ 
ments and sufferings. When any of our senses are affected, 
or appetites gratified with the objects of them, we may be 
said to exist, or live, in a state of sensation. When none 
of our senses are affected, or appetites gratified, and yet we 
perceive, and reason, and act, we may be said to exist, or 
live, in a state of reflection. Now, it is by no means cer¬ 
tain, that any thing which is dissolved by death is any way 
necessary to the living being, in this its state of reflection, 
after ideas are gained. For though, from our present con¬ 
stitution and condition of being, our external organs of 
sense are necessary for conveying in ideas to our reflect¬ 
ing powers, as carriages, and levers, and scaffolds are in 
architecture; yet, when those ideas are brought in, we are 
6 


62 OF A FUTURE LIFE. [PART I. 

capable of reflecting in the most intense degree, and of 
enjoying the greatest pleasure, and feeling the greatest pain, 
by means of that reflection, without any assistance from 
our senses; and without any at all, which we know of, 
from that body, which will be dissolved by death. It does 
not appear, then, that the relation of this gross body to the 
reflecting being, is, in any degree, necessary to thinking, to 
our intellectual enjoyments or sufferings; nor, consequently, 
that the dissolution, or alienation of the former, by death, 
will be the destruction of those present powers, which ren¬ 
der us capable of this state of reflection. Further, there are 
instances of mortal diseases, which do not at all affect our 
present intellectual powers; and this affords a presumption, 
that those diseases will not destroy these present powers. 
Indeed, from the observations made above, (1) it appears, 
that there is no presumption, from their mutually affecting 
each other, that the dissolution of the body is the destruc¬ 
tion of the living agent. And, by the same reasoning it 
must appear, too, that there is no presumption, from their 
mutually affecting each other, that the dissolution of the 
body is the destruction of our present reflecting powers; 
but instances of their not affecting each other, afford a 
presumption of the contrary. Instances of mortal diseases 
not impairing our present reflecting powers, evidently turn 
our thoughts even from imagining such diseases to be the 
destruction of them. Several things, indeed, greatly affect 
all our living powers, and, at length, suspend the exercise 
of them; as, for instance, drowsiness, increasing till it ends 
in sound sleep: and from hence we might have imagined 
it would destroy them, till we found, by experience, the 
weakness of this way of judging. But, in the diseases 
now mentioned, there is not so much as the shadow of 
probability, to lead us to any such conclusion, as to the 
reflecting powers which we have at present; for, in those 
(1) Pages 56, 57, 58 


CHAP. I.] OF A FUTURE LIFE. 63 

diseases, persons, the moment before death, appear to be in 
the highest vigor of life. They discover apprehension, 
memory, reason, all entire; with the utmost force of affec¬ 
tion; sense of a character, of shame and honor; and the 
highest mental enjoyments and sufferings, even to the last 
gasp: and these surely prove even greater vigor of life than 
bodily strength does. Now, what pretense is there for 
thinking, that a progressive disease, when arrived to such 
a degree—I mean that degree which is mortal—will 
destroy those powers, which were not impaired, which 
were not affected by it, during its whole progress, quite 
up to that degree? And if death, by diseases of this 
kind, is not the destruction of our present reflecting 
powers, it will scarce be thought that death by any other 
means is. 

It is obvious that this general observation may be carried 
on further: and there appears so little connection between 
our bodily powers of sensation, and our present powers of 
reflection, that there is no reason to conclude that death, 
which destroys the former, does so much as suspend the 
exercise of the latter, or interrupt our continuing to exist 
in the like state of reflection which we do now. For, sus¬ 
pension of reason, memory, and the affections which they 
excite, is no part of the idea of death, nor is implied in our 
notion of it. And our daily experiencing these powers to 
be exercised, without any assistance, that we know of 
from those bodies which will be dissolved by death; and 
our finding often, that the exercise of them is so lively to 
the last; these things afford a sensible apprehension, that 
death may not perhaps be so much as a discontinuance of 
the exercise of these powers, nor of the enjoyments and 
sufferings which it implies ;(1) so that our posthumous life, 
whatever there may be in it additional to our present, yet 

(1) There are three distinct questions, relating to a future life here 
considered: Whether death be the destruction of living agents? If 


64 


OF A FUTURE LIFE. 


[PART I. 

may not be entirely beginning anew, but going on. Death 
may, in some sort, and in some respects, answer to our 
birth, which is not a suspension of the faculties which we 
had before it, or a total change of the state of life in which 
we existed when in the womb, but a continuation of both, 
with such and such great alterations. 

Nay, for aught we know of ourselves, of our present life, 
and of death, death may immediately, in the natural course 
of things, put us into a higher and more enlarged state of 
life, as our birth does;(l) a state in which our capacities and 
sphere of perception, and of action, may be much greater 
than at present. For, as our relation to our external 
organs of sense renders us capable of existing in our pres¬ 
ent state of sensation, so it may be the only natural hinder- 
ance to our existing, immediately, and, of course, in a higher 
state of reflection. The truth is, reason does not at all show 
us in what state death naturally leaves us. But were we 
sure, that it would suspend all our perceptive and active 
powers, yet the suspension of a power, and the destruction 
of it, are effects so totally different in kind, as we expe¬ 
rience from sleep and a swoon, that we cannot in any wise 
argue from one to the other; or conclude, even to the lowest 
degree of probability, that the same kind of force which 

not, Whether it be the destruction of their present powers of reflec¬ 
tion, as it certainly is the destruction of their present powers of sen¬ 
sation? And if not, Whether it be the suspension, or discontinuance 
of the exercise of these present reflecting powers? Now, if there 
be no reason to believe the last, there will be, if that were possible, 
less for the next, and less still for the first. 

(l)This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brahmans: 
yojui^uv /uev ya^ <f» r ov f*(V ivS'aJ'e /3 icy, «I>? av a k/u>iv nov/mtvoev tivetr rbv J'e 
d-dvetroy, yivttriv uc roy ovrax /3<ov, ha) rev tbJ'etijuovct role <$iXc<ro<$Yi<rduTl. 
Lib. xv, p. 1039. Ed. Amst. 1707. To which opinion perhaps An¬ 
toninus may allude in these words, vvy yrt^i/uivae, ?rbrt t/jfi^vov tn we 
yeto-rgbe th? yuvetix.be <rou ourcee ix.J't^terScti, r»v wgstv tv « ro ^u^dptby 

<rou rou i\urgou rovrov 'vcTnriiTcu. Lib. ix,Chap. 3. 


CHAP. I.] OF A FUTURE LIFE. 65 

is sufficient to suspend our faculties, though it be increased 
ever so much, will be sufficient to destroy them. 

These observations together may be sufficient to show, 
how little presumption there is that death is the destruction 
of human creatures. However, there is the shadow of an 
analogy, which may lead us to imagine it is—the supposed 
likeness which is observed between the decay of vegetables 
and of living creatures. And this likeness is indeed suf¬ 
ficient to afford the poets very apt allusions to the flowers of 
the field, in their pictures of the frailty of our present life. 
But, in reason, the analogy is so far from holding, that 
there appears no ground even for the comparison, as to the 
present question; because one of the two subjects com¬ 
pared is wholly void of that, which is the principle and 
chief thing in the other, the power of perception and of ac¬ 
tion; and which is the only thing we are inquiring about 
the continuance of. So that the destruction of a vegetable 
is an event not similar, or analogous, to the destruction of 
a living agent. 

But if, as was above intimated, leaving off the delusive 
custom of substituting imagination in the room of experi¬ 
ence, we would confine ourselves to what we do know and 
understand—if we would argue only from that, and from 
that form our expectations, it would appear, at first sight, 
that as no probability of living beings ever ceasing to be so, 
can be concluded from the reason of the thing, so none 
can be collected from the analogy of nature; because we 
cannot trace any living beings beyond death. But as we 
are conscious that we are endued with capacities of percep¬ 
tion and of action, and are living persons, what we are. to 
go upon is, that we shall continue so till we foresee some 
accident, or event, which will endanger those capacities, or 
be likely to destroy us; which death does in no wise appear 
to be. 

And thus, when we go out of this world, we may pass 
6 * 


66 OF A FUTURE LIFE. [PART I. 

into new scenes, and a new state of life and action, jnst as 
naturally as we came into the present. And this new state 
may naturally be a social one. And the advantages of it, 
advantages of every kind, may naturally be bestowed, 
according to some fixed general laws of wisdom, upon 
every one in proportion to the degrees of his virtue. And 
though the advantages of that future natural state should 
not be bestowed, as these of the present in some measure 
are, by the will of the society, but entirely by His more im¬ 
mediate action, upon whom the whole frame of nature 
depends, yet this distribution may be just as natural, as 
their being distributed here by the instrumentality of men. 
And, indeed, though one were to allow any confused, unde¬ 
termined sense, which people please to put upon the word 
natural, it would be a shortness of thought scarce credible 
to imagine, that no system or course of things can be so, 
but only what we see at present ;(1) especially whilst the 
probability of a future fife, or the natural immortality of 
the soul, is admitted upon the evidence of reason; because 
this is really both admitting and denying at once, a state 
of being different from the present to be natural. But the 
only distinct meaning of that word is stated, fixed, or set¬ 
tled; since what is natural as much requires, and presup¬ 
poses an intelligent agent to render it so, that is, to effect it 
continually, or at stated times, as what is supernatural or 
miraculous does to effect it for once. And from hence it 
must follow, that persons’ notion of what is natural will be 
enlarged, in proportion to their greater knowledge of the 
works of God and the dispensations of his providence. Nor 
is there any absurdity in supposing, that there may be beings 
in the universe, whose capacities, and knowledge, and views, 
may be so extensive, as that the whole Christian dispensa¬ 
tion may to them appear natural, that is, analogous or con¬ 
formable to God’s dealings with other parts of his creation, 
(1) See Part 2, Chap, ii; and Part 2, Chap. iv. 


OF A FUTURE LIFE. 


67 


CHAP. I.] 

as natural as the visible known course of things appears to 
us. For there seems scarce any other possible sense to be 
put upon the word, but that only in which it is here used— 
similar, stated, or uniform. 

This credibility of a future life, which has here been 
insisted upon, how little soever it may satisfy our curiosity, 
seems to answer all the purposes of religion, in like manner 
as a demonstrative proof would. Indeed, a proof, even a 
demonstrative one, of a future life, would not be a proof of 
religion. For, that we are to live hereafter, is just as 
reconcilable with the scheme of Atheism, and as well to be 
accounted for by it, as that we are now alive is; and, there¬ 
fore, nothing can be more absurd, than to argue from that 
scheme, that there can be no future state. But as religion 
implies a future state, any presumption against such a state 
is a presumption against religion. And the foregoing obser¬ 
vations remove all presumptions of that sort, and prove, to 
a very considerable degree of probability, one fundamental 
doctrine of religion; which, if believed, would greatly open 
and dispose the mind seriously to attend to the general evi¬ 
dence of the whole. 


68 


OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD 


[part I. 


CHAPTER II. 

OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY REWARDS AND PUNISH¬ 
MENTS, AND PARTICULARLY OF THE LATTER. 

That which makes the question concerning a future life 
to be of so great importance to us, is our capacity of hap¬ 
piness and misery. And that which makes the considera¬ 
tion of it to be of so great importance to us, is the suppo¬ 
sition of our happiness and misery hereafter, depending 
upon our actions here. Without this, indeed, curiosity 
could not but sometimes bring a subject, in which we may 
be so highly interested, to our thoughts, especially upon 
the mortality of others, or the near prospect of our own. 
But reasonable men would not take any farther thought 
about hereafter, than what should happen thus occasionally 
to rise in their minds, if it were certain that our future inter¬ 
est no way depended upon our present behavior; whereas, 
on the contrary, if there be ground, either from analogy or 
any thing else, to think it does, then there is reason, also, 
for the most active thought and solicitude to secure that 
interest—to behave so as that we may escape that misery, 
and obtain that happiness in another life, which we not 
only suppose ourselves capable of, but which we apprehend, 
also, is put in our own power. And whether there be 
ground for this last apprehension, certainly would deserve 
to be most seriously considered, were there no other proof 
of a future life, and interest, than that presumptive one 
which the foregoing observations amount to. 

Now, in the present state, all which we enjoy, and a great 
part of what we suffer, is put in our own power. For 
pleasure and pain are the consequences of our actions; and 
we are endued by the Author of our nature with capacities 
of foreseeing these consequences. We find, by experience, 
he does not so much as preserve our lives exclusively of 


CHAP. II.] BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. 69 

' 

our own care and attention to provide ourselves with, and 
to make use of, that sustenance, by which he has appointed 
our lives shall be preserved, and without which he has 
appointed they shall not be preserved at all. And, in gen¬ 
eral, we foresee, that the external things, which are the ob¬ 
jects of our various passions, can neither be obtained nor 
enjoyed, without exerting ourselves in such and such man¬ 
ners; but by thus exerting ourselves, we obtain and enjoy 
these objects, in which our natural good consists; or by this 
means God gives us the possession and enjoyment of them. 
I know not that we have any one kind or degree of enjoyment, 
but by the means of our own actions. And, by prudence 
and care, we may, for the most part, pass our days in toler¬ 
able ease and quiet; or, on the contrary, we may, by rash¬ 
ness, ungoverned passion, willfulness, or even by negligence, 
make ourselves as miserable as ever we please. And many 
do please to make themselves extremely miserable, that is, 
to do what they know beforehand will render them so. 
They follow those ways, the fruit of which they know, by 
instruction, example, experience, will be disgrace, and pov¬ 
erty, and sickness, and untimely death. This every one 
observes to be the general course of things; though it is to 
be allowed, we cannot find by experience, that all our suffer¬ 
ings are owing to our own follies. 

Why the Author of nature does not give his creatures 
promiscuously such and such perceptions, without regard to 
their behavior—why he does not make them happy without 
the instrumentality of their own actions, and prevent their 
bringing any sufferings upon themselves, is another matter. 
Perhaps there may be some impossibilities in the nature of 
things, which we are unacquainted with;(l) or less happi¬ 
ness, it may be, would, upon the whole, be produced by 
such a method of conduct, than is by the present: or, per¬ 
haps, divine goodness, with which, if I mistake not, we 
(1) Part l,Chap. vii. 


70 OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD [PART I. 

make very free in our speculations, may not be a bare single 
disposition to produce happiness; but a disposition to make 
the good, the faithful, the honest man happy. Perhaps an 
infinitely perfect Mind may be pleased with seeing his crea¬ 
tures behave suitably to the nature which he has given 
them; to the relations which he has placed them in to each 
other; and to that which they stand in to himself—that 
relation to himself, which, during their existence, is even 
necessary, and which is the most important one of all. 
Perhaps, I say, an infinitely perfect Mind may be pleased 
with this moral piety of moral agents, in and for itself, as 
well as upon account of its being essentially conducive to 
the happiness of his creation. Or the whole end, for which 
God made, and thus governs the world, may be utterly 
beyond the reach of our faculties: there may be somewhat 
in it as impossible for us to have any conception of, as for a 
blind man to have a conception of colors. But however 
this bfe, it is certain matter of universal experience, that the 
general method of Divine administration is, forewarning us, 
or giving us capacities to foresee, with more or less clear¬ 
ness, that if we act so and so, we shall have such enjoy¬ 
ments; if so and so, such sufferings; and giving us those 
enjoyments, and making us feel those sufferings, in conse¬ 
quence of our actions. 

“ But all this is to be ascribed to the general course of 
nature.” True. This is the very thing which I am observ¬ 
ing. It is to be ascribed to the general course of nature; 
that is, not surely to the words, or ideas, course of nature, 
but to Him who appointed it, and put things into it; or to a 
course of operation, from its uniformity or consistency, 
called natural, (1) and which necessarily implies an opera¬ 
ting agent. For when men find themselves necessitated to 
confess an Author of nature, or that God is the natural 
governor of the world, they must not deny this again, 
(1) Pages 66, 67. 


CHAP. II.] BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. 71 

because his government is uniform; they must not deny 
that he does things at all, because he does them con¬ 
stantly; because the effects of his acting are permanent, 
whether his acting be so or not; though there is no reason 
to think it is not. In short, every man, in every thing he 
does, naturally acts upon the forethought and apprehension 
of avoiding evil, or obtaining good: and, if the natural 
course of things be the appointment of God, and our 
natural faculties of knowledge and experience are given us 
by him, then the good and bad consequences which follow 
our actions are his appointment, and our foresight of those 
consequences is a warning given us by him, how we are 
to act. 

“Is the pleasure, then, naturally accompanying every 
particular gratification of passion, intended to put us upon 
gratifying ourselves in every such particular instance, and 
as a reward to us for so doing? ” No, certainly. Nor is it 
to be said, that our eyes were naturally intended to give us 
the sight of each particular object to which they do or can 
extend—objects which are destructive of them, or which, 
for any other reason, it may become us to turn our eyes 
from. Yet there is no doubt, but that our eyes were 
intended for us to see with. So neither is there any doubt, 
but that the foreseen pleasures and pains, belonging to the 
passions, were intended, in general, to induce mankind to 
act in such and such manners. 

Now, from this general observation, obvious to every one, 
that God has given us to understand he has appointed 
satisfaction and delight to be the consequence of our acting 
in one manner, and pain and uneasiness of our acting in 
another, and of our not acting at all; and that we find 
the consequences, which we were beforehand informed of, 
uniformly to follow; we may learn, that we are, at present, 
actually under his government, in the strictest and most 
proper sense—in such a sense, as that he rewards and 


72 OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD [PART I. 

punishes us for our actions. An Author of nature being 
supposed, it is not so much a deduction of reason as a mat¬ 
ter of experience, that we are thus under his government— 
under his government, in the same sense as we are under 
the government of civil magistrates. Because the annexing 
pleasure to some actions, and pain to others, in our power 
to do or forbear, and giving notice of this appointment 
beforehand to those whom it concerns, is the proper formal 
notion of government. Whether the pleasure or pain which 
thus follows upon our behavior, be owing to the Author of 
nature’s acting upon us every moment which we feel it, or 
to his having at once contrived and executed his own part 
in the plan of the world, makes no alteration as to the 
matter before us. For, if civil magistrates could make the 
sanction of their laws take place, without interposing at all, 
after they had passed them—without a trial and the for¬ 
malities of an execution; if they were able to make their 
laws execute themselves, or every offender to execute them 
upon himself, we should be just in the same sense under 
their government then, as we are now; but in a much 
higher degree, and more perfect manner. Yain is the 
ridicule with which one foresees some persons will divert 
themselves, upon finding lesser pains considered as instances 
of Divine punishment. There is no possibility of answering 
or evading the general thing here intended, without denying 
all final causes. For, final causes being admitted, the 
pleasures and pains now mentioned must be admitted, too, 
as instances of them. And if they are—if God annexes 
delight to some actions and uneasiness to others, with an 
apparent design to induce us to act so and so, then he not 
only dispenses happiness and misery, but, also, rewards and 
punishes actions. If, for example, the pain which we feel 
upon doing what tends to the destruction of our bodies, 
suppose upon too near approaches to fire, or upon wounding 
ourselves, be appointed by the Author of nature to prevent 


CHAP. II.] BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. 73 

our doing what thus tends to our destruction; this is alto¬ 
gether as much an instance of his punishing our actions, 
and consequently of our being under his government, as 
declaring, by a voice from heaven, that if we acted so, he 
would inflict such pain upon us, and inflicting it whether it 
be greater or less. 

Thus, we find, that the true notion or conception of the 
Author of nature, is that of a master or governor, prior to 
the consideration of his moral attributes. The fact of our 
case, which we find by experience, is, that he actually 
exercises dominion or government over us at present, by 
rewarding and punishing us for our actions, in as strict and 
proper a sense of these words, and even in the same sense, 
as children, servants, subjects, are rewarded and punished 
by those who govern them. 

And thus, the whole analogy of nature, the whole pre¬ 
sent course of things, most fully shows, that there is nothing 
incredible in the general doctrine of religion, that God will 
reward and punish men for their actions, hereafter—nothing 
incredible, I mean, arising out of the notion of rewarding 
and punishing; for the whole course of nature is a present 
instance of his exercising that government over us, which 
implies in it rewarding and punishing. 


But, as Divine punishment is what men chiefly object 
against, and are most unwilling to allow, it may be proper 
to mention some circumstances in the natural course of 
punishments at present, which are analogous to what relig¬ 
ion teaches us concerning a future state of punishment; 
indeed, so analogous, that as they add a further credibility 
to it, so they cannot but raise a most serious apprehension 
of it in those who will attend to them. 

It has been now observed, that such and such miseries 
naturally follow such and such actions of imprudence and 



74 OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD [PART I. 

willfulness, as well as actions more commonly and more dis¬ 
tinctly considered as vicious; and that these consequences, 
when they may be foreseen, are properly natural punish¬ 
ments annexed to such actions. For the general thing here 
insisted upon is, not that we see a great deal of misery in 
the world, but a great deal which men bring upon them¬ 
selves by their own behavior, which they might have 
foreseen and avoided. Now, the circumstances of these 
natural punishments, particularly deserving our attention, 
are such as these: that oftentimes they follow, or are 
inflicted in consequence of actions which procure many 
present advantages, and are accompanied with much present 
pleasure; for instance, sickness and untimely death are the 
consequence of intemperance, though accompanied with 
the highest mirth and jollity: that these punishments are 
often much greater than the advantages or pleasures ob¬ 
tained by the actions, of which they are the punishments or 
consequences: that, though we may imagine a constitution 
of nature, in which these natural punishments, which are 
in fact to follow, would follow immediately upon such 
actions being done, or very soon after, we find, on the 
contrary, in our world, that they are often delayed a great 
while, sometimes even till long after the actions occasioning 
them are forgot; so that the constitution of nature is such, 
that delay of punishment is no sort nor degree of presump¬ 
tion of final impunity: that, after such delay, these natural 
punishments or miseries often come, not by degrees, but 
suddenly, with violence, and at once; however, the chief 
misery often does: that, as certainty of such distant misery 
following such actions is never afforded persons, so, perhaps, 
during the actions, they have seldom a distinct, full expec¬ 
tation of its following :(1) and, many times, the case is only 
thus, that they see in general, or may see, the credibility 
that intemperance, suppose, will bring after it diseases; civil 
(1) See Part 2, Chap. vi. 


CHAP, II.] BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. *75 

crimes, civil punishments; when yet the real probability 
often is, that they shall escape; but things, notwithstanding, 
take their destined course, and the misery inevitably follows 
at its appointed time, in very many of these cases. Thus, 
also, though youth may be alledged as an excuse for rash¬ 
ness and folly, as being naturally thoughtless, and not 
- clearly foreseeing all the consequences of being untractable 
and profligate; this does not hinder but that these conse¬ 
quences follow, and are grievously felt throughout the 
whole course of mature life. Habits contracted, even in 
that age, are often utter ruin; and men’s success in the 
world, not only in the common sense of worldly success, 
but their real happiness and misery, depends, in a great 
• degree, and in various ways, upon the manner in which they 
pass their youth; which consequences they, for the most 
part, neglect to consider, and, perhaps, seldom can properly 
be said to believe beforehand. It requires, also, to be men¬ 
tioned, that, in numberless cases, the natural course of 
things affords us opportunities for procuring advantages to 
ourselves at certain times, which we cannot procure when 
we will, nor ever recall the opportunities, if we have 
neglected them. Indeed, the general course of nature is an 
example of this. If, during the opportunity of youth, per¬ 
sons are indocile and self-willed, they inevitably suffer in 
their future life, for want of those acquirements which they 
neglected the natural season of attaining. If the husband¬ 
man lets his seed-time pass without sowing, the whole year 
is lost to him beyond recovery. In like manner, though 
after men have been guilty of folly and extravagance, up to 
a certain degree , it is often in their power, for instance, to 
retrieve their affairs, to recover their health and character, 
at least in good measure, yet real reformation is, in many 
cases, of no avail at all toward preventing the miseries, 
poverty, sickness, infamy, naturally annexed to folly and 
extravagance, exceeding that degree. There is a certain 


76 OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD [PART I. 

bound to imprudence and misbehavior, which, being trans¬ 
gressed, there remains no place for repentance in the natural 
course of things. It is, further, very much to be remarked, 
that neglects from inconsiderateness, want of attention,(l) 
not looking about us to see what we have to do, are often 
attended with consequences altogether as dreadful as any 
active misbehavior, from the most extravagant passion. 
And, lastly, civil government being natural, the punishments 
of it are so too; and some of these punishments are capital, 
as the effects of a dissolute course of pleasure are often 
mortal. So that many natural punishments are final (2) to 
him who incurs them, if considered only in his temporal 
capacity; and seem inflicted by natural appointment, either 
to remove the offender out of the way of being further 
mischievous, or as an example, though frequently a disre¬ 
garded one, to those who are left behind. 

(1) Part 2, Chap. vi. 

(2) The general consideration of a future state of punishment 
most evidently belongs to the subject of natural religion. But if 
any of these reflections should be thought to relate more peculiarly 
to this doctrine, as taught in Scripture, the reader is desired to ob¬ 
serve, that Gentile writers, both moralists and poets, speak of the 
future punishment of the wicked, both as to the duration and degree 
of it, in a like manner of expression and of description, as the Scrip¬ 
ture does. So that all which can positively be asserted to be matter 
of mere revelation, with regard to this doctrine, seems to be, that 
the great distinction between the righteous and the wicked shall be 
made at the end of this world—that each shall then receive according 
to his deserts. Reason did, as it well might, conclude, that it should, 
finally and upon the whole, be well with the righteous and ill with 
the wicked; but it could not be determined, upon any principles of 
reason, whether human creatures might not have been appointed to 
pass through other states of life and being, before that distributive 
justice should finally and effectually take place. Revelation teaches 
us, that the next state of things, after the present, is appointed for 
the execution of this justice; that it shall be no longer delayed; but the 
mystery of God, the great mystery of his suffering vice and confusion 
to prevail, shall then he finished; and he will take to him his great power, 
and will reign, by rendering to every one according to his works. 


CHAP. II.] BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. 77 

These things are not what we call accidental, or to be met 
with only now and then, but they are things of every day’s 
experience; they proceed from general laws, very general 
ones, by which God governs the world, in the natural 
course of his providence. And they are so analogous to 
what religion teaches us concerning the future punishment 
of the wicked, so much of a piece with it, that both would 
naturally be expressed in the very same words and manner 
of description. In the book of Proverbs, (1) for instance, 
Wisdom is introduced as frequenting the most public places 
of resort, and as rejected when she offers herself as the 
natural appointed guide of human life. “ How long,” 
speaking to those who are passing through it, “how long, 
ye simple ones, will ye love folly, and the scomers delight 
in their scorning, and fools hate knowledge? Turn ye at 
my reproof. Behold, I will pour out my spirit upon you, I 
will make known my words unto you.” But, upon being 
neglected, “ Because I have called, and ye refused, I have 
stretched out my hand, and no man regarded; but ye have 
set at naught all my counsel, and would none of my 
reproof: I, also, will laugh at your calamity, I will mock 
when your fear cometh; when your fear cometh as desola¬ 
tion, and your destruction cometh as a whirlwind; when 
distress and anguish cometh upon you. Then shall they 
call upon me, but I will not answer; they shall seek me 
early, but they shall not find me.” This passage, every one 
sees, is poetical, and some parts of it are highly figurative; 
but their meaning is obvious. And the thing intended is 
expressed more literally in the following words: “For that 
they hated knowledge, and did not choose the fear of the 
Lord, therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their own way, 
and be filled with their own devices. For the security of 
the simple shall slay them, and the prosperity of fools shall 
destroy them.” And the whole passage is so equally 

(1) Chap. i. 

7 * 


78 


OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD [PART I. 

applicable to what we experience in the present world, con¬ 
cerning the consequences of men’s actions, and to what 
religion teaches us is to be expected in another, that it may¬ 
be questioned which of the two was principally intended. 

Indeed, when, one has been recollecting the proper proofs 
of a future state of rewards and punishments, nothing, me- 
thinks, can give one so sensible an apprehension of the 
latter, or representation of it to the mind, as observing, that 
after the many disregarded checks, admonitions, and warn¬ 
ings, which people meet with in the ways of vice, and folly, 
and extravagance; warnings from their very nature; from 
the examples of others; from the lesser inconveniences 
which they bring upon themselves; from the instructions 
of wise and virtuous men: after these have been long des¬ 
pised, scorned, ridiculed; after the chief bad consequences, 
temporal consequences, of their follies, have been delayed 
for a great while, at length they break in irresistibly, like 
an armed force; repentance is too late to relieve, and can 
serve only to aggravate their distress: the case is become 
desperate; and poverty and sickness, remorse and anguish, 
infamy and death, the effects of their own doings, over¬ 
whelm them, beyond possibility of remedy or escape. This 
is an account of what is, in fact, the general constitution of 
nature. 

It is not in any sort meant, that, according to wha/ 
appears, at present, of the natural course of things, mep 
are always uniformly punished in proportion to their mis¬ 
behavior ; but that there are very many instances of misbe¬ 
havior punished in the several ways now mentioned, and 
very dreadful instances, too, sufficient to show what the 
laws of the universe may admit; and, if thoroughly consid¬ 
ered, sufficient fully to answer all objections against the 
credibility of a future state of punishments, from any 
imaginations, that the frailty of our nature and external 
temptations almost annihilate the guilt of human vices; as 


CHAP. II.] BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. *79 

well as objections of another sort: from necessity; from 
suppositions that the will of an infinite Being cannot be 
contradicted, or that he must be incapable of offense and 
pro vocational) “’ N 

Reflections of this kind are not without their terrors to 
serious persons, the most free from enthusiasm, and of the 
greatest strength of mind; but it is fit things be stated and 
considered as they really are. And there is, in the present 
age, a certain fearlessness with regard to what may be 
hereafter under the government of God, which nothing but 
a universally acknowledged demonstration on the side of 
atheism can justify, and which makes it quite necessary that 
men be reminded, and, if possible, made to feel, that there 
is no sort of ground for being thus presumptuous, even 
upon the most skeptical principles. For, may it not be said 
of any person, upon his being born into the world, he may 
behave so as to be of no service to it, but by being made 
an example of the woful effects of vice and folly; that he 
may, as any one may, if he will, incur an infamous execu¬ 
tion from the hands of civil justice; or, in some other 
course of extravagance, shorten his days, or bring upon 
himself infamy and diseases worse than death ? So that it 
had been better for him, even with regard to the present 
world, that he had never been born. And is there any 
pretense of reason for people to think themselves secure, 
and talk as if they had certain proof, that, let them act as 
licentiously as they will, there can be nothing analogous to 
this, with regard to a future and more general interest, under 
the providence and government of the same God ? 


(1) See Chaps, iv and vi. 


80 


OF THE MORAL 


[part I. 


CHAPTER III. 

OF THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 

As the manifold appearances of design and of final 
causes, in the constitution of the world, prove it to be the 
work of an intelligent Mind, so the particular final causes of 
pleasure and pain, distributed amongst his creatures, prove 
that they are under his government—what may be called 
his natural government of creatures endued with sense and 
reason. This, however, implies somewhat more than seems 
usually attended to, when we speak of God’s natural gov¬ 
ernment of the world. It implies government of th%very 
same kind with that which a master exercises over his ser¬ 
vants, or a civil magistrate over his subjects. These latter 
instances of final causes as really prove an intelligent Gov¬ 
ernor of the world, in the sense now mentioned, and before(l) 
distinctly treated of, as any other instances of final causes 
prove an intelligent Maker of it. 

But this alone does not appear, at first sight, to determine 
any thing certainly, concerning the moral character of the 
Author of nature, considered in this relation of governor— 
does not ascertain his government to be moral, or prove that 
he is the righteous judge of the world. Moral government 
consists, not barely in rewarding and punishing men for 
their actions, which the most tyrannical person may do; 
but in rewarding the righteous and punishing the wicked— 
in rendering to men according to their actions, Considered 
as good or evil. And the perfection of moral government 
consists in doing this, with regard to all intelligent creatures, 
in an exact proportion to their personal merits or demerits. 

Some men seem to think the only character of the 
Author of nature to be that of simple absolute benevo¬ 
lence. This, considered as a principle of action, and infinite 
(1) Chap. ii. 


CHAP. III.] GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 81 

in degree, is a disposition to produce the greatest possible 
happiness, without regard to person’s behavior, otherwise 
than as such regard would produce higher degrees of it. 
And supposing this to be the only character of God, verac¬ 
ity and justice in him would be nothing but benevolence 
conducted by wisdom. Now, surely this ought not to be 
asserted, unless it can be proved; for we should speak with 
cautious reverence upon such a subject. And whether it 
can be proved or no, is not the thing here to be inquired 
into; but whether, in the constitution and conduct of the 
world, a righteous government be not discemibly planned 
out; which necessarily implies a righteous governor. There 
may, possibly, be in the creation, beings, to whom the 
Author of nature manifests himself under this most amiable 
of all characters, this of infinite, absolute benevolence; for 
it is the most amiable, supposing it not, as, perhaps, it is 
not, incompatible with justice; but he manifests himself to 
us under the character of a righteous governor. He may, 
consistently with this, be simply and absolutely benevolent, 
in the sense now explained; but he is, for he has given us 
a proof in the constitution and conduct of the world that 
he is, a governor over servants, as he rewards and punishes 
us for our actions. And in the constitution and conduct of 
it, he may, also, have given, besides the reason of the thing, 
and the natural presages of conscience, clear and distinct 
intimations, that his government is righteous or moral— 
clear to such as think the nature of it deserving their atten¬ 
tion ; and yet not to every careless person who casts a tran¬ 
sient reflection upon the subject.(l) 

(1) The objections against religion, from the evidence of it not 
being universal, nor so strong as might possibly have been, may be 
urged against natural religion, as well as against revealed. And, 
therefore, the consideration of them belongs to the first part of this 
treatise, as well as the second. But as these objections are chiefly 
urged against revealed religion, I choose to consider them in the second 


82 


OF THE MORAL 


[part I. 

But it is particularly to be observed, that the Divine gov¬ 
ernment, which we experience ourselves under in the pres¬ 
ent state, taken alone, is allowed not to be the perfection of 
moral government. And yet this by no means hinders, but 
that there may be somewhat, be it more or less, truly moral 
in it. A righteous government may plainly appear to be 
carried on to some degree-—enough to give us the apprehen¬ 
sion that it shall be completed, or carried on to that degree 
of perfection which religion teaches us it shall; but which 
cannot appear, till much more of the Divine administration 
be seen, than can in the present life. And the design of 
this chapter is to inquire how far this is the case—how far 
over and above the moral nature(l) which God has given 
us, and our natural notion of him, as righteous governor of 
those his creatures to whom he has given this nature ;(2) I 
say how far, besides this, the principles and beginnings 
of a moral government over the world may be discerned 
notwithstanding and amidst all the confusion and disorder 
of it. 

Now one might mention here, what has been often urged 
with great force, that, in general, less uneasiness, and more 
satisfaction, are the natural consequences(3) of a virtuous 
than of a vicious course of life, in the present state, gs an 
instance of a moral government established in nature^—an 
instance of it collected from experience and present Matter 
of fact. But it must be owned a thing of difficulty to 
weigh and balance pleasures and uneasinesses, each amongst 
themselves, and, also, against each other, so as to make an 
estimate with any exactness, of the overplus of happiness 

part. And the answer to them there, chap, vi, as urged against Chris¬ 
tianity, being almost equally applicable to them as urged against the 
religion of nature, to avoid repetition, the reader is referred to that 
chapter. 

(1) Dissertation 2. (2) Chap. vi. 

(3) See Lord Shaftesbury’s Inquiry concerning Virtue, Part 2. 


CHAP. III.] GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 83 

on the side of virtue. And it is not impossible, that amidst 
the infinite disorders of the world, there may be exceptions 
to the happiness of virtue, even with regard to those per¬ 
sons whose course of life, from their youth up, has been 
blameless, and more with regard to those, who have gone 
on for some time in the ways of vice, and have afterward 
reformed. For suppose an instance of the latter case; a 
person with his passions inflamed, his natural faculty of 
self-government impaired by habits of indulgence, and with 
all his vices about him, like so many harpies, craving for their 
accustomed gratification; who can say how long it might 
be before such a person would find more satisfaction in the 
reasonableness and present good consequences of virtue, 
than difficulties and self-denial in the restraints of it? Ex¬ 
perience, also, shows, that men can, to a great degree, get 
over their sense of shame, so as that, by professing them¬ 
selves to be without principle, and avowing even direct 
villany, they can support themselves against the infamy of 
it. But as the ill actions of any one will probably be more 
talked of, and oftener thrown in his way, upon his reforma¬ 
tion, so the infamy of them will be much more felt, after 
the natural sense of virtue and of honor is recovered. Un¬ 
easinesses of this kind ought indeed to be put to the account 
of former vices; yet it will be said, they are, in part, the 
consequences of reformation. Still I am far from allowing 
it doubtful, whether virtue, upon the whole, be happier 
than vice in the present world; but if it were, yet the be¬ 
ginnings of a righteous administration may, beyond all 
question, be found in nature, if we will attentively inquire 
after them. And, 

I. In whatever manner the notion of God’s moral gov¬ 
ernment over the world might be treated, if it did not ap¬ 
pear whether he were, in a proper sense, our governor at all ; 
yet when it is certain matter of experience, that he does 
manifest himself to us under the character of a governor, 


84 OF THE MORAL [PART I. 

in the sense explained,(l) it must deserve to be considered, 
whether there be not reason to apprehend, that he may be 
a righteous or moral governor. Since it appears to be fact, 
that God does govern mankind by the method of rewards 
and punishments, according to some settled rules of dis¬ 
tribution, it is surely a question to be asked, What pre¬ 
sumption is there against his finally rewarding and punish¬ 
ing them according to this particular rule, namely, as they 
act reasonably or unreasonably, virtuously or viciously? 
since rendering men happy or miserable by this rule, cer¬ 
tainly falls in, much more falls in, with our natural apprehen¬ 
sions and sense of things, than doing so by any other rule 
whatever; since rewarding and punishing actions by any 
other rule, would appear much harder to be accounted for 
by minds formed as he has formed ours. Be the evidence 
of religion, then, more or less clear, the expectation which 
it raises in us, that the righteous shall, upon the whole, be 
happy, and the wicked miserable, cannot, however, possibly 
be considered as absurd or chimerical; because it is no 
more than an expectation, that a method of government, 
already begun, shall be carried on—the method of reward¬ 
ing and punishing actions, and shall be carried on by a par¬ 
ticular rule, which unavoidably appears to us, at first sight, 
more natural than any other, the rule which we call distrib¬ 
utive justice. Nor, 

II. Ought it to be entirely passed over, that tranquility, 
satisfaction, and external advantages, being the natural con¬ 
sequences of prudent management of ourselves and our 
affairs; and rashness, profligate negligence, and willful 
folly, bringing after them many inconveniences and suffer¬ 
ings ; these afford instances of a right constitution of na¬ 
ture ; as the correction of children, for their own sakes and 
by way of example, when they run into danger or hurt 
themselves, is a part of right education. And thus, that 
(1) Chap. ii. 


CHAP. III.] GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 85 

God governs the world by general fixed laws—that he has 
endued us with capacities of reflecting upon this constitu¬ 
tion of things, and foreseeing the good and bad conse¬ 
quences of our behavior, plainly implies some sort of moral 
government: since from such a constitution of things it 
cannot but follow, that prudence and imprudence, which are 
of the nature of virtue and vice,(l) must be, as they are, 
respectively rewarded and punished. 

III. From the natural course of things, vicious actions 
are, to a great degree, actually punished as mischievous to 
society; and besides punishment actually inflicted upon this 
account, there is, also, the fear and apprehension of it in 
those persons whose crimes have rendered them obnoxious 
to it in case of a discovery; this state of fear being itself 
often a very considerable punishment. The natural fear 
and apprehension of it, too, which restrains from such 
crimes, is a declaration of nature against them. It is 
necessary to the very being of society, that vices destruc¬ 
tive of it should be punished as being so; the vices of 
falsehood, injustice, cruelty: which punishment, therefore, 
is as natural as society, and so is an instance of a kind of 
moral government, naturally established, and actually taking 
place. And, since the certain natural course of things is 
the conduct of Providence, or the government of God, 
though carried on by the instrumentality of men, the obser¬ 
vation here made amounts to this, that mankind find them¬ 
selves placed by him in such circumstances, as that they 
are unavoidably accountable for their behavior, and are 
often punished, and sometimes rewarded, under his govern¬ 
ment, in the view of their being mischievous or eminently 
beneficial to society. 

If it be objected that good actions, and such as are bene¬ 
ficial to society, are often punished, as in the case of perse¬ 
cution, and in other cases, and that ill and mischievous 

(1) See Dissertation 2. 

8 


86 


OF THE MORAL 


[part I. 

actions are often rewarded, it may be answered distinctly, 
first, that this is in no sort necessary, and, consequently, not 
natural in the sense in which it is necessary, and, therefore, 
natural, that ill or mischievous actions should be punished; 
and, in the next place, that good actions are never punished, 
considered as beneficial to society, nor ill actions rewarded, 
under the view of their being hurtful to it. So that it 
stands good, without any thing on the side of vice to be set 
over against it, that the Author of nature has as truly 
directed that vicious actions, considered as mischievous to 
society, should be punished, and put mankind under a ne¬ 
cessity of thus punishing them, as he has directed and ne¬ 
cessitated us to preserve our lives by food. 

IV. In the natural course of things, virtue, as such, is 
actually rewarded, and vice, as such, punished; which 
seems to afford an instance, or example, not only of govern¬ 
ment, but of moral government begun and established— 
moral in the strictest sense, though not in that perfection of 
degree which religion teaches us to expect. In order to 
see this more clearly, we must distinguish between actions 
themselves, and that quality ascribed to them, which we 
call virtuous or vicious. The gratification itself of every 
natural passion must be attended with delight; and acqui¬ 
sitions of fortune, however made, are acquisitions of the 
means or materials of enjoyment. An action, then, by 
which any natural passion is gratified, or fortune acquired, 
procures delight or advantage, abstracted from all consider¬ 
ation of the morality of such action. Consequently, the 
pleasure or advantage in this case is gained by the action 
itself, not by the morality, the virtuousness or viciousness 
of it, though it be, perhaps, virtuous or vicious. Thus, to 
say such an action, or course of behavior, procured such 
pleasure or advantage, or brought on such inconvenience 
and pain, is quite a different thing from saying, that such 
good or bad effect was owing to the virtue or vice of such 


CHAP. III.] GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 87 

action or behavior. In one case, an action, abstracted 
from all moral consideration, produced its effect; in the 
other case, for it will appear that there are such cases, the 
morality of the action, the action under a moral considera¬ 
tion, that is, the virtuousness or viciousness of it, produced 
the effect. How I say, virtue, as such, naturally procures 
considerable advantages to the virtuous, and vice, as such, 
naturally occasions great inconvenience, and even misery to 
the vicious, in very many instances. The immediate effects 
of virtue and vice upon the mind and temper are to be 
mentioned as instances of it. Vice, as such, is naturally 
attended with some sort of uneasiness, and not uncommonly 
with great disturbance and apprehension. That inward 
feeling, which, respecting lesser matters and in familiar 
speech, we call being vexed with one’s self, and in matters 
of importance, and in more serious language, remorse, is an 
uneasiness naturally arising from an action of a man’s own, 
reflected upon by himself as wrong, unreasonable, faulty, 
that is, vicious in greater or less degrees; and this mani¬ 
festly is a different feeling from that uneasiness which arises 
from a sense of mere loss or harm. What is more common 
than to hear a man lamenting an accident or event, and 
adding, But, however, he has the satisfaction that he cannot 
blame himself for it; or, on the contrary, that he has the 
uneasiness of being sensible that it was his own doing? 
Thus, also, the disturbance and fear which often follow upon 
a man’s having done an injury, arise from a sense of his 
being blameworthy; otherwise there would, in many cases, 
be no ground of disturbance, nor any reason to fear resent¬ 
ment or shame. On the other hand, inward security and 
peace, and a mind open to the several gratifications of life, 
are the natural attendants of innocence and virtue; to 
which must be added, the complacency, satisfaction, and 
even joy of heart, which accompany the exercise, the real 
exercise, of gratitude, friendship, benevolence. 


88 OF THE MORAL [PART I. 

And here, I think, ought to be mentioned the fears of 
future punishment, and peaceful hopes of a better life, in 
those who fully believe or have any serious apprehension of 
religion; because these hopes and fears are present uneasi¬ 
ness and satisfaction to the mind, and cannot be got rid of 
by great part of the world, even by men who have thought 
most thoroughly upon that subject of religion. And no 
one can say how considerable this uneasiness and satisfaction 
may be, or what, upon the whole, it may amount to. 

In the next place comes in the consideration, that all 
honest and good men are disposed to befriend honest good 
men, as such, and to discountenance the vicious, as such, 
and do so in some degree, indeed in a considerable degree; 
from which favor and discouragement cannot but arise con¬ 
siderable advantage and inconvenience. And, though the 
generality of the world have little regard to the morality 
of their own actions, and may be supposed to have less to 
that of others, when they themselves are not concerned, 
yet, let any one be known to be a man of virtue, somehow 
or other he will be favored, and good offices will be done 
him, from regard to his character, without remote views, 
occasionally, and in some low degree, I think, by the gen¬ 
erality of the world, as it happens to come in their way. 
Public honors, too, and advantages, are the natural conse¬ 
quences—are sometimes, at least, the consequences in fact, 
of virtuous actions, of eminent justice, fidelity, charity, love to 
our country, considered in the view of being virtuous. And 
sometimes even death itself, often infamy and external 
inconveniences, are the public consequences of vice, as vice. 
For instance, the sense which mankind have of tyranny, 
injustice, oppression, additional to the mere feeling or fear 
of misery, has, doubtless, been instrumental in bringing 
about revolutions, which make a figure even in the history 
of the world. For it is plain, men resent injuries as imply¬ 
ing faultiness, and retaliate, not merely under the notion of 


GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 


89 


CHAP. III.] 

having received harm, but of having received wrong; and 
they have this resentment in behalf of others, as well as of 
themselves. So, likewise, even the generality are, in some 
degree, grateful and disposed to return good offices, not 
merely because such a one has been the occasion of good 
to them, but under the view that such good offices implied 
kind intention and good desert in the doer. To all this 
may be added two or three particular things, which many 
persons will think frivolous; but to me nothing appears so, 
which at all comes in toward determining a question of 
such importance, as whether there be or be not a moral 
institution of government, in the strictest sense moral, visibly 
established and begun in nature. The particular things are 
these: that in domestic government, which is, doubtless, 
natural, children, and others also, are very generally pun¬ 
ished for falsehood, and injustice, and ill-behavior, as such, 
and rewarded for the contrary; which are instances where 
veracity, and justice, and right behavior, as such, are natu¬ 
rally enforced by rewards and punishments, whether more or 
less considerable in degree: that, though civil government be 
supposed to take cognizance of actions in no other view than 
as prejudicial to society, without respect to the immorality 
of them, yet as such actions are immoral, so the sense 
which men have of the immorality of them very greatly 
contributes, in different ways, to bring offenders to justice; 
and that entire absence of all crime and guilt, in the moral 
sense, when plainly appearing, will almost of course pro¬ 
cure, and circumstances of aggravated guilt prevent, a 
remission of the penalties annexed to civil crimes, in many 
cases, though by no means in all. 

Upon the whole, then, besides the good and bad effects 
of virtue and vice upon men’s own minds, the course of the 
world does, in some measure, turn upon the approbation 
and disapprobation of them, as such, in others. The sense 
of well and ill-doing, the presages of conscience, the love 


90 


OF THE MORAL 


[part. I. 

of good characters and dislike of bad ones, honor, shame, 
resentment, gratitude; all these, considered in themselves, 
and in their effects, do afford manifest real instances of 
virtue, as such, naturally favored, and of vice, as such, 
discountenanced, more or less, in the daily course of human 
life, in every age, in every relation, in every general circum¬ 
stance of it. That God has given us a moral nature,(l) 
may most justly be urged as a proof of our being under 
his moral government; but that he has placed us in a con¬ 
dition, which gives this nature, as one may speak, scope to 
operate, and in which it does unavoidably operate, that is, 
influence mankind to act, so as thus to favor and reward vir¬ 
tue, and discountenance and punish vice; this is not the same, 
but a further additional proof of his moral government; for 
it is an instance of it. The first is a proof that he will 
finally favor and support virtue effectually; the second is 
an example of his favoring and supporting it at present, in 
some degree. 

If a more distinct inquiry be made, whence it arises, that 
virtue, as such, is often rewarded, and vice, as such, is pun¬ 
ished, and this rule never inverted, it will be found to 
proceed, in part, immediately from the moral nature itself 
which God has given us; and, also, in part, from his having 
given us, together with this nature, so great a power over 
each other’s happiness and misery. For, first, it is certain, 
that peace and delight, in some degree and upon some 
occasions, is the necessary and present effect of virtuous 
practice—an effect arising immediately from that constitution 
of our nature. We are so made that well-doing, as such, 
gives us satisfaction, at least in some instances; ill-doing, as 
as such, in none. And, secondly, from our moral nature, 
joined with God’s having put our happiness and misery, in 
many respects, in each other’s power, it cannot but be that 
vice, as such, some kinds and instances of it at least, will 
(1) See Dissertation 2. 


CHAP. III.] GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 91 

be infamous, and men will be disposed to punish it as in 
itself detestable; and the villain will, by no means, be able 
always to avoid feeling that infamy, any more than he will 
be able to escape this further punishment which mankind' 
will be disposed to inflict upon him, under the notion of his 
deserving it. But there can be nothing on the side of vice 
to answer this; because there is nothing in the human mind 
contradictory, as the logicians speak, to virtue. For virtue 
consists in a regard to what is right and reasonable, as 
being so; in a regard to veracity, justice, charity, in them¬ 
selves : and there is surely no such thing as a like natural 
regard to falsehood, injustice, cruelty. If it be thought, 
that there are instances of an approbation of vice, as such, 
in itself, and for its own sake, (though it does not appear to 
me that there is any such thing at all, but, supposing there 
be,) it is, evidently, monstrous; as much so as the most 
acknowledged perversion of any passion whatever. Such 
instances of perversion, then, being left out as merely 
imaginary, or, however, unnatural, it must follow, from the 
frame of our nature, and from our condition, in the respects 
now described, that vice cannot at all be, and virtue cannot 
but be, favored, as such, by others, upon some occasions, 
and happy in itself, in some degree. For what is here 
insisted upon, is not the degree in which virtue and vice 
are thus distinguished, but only the thing itself, th^t tH&y 
are so in some degree; though the whole good arid bad 
effect of virtue and vice, as such, is not inconsiderable in 
degree. But that they must be thus distinguished, in some 
degree, is in a manner necessary; it is matter of fact, of 
daily experience, even in the greatest confusion of human 
affairs. 

It is not pretended but that, in the natural course of 
things, happiness and misery appear to be distributed by 
other rules, than only the personal merit and demerit of 
characters. They may sometimes be distributed by way of 


92 


OF THE MORAL 


[part I. 

mere discipline. There may be the wisest and best reasons 
why the world should be governed by general laws, from 
whence such promiscuous distribution, perhaps, must follow; 
and, also, why our happiness and misery should be put in 
each other’s power, in the degree which they are. And 
these things, as in general they contribute to the rewarding 
virtue and punishing vice, as such, so they often contribute, 
also, not to the inversion of this, which is impossible, but to 
the rendering persons prosperous, though wicked; afflicted, 
though righteous; and, which is worse, to the rewarding 
some actions, though vicious, and 'punishing other actions, 
though virtuous. But all this cannot drown the voice of 
nature in the conduct of Providence, plainly declaring itself 
for virtue, by way of distinction from 'vice, and preference 
to it. For, our being so constituted as that virtue and vice 
are thus naturally favored and discountenanced, rewarded 
and punished respectively, as such, is an intuitive proof of 
the intent of nature that it should be so; otherwise the 
constitution of our mind, from which it thus immediately 
and directly proceeds, would be absurd. But it cannot be 
said, because virtuous actions are sometimes punished, and 
vicious actions rewarded, that nature intended it. For, 
though this great disorder is brought about, as all actions 
are done, by means of some natural passion, yet this may 
be, as it undoubtedly is, brought about by the perversion of 
such passion, implanted in us for other, and those very good 
purposes. And, indeed, these other and good purposes, 
even of every passion, may be clearly seen. 

We have, then, a declaration, in some degree of present 
effect, from Him who is supreme in nature, which side he 
is of or what part he takes—a declaration for virtue, and 
against vice. So far, therefore, as a man is true to virtue, 
to veracity and justice, to equity and charity, and the right of 
the case, in whatever he is concerned, so far he is on the side 
of the Divine administration, and co-operates with it; and 


CHAP. III.] GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 93 

from hence, to such a man, arises naturally a secret satisfac¬ 
tion and sense of security, and implicit hope of somewhat 
further. And, 

V. This hope is confirmed by the necessary tendencies 
of virtue, which, though not of present effect, yet are at 
present discernible in nature; and so afford an instance of 
somewhat moral in the essential constitution of it. There 
is, in the nature of things, a tendency in virtue and vice to 
produce the good and bad effects now mentioned, in a 
greater degree than they do, in fact, produce them. For 
instance, good and bad men would be much more rewarded 
and punished as such, were it not that justice is often arti¬ 
ficially eluded, that characters are not known, and many 
who would thus favor virtue and discourage vice, are hin¬ 
dered from doing so by accidental causes. These tendencies 
of virtue and vice are obvious with regard to individuals. 
But it may require more particularly to be considered, that 
power in a society, by being under the direction of virtue, 
naturally increases, and has a necessary tendency to prevail 
over opposite power, not under the direction of it; in like 
manner as power, by being under the direction of reason, 
increases, and has a tendency to prevail over brute force. 
There are several brute creatures of equal, and several of 
superior strength, to that of men; and, possibly, the sum 
of the whole strength of brutes may be greater than that 
of mankind, but reason gives us the advantage and supe¬ 
riority *over them, and thus man is the acknowledged 
governing animal upon the earth. Nor is this superiority 
considered by any as accidental, but as what reason has a 
tendency, in the nature of the thing, to obtain. And yet, 
perhaps, difficulties may be raised about the meaning, as 
well as the truth of the assertion, that virtue has the like 
tendency. 

To obviate these difficulties, let us see more distinctly 
how the case stands with regard to reason, which is so 


94 OF THE MORAL [PART I. 

readily acknowledged to have this advantageous tendency. 
Suppose, then, two or three men, of the best and most im¬ 
proved understanding, in a desolate, open plain, attacked by 
ten times the number of. beasts of prey; would their reason 
secure them the victory in this unequal combat? Power, 
then, though joined with reason and under its direction, 
cannot be expected to prevail over opposite power, though 
merely brutal, unless the one bears some proportion to the 
other. Again, put the imaginary case, that rational and 
irrational creatures were of like external shape and manner; 
it is certain, before there were opportunities for the first to 
distinguish each other, to separate from their adversaries, 
and to form a union among themselves, they might be upon 
a level, or in several respects, upon great disadvantage, 
though, united, they might be vastly superior; since union 
is of such efficacy, that ten men, united, might be able to 
accomplish what ten thousand of the same natural strength 
and understanding, wholly ununited, could not. In this 
case, then, brute force might more than maintain its ground 
against reason, for want of union among the rational crea¬ 
tures. Or suppose a number of men to land upon an island 
inhabited only by wild beasts—a number of men, who, by 
the regulations of civil government, the inventions of art, 
and the experience of some years, could they be preserved 
so long, would be really sufficient to subdue the wild beasts, 
and to preserve themselves in security from them; yet, a 
conjuncture of accidents might give such advantage to the 
irrational animals as that they might at once overpower, 
and even extirpate, the whole species of rational ones. 
Length of time, then, proper scope, and opportunities for 
reason to exert itself, may be absolutely necessary to its 
prevailing over brute force. Further still, there are many 
instances of brutes succeeding in attempts which they could 
not have undertaken, had not their irrational nature ren¬ 
dered them incapable of foreseeing the danger of such 


CHAP. III.] GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 95 

attempt, or the fury of passion hindered their attending to 
it; and there are instances of reason, and real prudence, 
preventing men’s undertaking what, it hath appeared after¬ 
ward, they might have succeeded in by a lucky rashness. 
And, in certain conjunctures, ignorance and folly, weakness 
and discord, may have their advantages. So that rational 
animals have not, necessarily, the superiority over irrational 
ones; but, how improbable soever it may be, it is, evidently, 
possible that, in some globes, the latter may be superior. 
And were the former wholly at variance and disunited, by 
false self-interest and envy, by treachery and injustice, and 
consequent rage and malice against each other, whilst the 
latter were firmly united among themselves by instinct, this 
might greatly contribute to the introducing such an inverted 
order of things. For every one would consider it as 
inverted; since reason has, in the nature of it, a tendency 
to prevail over brute force, notwithstanding the possibility 
it may not prevail, and the necessity which there is of many 
concurring circumstances to render it prevalent. 

Now, I say, virtue in a society has a like tendency to 
procure superiority and additional power, whether this 
power be considered as the means of security from opposite 
power, or of obtaining other advantages. And it has this 
tendency, by rendering public good an object and end to 
every member of the society; by putting every one upon 
consideration and diligence, recollection and self-government, 
both in order to see what is the most effectual method, and, 
also, in order to perform their proper part, for obtaining 
and preserving it; by uniting a society within itself, and so 
increasing its strength, and, which is particularly to be men¬ 
tioned, uniting it by means of veracity and justice. For, 
as these last are principal bonds of union, so benevolence, or 
public spirit, undirected, unrestrained by them, is—nobody 
knows what. 

And, suppose the invisible world, and the invisible 


96 OF THE MORAL [PART I. 

dispensations of Providence, to be in any sort analogous to 
what appears; or, that both together make up one uniform 
scheme, the two parts of which, the part which we see, 
and that which is beyond our observation, are analogous to 
each other; then, there must be a like natural tendency in 
the derived power, throughout the universe, under the 
direction of virtue, to prevail in general over that which is 
not under its direction; as there is in reason, derived reason 
in the universe, to prevail over brute force. But, then, in 
order to the prevalence of virtue, or that it may actually 
produce what it has a tendency to produce, the like concur¬ 
rences are necessary, as are, to the prevalence of reason. 
There must be some proportion between the natural power 
or force which is, and that which is not, under the direction 
of virtue. There must be sufficient length of time; for the 
complete success of virtue, as of reason, cannot, from the 
nature of the thing, be otherwise than gradual: there must 
be, as one may speak, a fair field of trial, a stage large and 
extensive enough, proper occasions and opportunities for 
the virtuous to join together, to exert themselves against 
lawless force, and to reap the fruit of their united labors. 
Now, indeed, it is to be hoped, that the disproportion 
between the good and the bad, even here on earth, is not so 
great, but that the former have natural power sufficient to 
their prevailing to a considerable degree, if circumstances 
would permit this power to be united. For, much less, very 
much less power, under the direction of virtue, would 
prevail over much greater, not under the direction of it. 
However, good men over the face of the earth cannot unite; 
as for other reasons, so because they cannot be sufficiently 
ascertained of each other’s characters. And the known 
course of human things, the scene we are now passing 
through, particularly the shortness of life, denies to virtue 
its full scope in several other respects. The natural ten¬ 
dency which we have been considering, though real, is 


CHAP. III.] GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 97 

hindered from being carried into effect in the present state; 
but these hinderances may be removed in a future one. 
Virtue, to borrow the Christian allusion, is militant here, 
and various untoward accidents contribute to its being often 
overborne; but it may combat with greater advantage here¬ 
after, and prevail completely and enjoy its consequent 
rewards, in some future states. Neglected as it is, perhaps 
unknown, perhaps despised and oppressed here, there may 
be scenes in eternity, lasting enough, and in every other 
way adapted, to afford it a sufficient sphere of action, and 
a sufficient sphere for the natural consequences of it to fol¬ 
low in fact. If the soul be naturally immortal, and this 
state be a progress toward a future one, as childhood is 
toward mature age, good men may naturally unite, not only 
amongst themselves, but also with other orders of virtuous 
creatures, in that future state. For virtue, from the very 
nature of it, is a principle and bond of union, in some 
degree, amongst all who are endued with it, and known 
to each other; so as that by it a good man cannot but 
recommend himself to the favor and protection of all vir¬ 
tuous beings, throughout the whole universe, who can be 
acquainted with his character, and can any way interpose 
in his behalf in any part of his duration. And one might 
add, that suppose all this advantageous tendency of virtue 
to become effect amongst one or more orders of creatures, 
in any distant scenes and periods, and to be seen by any 
orders of vicious creatures, throughout the universal king¬ 
dom of God; this happy effect of virtue would have a 
tendency, by way of example, and possibly in other ways, 
to amend those of them who are capable of amendment, 
and being recovered to a just sense of virtue. If our 
notions of the plan of Providence were enlarged, in any 
sort proportionable to what late discoveries have enlarged 
our views with respect to the material world, representa¬ 
tions of this kind would not appear absurd or extravagant. 

9 


98 OF THE MORAL [PART I. 

However, they are not to be taken as intended for a literal 
delineation of what is, in fact, the particular scheme of the 
universe, which cannot be known without revelation; for 
suppositions are not to be looked upon as true, because not 
incredible, but they are mentioned to show, that our finding 
virtue to be hindered from procuring to itself such supe¬ 
riority and advantages, is no objection against its having, in 
the essential nature of the thing, a tendency to procure 
them. And the suppositions now mentioned do plainly 
show this; for they show, that these hinderances are so far 
from being necessary, that we ourselves can easily conceive 
how they may be removed in future states, and full scope 
be granted to virtue. And all these advantageous tenden¬ 
cies of it are to be considered as declarations of God in its 
favor. This, however, is taking a pretty large compass; 
though it is certain, that as the material world appears to 
be, in a manner, boundless and immense, there must be some 
scheme of Providence vast in proportion to it. 

But let us return to the earth, our habitation, and we 
shall see this happy tendency of virtue, by imagining an 
instance not so vast and remote; by supposing a kingdom, 
or society of men, upon it, perfectly virtuous, for a succes¬ 
sion of many ages; to which, if you please, may be given 
a situation advantageous for universal monarchy. In such a 
state there would be no such thing as faction, but men of 
the greatest capacity would, of course, all along have the 
chief direction of affairs willingly yielded to them, and they 
would share it among themselves without envy. Each of 
these would have the part assigned him to which his genius 
was peculiarly adapted; and others, who had not any dis¬ 
tinguished genius, would be safe, and think themselves very 
happy, by being under the protection and guidance of those 
who had. Public determinations would really be the result 
of the united wisdom of the community, and they would 
faithfully be executed by the united strength of it. Some 


CHAP. III.] GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 99 

would, in a higher way, contribute, but all would, in some 
way, contribute to the public prosperity, and in it each 
would enjoy the fruits of his own virtue. And as injustice, 
whether by fraud or force, would be unknown among them¬ 
selves, so they would be sufficiently secured from it in their 
neighbors. For cunning and false self-interest, confedera¬ 
cies in injustice, ever slight, and accompanied with faction 
and intestine treachery; these, on one hand, would be found 
mere childish folly and weakness, when set in opposition 
against wisdom, public spirit, union inviolable, and fidelity 
on the other, allowing both a sufficient length of years to 
try their force. Add the general influence which such a 
kingdom would have over the face of the earth, by way of 
example particularly, and the reverence which would be 
paid it. It would plainly be superior to all others, and the 
world must gradually come under its empire; not by means 
of lawless violence, but partly by what must be allowed to 
be just conquest, and partly by other kingdoms submitting 
themselves voluntarily to it throughout a course of ages, 
and claiming its protection, one after another, in successive 
exigencies. The head of it would be a universal monarch, 
in another sense than any mortal has yet been, and the 
eastern style would be literally applicable to him, that “all 
people, nations, and languages should serve him.” And 
though, indeed, our knowledge of human nature, and the 
whole history of mankind, show the impossibility, without 
some miraculous interposition, that a number of men here on 
earth should unite in one society or government, in the fear 
of God and universal practice of virtue, and that such a 
government should continue so united for a succession of 
ages; yet, admitting or supposing this, the effect would be 
as now drawn out. And thus, for instance, the wonderful 
power and prosperity promised to the Jewish nation in the 
Scripture, would be, in a great measure, the consequence of 
what is predicted of them; that the “ people should be all 


100 


OF THE MORAL 


[part I. 

righteous and inherit the land for ever ;”(1) were we to un¬ 
derstand the latter phrase of a long continuance only, suf¬ 
ficient to give things time to work. The predictions of this 
kind, for there are many of them, cannot come to pass in the 
present known course of nature; but suppose them come 
to pass, and then the dominion and pre-eminence promised 
must naturally follow, to a very considerable degree. 

Consider, now, the general system of religion—that the 
government of the world is uniform, and one, and moral— 
that virtue and right shall finally have the advantage, and 
prevail over fraud and lawless force, over the deceits as well 
as the violence of wickedness, under the conduct of one 
supreme Governor; and from the observations above made, 
it will appear, that God has, by our reason, given us to see 
a peculiar connection in the several parts of this scheme, 
and a tendency toward the completion of it, arising out of 
the very nature of virtue; which tendency is to be consid¬ 
ered as somewhat moral in the essential constitution of 
things. If any one should think all this to be of little 
importance, I desire him to consider what he would think, 
if vice had, essentially and in its nature, these advantageous 
tendencies, or if virtue had, essentially, the direct contrary 
ones. 

But it may be objected, that notwithstanding all these 
natural effects, and these natural tendencies of virtue, yet 
things may be now going on throughout the universe, and 
may go on hereafter, in the same mixed way as here, at 
present, upon earth; virtue sometimes prosperous, some¬ 
times depressed; vice sometimes punished, sometimes suc¬ 
cessful. The answer to which is, that it is not the purpose 
of this chapter, nor of this treatise, properly to prove God’s 
perfect moral government over the world, or the truth of 
religion, but to observe what there is in the constitution and 
course of nature, to confirm the proper proof of it, supposed 
(1) Isa. lx, 21. 


CHAP. III.] GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 101 

to be known, and that the weight of the foregoing observa¬ 
tions to this purpose may be thus distinctly proved. Pleas¬ 
ure and pain are, indeed, to a certain degree, say to a very 
high degree, distributed amongst us, without any apparent 
regard to the merit or demerit of characters. And were 
there nothing else, concerning this matter, discernible in the 
constitution and course of nature, there would be no ground, 
from the constitution and course of nature, to hope or to 
fear, that men would be rewarded or punished hereafter 
according to their deserts; which, however, it is to be 
remarked, implies, that even then there would be no 
ground, from appearances, to think that vice, upon the 
whole, would have the advantage, rather than that virtue 
would. And thus the proof of a future state of retribu¬ 
tion, would rest upon the usual known arguments for it; 
which are, I think, plainly unanswerable, and would be so, 
though there were no additional confirmation of them from 
the things above insisted on. But these things are a very 
strong confirmation of them: for, 

1. They show that the Author of nature is not indiffer¬ 
ent to virtue and vice. They amount to a declaration from 
him, determinate, and not to be evaded, in favor of one, and 
against the other: such a declaration as there is nothing to 
be set over against, or answer, on the part of vice. So that 
were a man, laying aside the proper proof of religion, to 
determine from the course of nature only, whether it were 
most probable that the righteous or the wicked would have 
the advantage in a future life, there can be no doubt but 
that he would determine the probability to be, that the for¬ 
mer would. The course of nature, then, in the view of it 
now given, furnishes us with a real practical proof of the 
obligations of religion. 

2. When, conformably to what religion teaches us, God 
shall reward and punish virtue and vice, as such, so as that 
every one shall, upon the whole, have his deserts, this dis- 


102 OF THE MORAL [PART I. 

tributive justice will not be a thing different in kind, but 
only in degree, from wbat we experience in his present gov¬ 
ernment. It will be that in effect, toward which we now see 
a tendency . It will be no more than the completion of that 
moral government, the principles and beginning of which 
have been shown, beyond all dispute, discernible in the 
present constitution and course of nature. And from hence 
it follows, 

3. That as, under the natural goverment of God, our 
experience of those kinds and degrees of happiness and 
misery, which we do experience at present, gives just 
ground to hope for and to fear higher degrees and other 
kinds of both in a future state, supposing a future state ad¬ 
mitted; so, under his moral government, our experience 
that virtue and vice are, in the manners above mentioned, 
actually rewarded and punished at present, in a certain 
degree, gives just ground to hope and to fear that they 
may be rewarded and punished in a higher degree here¬ 
after. It is acknowledged, indeed, that this alone is not 
sufficient ground to think, that they actually will be 
rewarded and punished in a higher degree, rather than in a 
lower: but then, 

Lastly, There is sufficient ground to think so, from the 
good and bad tendencies of virtue and vice. For these ten¬ 
dencies are essential, and founded in the nature of things; 
whereas, the hinderances, to their becoming effect are, in 
numberless cases, not necessary but artificial only. Now, 
it may be much more strongly argued, that these tendencies, 
as well as the actual rewards and punishments of virtue 
and vice, which arise directly out of the nature of things, 
will remain hereafter, than that the accidental hinderances 
of them will. And if these hinderances do not remain, 
those rewards and punishments cannot but be carried on 
much further toward the perfection of moral government, 
that is, the tendencies of virtue and vice will become effect; 


CHAP. HI.] GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 103 

but when, or where, or in what particular way, cannot be 
known at all but by revelation. 

Upon the whole, there is a kind of moral government 
implied in God’s natural governmental) virtue and vice are 
naturally rewarded and punished as beneficial and mis¬ 
chievous to society,(2) and rewarded and punished directly 
as virtue and vice.(3) The notion, then, of a moral scheme 
of government, is not fictitious, but natural; for it is sug¬ 
gested to our thoughts by the constitution and course of 
nature, and the execution of this scheme is actually begun, 
in the instances here mentioned. And these things are to 
be considered as a declaration of the Author of nature, for 
virtue, and against vice; they give a credibility to the sup¬ 
position of their being rewarded and punished hereafter, 
and, also, ground to hope and to fear, that they may be 
rewarded and punished in higher degrees than they are 
here. And as all this is confirmed, so the argument for 
religion, from the constitution and course of nature, is car¬ 
ried on farther, by observing, that there are natural tenden¬ 
cies, and, in innumerable cases, only artificial hinderances, 
to this moral scheme’s being carried on much farther toward 
perfection than it is at present. (4) The notion, then, of a 
moral scheme of government, much more perfect than what 
is seen, is not a fictitious, but a natural notion, for it is sug¬ 
gested to our thoughts by the essential tendencies of virtue 
and vice. And these tendencies are to be considered as 
intimations, as implicit promises and threatenings, from the 
Author of nature, of much greater rewards and punish¬ 
ments to follow virtue and vice, than do at present. And, 
indeed, every natural tendency, which is to continue, but 
which is hindered from becoming effect by only accidental 
causes, affords a presumption, that such tendency will, some 
time or other, become effect—a presumption in degree pro¬ 
portionable to the length of the duration through which 
(1) Page 83. (2) Page 85. (3) Page 86, &c. (4) Page 93, &c. 


104 OF THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. [PART I. 

such tendency will continue. And from these things 
together arises a real presumption, that the moral scheme 
of government established in nature, shall be carried on 
much farther toward perfection hereafter, and, I think, a 
presumption that it will be absolutely completed. But 
from these things, joined with the moral nature which God 
has given us, considered as given us by him, arises a prac¬ 
tical proof(l) that it will be completed—a proof from fact, 
and, therefore, a distinct one from that which is deduced 
from the eternal and unalterable relations, the fitness and 
unfitness of actions. 

(1) See this proof drawn out briefly, Chap. 6. 


CHAP. IV.] 


OF A STATE OF TRIAL. 


105 


CHAPTER IV. 

OF A STATE OF PROBATION, AS IMPLYING TRIAL, DIFFICUL¬ 
TIES, AND DANGER. 

The general doctrine of religion, that our present life is 
a state of probation for a future one, comprehends under 
it several particular things, distinct from each other. But 
the first and most common meaning of it seems to be, that 
our future interest is now depending, and depending upon 
ourselves—that we have scope and opportunities here for 
that good and bad behavior, which God will reward and 
punish hereafter; together with temptations to one, as well as 
inducements of reason to the other. And this is, in a great 
measure, the same with saying, that we are under the moral 
government of God, and to give an account of our actions 
to him. For the notion of a future account, and general 
righteous judgment, implies some sort of temptations to 
what is wrong, otherwise there would be no moral possi¬ 
bility of doing wrong, nor ground for judgment or dis¬ 
crimination. But there is this difference, that the word 
probation is more distinctly and particularly expressive of 
allurements to wrong, or difficulties in adhering uniformly 
to what is right, and of the danger of miscarrying by such 
temptations, than the words moral government. A state of 
probation, then, as thus particularly implying in it trial, 
difficulties, and danger, may require to be considered dis¬ 
tinctly by itself. 

And as the moral government of God, which religion 
teaches us, implies, that we are in a state of trial with 
regard to a future world, so, also, his natural government 
over us implies, that we are in a state of trial, in a like 
sense, with regard to the present world. Natural govern¬ 
ment, by rewards and punishments, as much implies natural 
trial, as moral government does moral trial. The natural 


106 OF A STATE OF TRIAL. [PART I. 

government of God here meant,(l) consists in his annexing 
pleasure to some actions, and pain to others, which are in 
our power to do or forbear, and in giving us notice of such 
appointment beforehand. This necessarily implies, that he 
has made our happiness and misery, or our interest, to 
depend in part upon ourselves. And so far as men have 
temptations to any course of action, which will probably 
occasion them greater temporal inconvenience and uneasi¬ 
ness than satisfaction, so far their temporal interest is in 
danger from themselves, or they are in a state of trial with 
respect to it. Now, people often blame others, and even 
themselves, for their misconduct in their temporal concerns. 
And we find many are greatly wanting to themselves, and 
miss of that natural happiness which they might have ob¬ 
tained in the present life; perhaps every one does in some 
degree. But many run themselves into great inconvenience, 
and into extreme distress and misery, not through incapacity 
of knowing better, and doing better for themselves, which 
would be nothing to the present purpose, but through their 
own fault. And these things necessarily imply temptation, 
and danger of miscarrying, in a greater or less degree, with 
respect to our worldly interest or happiness. Every one, 
too, without having religion in his thoughts, speaks of the 
hazards which young people run upon their setting out in 
the world—hazards from other causes, than merely their 
ignorance, and unavoidable accidents. And some courses 
of vice, at least, being contrary to men’s worldly interest 
or good, temptations to these must, at the same time, be 
temptations to forego our present and our future interest. 
Thus, in our natural or temporal capacity, we are in a state 
of trial, that is, of difficulty and danger, analogous or like 
to our moral and religious trial. 

This will more distinctly appear to any one, who thinks 
it worth while, more distinctly, to consider what it is which 
Cl) Chap. ii. 


CHAP. IV.] OF A STATE OF TRIAL. 107 

constitutes our trial in both capacities, and to observe how 
mankind behave under it. 

And that which constitutes this our trial, in both these 
capacities, must be somewhat either in our external circum¬ 
stances, or in our nature. For, on the one hand, persons 
may be betrayed into wrong behavior upon surprise, or 
overcome upon any other very singular and extraordinary 
external occasions, who would, otherwise, have preserved 
their character of prudence and of virtue; in which cases, 
every one, in speaking of the wrong behavior of these 
persons, would impute it to such particular external circum¬ 
stances. And, on the other hand, men who have contracted 
habits of vice and folly of any kind, or have some particular 
passions in excess, will seek opportunities, and, as it were, 
go out of their way to gratify themselves in these respects, 
at the expense of their wisdom and their virtue, led to it, 
as every one would say, not by external temptations, but 
by such habits and passions. And the account of this last 
case is, that particular passions are no more coincident 
with prudence, or that reasonable self-love, the end of which 
is our worldly interest, than they are with the principle of 
virtue and religion, but often draw contrary ways to one as 
well as to the other; and so such particular passions are 
as much temptations to act imprudently with regard to our 
worldly interest, as to act viciously.(l) However, as when 
we say men are misled by external circumstances of tempta¬ 
tion, it cannot but be understood, that there is somewhat 
within themselves, to render those circumstances tempta¬ 
tions, or to render them susceptible of impressions from 
them; so, when we say, they are misled by passions-, it is 
always supposed, that there are occasions, circumstances, 
and objects, exciting these passions, and affording means 
for gratifying them. And, therefore, temptations from 

(1) See Sermons preached at the Rolls, 1726, 2d edit., p. 205, &c. 
Pref., p. 25, &c. Serm., p. 21, &c. 


108 OF A STATE OF TRIAL. [PART. I. 

within, and from without, coincide, and mutually imply 
each other. Now, the several external objects of the appe¬ 
tites, passions, and affections, being present to the senses, 
or offering themselves to the mind, and so exciting emotions 
suitable to their nature, not only in cases where they can 
be gratified consistently with innocence and prudence, but, 
also, in cases where they cannot, and yet can be gratified 
imprudently and viciously; this as really puts them in 
danger of voluntarily foregoing their present interest or 
good, as their future, and as really renders self-denial neces¬ 
sary to secure one as the other; that is, we are in a like state 
of trial with respect to both, by the very same passions, 
excited by the very same means. Thus, mankind having a 
temporal interest depending upon themselves, and a prudent 
course of behavior being necessary to secure it, passions 
inordinately excited, whether by means of example or by 
any other external circumstance, toward such objects, at 
such times, or in such degrees, as that they cannot be grati¬ 
fied consistently with worldly prudence, are temptations 
dangerous, and too often successful temptations, to forego a 
greater temporal good for a less; that is, to forego what is, 
upon the whole, our temporal interest, for the sake of a 
present gratification. This is a description of our state of 
trial in our temporal capacity. Substitute now the word 
future for temporal , and virtue for prudence, and it will be 
just as proper a description of our state of trial in our 
religious capacity, so analogous are they to each other. 

If, from consideration of this our like state of trial in 
both capacities, we go on to observe further, how mankind 
behave under it, we shall find there are some who have so 
little sense of it, that they scarce look beyond the passing 
day; they are so taken up with present gratifications, as to 
have, in a manner, no feeling of consequences, no regard to 
their future ease or fortune in this life, any more than to 
their happiness in another. Some appear to be blinded and 


CHAP. IV.] OF A STATE OF TRIAL. 109 

deceived by inordinate passion, in their worldly concerns, as 
much as in religion. Others are, not deceived, but, as it 
were, forcibly carried away, by the like passions, against 
their better judgment, and feeble resolutions, too, of acting 
better. And there are men, and truly they are not a few, 
who shamelessly avow, not their interests, but their mere 
will and pleasure, to be their law of life; and who, in open 
defiance of every thing that is reasonable, will go on in a 
course of vicious extravagance, foreseeing, with no remorse 
and little fear, that it will be their temporal min; and some 
of them, under the apprehension of the consequences of 
wickedness in another state: and, to speak in the most 
moderate way, human creatures are not only continually 
liable to go wrong voluntarily, but we see, likewise, that 
they often actually do so, with respect to their temporal 
interests, as well as with respect to religion. 

Thus, our difficulties and dangers, or our trials in our 
temporal and our religious capacity, as they proceed from 
the same causes, and have the same effect upon men’s 
behavior, are evidently analogous, and of the same kind. 

It may be added, that as the difficulties and dangers 
of miscarrying in our religious state of trial are greatly 
increased, and, one is ready to think, in a manner wholly 
made , by the ill-behavior of others; by a wrong education— 
wrong in a moral sense, sometimes positively vicious; by 
general bad example; by the dishonest artifices which are 
got into business of all kinds; and, in very many parts of 
the world, by religion’s being corrupted into superstitions 
which indulge men in their vices; so, in like manner, the 
difficulties of conducting ourselves prudently in respect to 
our present interest, and our danger of being led aside 
from pursuing it, are greatly increased by a foolish educa¬ 
tion ; and, after we come to mature age, by the extravagance 
and carelessness of others, whom we have intercourse with; 
and by mistaken notions, very generally prevalent, and 

10 


110 OF A STATE OF TRIAL. [PART I. 

taken up from common opinion, concerning temporal happi¬ 
ness, and wherein it consists. And persons, by their own 
negligence and folly in their temporal affairs, no less than 
by a course of vice, bring themselves into new difficulties, 
and, by habits of indulgence, become less qualified to go 
through them; and one irregularity after another embar¬ 
rasses things to such a degree, that they know not where¬ 
about they are, and often makes the path of conduct so 
intricate and perplexed, that it is difficult to trace it out— 
difficult even to determine what is the prudent or the moral 
part. Thus, for instance, wrong behavior in one Stage of 
life, youth—wrong, I mean, considering ourselves only in 
our temporal capacity, without taking in religion; this, in 
several ways, increases the difficulties of right behavior in 
mature age; that is, puts us into a more disadvantageous 
state of trial in our temporal capacity. 

We are an inferior part of the creation of God. There 
are natural appearances of our being in a state of degra¬ 
dation ;(1) and we certainly are in a condition which does 
not seem, by any means, the most advantageous we could 
imagine or desire, either in our natural or moral capacity, 
for securing either our present or future interest. However, 
this condition, low, and careful, and uncertain as it is, does 
not afford any just ground of complaint: for, as men may 
manage their temporal affairs with prudence, and so pass 
their days here on earth in tolerable ease and satisfaction, by 
a moderate degree of care, so, likewise, with regard to relig¬ 
ion, there is no more required than what they are well able 
to do, and what they must be greatly wanting to themselves 
if they neglect. And for persons to have that put upon 
them which they are well able to go through, and no more, 
we naturally consider as an equitable thing, supposing it 
done by proper authority. Nor have we any more reason 
to complain of it, with regard to the Author of nature, 
(1) Part 2, Chap. v. 


CHAP. IV.] OF A STATE OF TRIAL. Ill 

than of his not having given us other advantages, belonging 
to other orders of creatures. 

But the thing here insisted upon is, that the state of trial 
which religion teaches us we are in, is rendered credible, 
by its being throughout uniform and of a piece with the 
general conduct of Providence toward us, in all other 
respects within the compass of our knowledge. Indeed, if 
mankind, considered in their natural capacity as inhabitants 
of this world only, found themselves, from their birth to 
their death, in a settled state of security and happiness, 
without any solicitude or thought of their own; or, if they 
were in no danger of being brought into inconveniences and 
distress by carelessness, or the folly of passion, through 
bad example, the treachery of others, or the deceitful 
appearances of things; were this our natural condition, then 
it might seem strange, and be some presumption against 
the truth of religion, that it represents our future and more 
general interest, as not secure, of course, but as depending 
upon our behavior, and requiring recollection and self- 
government to obtain it. For, it might be alledged, “What 
you say is our condition in one respect, is not in anywise 
of a sort with what we find, by experience, our condition is 
in another. Our whole present interest is secured to our 
hands, without any solicitude of ours, and why should not 
our future interests, if we have any such, be so too ? ” But 
since, on the contrary, thought and consideration, the volun¬ 
tary denying ourselves many things which we desire, and a 
course of behavior far from being always agreeable to us, 
are absolutely necessary to our acting even a common 
decent and common prudent part, so as to pass with any 
satisfaction through the present world, and be received 
upon any tolerable good terms in it; since this is the case, 
all presumption against self-denial and attention being neces¬ 
sary to secure our higher interest, is removed. Had we 
not experience, it might, perhaps, speciously be urged, that 
it is improbable any thing of hazard and danger should be 


112 OF A STATE OF TRIAL. [PART I. 

put upon us by an infinite Being, when every thing which 
is hazard and danger in our manner of conception, and will 
end in error, confusion, and misery, is now already cer¬ 
tain in his foreknowledge. And, indeed, why any thing of 
hazard and danger should be put upon such frail creatures 
as we are, may well be thought a difficulty in speculation; 
and cannot but be so, till we know the whole, or, however, 
much more of the case. But still, the constitution of na¬ 
ture is as it is. Our happiness and misery are trusted to 
our conduct, and made to depend upon it. Somewhat, and, 
in many circumstances, a great deal, too, is put upon us, 
either to do, or to suffer, as we choose. And all the various 
miseries of life, which people bring upon themselves by 
negligence and folly, and might have avoided by proper 
care, are instances of this; which miseries are, beforehand, 
just as contingent and undetermined as their conduct, and 
left to be determined by it. 

These observations are an answer to the objections against 
the credibility of a state of trial, as implying temptations, 
and real danger of miscarrying with regard to our general 
interest, under the moral government of God; and they 
show, that, if we are at all to be considered in such a capac¬ 
ity, and as having such an interest, the general analogy of 
Providence must lead us to apprehend ourselves in danger 
of miscarrying, in different degrees, as to this interest, by 
our neglecting to act the proper part belonging to us in 
that capacity. For we have a present interest, under the 
government of God which we experience here upon earth. 
And this interest, as it is not forced upon us, so neither is it 
offered to our acceptance, but to our acquisition; in such 
sort, as that we are in danger of missing it, by means of 
temptations to neglect or act contrary to it; and without 
attention and self-denial, must and do miss of it. It is, 
then, perfectly credible, that this may be our case with 
respect to that chief and final good which religion proposes 
to us. 


CHAP. V.] OF A STATE OF MORAL DISCIPLINE. 


113 


CHAPTER Y. 

OF A STATE OF PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR MORAL DIS¬ 
CIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT. 

From the consideration of our being in a probation-state, 
of so much difficulty and hazard, naturally arises the ques¬ 
tion, how we came to be placed in it ? But such a general 
inquiry as this would be found involved in insuperable 
difficulties. For, though some of these difficulties would be 
lessened by observing, that all wickedness is voluntary, as 
is implied in its very notion, and that many of the miseries 
of life have apparent good effects, yet when we consider 
other circumstances belonging to both, and what must be 
the consequence of the former in a life to come, it cannot 
but be acknowledged plain folly and presumption, to pretend 
to give an account of the whole reasons of this matter—the 
whole reasons of our being allotted a condition, out of which 
so much wickedness and misery, so circumstanced, would 
in fact arise. Whether it be not beyond our faculties, not 
only to find out, but even to understand, the whole account 
of this, or, though we should be supposed capable of 
understanding it, yet, whether it would be of service or 
prejudice to us to be informed of it, is impossible to say. 
But, as our present condition can in nowise be shown incon¬ 
sistent with the perfect moral government of God, so religion 
teaches us we were placed in it, that we might qualify our¬ 
selves, by the practice of virtue, for another state, which is 
to follow it. And this, though but a partial answer, a very 
partial one indeed, to the inquiry now mentioned, yet is 
a more satisfactory answer to another, which is of real, and 
of the utmost importance to us to have answered—the 
inquiry, What is our business here? The known end, then, 
why we are placed in a state of so much affliction, hazard, 
and difficulty, is, our improvement in virtue and piety, as 


OF A STATE OF 


114 


[part I. 


the requisite qualification for a future state of security and 
happiness. 

Now, the beginning of life, considered as an education 
for mature age in the present world, appears plainly, at 
first sight, analogous to this our trial for a future one; the 
former being, in our temporal capacity, what the latter is in 
our religious capacity. But some observations common to 
both of them, and a more distinct consideration of each, will 
more distinctly show the extent and force of the analogy 
between them; and the credibility which arises from hence, 
as well as from the nature of the thing, that the present 
life was intended to be a state of discipline for a future one. 

I. Every species of creatures is, we see, designed for a 
particular way of life, to which the nature, the capacities, 
temper, and qualifications of each species, are as necessary 
as their external circumstances. Both come into the notion 
of such state, or particular way of life, and are constituent 
parts of it. Change a man’s capacities or character to the 
degree in which it is conceivable they may be changed, and 
he would be altogether incapable of a human course of 
life and human happiness—as incapable as if, his nature 
continuing unchanged, he were placed in a world where he 
had no sphere of action, nor any objects to answer his 
appetites, passions, and affections of any sort. One thing 
is set over against another, as an ancient writer expresses it. 
Our nature corresponds to our external condition. Without 
this correspondence, there would be no possibility of any 
such thing as human life and human happiness; which life 
and happiness are, therefore, a result from our nature and 
condition jointly; meaning by human life, not living in the 
literal sense, but the whole complex notion commonly un¬ 
derstood by those words. So that, without determining 
what will be the employment and happiness, the particu¬ 
lar life of good men hereafter, there must be some determ¬ 
inate capacities, some necessaiy character and qualifications, 


CHAP. V.] MORAL DISCIPLINE. 115 

without which persons cannot but be utterly incapable of it; 
in like manner as there must be some, without which men 
would be incapable of their present state of life. Now, 

II. The constitution of human creatures, and, indeed, of 
all creatures which come under our notice, is such, as that 
they are capable of naturally becoming qualified for states 
of life, for which they were once wholly unqualified. In 
imagination we may, indeed, conceive of creatures, as inca¬ 
pable of having any of their faculties naturally enlarged, or 
as being unable naturally to acquire any new qualifications; 
but the faculties of every species known to us are made for 
enlargement—for acquirements of experience and habits. 
We find ourselves in particular endued with capacities, not 
only of perceiving ideas, and of knowledge or perceiving 
truth, but, also, of storing up our ideas and knowledge by 
memory. We are capable, not only of acting, and of hav¬ 
ing different momentary impressions made upon us, but of 
getting a new facility in any kind of action, and of settled 
alterations in our temper or character. The power of the 
two last is the power of habits. But neither the perception 
of ideas, nor knowledge of any sort, are habits, though 
absolutely necessary to the forming of them. However, 
apprehension, reason, memory, which are the capacities of 
acquiring knowledge, are greatly improved by exercise. 
Whether the word habit is applicable to all these improve¬ 
ments, and, in particular, how far the powers of memory 
and of habits may be powers of the same nature, I shall 
not inquire. But that perceptions come into our minds 
readily and of course, by means of their having been there 
before, seems a thing of the same sort, as readiness in any 
particular kind of action, proceeding from being accustomed 
to it. And aptness to recollect practical observations of 
service in our conduct, is plainly habit in many cases. 
There are habits of perception and habits of action. An 
instance of the former, is our constant and even involuntary 


116 OF A STATE OF [PART L 

readiness in correcting the impressions of our sight, con¬ 
cerning magnitudes and distances, so as to substitute judg¬ 
ment in the room of sensation, imperceptibly to ourselves. 
And it seems as if all other associations of ideas, not 
naturally connected, might be called passive habits, as 
properly as our readiness in understanding languages upon 
sight, or hearing of words. And our readiness in speaking 
and writing them is an instance of the latter—of active 
habits. For distinctness, we may consider habits as belong¬ 
ing to the body, or the mind, and the latter will be ex¬ 
plained by the former. Under the former are compre¬ 
hended all bodily activities or motions, whether graceful 
or unbecoming, which are owing to use; under the latter, 
general habits of life and conduct, such as those of obe¬ 
dience and submission to authority, or to any particular 
person; those of veracity, justice, and charity; those of 
attention, industry, self-government, envy, revenge. And 
habits of this latter kind seem produced by repeated acts, 
as well as the former. And, in like manner, as habits 
belonging to the body are produced by external acts, so 
habits of the minds are produced by the exertion of 
inward practical principles; that is, by carrying them into 
act, or acting upon them, the principles of obedience, of 
veracity, justice, and charity. Nor can those habits be 
formed by any external course of action, otherwise than as 
it proceeds from these principles; because it is only these 
inward principles exerted, which are strictly acts of obe¬ 
dience, of veracity, of justice, and of charity. So, like¬ 
wise, habits of attention, industry, self-government, are, in 
the same manner, acquired by exercise; and habits of envy 
and revenge by indulgence, whether in outward act or in 
thought and intention, that is, inward act; for such intention 
is an act. Resolutions, also, to do well are properly acts: 
and endeavoring to enforce upon our own minds a practical 
sense of virtue, or to beget in others that practical sense of 


CHAP. V.] MORAL DISCIPLINE. 117 

it which a man really has himself, is a virtuous act. All 
these, therefore, may and will contribute toward forming 
good habits. But, going over the theory of virtue in one’s 
thoughts, talking well, and drawing fine pictures of it, this 
is so far from necessarily or certainly conducing to form a 
habit of it in him who thus employs himself, that it may 
harden the mind in a contrary course, and render it gradu¬ 
ally more insensible; that is, form a habit of insensibility 
to all moral considerations. For, from our very faculty 
of habits, passive impressions, by being repeated, grow 
weaker. Thoughts, by often passing through the mind, 
are felt less sensibly; being accustomed to danger, begets 
intrepidity, that is, lessens fear; to distress, lessens the 
passion of pity; to instances of others’ mortality, lessens 
the sensible apprehension of our own. And from these 
two observations together, that practical habits are formed 
and strengthened by repeated acts, and that passive im¬ 
pressions grow weaker by being repeated upon us, it must 
follow, that active habits may be gradually forming and 
strengthening, by a course of acting upon such and such 
motives and excitements, whilst these motives and excite¬ 
ments themselves are, by proportionable degrees, growing 
less sensible; that is, are continually less and less sensibly 
felt, even as the active habits strengthen. And experience 
confirms this; for active principles, at the very time that 
they are less lively in perception than they were, are found 
to be somehow wrought more thoroughly into the temper 
and character, and become more effectual in influencing our 
practice. The three things just mentioned may afford 
instances of it. Perception of danger is a natural excite¬ 
ment of passive fear and active caution; and, by being 
inured to danger, habits of the latter are gradually 
wrought, at the same time that the former gradually les¬ 
sens. Perception of distress in others is a natural excite¬ 
ment, passively to pity, and actively to relieve it; but let a 


118 


OF A STATE OF 


[part I. 

man set himself to attend to, inquire out, and relieve 
distressed persons, and he cannot but grow less and less sen¬ 
sibly affected with the various miseries of life, with which 
he must become acquainted; when yet, at the same time, 
benevolence, considered not as a passion, but as a practical 
principle of action, will strengthen; and, whilst he pas¬ 
sively compassionates the distressed less, he will acquire a 
greater aptitude actively to assist and befriend them. So, 
also, at the same time, that the daily instances of men’s 
dying around us give us daily a less sensible passive feeling 
or apprehension of our own mortality, such instances greatly 
contribute to the strengthening a practical regard to it in 
serious men; that is, to forming a habit of acting with a 
constant view to it. And this seems again further to show, 
that passive impressions made upon our minds by admoni¬ 
tion, experience, example, though they may have a remote 
efficacy, and a very great one, toward forming active habits, 
yet can have this efficacy no otherwise than by inducing us 
to such a course of action; and that it is, not being affected 
so and so, but acting, which forms those habits; only it 
must be always remembered, that real endeavors to enforce 
good impressions upon ourselves, are a species of virtuous 
action. Nor do we know how far it is possible, in the 
nature of things, that effects should be wrought in us at 
once equivalent to habits, that is, what is wrought by use 
and exercise. However, the thing insisted upon is, not 
what may be possible, but what is, in fact, the appointment 
of nature, which is, that active habits are to be formed by 
exercise. Their progress may be so gradual as to be imper¬ 
ceptible in its steps; it may be hard to explain the faculty 
by which we are capable of habits, throughout its several 
parts, and to trace it up to its original, so as to distinguish 
it from all others in our mind; and it seems as if contrary 
effects were to be ascribed to it. But the thing in gen¬ 
eral, that our nature is formed to yield, in some such 


CHAP. V.]] MORAL DISCIPLINE. 119 

manner as this, to use and exercise, is matter of certain 
experience. 

Thus, by accustoming ourselves to any course of action 
we get an aptness to go on, a facility, readiness, and often 
pleasure in it. The inclinations which rendered us averse 
to it grow weaker; the difficulties in it, not only the imag¬ 
inary, but the' real ones, lessen; the reasons for it offer 
themselves of course to our thoughts upon all occasions; 
and the least glimpse of them is sufficient to make us go 
on in a course of action to which we have been accustomed. 
And practical principles appear to grow stronger absolutely 
in themselves, by exercise, as well as relatively, with regard 
to contrary principles; which, by being accustomed to sub¬ 
mit, do so habitually, and of course. And thus a new char¬ 
acter, in several respects, may be formed; and many habi¬ 
tudes of life, not given by nature, but which nature directs 
us to acquire. 

III. Indeed, we may be assured, that we should never 
have had these capacities of improving by experience, 
acquired knowledge and habits, had they not been neces¬ 
sary, and intended to be made use of. And, accordingly, 
we find them so necessary, and so much intended, that, 
without them, we should be utterly incapable of that which 
was the end, for which we were made, considered in our 
temporal capacity only—the employments and satisfactions 
of our mature state of life. 

Nature does in nowise qualify us wholly, much less at 
once, for this mature state of life. Even maturity of under¬ 
standing and bodily strength are not only arrived to gradu¬ 
ally, but are, also, very much owing to the continued exer¬ 
cise of our powers of body and mind from infancy. But if 
we suppose a person brought into the world with both these 
in maturity, as far as this is conceivable, he would plainly 
at first be as unqualified for the human fife of mature 
age, as an idiot. He would be in a manner distracted with 


120 OF A STATE OF [PART I. 

astonishment, and apprehension, and curiosity, and suspense; 
nor can one guess how long it would be before he would be 
familiarized to himself, and the objects about him, enough 
even to set himself to any thing. It may be questioned, 
too, whether the natural information of his sight and hear¬ 
ing would be of any manner of use at all to him in act¬ 
ing, before experience. And it seems that men would be 
strangely headstrong and self-willed, and disposed to exert 
themselves with an impetuosity which would render society 
insupportable, and the living in it impracticable, were it not 
for some acquired moderation and self-government, some 
aptitude and readiness in restraining themselves, and conceal¬ 
ing their sense of things. Want of every thing of this 
kind which is learned, would render a man as uncapable of 
society as want of language would; or as his natural igno¬ 
rance of any of the particular employments of life, would 
render him incapable of providing himself with the com¬ 
mon conveniences, or supplying the necessary wants of it. 
In these respects, and, probably, in many more, of which 
we have no particular notion, mankind is left by nature an 
unformed, unfinished creature, utterly deficient and unqual¬ 
ified, before the acquirement of knowledge, experience, and 
habits, for that mature state of fife, which was the end of 
his creation, considering him as related only to this world. 

But, then, as nature has endued us with the power of 
supplying those deficiencies, by acquired knowledge, expe¬ 
rience, and habits, so, likewise, we are placed in a condi¬ 
tion, in infancy, childhood, and youth, fitted for it—fitted 
for our acquiring those qualifications of all sorts, which we 
stand in need of in mature age. Hence, children, from 
their very birth, are daily growing acquainted with the 
objects about them, with the scene in which they are 
placed, and to have a future part; and learning somewhat 
or other, necessary to the performance of it. The subordi¬ 
nations, to which they are accustomed in domestic life. 


CHAP. V.] MORAL DISCIPLINE. 121 

teach them self-government in common behavior abroad, 
and prepare them for subjection and obedience to civil 
authority. What passes before their eyes, and daily hap¬ 
pens to them, gives them experience, caution against treach¬ 
ery and deceit, together with numberless little rules of 
action and conduct, which we could not live without, and 
which are learned so insensibly and so perfectly, as to be 
mistaken, perhaps, for instinct; though they are the effect 
of long experience and exercise: as much so as language, 
or knowledge in particular business, or the qualifications 
and behavior belonging to the several ranks and professions. 
Thus, the beginning of our days is adapted to be, and is, a 
state of education in the theory and practice of mature life. 
We are much assisted in it by example, instruction, and the 
care of others; but a great deal is left to ourselves to do. 
And of this, as part is done easily and of course, so part 
requires diligence and care, the voluntary foregoing many 
things which we desire, and setting ourselves to what we 
should have no inclination to, but for the necessity or expe¬ 
dience of it. For that labor and industry which the station 
of so many absolutely requires, they would be greatly un¬ 
qualified for in maturity, as those in other stations would be 
for any other sorts of application, if both were not accus¬ 
tomed to them in their youth. And according as persons 
behave themselves, in the general education which all go 
through, and in the particular ones adapted to particular 
employments, their character is formed, and made appear; 
they recommend themselves more or less; and are capable 
of, and placed in different stations in the society of mankind. 

The former part of life, then, is to be considered as an 
important opportunity, which nature puts into our hands, 
and which, when lost, is not to be recovered. And our 
being placed in a state of discipline throughout this life, for 
another world, is a Providential disposition of things, ex¬ 
actly of the same kind as our being placed in a state of 


122 


OF A STATE OF 


[part I. 

discipline during childhood, for mature age. Our condition, 
in both respects, is uniform and of a piece, and compre¬ 
hended under one and the same general law of nature. 

And if we were not able at all to discern, how or in what 
way the present life could be our preparation for another, 
this would be no objection against the credibility of its being 
so. For we do not discern how food and sleep contribute 
to the growth of the body, nor could have any thought that 
they would, before we had experience. Nor do children at 
all think, on the one hand, that the sports and exercises, to 
which they are so much addicted, contribute to their health 
and growth; nor, on the other, of the necessity which there 
is for their being restrained in them; nor are they capable 
of understanding the use of many parts of discipline, which, 
nevertheless, they must be made to go through, in order to 
qualify them for the business of mature age. Were we not 
able, then, to discover in what respects the present life could 
form us for a future one, yet nothing would be more sup- 
posable than that it might, in some respects or other, from 
the general analogy of Providence. And this, for aught I 
see, might reasonably be said, even though we should not 
take in the consideration of God’s moral government over 
the world. But, 

IV. Take in this consideration, and, consequently, that 
the character of virtue and piety is a necessary qualification 
for the future state, and then we may distinctly see how, 
and in what respects, the present life may be a preparation 
for it; since we want, and are capable of improvement in 
that character , by moral and religious habits; and the present 
life is fit to be a state of discipline for such improvement; in 
like manner as we have already observed, how, and in what 
respects, infancy, childhood, and youth, are a necessary pre¬ 
paration, and a natural state of ’discipline, for mature age. 

Nothing, which we at present see, would lead us to the 
thought of a solitary unactive state hereafter; but, if we 


CHAP. V.] MORAL DISCIPLINE. 123 

judge at all from the analogy of nature, we must suppose, 
according to the Scripture account of it, that it will be a 
community. And there is no shadow of any thing unrea¬ 
sonable in conceiving, though there be no analogy for it, 
that this community will be, as the Scripture represents it, 
under the more immediate, or, if such an expression may 
be used, the more sensible government of God. Nor is our 
ignorance, what will be the employments of this happy 
community, nor our consequent ignorance, what particular 
scope or occasion there will be for the exercise of veracity, 
justice, and charity, amongst the members of it with regard 
to each other, any proof that there will be no sphere of 
exercise for those virtues. Much less, if that were possible, 
is our ignorance any proof that there will be no occasion 
for that frame of mind, or character, which is formed by 
the daily practice of those particular virtues here, and which 
is a result from it. This, at least, must be owned in general, 
that as the government established in the universe is moral, 
the character of virtue and piety must, in some way or other, 
be the condition of our happiness, or the qualification for it. 

Now, from what is above observed concerning our natural 
power of habits, it is easy to see, that we are capable of 
moral improvement by discipline. And how greatly we 
want it, need not be proved to any one who is acquainted 
with the great wickedness of mankind, or even with those 
imperfections which the best are conscious of. But it is 
not, perhaps, distinctly attended to by every one, that the 
occasion which human creatures have for discipline, to im¬ 
prove in them this character of virtue and piety, is to be 
traced up higher than to excess in the passions, by indul¬ 
gence and habits of vice. Mankind, and, perhaps, all finite 
creatures, from the very constitution of their nature, before 
habits of virtue, are deficient, and in danger of deviating 
from what is right, and, therefore, stand in need of virtuous 
habits for a security against this danger. For, together 


124 OF A STATE OF [PART I. 

with the general principle of moral understanding, we have 
in our inward frame various affections toward particular 
external objects. These affections are naturally, and of 
right, subject to the government of the moral principle, as 
to the occasions upon which they may be gratified, as to the 
times, degrees, and manner, in which the objects of them 
may be pursued; but, then, the principle of virtue can 
neither excite them, nor prevent their being excited. On 
the contrary, they are naturally felt, when the objects of 
them are present to the mind, not only before all consider¬ 
ation whether they can be obtained by lawful means, but 
after it is found they cannot. For the natural objects of 
affection continue so; the necessaries, conveniences, and 
pleasures of life, remain naturally desirable, though they 
cannot be obtained innocently—nay, though they cannot 
possibly be obtained at all. And when the objects of any 
affection whatever cannot be obtained without unlawful 
means, but may be obtained by them, such affection, though 
its being excited, and its continuing some time in the mind, 
be as innocent as it is natural and necessary, yet cannot but 
be conceived to have a tendency to incline persons to ven¬ 
ture upon such unlawful means, and, therefore, must be 
conceived as putting them in some danger of it. Now, 
what is the general security against this danger—against 
their actually deviating from right? As the danger is, so, 
also, must the security be, from within, from the practical 
principle of virtue.(l) And the strengthening or improving 

(1) It may be thought that a sense of interest would as effectually 
restrain creatures from doing wrong. But if by a sense of interest 
is meant, a speculative conviction or belief that such and such indul¬ 
gence would occasion them greater uneasiness, upon the whole, 
than satisfaction, it is contrary to present experience to say, that 
this sense of interest is sufficient to restrain them from thus indulg¬ 
ing themselves. And if by a sense of interest is meant, a practical 
regard to what is upon the whole our happiness, this is not only 
coincident with the principle of virtue, or moral rectitude, but is 
a part of the idea itself. And it is evident this reasonable self-love 


MORAL DISCIPLINE. 


125 


CHAP. V.] 

this principle, considered as practical, or as a principle of 
action, will lessen the danger or increase the security against 
it. And this moral principle is capable of improvement, 
by proper discipline and exercise; by recollecting the prac¬ 
tical impressions which example and experience have made 
upon us; and, instead of following humor and mere inclina¬ 
tion, by continually attending to the equity and right of the 
case, in whatever we are engaged, be it in greater or less 
matters; and accustoming ourselves always to act upon it, 
as being itself the just and natural motive of action; and, 
as this moral course of behavior must necessarily, under 
Divine government, be of final interest. Thus, the principle 
of virtue, impi'oved into a habit, of which improvement we 
are thus capable, will plainly be, in proportion to the strength 
of it, a security against the danger which finite creatures are 
in, from the very nature of propension, or particular affec¬ 
tions. This way of putting the matter supposes particular 
affections to remain in a future state, which it is scarce 
possible to avoid supposing. And if they do, we clearly 
see, that acquired habits of virtue and self-government may 
be necessary for the regulation of them. However, though 
we were not distinctly to take in this supposition, but to 
speak only in general, the thing really comes to the same. 
For habits of virtue, thus acquired by discipline, are im¬ 
provement in virtue; and improvement in virtue must be 
advancement in happiness, if the government of the universe 
be moral. 

From these things we may observe, and it will farther 

wants to be improved, as really as any principle in our nature. For 
we daily see it over-matched, not only by the more boisterous pas¬ 
sions, but by curiosity, shame, love of imitation, by any thing, even 
indolence: especially if the interest, the temporal interest, suppose, 
which is the end of such self-love, be at a distance. So greatly are 
profligate men mistaken, when they affirm they are wholly governed 
by interestedness and self-love: and so little cause is there for moral¬ 
ists to disclaim this principle. See page 108. 


126 OF A STATE OF [PART I. 

show this our natural and original need of being improved 
by discipline, how it comes to pass, that creatures, made 
upright, fall; and that those who preserve their upright¬ 
ness, by so doing, raise themselves to a more secure state 
of virtue. To say that the former is accounted for by the 
nature of liberty, is to say no more than that an event’s 
actually happening is accounted for by a mere possibility of 
its happening. But it seems distinctly conceivable from the 
very nature of particular affections or propensions. For, 
suppose creatures intended for such a particular state of 
life, for which such propensions were necessary; suppose 
them endued with such propensions, together with moral 
understanding, as well including a practical sense of virtue 
as a speculative conception of it; and that all these several 
principles, both natural and moral, forming an inward con¬ 
stitution of mind, were in the most exact proportion possible, 
that is, in a proportion the most exactly adapted to their 
intended state of life; such creatures would be made up¬ 
right, or finitely perfect. Now, particular propensions, from 
their very nature, must be felt, the objects of them being 
present, though they cannot be gratified at all, or not with 
the allowance of the moral principle. But if they can be 
gratified without its allowance, or by contradicting it, then 
they must be conceived to have some tendency, in how 
low a degree soever, yet some tendency, to induce persons 
to such forbidden gratification. This tendency, in some one 
particular propension, may be increased, by the greater 
frequency of occasions naturally exciting it, than of occa¬ 
sions exciting others. The least voluntary indulgence in 
forbidden circumstances, though but in thought, will increase 
this wrong tendency, and may increase it further, till, pecu¬ 
liar conjunctures, perhaps, conspiring, it becomes effect; 
and danger of deviating from right, ends in actual deviation 
from it—a danger necessarily arising from the very nature 
of propension, and which, therefore, could not have been 


CHAP. V.] MORAL DISCIPLINE. 127 

prevented, though it might have been escaped, or got inno¬ 
cently through. The case would be, as if we were to sup¬ 
pose a straight path marked out for a person, in which such 
a degree of attention would keep him steady; but, if he 
would not attend in this degree, any one of a thousand 
objects catching his eye, might lead him out of it. Now, 
it is impossible to say, how much even the first full overt 
act of irregularity might disorder the inward constitution, 
unsettle the adjustments, and alter the proportions which 
formed it, and in which the uprightness of its make con¬ 
sisted. But repetition of irregularities would produce habits, 
and thus the constitution would be spoiled, and creatures, 
made upright, become corrupt and depraved in their settled 
character, proportionably to their repeated irregularities in 
occasional acts. But, on the contrary, these creatures might 
have improved and raised themselves to a higher and more 
secure state of virtue, by the contrary behavior—by steadily 
following the moral principle, supposed to be one part of 
their nature, and thus withstanding that unavoidable 
danger of defection, which necessarily arose from propen¬ 
sion, the other part of it. For, by thus preserving their 
integrity for some time, their danger would lessen, since 
propensions, by being inured to submit, would do it more 
easily and of course; and their security against this lessening 
danger would increase, since the moral principle would gain 
additional strength by exercise; both which things are im¬ 
plied in the notion of virtuous habits. Thus, then, vicious 
indulgence is not only criminal in itself, but, also, depraves 
the inward constitution and character. And virtuous self- 
government is not only right in itself, but, also, improves 
the inward constitution or character; and may improve it to 
such a degree, that though we should suppose it impossible 
for particular affections to be absolutely coincident with the 
moral principle, and, consequently, should allow that such 
creatures as have been above supposed would for ever remain 


128 OF A STATE OF [PART I. 

defectible, yet their danger of actually deviating from right 
may be almost infinitely lessened, and they fully fortified 
against what remains of it, if that may be called danger, 
against which there is an adequate effectual security. But 
still, this their higher perfection may continue to consist in 
habits of virtue formed in a state of discipline, and this 
their more complete security remain to proceed from them. 
And thus it is plainly conceivable, that creatures without 
blemish, as they came out of the hands of God, may be in 
danger of going wrong, and so may stand in need of the 
security of virtuous habits, additional to the moral principle 
wrought into their natures by him. That which is the 
ground of their danger, or their want of security, may be 
considered as a deficiency in them, to which virtuous habits 
are the natural supply. And as they are naturally capable 
of being raised and improved by discipline, it may be a 
thing fit and requisite, that they should be placed in cir¬ 
cumstances with an eye to it—in circumstances peculiarly 
fitted to be, to them, a state of discipline for their improve¬ 
ment in virtue. 

But how much more strongly must this hold with respect 
to those who have corrupted their natures, are fallen from 
their original rectitude, and whose passions are become 
excessive by repeated violations of their inward constitu¬ 
tion? Upright creatures may want to be improved; de¬ 
praved creatures want to be renewed. Education and dis¬ 
cipline, which may be in all degrees and sorts of gentleness 
and of severity, are expedient for those; but must be abso¬ 
lutely necessary for these. For these, discipline, of the 
severer sort, too, and in the higher degrees of it, must be 
necessary, in order to wear out vicious habits—to recover 
their primitive strength of self-government, which indul¬ 
gence must have weakened—to repair, as well as raise 
into a habit, the moral principle, in order to their arriving 
at a secure state of virtuous happiness. 


CHAP. V.] MORAL DISCIPLINE. 120 

Now, whoever will consider the thing may clearly see, 
that the present world is peculiarly fit to be a state of dis¬ 
cipline for this purpose, to such as will set themselves to 
mend and improve. For, the various temptations with 
which we are surrounded; our experience of the deceits of 
wickedness; having been in many instances led wrong our¬ 
selves ; the great viciousness of the world; the infinite dis¬ 
orders consequent upon it; our being made acquainted with 
pain and sorrow, either from our own feeling of it, or from 
the sight of it in others; these things, though some of them 
may, indeed, produce wrong effects upon our minds, yet, 
when duly reflected upon, have all of them a direct ten¬ 
dency to bring us to a settled moderation and reasonable¬ 
ness of temper—the contrary both to thoughtless levity, 
and, also, to that unrestrained self-will, and violent bent to 
follow present inclination, which may be observed in undis¬ 
ciplined minds. Such experience, as the present state 
affords, of the frailty of our nature, of the boundless ex¬ 
travagance of ungoverned passion, of the power which an 
infinite Being has over us, by the various capacities of mis¬ 
ery which he has given us; in short, that kind and degree 
of experience which the present state affords us, that the 
constitution of nature is such as to admit the possibility, the 
danger, and the actual event of creatures losing their inno¬ 
cence and happiness, and becoming vicious, and wretched, 
hath a tendency to give us a practical sense of things very 
different from a mere speculative knowledge, that we are 
liable to vice, and capable of misery. And who knows, 
whether the security of creatures, in the highest and most 
settled state of perfection, may not, in part, arise from their 
having had such a sense of things as this, formed and 
habitually fixed within them, in some state of probation? 
And passing through the present world with that moral 
attention which is necessary to the acting a right part in it, 
may leave everlasting impressions of this sort upon our 


OF A STATE OF 


130 


[part I. 


minds. But to be a little more distinct: allurements to 
what is wrong; difficulties in the discharge of our duty; 
our not being able to act a uniform right part without 
some thought and care; and the opportunities which we 
have, or imagine we have, of avoiding what we dislike, or 
obtaining what we desire, by unlawful means, when we 
either cannot do it all, or, at least, not so easily by lawful 
ones; these things, that is, the snares and temptations of 
vice, are what render the present world peculiarly fit to be 
a state of discipline to those who will preserve their integ¬ 
rity ; because they render being upon our guard, resolution, 
and the denial of our passions, necessary in order to that 
end. And the exercise of such particular recollection, 
intention of mind, and self-government, in the practice of 
virtue, has, from the make of our nature, a peculiar ten¬ 
dency to form habits of virtue, as implying not only a real, 
but, also, a more continued, and a more intense exercise of 
the virtuous principle; or a more constant and a stronger 
effort of virtue exerted into act. Thus, suppose a person 
to know himself to be in particular danger, for some time, 
of doing any thing wrong, which yet he fully resolves not 
to do, continued recollection, and keeping upon his guard, 
in order to make good his resolution, is a continued exerting 
of that act of virtue in a high degree , which need have been, 
and, perhaps, would have been, only instantaneous and weak , 
had the temptation been so. It is, indeed, ridiculous to 
assert, that self-denial is essential to virtue and piety; but 
it would have been nearer the truth, though not strictly the 
truth itself, to have said, that it is essential to discipline 
and improvement. For, though actions materially virtuous, 
which have no sort of difficulty, but are perfectly agreeable 
to our particular inclinations, may, possibly, be done only 
from these particular inclinations, and so may not be any 
exercise of the principle of virtue, that is, not be virtuous ac¬ 
tions at all; yet, on the contrary, they may be an exercise 


MORAL DISCIPLINE. 


131 


CHAP. V.] 

of that principle, and, when they are, they have a ten¬ 
dency to form and fix the habit of virtue. But when the 
exercise of the virtuous principle is more continued, oftener 
repeated, and more intense, as it must be in circumstances 
of danger, temptation, and difficulty, of any kind, and in 
any degree, this tendency is increased proportionably, and a 
more confirmed habit is the consequence. 

This, undoubtedly, holds to a certain length, but how far 
it may hold, I know not. Neither our intellectual powers, 
nor our bodily strength, can be improved beyond such a de¬ 
gree ; and both may be overwrought. Possibly, there may be 
somewhat analogous to this, with respect to the moral char¬ 
acter, which is scarce worth considering. And I mention it 
only, lest it should come into some persons’ thoughts, not 
as an exception to the foregoing observations, which, per¬ 
haps, it is, but as a confutation of them, which it is not. 
And there may be several other exceptions. Observations 
of this kind cannot be supposed to hold minutely, and in 
every case. It is enough that they hold in general. And 
these plainly hold so far, as that from them may be seen 
distinctly, which is all that is intended by them, that the 
present world is peculiarly jit to he a state of discipline for 
our improvement in virtue and piety; in the same sense as 
some sciences, by requiring and engaging the attention, not 
to be sure of such persons as will not, but of such as will, 
set themselves to them, are fit to form the mind to habits 
of attention. 

Indeed, the present state is so far from proving, in event, 
a discipline of virtue to the generality of men, that, on the 
contrary, they seem to make it a discipline of vice. And 
the viciousness of the world is, in different ways, the great 
temptation, which renders it a state of virtuous discipline, in 
the degree it is, to good men. The whole end, and the 
whole occasion of mankind’s being placed in such a state as 
the present, is not pretended to be accounted for. That 


132 OF A STATE OF [PART I. 

which appears amidst the general corruption is, that there 
are some persons, who, having within them the principle of 
amendment and recovery, attend to and follow the notices 
of virtue and religion, be they more clear or more obscure, 
which are afforded them; and that the present world is, not 
only an exercise of virtue in these persons, but an exercise 
of it in ways and degrees peculiarly apt to improve it—apt 
to improve it, in some respects, even beyond what would be 
by the exercise of it required in a perfectly virtuous society, 
or in a society of equally imperfect virtue with themselves. 
But that the present world does not actually become a state 
of moral discipline to many, even to the generality, that is, 
that they do not improve or grow better in it, cannot be 
urged as a proof that it was not intended for moral disci¬ 
pline, by any who at all observe the analogy of nature. 
For of the numerous seeds of vegetables, and bodies of 
animals, which are adapted and put in the way, to improve 
to such a point or state of natural maturity and perfection, 
we do not see, perhaps, that one in a million actually does. 
Far the greatest part of them decay before they are im¬ 
proved to it, and appear to be absolutely destroyed. Yet 
no one, who does not deny all final causes, will deny, that 
those seeds and bodies which do attain to that point of ma¬ 
turity and perfection, answer the end for which they were 
really designed by nature; and, therefore, that nature de¬ 
signed them for such perfection. And I cannot forbear 
adding, though it is not to the present purpose, that the 
appearance of such an amazing waste in nature, with respect 
to these seeds and bodies, by foreign causes, is to us as un¬ 
accountable, as, what is much more terrible, the present 
and future ruin of so many moral agents by themselves, 
that is, by vice. 

Against this whole notion of moral discipline it may be 
objected, in another way, that so far as a course of beha¬ 
vior, materially virtuous, proceeds from hope and fear, so 


CHAP. V.] MORAL DISCIPLINE. 133 

far it is only a discipline and strengthening of self-love. 
But doing what God commands, because he commands it, is 
obedience, though it proceeds from hope or fear. And a 
course of such obedience will form habits of it; and a con¬ 
stant regard to veracity, justice, and charity, may form dis¬ 
tinct habits of these particular virtues, and will, certainly, 
form habits of self-government, and of denying our inclina¬ 
tions, whenever veracity, justice, or charity requires it. Nor 
is there any foundation for this great nicety, with which 
some affect to distinguish in this case, in order to depreciate 
all religion proceeding from hope or fear. For veracity, 
justice, and charity, regard to God’s authority, and to our 
own chief interest, are not only all three coincident, but 
each of them is, in itself, a just and natural motive or prin¬ 
ciple of action. And he who begins a good life from any 
one of them, and perseveres in it, as he is already in some 
degree, so he cannot fail of becoming more and more of 
that character, which is correspondent to the constitution 
of nature as moral, and to the relation which God stands 
in to us as moral governor of it; nor, consequently, can 
he fail of obtaining that happiness, which this constitution 
and relation necessarily suppose connected with that char¬ 
acter. 

These several observations, concerning the active princi¬ 
ple of virtue and obedience to God’s commands, are appli¬ 
cable to passive submission or resignation to his will; which 
is another essential part of a right character, connected with 
the former, and very much in our power to form ourselves 
to. It may be imagined, that nothing but afflictions can 
give occasion for or require this virtue; that it can have no 
respect to, nor be any way necessary to qualify for a state 
of perfect happiness; but it is not experience which can 
make us think thus: prosperity itself, whilst any thing sup¬ 
posed desirable is not ours, begets extravagant and un¬ 
bounded thoughts. Imagination is altogether as much a 
12 


134 


OF A STATE OF 


[part I. 

source of discontent as any thing in our external condition. 
It is, indeed, true, that there can be no scope for patience, 
when sorrow shall be no more; but there may be need of a 
temper of mind, which shall have been formed by patience. 
For, though self-love, considered merely as an active princi¬ 
ple leading us to pursue our chief interest, cannot but be 
uniformly coincident with the principle of obedience to God’s 
commands, our interest being rightly understood; because 
this obedience, and the pursuit of our own chief interest, 
must be, in every case, one and the same thing; yet it may 
be questioned, whether self-love, considered merely as the 
desire of our own interest or happiness, can, from its nature, 
be thus absolutely and uniformly coincident with the will of 
God, any more than particular affections can;(l) coincident 
in such sort, as not to be liable to be excited upon occasions, 
and in degrees, impossible to be gratified consistently with 
the constitution of things, or the Divine appointments. So 
that habits of resignation may, upon this account, be requi¬ 
site for all creatures—habits, I say, which signify what is 
formed by use. However, in general it is obvious that 
both self-love and particular affection in human creatures, 
considered only as passive feelings, distort and rend the 
mind, and, therefore, stand in need of discipline. Now, 
denial of those particular affections, in a course of active 
virtue and obedience to God’s will, has a tendency to mod¬ 
erate them, and seems, also, to have a tendency to habituate 
the mind to be easy and satisfied with that degree of hap¬ 
piness which is allotted us, that is, to moderate self-love. 
But the proper discipline for resignation is affliction. For 
a right behavior under that trial, recollecting ourselves so 
as to consider it in the view in which religion teaches us to 
consider it, as from the hand of God; receiving it as what 
he appoints, or thinks proper to permit, in his world and 
under his government; this will habituate the mind to a 
(1) Page 123. 


MORAL DISCIPLINE. 


CHAP. V.] 


135 


dutiful submission. And such submission, together with 
the active principle of obedience, make up the temper and 
character in us which answers to his sovereignty, and which 
absolutely belongs to the condition of our being, as depend¬ 
ent creatures. Nor can it be said, that this is only break¬ 
ing the mind to a submission to mere power; for mere 
power may be accidental, and precarious, and usurped; but 
it is forming within ourselves the temper of resignation to 
his rightful authority, who is, by nature, supreme over all. 

Upon the whole, such a character, and such qualifica¬ 
tions, are necessary for a mature state of life in the present 
world, as nature alone does in nowise bestow, but has put 
it upon us in great part to acquire, in our progress from one 
stage of life to another, from childhood to mature age—put 
it upon us to acquire them, by giving us capacities of doing 
it, and by placing us, in the beginning of life, in a condition 
fit for it. And this is a general analogy to our condition in 
the present world, as in a state of moral discipline for an¬ 
other. It is in vain, then, to object against the credibility 
of the present fife’s being intended for this purpose, that all 
the trouble and the danger unavoidably accompanying such 
discipline might have been saved us, by our being made at 
once the creatures and the characters which we were to be. ^ 
For we experience, that what we were to be, was to be the 
effect of what we would do; and that the general conduct of 
nature is, not to save us trouble or danger, but to make us 
capable of going through them, and to put it upon us to do 
so. Acquirements of our own experience and habits, are 
the natural supply to our deficiencies, and security against 
our dangers; since it is as plainly natural to set ourselves to 
acquire the qualifications as the external things which we 
stand in need of. In particular, it is as plainly a general 
law of nature, that we should, with regard to our temporal 
interest, form and cultivate practical principles within us, 
by attention, use, and discipline, as any thing whatever 


136 OF A STATE OF MORAL DISCIPLINE. [PART I. 

is a natural law; chiefly in the beginning of life, but, also, 
throughout the whole course of it. And the alternative is 
left to our choice, either to improve ourselves and better 
our condition, or, in default of such improvement, to remain 
deficient and wretched. It is, therefore, perfectly credible, 
from the analogy of nature, that the same may be our case, 
with respect to the happiness of a future state and the qual¬ 
ifications necessary for it. 

There is a third thing, which may seem implied in the 
present world’s being a state of probation; that it is a theatre 
of action for the manifestation of persons’ characters, with 
respect to a future one; not, to be sure, to an all-knowing 
Being, but to his creation, or part of it. This may, per¬ 
haps, be only a consequence of our being in a state of proba¬ 
tion in the other senses. However, it is not impossible, that 
men’s showing and making manifest what is in their heart, 
what their real character is, may have respect to a future 
life, in ways and manners which we are not acquainted 
with; particularly it may be a means, for the Author of 
nature does not appear to do any thing without means, of 
their being disposed of suitably to their characters; and of 
its being known to the creation, by way of example, that 
they are thus disposed of. But not to enter upon any con¬ 
jectural account of this, one may just mention, that the 
manifestation of persons’ characters contributes very much, 
in various ways, to the carrying on a great part of that 
general course of nature respecting mankind, which comes 
under our observation at present. I shall only add, that 
probation, in both these senses, as well as in that treated of 
in the foregoing chapter, is implied in moral government; 
since by persons’ behavior under it, their characters cannot 
but be manifested, and, if they behave well, improved. 


CHAP. VI.] NECESSITY AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 


137 


CHAPTER YI. 

OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, CONSIDERED AS INFLUENCING 
PRACTICE. 

Throughout the foregoing treatise it appears, that the 
condition of mankind, considered as inhabitants of this 
world only, and under the government of God which we 
experience, is greatly analogous to our condition, as designed 
for another world, or under that farther government which 
religion teaches us. If, therefore, any assert, as a fatalist 
must, that the opinion of universal necessity is reconcilable 
with the former, there immediately arises a question in the 
way of analogy, whether he must not also own it to be 
reconcilable to the latter, that is, with the system of religion 
itself, and the proof of it. The reader, then, will observe, 
that the question now before us, is not absolute, whether 
the opinion of fate be reconcilable with religion; but hypo¬ 
thetical, whether, upon supposition of its being reconcilable 
with the constitution of nature, it be not reconcilable with 
religion also; or, what pretense a fatalist—not other per¬ 
sons, but a fatalist—has to conclude, from his opinion, that 
there can be no such thing as religion. And as the puzzle 
and obscurity, which must unavoidably arise from arguing 
upon so absurd a supposition, as that of universal necessity, 
will, I fear, easily be seen, it will, I hope, as easily be 
excused. 

But, since it has been all along taken for granted, as a 
thing proved, that there is an intelligent Author of nature, 
or natural Governor of the world, and, since an objection 
may be made against the proof of this, from the opinion of 
universal necessity, as it may be supposed that such neces¬ 
sity will itself account for the origin and preservation of 
all things, it is requisite that this objection be distinctly 
answered, or, that it be shown, that a fatality, supposed 


138 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [PART I. 

consistent with what we certainly experience, does not de¬ 
stroy the proof of an intelligent Author and Governor of 
nature, before we proceed to consider, whether it destroys 
the proof of a moral Governor of it, or of our being in a 
state of religion. 

Now, when it is said by a fatalist, that the whole consti¬ 
tution of nature, and the actions of men, that every thing 
and every mode and circumstance of every thing, is neces¬ 
sary, and could not possibly have been otherwise, it is to be 
observed that this necessity does not exclude deliberation, 
choice, preference, and acting from certain principles, and 
to certain ends; because all this is matter of undoubted 
experience, acknowledged by all, and what every man may, 
every moment, be conscious of. And from hence it follows, 
that necessity, alone and of itself, is in no sort an account 
of the constitution of nature, and how things came to be and 
to continue as they are; but only an account of this circum¬ 
stance relating to their origin and continuance, that they 
could not have been otherwise than they are and have been. 
The assertion that every thing is by necessity of nature, is 
not an answer to the question, whether the world came 
into being as it is by an intelligent Agent forming it thus, 
or not; but to quite another question, whether it came into 
being as it is, in that way and manner which we call neces¬ 
sarily ., or in that way and manner which we call freely. 
For, suppose farther, that one, who was a fatalist, and one, 
who kept to his natural sense of things, and believed him¬ 
self a free agent, were disputing together, and vindicating 
their respective opinions, and they should happen to instance 
in a house, they would agree that it was built by an archi¬ 
tect. Their difference concerning necessity and freedom, 
would occasion no difference of judgment concerning this, 
but only concerning another matter, whether the architect 
built it necessarily or freely. Suppose, then, they should 
proceed to inquire, concerning the constitution of nature; in 


CHAP. VI.] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 139 

a lax way of speaking, one of them might say, it was by 
necessity, and the other by freedom; but, if they had any 
meaning to their words, as the latter must mean a free 
agent, so the former must, at length, be reduced to mean an 
agent, whether he would say one or more, acting by neces¬ 
sity; for abstract notions can do nothing. Indeed, we 
ascribe to God a necessary existence, uncaused by any 
agent. For we find within ourselves the idea of infinity, 
that is, immensity and eternity, impossible, even in imagi¬ 
nation, to be removed out of being. We seem to discern 
intuitively, that there must, and cannot but be, somewhat, 
external to ourselves, answering this idea, or the archetype 
of it. And from hence, (for this abstract , as much as any 
other, implies a concrete,) we conclude, that there is, and 
cannot but be, an infinite and immense eternal Being existing 
prior to all design contributing to his existence, and exclu¬ 
sive of it. And, from the scantiness of language, a mannei 
of speaking has been introduced, that necessity is the 
foundation, the reason, the account of the existence of God. 
But it is not alledged, nor can it be at all intended, that 
every thing exists as it does by this kind of necessity—a 
necessity antecedent in nature to design; it cannot, I say, 
be meant, that every thing exists as it does, by this kind of 
necessity, upon several accounts; and particularly, because 
it is admitted, that design in the actions of men, contributes 
to many alterations in nature. For, if any deny this, I shall 
not pretend to reason with them. 

From these things it follows, first, that when a fatalist 
asserts that every thing is by necessity, he must mean, by am, 
agent acting necessarily; he must, I say, mean this, for I 
am very sensible he would not choose to mean it: and, 
secondly, that the necessity, by which such an agent is sup¬ 
posed to act, does not exclude intelligence and design. So 
that, were the system of fatality admitted, it would just as 
much account for the formation of the world, as for the 


140 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [PART. I. 

structure of a house, and no more. Necessity as much 
requires and supposes a necessary agent, as freedom requires 
and supposes a free agent to be the former of the world. 
And the appearances of design and of final causes in the 
constitution of nature, as really prove this acting agent to 
be an intelligent designer, or to act from choice, upon the 
scheme of necessity, supposed possible, as upon that of 
freedom. 

It appearing thus, that the notion of necessity does not 
destroy the proof, that there is an intelligent Author of 
nature and natural Governor of the world, the present 
question which the analogy before mentioned (1) suggests, 
and which, I think, it will answer, is this: whether the 
opinion of necessity, supposed consistent with possibility, 
with the constitution of the world, and the natural gov¬ 
ernment which we experience exercised over it, destroys all 
reasonable ground of belief, that we are in a state of relig¬ 
ion ; or whether that opinion be reconcilable with religion, 
with the system and the proof of it. 

Suppose, then, a fatalist to educate any one, from his 
youth up, in his own principles; that the child should reason 
upon them, and conclude, that since he cannot possibly 
behave otherwise than he does, he is not a subject of blame 
or commendation, nor can deserve to be rewarded or pun¬ 
ished: imagine him to eradicate the very perceptions of 
blame and commendation out of his mind, by means of this 
system; to form his temper and character, and behavior to 
it; and from it to judge of the treatment he was to expect, 
say, from reasonable men, upon his coming abroad into the 
world; as the fatalist judges from this system, what he is 
to expect from the Author of nature, and with regard to a 
future state. I cannot forbear stopping here to ask, whether 
any one of common sense would think fit, that a child should 
be put upon these speculations, and be left to apply them 
(1) Page 137. 


CHAP. VI.] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 141 

to practice? And a man has little pretense to reason, who 
is not sensible that we are all children in speculations of 
this kind. However, the child would doubtless be highly- 
delighted to find himself freed from the restraints of fear 
and shame, with which his play-fellows were fettered and 
embarrassed, and highly conceited in his superior knowl¬ 
edge, so far beyond his years. But conceit and vanity 
would be the least bad part of the influence which these 
principles must have, when thus reasoned and acted upon, 
during the course of his education. He must either be 
allowed to go on, and be the plague of all about him, and 
himself too, even to his own destruction, or else correction 
must be continually made use of, to supply the want of 
those natural perceptions of blame and commendation, which 
we have supposed to be removed, and to give him a prac¬ 
tical impression of what he had reasoned himself out of the 
belief of, that he was, in fact, an accountable child, and to 
be punished for doing what he was forbid. It is, therefore, 
in reality impossible, but that the correction which he must 
meet with, in the course of his education, must convince 
him, that if the scheme he was instructed in were not false, 
yet that he reasoned inconclusively upon it, and, somehow 
or other, misapplied it to practice and common life; as what 
the fatalist experiences of the conduct of Providence at 
present, ought, in all reason, to convince him, that this 
scheme is misapplied, when applied to the subject of relig¬ 
ion.(1) But, supposing the child’s temper could remain 
still formed to the system, and his expectation of the treat¬ 
ment he was to have in the world be regulated by it, so as 
to expect that no reasonable man would blame or punish 
him for any thing which he should do, because he could not 
help doing it; upon this supposition, it is manifest he would, 
upon his coming abroad into the world, be insupportable to 
society, and the treatment which he would receive from it, 
(1) Page 138. 


142 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [PART I. 

would render it so to him; and he could not fail of doing 
somewhat very soon, for which he would be delivered over 
into the hands of civil justice: and thus, in the end, he would 
be convinced of the obligations he was under to his wise 
instructer. Or, suppose this scheme of fatality, in any 
other way, applied to practice, such practical application 
of it will be found equally absurd—equally fallacious in a 
practical sense: for instance, that if a man be destined to 
live such a time, he shall live to it, though he take no care 
of his own preservation; or, if he be destined to die before 
that time, no care can prevent it; therefore, all care about 
preserving one’s life is to be neglected, which is the fallacy 
instanced in by the ancients. But now,' on the contrary, 
none of these practical absurdities can be drawn, from rea¬ 
soning upon the supposition that we are free; but all such 
reasoning, with regard to the common affairs of life, is 
justified by experience. And, therefore, though it were 
admitted that this opinion of necessity were speculatively 
true, yet, with regard to practice, it is as if it were false, so 
far as our experience reaches, that is, to the whole of our 
present life. For, the constitution of the present world, 
and the condition in which we are actually placed, is as if 
we were free. And it may, perhaps, justly be concluded, 
that since the whole process of action, through every step 
of it, suspense, deliberation, inclining one way, determining, 
and, at last, doing as we determine, is as if we were free, 
therefore we are so. But, the thing here insisted upon is, 
that under the present natural government of the world, we 
find we are treated and dealt with as if we were free, prior 
to all consideration whether we are or not. Were this 
opinion, therefore, of necessity, admitted to be ever so true, 
yet such is, in fact, our condition and the natural course of 
things, that whenever we apply it to life and practice, this 
application of it always misleads us, and cannot but mislead 
as, in a most dreadful manner, with regard to our present 


CHAP. VI.] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 143 

interest. And how can people think themselves so very- 
secure, then, that the same application of the same opinion 
may not mislead them, also, in some analogous manner, with 
respect to a future, a more general, and more important 
interest? For, religion being a practical subject, and the 
analogy of nature showing us, that we have not faculties to 
apply this opinion, were it a true one, to practical subjects; 
whenever we do apply it to the subject of religion, and 
thence conclude that we are free from its obligations, it is 
plain this conclusion cannot be depended upon. There will 
still remain just reason to think, whatever appearances are, 
that we deceive ourselves; in somewhat of a like manner as 
when people fancy they can draw contradictory conclusions 
from the idea of infinity. 

From these things together, the attentive reader will see, 
it follows, that if, upon the supposition of freedom, the 
evidence of religion be conclusive, it remains so, upon sup¬ 
position of necessity; because the notion of necessity is not 
applicable to practical subjects; that is, with respect to 
them, is as if it were not true. Nor does this contain any 
reflection upon reason, but only upon what is unreasonable. 
For, to pretend to act upon reason, in opposition to practical 
principles which the Author of our nature gave us to act 
upon, and to pretend to apply our reason to subjects with 
regard to which our own short views, and even our experi¬ 
ence, will show us it cannot be depended upon—and such, 
at best, the subject of necessity must be—this is vanity, 
conceit, and unreasonableness. 

But this is not all. For we find within ourselves a will, 
and are conscious of a character. Now, if this, in us, be 
reconcilable with fate, it is reconcilable with it in the Author 
of nature. And, besides, natural government and final 
causes imply a character and a will in the Governor and 
Designer ;(1) a will concerning the creatures whom he 
(1) By will and character is meant that, which, in speaking of men, 


144 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [PART I. 

governs. The Author of nature, then, being certainly of 
some character or other, notwithstanding necessity, it is evi¬ 
dent this necessity is as reconcilable with the particular 
character of benevolence, veracity, and justice, in him, 
which attributes are the foundation of religion, as with any 
other character; since we find this necessity no more hinders 
men horn being benevolent than cruel, true than faithless, 
just than unjust, or, if the fatalist pleases, what we call 
unjust. For it is said, indeed, that what, upon supposition 
of freedom, would be just punishment, upon supposition of 
necessity, becomes manifestly unjust; because it is punish¬ 
ment inflicted for doing that which persons could not avoid 
doing. As if the necessity, which is supposed to destroy the 
injustice of murder, for instance, would not, also, destroy the 
injustice of punishing it. However, as little to the purpose 
as this objection is in itself, it is very much to the purpose 
to observe from it, how the notions of justice and injustice 
remain, even whilst we endeavor to suppose them removed; 
how they force themselves upon the mind, even whilst we 
are making suppositions destructive of them: for there is 
not, perhaps, a man in the world, but would be ready to 
make this objection at first thought. 

But though it must be evident, that universal necessity, 
if it be reconcilable with any thing, is reconcilable with that 
character in the Author of nature, which is the foundation 
of religion, “yet, does it not plainly destroy the proof, that 
he is of that character, and, consequently, the proof of 
religion? ” By no means. For we find that happiness and 
misery are not our fate, in any such sense as not to be the 
consequences of our behavior, but that they are the conse¬ 
quences of it.(l) We find God exercises the same kind of 

we should express, not only by these words, hut, also, by the words 
temper, taste, dispositions, practical principles; that whole frame of 
mind, from whence we act in one manner rather than another. 

(1) Chap. ii. 


145 


CHAP. VI.] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 

government over us, with that which a father exercises over 
his children, and a civil magistrate over his subjects. Now, 
whatever becomes of abstract questions concerning liberty 
and necessity, it evidently appears to us, that veracity and 
justice must be the natural rule and measure of exercising 
this authority, or government, to a Being, who can have no 
competitions, or interfering of interests, with his creatures 
arid his subjects. 

But, as the doctrine of liberty, though we experience its 
truth, may be perplexed with difficulties which run up into 
the most abstruse of all speculations, and as the opinion of 
necessity seems to be the very basis upon which infidelity 
grounds itself, it may be of some use to offer a more par¬ 
ticular proof of the obligations of religion, which may dis¬ 
tinctly be shown not to be destroyed by this opinion. 

The proof, from final causes, of an intelligent Author of 
nature, is not affected by the opinion of necessity, supposing 
necessity a thing possible in itself, and reconcilable with 
the constitution of things. (1) And it is a matter of fact, 
independent on this or any other speculation, that he governs 
the world by the method of rewards and punishments ;(2) 
and, also, that he hath given us a moral faculty, by which 
we distinguish between actions, and approve some as vir¬ 
tuous and of good desert, and disapprove others as vicious 
and of ill desert.(3) Now, this moral discernment implies, 
in the notion of it, a rule of action, and a rule of a very 
peculiar kind; for it carries in it authority and a right 
of direction—authority in such a sense, as that we cannot 
depart from it without being self-condemned.(4) And that 
the dictates of this moral faculty, which are by nature a 
rule to us, are, moreover, the laws of God—laws in a sense 
including sanctions, may be thus proved. Consciousness of 
a rule or guide of action, in creatures who are capable of 

(1) Page 137, &c. (2) Chap. ii. (3) Dissertation 2. (4) Ser¬ 
mon 2, at the Rolls. 


13 


146 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [PART I. 

considering it as given them by tbeir Maker, not only raises 
immediately a sense of duty, but, also, a sense of security 
in following it, and of danger in deviating from it. A direc¬ 
tion of tbe Author of nature, given to creatures capable of 
looking upon it as such, is plainly a command from him; 
and a command from him necessarily includes in it, at least, 
an implicit promise in case of obedience, or threatening in 
case of disobedience. But then the sense of perception of 
good and ill desert, (1) which is contained in the moral 
discernment, renders the sanction explicit, and makes it 
appear, as one may say, expressed. For, since his method 
of government is to reward and punish actions, his having 
annexed to some actions an inseparable sense of good desert, 
and to others of ill, this surely amounts to declaring upon 
whom his punishments shall be inflicted, and his rewards be 
bestowed. For he must have given us this discernment and 
sense of things as a presentiment of what is to be hereafter; 
that is, by way of information beforehand, what we are 
finally to expect in this world. There is, then, most evident 
ground to think, that the government of God, upon the 
whole, will be found to correspond to the nature which he 
has given us; and that, in the upshot and issue of things, 
happiness and misery shall, in fact and event, be made to 
follow virtue and vice respectively; as he has already, in 
so peculiar a manner, associated the ideas of them in our 
minds. And from hence might easily be deduced the obli¬ 
gations of religious worship, were it only to be considered 
as a means of preserving upon our minds a sense of this 
moral government of God, and securing our obedience to 
it; which yet is an extremely imperfect view of that most 
important duty. 

Now, I say, no objection from necessity can lie against 
this general proof of religion: none against the proposition 
reasoned upon, that we have such a moral faculty and 
(1) Dissertation2. 


147 


CHAP. VI.] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 

discernment; because this is a mere matter of fact, a thing 
of experience, that human kind is thus constituted: none 
against the conclusion; because it is immediate, and wholly 
from this fact. For the conclusion, that God will finally 
reward the righteous and punish the wicked, is not here 
drawn, from its appearing to us fit(l) that he should, but 
from its appearing, that he has told us he, will. And this 
he has certainly told us, in the promise and threatening, 
which, it hath been observed, the notion of a command 
implies, and the sense of good and ill desert, which he has 
given us, more distinctly expresses. And this reasoning 
from fact is confirmed, and, in some degree, even verified, 
by other facts—by the natural tendencies of virtue and 
of vice,(2) and by this, that God, in the natural course of 
his providence, punishes- vicious' actions, as mischievous to 
society, and, also, vicious actions, as such, in the strictest 
sense.(3) So that the general proof of religion is unan¬ 
swerably real, even upon the wild supposition which we are 
arguing upon. 

(1) However, I am far from intending to deny, that the will of 
God is determined by what is fit, by the right and reason of the 
case; though one chooses to decline matters of such abstract specu¬ 
lation, and to speak with caution when one does speak of them. 
But if it be intelligible to say, that it is Jit and reasonable for every 
one to consult his own happiness, then fitness of action, or the right and 
reason of the case, is an intelligible manner of speaking. And it 
seems as inconceivable, to suppose God to approve one course of 
action, or one end, preferably to another, which yet his acting at all 
from design implies that he does, without supposing somewhat prior 
in that end to be the ground of the preference; as to suppose him to 
discern an abstract proposition to be true, without supposing some¬ 
what prior in it to be the ground of the discernment. It doth not, 
therefore, appear, that moral right is any more relative to percep¬ 
tion than abstract truth is; or that it is any more improper to 
speak of the fitness and rightness of actions and ends, as founded 
in the nature of things, than to speak of abstract truth, as thus 
founded. 


(2) Page 93. 


(3) Page 86, &c. 


148 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [PART I. 

It must, likewise, be observed farther, that natural relig¬ 
ion hath, besides this, an external evidence, which the doc¬ 
trine of necessity, if it could be true, would not affect. 
For, suppose a person, by the observations and reasoning 
above, or by any other, convinced of the truth of religion— 
that there is a God who made the world, who is the moral 
governor and judge of mankind, and will, upon the whole, 
deal with every one according to his works—I say, suppose 
a person convinced of this by reason, but to know nothing 
at all of antiquity, or the present state of mankind, it would 
be natural for such a one to be inquisitive, what was the 
history of this system of doctrine; at what time, and in 
what manner, it came first into the world; and whether it 
were believed by any considerable part of it. And were he 
upon inquiry to find, that a particular person, in a late age, 
first of all proposed it as a deduction of reason, and that 
mankind were before wholly ignorant of it, then, though its 
evidence from reason would remain, there would be no 
additional probability of its truth, from the account of its 
discovery. But instead of this being the fact of the case, 
on the contrary, he would find what could not but afford 
him a very strong confirmation of its truth: first, that 
somewhat of this system, with more or fewer additions and 
alterations, hath been professed in all ages and countries of 
which we have any certain information relating to this mat¬ 
ter: secondly, that it is certain historical fact, so far as 
we can trace things up, that this whole system of belief, 
that there is one God, the creator and moral governor of 
the world, and that mankind is in a state of religion, was 
received in the first ages: and, thirdly, that as there is 
no hint or intimation in history, that this system was first 
reasoned out, so there is express historical or traditional 
evidence, as ancient as history, that it was taught first by 
revelation. Now, these things must be allowed to be of 
no great weight. The first of them, general consent, shows 


CHAP. VI.] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 149 

this system to be conformable to the common sense of man 
kind. The second, namely, that religion was believed in 
the first ages of the world, especially as it does not appeal 
that there were then any superstitious or false additions to 
it, cannot but be a farther confirmation of its truth. For 
it is a proof of this alternative; either that it came into the 
world by revelation, or that it is natural, obvious, and forces 
itself upon the mind. The former of these is the conclu¬ 
sion of learned men. And whoever will consider, how 
unapt for speculation rude and uncultivated minds are, will, 
perhaps from hence alone, be strongly inclined to believe it 
the truth. And as it is shown in the second part(l) of this 
treatise, that there is nothing of such peculiar presumption 
against a revelation in the beginning of the world, as there 
is supposed to be against subsequent ones, a skeptic could 
not, I think, give any account, which would appear more 
probable even to himself, of the early pretenses to revela¬ 
tion, than by supposing some real original one, from whence 
they were copied. And the third thing above-mentioned, 
that there is express historical or traditional evidence, as 
ancient as history, of the system of religion being taught 
mankind by revelation; this must be admitted as some 
degree of real proof, that it was so taught. For why 
should not the most ancient tradition be admitted a^some 
additional proof of a fact, against which there is no pre¬ 
sumption? And this proof is mentioned here, because it 
has its weight to show, that religion came into the world by 
revelation prior to all consideration of the proper authority 
of any book supposed to contain it; and even prior to all 
consideration, whether the revelation itself be uncorruptly 
handed down and related, or mixed and darkened with 
fables. Thus the historical account which we have, of the 
origin of religion, taking in all circumstances, is a real con¬ 
firmation of its truth, no way affected by the opinion of 

(1) Chap. ii. 

13 * 


150 


OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [PART I. 

necessity. And the external evidence, even of natural relig¬ 
ion, is by no means inconsiderable. 

But it is carefully to be observed, and ought to be recol¬ 
lected after all proofs of virtue and religion, which are only 
general, that as speculative reason may be neglected, preju¬ 
diced, and deceived, so, also, may our moral understanding 
be impaired and perverted, and the dictates of it not impar¬ 
tially attended to. This, indeed, proves nothing against the 
reality of our speculative or practical faculties of percep¬ 
tion—against their being intended by nature to inform us in 
the theory of things, and instruct us how we are to behave, 
and what we are to expect, in consequence of our behavior. 
Yet our liableness, in the degree we are liable, to prejudice 
and perversion, is a most serious admonition to us to be 
upon our guard, with respect to what is of such conse¬ 
quence, as our determinations concerning virtue and relig¬ 
ion ; and, particularly, not to take custom, and fashion, and 
slight notions of honor, or imaginations of present ease, use, 
and convenience to mankind, for the only moral rule.(l) 

The foregoing observations, drawn from the nature of 
the thing, and the history of religion, amount, when taken 
together, to a real practical proof of it, not to be confuted; 
such a proof as, considering the infinite importance of the 
thing* I apprehend, would be admitted fully sufficient, in 
reason, to influence the actions of men, who act upon 
thought and reflection; if it were admitted that there is 
no proof of the contrary. But it may be said, “There are 
many probabilities, which cannot, indeed, be confuted, that 
is, shown to be no probabilities, and yet may be overbal¬ 
anced by greater probabilities on the other side; much 
more by demonstration. And there is no occasion to ob¬ 
ject against particular arguments alledged for an opinion, 
when the opinion itself may be clearly shown to be false, 
without meddling with such arguments at all, but leaving 
(1) Dissertation 2. 


CHAP. VI.] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 151 

them just as they are.(l) Now, the method of govern¬ 
ment by rewards and punishments, and, especially, reward¬ 
ing and punishing good and ill desert, as such, respectively, 
must go upon supposition, that we are free and not necessary 
agents. And it is incredible, that the Author of nature 
should govern us upon a supposition as true, which he 
knows to be false; and, therefore, absurd to think he will 
reward or punish us for our actions hereafter; especially 
that he will do it under the notion that they are of good or 
ill desert.” Here, then, the matter is brought to a point. 
And the answer to all this is full, and not to be evaded; 
that the whole constitution and course of things, the whole 
analogy of Providence, shows, beyond possibility of doubt, 
that the conclusion from this reasoning is false, wherever 
the fallacy lies. The doctrine of freedom, indeed, clearly 
shows where; in supposing ourselves necessary, when, in 
truth, we are free agents. But, upon the supposition of 
necessity, the fallacy lies in taking for granted, that it is 
incredible necessary agents should be rewarded and pun¬ 
ished. But that, somehow or other, the conclusion now 
mentioned is false, is most certain. For it is fact, that God 
does govern even brute creatures by the method of rewards 
and punishments, in the natural course of things. And 
men are rewarded and punished for their actions—punished 
for actions mischievous to society as being so—punished for 
vicious actions, as such, by the natural instrumentality of 
each other, under the present conduct of Providence. Nay, 
even the affection of gratitude, and the passion of resent¬ 
ment, and the rewards and punishments following from 
them, which in general are to be considered as natural, that 
is, from the Author of nature; these rewards and punish¬ 
ments, being naturally (2) annexed to actions considered as 
implying good intention and good desert, ill intention and 
ill desert; these natural rewards and punishments, I say, 
(1) Pages 38, 41. (2) Sermon 8, at the Rolls. 


152 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [PART I. 

are as much a contradiction to the conclusion above, and 
show its falsehood, as a more exact and complete rewarding 
and punishing of good and ill desert, as such. So that, 
if it be incredible that necessary agents should be thus 
rewarded and punished, then men are not necessary, but 
free, since it is matter of fact that they are thus rewarded 
and punished. But if, on the contrary, which is the sup¬ 
position we have been arguing upon, it be insisted that 
men are necessary agents, then there is nothing incredible 
in the farther supposition of necessary agents being thus 
rewarded and punished, since we ourselves are thus dealt 
with. 

From the whole, therefore, it must follow, that a necessity 
supposed possible, and reconcilable with the constitution of 
things, does in no sort prove, that the Author of nature 
will not, nor destroy the proof that he will, finally and 
upon the whole, in his eternal government, render his crea¬ 
tures happy or miserable, by some means or other, as they 
behave well or ill. Or, to express this conclusion in words 
conformable to the title of the chapter, the analogy of 
nature shows us, that the opinion of necessity, considered 
as practical, is false. And if necessity, upon the supposi¬ 
tion above mentioned, doth not destroy the proof of natural 
religion, it evidently makes no alteration in the proof of 
revealed. 

From these things, likewise, we may learn in what sense 
to understand that general assertion, that the opinion of 
necessity is essenjjally destructive of all religion. First, in 
a practical sense: that by this notion atheistical men pre¬ 
tend to satisfy and encourage themselves in vice, and justify 
to others their disregard to all religion. And, secondly, in 
the strictest sense: that it is a contradiction to the whole 
constitution of nature, and to what we may every mo¬ 
ment experience in ourselves, and so overturns every thing. 
But by no means is this assertion to be understood, as if 


153 


CHAP. VI.] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 

necessity, supposing it could possibly be reconciled with 
the constitution of things, and with what we experience, 
were not, also, reconcilable with religion; for, upon this 
supposition, it demonstrably is so. 

. 


♦ 


i 




nnv 


154 


THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, 


[part I. 


CHAPTER VII. 

OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME, 
OR CONSTITUTION, IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 

Though it be, as it cannot but be, acknowledged, that the 
analogy of nature gives a strong credibility to the general 
doctrine of religion, and to the several particular things 
contained in it, considered as so many matters of fact; and, 
likewise, that it shows this credibility not to be destroyed 
by any notions of necessity; yet still, objections may be 
insisted upon against the wisdom, equity, and goodness of 
the Divine government, implied in the notion of religion, 
and against the method by which this government is con¬ 
ducted, to which objections analogy can be no direct answer. 
For the credibility, or the certain truth, of a matter of fact, 
does not immediately prove any thing concerning the wisdom 
or goodness of it; and analogy can do no more, immediately 
or directly, than show such and such things to be true or 
credible considered only as matters of fact. But still, if, 
upon supposition of a moral constitution of nature and a 
moral government over it, analogy suggests and makes it 
credible, that this government must be a scheme, system, or 
constitution of government, as distinguished from a number 
of single unconnected acts of distributive justice and good¬ 
ness ; and, likewise, that it must be a scheme, so imperfectly 
comprehended, and of such a sort in other respects, as to 
afford a direct general answer to all objections against the 
justice and goodness of it; then analogy is, remotely, of 
great service in answering those objections, both by suggest¬ 
ing the answer, and showing it to be a credible one. 

Now this, upon inquiry, will be found to be the case. 
For, first, upon supposition that God exercises a moral 
government over the world, the analogy of his natural 
government suggests and makes it credible, that his moral 


CHAP. VII.] A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 155 

government must be a scheme quite beyond our compre¬ 
hension; and this affords a general answer to all objections 
against the justice and goodness of it. And, secondly, a 
more distinct observation of some particular things contained 
in God’s scheme of natural government, the like things 
being supposed, by analogy, to be contained in his moral 
government, will farther show how little weight is to be laid 
upon these objections. 

I. Upon supposition that God exercises a moral govern¬ 
ment over the world, the analogy of his natural government 
suggests, and makes it credible, that his moral government 
must be a scheme quite beyond our comprehension: and 
this affords a general answer to all objections against the 
justice and goodness of it. It is most obvious, analogy 
renders it highly credible, that upon supposition of a moral 
government, it must be a scheme; for the world, and the 
whole natural government of it, appears to be so—to be a 
scheme, system, or constitution, whose parts correspond to 
each other, and to a whole, as really as any work of art, or 
as any particular model of a civil constitution and govern¬ 
ment. In this great scheme of the natural world, individuals 
have various peculiar relations to other individuals of their 
own species. And whole species are, we find, variously 
related to other species, upon this earth. Nor do we know 
how much farther these kinds of relations may extend. 
And, as there is not any action, or natural event, which we 
are acquainted with, so single and unconnected as not to 
have a respect to some other actions and events, so, possibly, 
each of them, when it has not an immediate, may yet have 
a remote, natural relation to other actions and events, much 
beyond the compass of this present world. There seems, 
indeed, nothing from whence we can so much as make 
a conjecture, whether all creatures, actions, and events 
throughout the whole of nature, have relations to each 
other. But, as it is obvious that all events have future 


156 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD. [PART I. 

unknown consequences, so, if we trace any, as far as we can 
go, into what is connected with it, we shall find, that if 
such event were not connected with somewhat farther in 
nature unknown to us, somewhat both past and present, 
such event could not possibly have been at all. Nor can 
we give the whole account of any one thing whatever; of 
all its causes, ends, and necessary adjuncts; those adjuncts, 
I mean, without which it could not have been. By this 
most astonishing connection, these reciprocal correspondences 
and mutual relations, every thing which we see in the course 
of nature, is actually brought about. And things seem¬ 
ingly the most insignificant imaginable, are perpetually 
observed to be the necessary conditions to other things of 
the greatest importance; so that any one thing whatever 
may, for aught we know to the contrary, be a necessary 
condition to any other. The natural world, then, and 
natural government of it, being such an incomprehensible 
scheme—so incomprehensible, that a man must really, in 
the literal sense, know nothing at all, who is not sensible of 
his ignorance in it; this immediately suggests, and strongly 
shows the credibility, that the moral world and government 
of it may be so too. Indeed, the natural and moral consti¬ 
tution and government of the world are so connected, as to 
make up together but one scheme; and it is highly probable 
that the first is formed and carried on merely in subser¬ 
viency to the latter, as the vegetable world is for the animal, 
and organized bodies for minds. But the thing intended 
here is, without inquiring how far the administration of the 
natural world is subordinate to that of the moral, only to 
observe the credibility, that one should be analagous or 
similar to the other: that, therefore, every act of Divine 
justice and goodness may be supposed to look much beyond 
itself and its immediate object—may have some reference 
to other parts of God’s moral administration, and to a gen¬ 
eral moral plan; and that every circumstance of this his 


CHAP. VII.] A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 157 

moral government may be adjusted beforehand with a 
view to the whole of it. Thus, for example, the deter¬ 
mined length of time, and the degrees and ways in 
which virtue is to remain in a state of warfare and disci¬ 
pline, and in which wickedness is permitted to have its pro¬ 
gress ; the times appointed for the execution of justice; the 
appointed instruments of it; the kinds of rewards and pun¬ 
ishments, and the manners of their distribution; all partic¬ 
ular instances of Divine justice and goodness, and every 
circumstance of them, may have such respects to each 
other, as to make up altogether a whole, connected and 
related in all its parts—a scheme, or system, which is as 
properly one as the natural world is, and of the like kind. 
And supposing this to be the case, it is most evident that 
we are not competent judges of this scheme, from the 
small parts of it which come within our view in the present 
life; and, therefore, no objections against any of these parts 
can be insisted upon by reasonable men. 

This our ignorance, and the consequence here drawn from 
it, are universally acknowledged upon other occasions; and, 
though scarce denied, yet are universally forgot, when per¬ 
sons come to argue against religion. And it is not, per¬ 
haps, easy, even for the most reasonable men always to 
bear in mind the degree of our ignorance, and make due 
allowances for it. Upon these accounts, it may not be use¬ 
less to go on a little farther, in order to show more dis¬ 
tinctly, how just an answer our ignorance is, to objections 
against the scheme of Providence. Suppose, then, a per¬ 
son boldly to assert, that the things complained of, the 
origin and continuance of evil, might easily have been 
prevented by repeated interpositions ;(l) interpositions so 
guarded and circumstanced, as would preclude all mischief 
arising from them: or, if this were impracticable, that a 
scheme of government is itself an imperfection; since more 

(1) Pages 160, 161. 

14 


158 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, [PART I. 

good might have been produced without any scheme, sys¬ 
tem or constitution at all, by continued single unrelated acts 
of distributive justice and goodness, because these would 
have occasioned no irregularities: and farther than this, it 
is presumed, the objections will not be carried. Yet the 
answer is obvious: that, were these assertions true, still the 
observations above, concerning our ignorance in th6 scheme 
of Divine government, and the consequence drawn from it, 
would hold, in great measure, enough to vindicate religion 
against all objections from the disorders of the present 
state. Were these assertions true, yet the government of 
the world might be just and good notwithstanding; for, at 
the most, they would infer nothing more than that it might 
have been better. But, indeed, they are mere arbitrary 
assertions; no man being sufficiently acquainted with the 
possibilities of things, to bring any proof of them to 
the lowest degree of probability. For, however possible 
what is asserted may seem, yet many instances may be 
alledged, in things much less out of our reach, of supposi¬ 
tions absolutely impossible and reducible to the most palpa¬ 
ble self-contradictions, which not every one by any means 
could perceive to be such, nor, perhaps, any one at first 
sight suspect. From these things it is easy to see dis¬ 
tinctly, how our ignorance, as it is the common, is really a 
satisfactory answer to all objections against the justice and 
goodness of Providence. If a man, contemplating any one 
providential dispensation, which had no relation to any 
others, should object, that he discerned in it a disregard to 
justice, or a deficiency of goodness, nothing would be less 
an answer to such objection, than our ignorance in other 
parts of Providence, or jn the possibilities of things, no 
way related to what he was contemplating. But when we 
know not but the parts objected against may be relative to 
other parts unknown to us, and when we are unacquainted 
with what is, in the nature of the thing, practicable in the 


159 


CHAP. VII.] A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 

case before us, then our ignorance is a satisfactory answer; 
because some unknown relation, or some unknown impossi¬ 
bility, may render what is objected against just and good; 
nay, good in the highest practical degree. 

II. And how little weight is to be laid upon such objec¬ 
tions will farther appear, by a more distinct observation of 
some particular things contained in the natural government 
of God, the like to which may be supposed from analogy, 
to be contained in his moral government. 

1. As, in the scheme of the natural world, no ends ap¬ 
pear to be accomplished without means, so we find that 
means very undesirable often conduce to bring about ends 
in such a measure desirable, as greatly to overbalance the 
disagreeableness of the means. And in cases where such 
means are conducive to such ends, it is not reason, but ex¬ 
perience, which shows us that they are thus conducive. 
Experience, also, shows many means to be conducive and 
necessary to accomplish ends, which means, before experi¬ 
ence, we should have thought would have had even a con¬ 
trary tendency. Now, from these observations relating to 
the natural scheme of the world, the moral being supposed 
analogous to it, arises a great credibility, that the putting 
our misery in each other’s power to the degree it is, and 
making men liable to vice to the degree we are; and, in 
general, that those things which are objected against the 
moral scheme of Providence may be, upon the whole, 
friendly and assistant to virtue, and productive of an over¬ 
balance of happiness; that is, the things objected against 
may be means by which an overbalance of good will, in the 
end, be found produced. And, from the same observations, 
it appears to be no presumption against this, that we do 
not, if, indeed, we do not, see those means to have any 
such tendency, or that they seem to us to have a con¬ 
trary one. Thus, those things which we call irregularities, 
may not be so at all; because they may be means of 


160 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, [PART I. 

accomplishing wise and good ends more considerable. And 
it may be added, as above, that they may, also, be the only 
means by which these wise and good ends are capable of 
being accomplished. 

After these observations it may be proper to add, in 
order to obviate an absurd and wicked conclusion from any 
of them, that though the constitution of our nature, from 
whence we are capable of vice and misery, may, as it un¬ 
doubtedly does, contribute to the perfection and happiness 
of the world; and though the actual permission of evil 
may be beneficial to it, (that is, it would have been more 
mischievous, not that a wicked person had himself abstained 
from his own wickedness, but that any one had forcibly pre¬ 
vented it, than that it was permitted,) yet, notwithstand¬ 
ing, it might have been much better for the world if this 
very evil had never been done. Nay, it is most clearly 
conceivable, that the very commission of wickedness may 
be beneficial to the world, and yet, that it would be infinitely 
more beneficial for men to refrain from it. For thus, in the 
wise and good constitution of the natural world, there are 
disorders which bring their own cures, diseases which are 
themselves remedies. Many a man would have died, had it 
not been for the gout or a fever; yet it would be thought 
madness to assert, that sickness is a better or more perfect 
state than health; though the like, with regard to the 
moral world, has been asserted. But, 

2. The natural government of the world is carried on by 
general laws. For this there may be wise and good rea¬ 
sons ; the wisest and best, for aught we know to the con¬ 
trary. And that there are such reasons, is suggested to our 
thoughts by the analogy of nature—by our being made to 
experience good ends to be accomplished, as, indeed, all the 
good which we enjoy is accomplished, by this means, that 
the laws, by which the world is governed, are general. For 
we have scarce any kind of enjoyments, but what we are. 


161 


CHAP. VII.] A SCHEME’‘INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 

in some way or other, instrumental in procuring ourselves, 
by acting in a manner which, we foresee, likely to procure 
them: now this foresight could not be at all, were not the 
government of the world carried on by general laws. And 
though, for aught we know to the contrary, every single 
case may be, at length, found to have been provided for 
even by these, yet to prevent all irregularities, or remedy 
them as they arise, by the wisest and best general laws, 
may be impossible in the nature of things, as we see it is 
absolutely impossible in civil government. But then we are 
ready to think, that the constitution of nature remaining as 
it is, and the course of things being permitted to go on, in 
other respects, as it does, there might be interpositions to 
prevent irregularities, though they could not have been 
prevented or remedied by any general laws. And there 
would, indeed, be reason to wish—which, by the way, is 
very different from a right to claim—that all irregularities 
were prevented or remedied by present interpositions, if 
these interpositions would have no other effect than this. 
But it is plain they would have some visible and immediate 
bad effects; for instance, they would encourage idleness 
and negligence, and they would render doubtful the natural 
rule of life, which is ascertained by this very thing, that the 
course of the world is carried on by general laws. And 
farther, it is certain they would have distant effects, and 
very great ones, too, by means of the wonderful connec¬ 
tions before mentioned.(1) So that we cannot so much as 
guess, what would be the whole result of the interpositions 
desired. It may be said, any bad result might be prevented 
by farther interpositions, whenever there was occasion for 
them; but this again is talking quite at random and in the 
dark.(2) Upon the whole, then, we see wise reasons why the 
course of the world should be carried on by general laws and 
good ends accomplished by this means; and, for aught we 

(1) Page 156, &c. (2) Page 158. 

14 * 


162 THE GOVERNMENT-OF GOD, [PART I. 

know, there may be the wisest reasons for it, and the best ends 
accomplished by it. We have no ground to believe, that 
all irregularities could be remedied as they arise, or could 
have been precluded by general laws. We find that inter¬ 
positions would produce evil, and prevent good; and, for 
aught we know, they would produce greater evil than they 
would prevent, and prevent greater good than they would 
produce. And if this be the case, then, the not interposing 
is so far from being a ground of complaint, that it is an 
instance of goodness. This is intelligible and sufficient; 
and going farther seems beyond the utmost reach of our 
faculties. 

But it may be said, that “after all, these supposed im¬ 
possibilities and relations are what we are unacquainted 
with; and we must judge of religion, as of other things, 
by what we do know, and look upon the rest as nothing: 
or, however, that the answers here given to what is objected 
against religion, may equally be made use of to invalidate 
the proof of it, since their stress lies so very much upon our 
ignorance.” But, 

1. Though total ignorance in any matter does, indeed, 
equally destroy, or rather preclude, all proof concerning it, 
and objections against it, yet partial ignorance does not. 
For we may in any degree be convinced, that a person is of 
such a character, and, consequently, will pursue such ends, 
though we are greatly ignorant what is the proper way of 
acting, in order the most effectually to obtain those ends; 
and in this case, objections against his manner of acting, as 
seemingly not conducive to obtain them, might be answered 
by our ignorance, though the proof that such ends were 
intended, might not at all be invalidated by it. Thus the 
proof of religion is a proof of the moral character of God, 
and, consequently, that his government is moral, and that 
every one, upon the whole, shall receive according to his 
deserts—a proof that this is the designed end of his 


CHAP. VII.] A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 163 

government. But we are not competent judges, what is the 
proper way of acting, in order the most effectually to accom¬ 
plish this end.(l) Therefore, our ignorance is an answer to 
objections against the conduct of Providence, in permitting 
irregularities, as seeming contradictory to this end. Now, 
since it is so obvious that our ignorance may be a satisfac¬ 
tory answer to objections against a thing, and yet not affect 
the proof of it; till it can be shown, it is frivolous to assert, 
that our ignorance invalidates the proof of religion, as it 
does the objections against it. 

2. Suppose unknown impossibilities, and unknown rela¬ 
tions, might justly be urged to invalidate the proof of relig¬ 
ion, as well as to answer objections against it, and that, in 
consequence of this, the proof of it were doubtful; yet 
still, let the assertion be despised, or let it be ridiculed, it is 
undeniably true, that moral obligations would remain cer¬ 
tain, though it were not certain what would, upon the whole, 
be the consequences of observing or violating them. For 
these obligations arise immediately and necessarily from the 
judgment of our own mind, unless perverted, which we 
cannot violate without being self-condemned. And they 
would be certain, too, from considerations of interest. For, 
though it were doubtful what will be the future conse¬ 
quences of virtue and vice, yet it is, however, credible, that 
they may have those consequences which religion teaches 
us they will; and this credibility is a certain(2) obligation 
in point of prudence, to abstain from all wickedness, and to 
live in the conscientious practice of all that is good. But, 

3. The answers above given to the objections against 
religion, cannot equally be made use of to invalidate the 
proof of it. For, upon suspicion that God exercises a 
moral government over the world, analogy does most 
strongly lead us to conclude, that this moral government 
must be a scheme or constitution beyond our comprehension 

(1) Pages 43, 44. (2) Page 38, and Part 2, Chap. vi. 


164 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD INCOMPREHENSIBLE. [PART I. 

And a thousand particular analogies show us, that parts of 
such a scheme, from their relation to other parts, may con¬ 
duce to accomplish ends, which we should have thought 
they had no tendency at all to accomplish; nay, ends, 
which before experience, we should have thought such 
parts were contradictory to, and had a tendency to pre¬ 
vent. And, therefore, all these analogies show, that the 
way of arguing made use of in objecting against religion, is 
delusive; because they show it is not at all incredible, that, 
could we comprehend the whole, we should find the per¬ 
mission of the disorders objected against, to be consistent 
with justice and goodness, and even to be instances of 
them. Now this is not applicable to the proof of religion, 
as it is to the objections against it ;(1) and, therefore, cannot 
invalidate that proof, as it does these objections. 

Lastly , From the observations now made, it is easy to 
see, that the answers above given to the objections against 
Providence, though, in a general way of speaking, they 
may be said to be taken from our ignorance, yet are by no 
means taken merely from that, but from somewhat which 
analogy shows us concerning it. For analogy shows us 
positively, that our ignorance in the possibilities of things, 
and the various relations in nature, renders us incom¬ 
petent judges, and leads us to false conclusions, in cases 
similar to this, in which we pretend to judge and to 
object. So that the things above insisted upon, are not 
mere suppositions of unknown impossibilities and rela¬ 
tions ; but they are suggested to our thoughts, and even 
forced upon the observation of serious men, and rendered 
credible, too, by the analogy of nature. And, therefore, to 
take these things into account, is to judge by experience, 
and what we do know; and it is not judging so, to take no 
notice of them. 

(1) Sermon at the Rolls, p. 312, 2d edit. 


PART I.] 


CONCLUSION. 


165 


CONCLUSION. 

The observations of the last chapter lead us to consider 
this little scene of human life, in which we are so busily 
engaged, as having reference, of some sort or other, to a 
much larger plan of things. Whether we are any way 
related to the more distant parts of the boundless universe 
into which we are brought, is altogether uncertain. But it 
is evident, that the course of things which comes within our 
view, is connected with somewhat past, present, and future 
beyond it. (1) So that we are placed, as one may speak, in 
the middle of a scheme, not a fixed, but a progressive one, 
every way incomprehensible—incomprehensible, in a man¬ 
ner, equally with respect to what has been, what now is, 
and what shall be hereafter. And this scheme cannot but 
contain in it somewhat as wonderful, and as much beyond 
our thought and conception,(2) as any thing in that of 
religion. For, will any man in his senses say, that it is less 
difficult to conceive how the world came to be, and to con¬ 
tinue as it is, without, than with, an intelligent Author and 
Governor of it ? or, admitting an intelligent Governor of it, 
that there is some other rule of government more natural, 
and of easier conception, than that which we call moral? 
Indeed, without an intelligent Author and Governor of 
nature, no account at all can be given, how this universe, or 
the part of it particularly in which we are concerned, came 
to be, and the course of it to be carried on, as it is; nor any 
of its general end and design, without a moral Governor of 
it. That there is an intelligent Author of nature and na¬ 
tural Governor of the world, is a principle gone upon in 
the foregoing treatise, as proved, and generally known 
and confessed to be proved. And the very notion of an 
intelligent Author of nature, proved by particular final 
(1) Page 155, &c. (2) See Part 2, Chap. ii. 


166 


CONCLUSION. 


[part I. 

causes, implies a will and a character. (1) Now, as our 
whole nature, the nature which he has given us, leads us 
to conclude his will and character to be moral, just, and 
good, so we can scarce in imagination conceive what it can 
be otherwise. However, in consequence of this his will 
and character, whatever it be, he formed the universe 
as it is, and carries on the course of it as he does, rather 
than in any other manner; and has assigned to us, and 
to all living creatures, a part and a lot in it. Irrational 
creatures act this their part, and enjoy and undergo the 
pleasures and the pains allotted them, without any reflection. 
But one would think it impossible, that creatures endued 
with reason could avoid reflecting sometimes upon all 
this—reflecting, if not from whence we came, yet, at least, 
whither we are going, and what the mysterious scheme, 
in the midst of which we find ourselves, will, at length, 
come out and produce—a scheme in which it is certain 
we are highly interested, and in which we may be inter¬ 
ested even beyond conception. For many things prove it 
palpably absurd to conclude, that we shall cease to be at 
death. Particular analogies do most sensibly show us, that 
there is nothing to be thought strange in our being to exist 
in another state of life. And that we are now living beings, 
affords a strong probability that we shall continue so; unless 
there be some positive ground, and there is none from 
reason or analogy, to think death will destroy us. Were a 
persuasion of this kind ever so well grounded, there would, 
surely, be little reason to take pleasure in it. But, indeed, 
it can have no other ground than some such imagination, as 
that of our gross bodies being ourselves; which is contrary 
to experience. Experience, too, most clearly shows us the 
folly of concluding, from the body and the living agent 
affecting each other mutually, that the dissolution of the 
former is the destruction of the latter. And there are 
(1) Pages 143, 144. 


CONCLUSION. 


PART I.] 


167 


remarkable instances of their not affecting each other, which 
lead us to a contrary conclusion. The supposition, then, 
which in all reason we are to go upon, is, that our living 
nature will continue after death. And it is infinitely unrea¬ 
sonable to form an institution of life, or to act upon any 
other supposition. Now, all expectation of immortality, 
whether more or less certain, opens an unbounded prospect 
to our hopes and our fears; since we see the constitution 
of nature is such as to admit of misery, as well as to be 
productive of happiness, and experience ourselves to par¬ 
take of both in some degree; and since we cannot but know 
what higher degrees of both we are capable of. And there 
is no presumption against believing farther, that our future 
interest depends upon our present behavior: for we see our 
present interest doth; and that the happiness and misery, 
which are naturally annexed to our actions, very frequently 
do not follow till long after the actions are done to which 
they are respectively annexed. So that, were speculation 
to leave us uncertain, whether it were likely that the Author 
of nature, in giving happiness and misery to his creatures, 
hath regard to their actions or not; yet, since w'e find by 
experience that he hath such regard, the whole sense of 
things which he has given us, plainly leads us, at once, and 
without any elaborate inquiries, to think that it may, indeed 
must, be to good actions chiefly that he hath annexed hap¬ 
piness, and to bad actions misery; or that he will, upon the 
whole, reward those who do well, and punish those who do 
evil. To confirm this from the constitution of the world, it 
has been observed, that some sort of moral government is 
necessarily implied in that natural government of God 
which we experience ourselves under; that good and bad 
actions, at present, are naturally rewarded and punished, 
not only as beneficial and mischievous to society, but, also, 
as virtuous and vicious; and that there is, in the very na¬ 
ture of the thing, a tendency to their being rewarded and 


168 CONCLUSION. [part I. 

punished in a much higher degree than they are at present. 
And, though this higher degree of distributive justice, 
which nature thus points out and leads toward, is prevented 
for a time from taking place, it is by obstacles which the 
state of this world unhappily throws in its way, and which, 
therefore, are in their nature temporary. Now, as these 
things, in the natural conduct of Providence, are observable 
on the side of virtue, so there is nothing to be set against 
them on the side of vice. A moral scheme of government, 
then, is visibly established, and, in some degree, carried 
into execution; and this, together with the essential tenden¬ 
cies of virtue and vice duly considered, naturally raise in us 
an apprehension that it will be carried on farther toward 
perfection in a future state, and that every one shall there 
receive according to his deserts. And if this be so, then 
our future and general interest, under the moral govern¬ 
ment of God, is appointed to depend upon our behavior, 
notwithstanding the difficulty which this may occasion of 
securing it, and the danger of losing it; just in the same 
manner as our temporal interest, under his natural gov¬ 
ernment, is appointed to depend upon our behavior, not¬ 
withstanding the like difficulty and danger. For, from 
our original constitution, and that of the world which we 
inhabit, we are naturally trusted with ourselves, with our 
own conduct and our own interest. And, from the same 
constitution of nature, especially joined with that course of 
things which is owing to men, we have temptations to be 
unfaithful in this trust, to forfeit this interest, to neglect it, 
and run ourselves into misery and ruin. From these temp¬ 
tations arise the difficulties of behaving so as to secure our 
temporal interest, and the hazard of behaving so as to 
miscarry in it. There is, therefore, nothing incredible in 
supposing, there may be the like difficulty and hazard with 
regard to that chief and final good which religion lays 
before us. Indeed, the whole account, how it came to pass 


PART I.] CONCLUSION. 169 

that we were placed in such a condition as this, must be 
beyond our comprehension. But it is in part accounted for 
by what religion teaches us, that the character of virtue 
and piety must be a necessary qualification for a future state 
of security and happiness, under the moral government of 
God; in like manner, as some certain qualifications or other 
are necessary for every particular condition of life, under 
his natural government; and that the present state was 
intended to be a school of discipline, for improving in 
ourselves that character. Now, this intention of nature is 
rendered highly credible by observing, that we are plainly 
made for improvement of all kinds; that it is a general 
appointment of Providence, that we cultivate practical prin¬ 
ciples, and form within ourselves habits of action, in order 
to become fit for what we were wholly unfit for before; 
that, in particular, childhood and youth is naturally ap¬ 
pointed to be a state of discipline for mature age; and that 
the present world is peculiarly fitted for a state of moral 
discipline. And, whereas objections are urged against the 
whole notion of moral government and a probationary state, 
from the opinion of necessity, it has been shown that God 
has given us the evidence, as it were, of experience, that all 
objections against religion on this head are vain and delu¬ 
sive. He has, also, in his natural government, suggested 
an answer to all our short-sighted objections against the 
equity and goodness of his moral government; and, in gen¬ 
eral, he has exemplified to us the latter by the former. 

These things, which, it is to be remembered, are matters 
of fact, ought, in all common sense, to awaken mankind, to 
induce them to consider, in earnest, their condition, and 
what they have to do. It is absurd—absurd to the degree 
of being ridiculous, if the subject were not of so serious a 
kind, for men to think themselves secure in a vicious life, or 
even in that immoral thoughtlessness which far the greatest 
15 


170 CONCLUSION. [PART I. 

part of them are fallen into. And the credibility of religion, 
arising from experience and facts here considered, is fully 
sufficient, in reason, to engage them to live in the general 
practice of all virtue and piety; under the serious appre¬ 
hension, though it should be mixed with some doubt, (1) of 
a righteous administration established in nature, and a future 
judgment in consequence of it; especially when we consider 
how very questionable it is whether any thing at all can be 
gained by vice;(2) how unquestionably little, as well as 
precarious, the pleasures and profits of it are at the best, 
and how soon they must be parted with at the longest. 
For, in the deliberations of reason, concerning what we are 
to pursue and what to avoid, as temptations to any thing 
from mere passion are supposed out of the case; so induce¬ 
ments to vice from cool expectations of pleasure and interest, 
so small, and uncertain, and short, are really so insignificant, 
as, in the view of reason, to be almost nothing in them¬ 
selves, and, in comparison with the importance of religion, 
they quite disappear and are lost. Mere passion, indeed, 
may be alledged, though not as a reason, yet as an excuse 
for a vicious course of life. And how sorry an excuse it is 
will be manifest by observing, that we are placed in a 
condition in which we are unavoidably inured to govern our 
passions, by being necessitated to govern them; and to lay 
ourselves under the same kind of restraints, and as great 
ones, too, from temporal regards, as virtue and piety, in the 
ordinary course of things, require. The plea of ungovern¬ 
able passion, then, on the side of vice, is the poorest of all 
things, for it is no reason, and but a poor excuse. But the 
proper motives to religion are the proper proofs of it, from 
our moral nature, from the presages of conscience, and our 
natural apprehension of God, under the character of a 
righteous Governor and Judge; a nature, and conscience, 
(1) Part 2, Chap. vi. (2) Pages 82, 83 


PART I.] CONCLUSION. l7l 

and apprehension given us by him; and from the confirm¬ 
ation of the dictates of reason, by “life and immortality 
brought to fight by the Gospel,” and “the wrath of God 
revealed from heaven, against all ungodliness and unright¬ 
eousness of men.” 




' 

■ ’ ■ 

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. 

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THE 


ANALOGY OF RELIGION 

TO THE 

CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE. 

PART II. 

OF REVEALED RELIGION. 

CHAPTER I. 

OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. 

Some persons, upon pretense of the sufficiency of the 
light of nature, avowedly reject all revelation, as, in its 
very notion, incredible, and what must be fictitious. And, 
indeed, it is certain no revelation would have been given, 
had the light of nature been sufficient in such a sense as 
to render one not wanting and useless. But no man in 
seriousness and simplicity of mind, can possibly think it so, 
who considers the state of religion in the heathen world 
before revelation, and its present state in those places which 
have borrowed no light from it; particularly, the doubtful¬ 
ness of some of the greatest men concerning things of the 
utmost importance, as well as the natural inattention and 
ignorance of mankind in general. It is impossible to say 
who would have been able to have reasoned out that whole 
system, which we call natural religion, in its genuine sim¬ 
plicity, clear of superstition; but there is certainly no 
ground to affirm that the generality could: if they could, 
there is no sort of probability that they would. Admitting 
there were, they would highly want a standing admonition, 

to remind them of it, and inculcate it upon them. And, 
15 * 173 


174 OF THE IMPORTANCE [PART II. 

farther still, were they as much disposed to attend to relig¬ 
ion as the better sort of men are, yet, even upon this sup¬ 
position, there would be various occasions for supernatural 
instruction and assistance, and the greatest advantages 
might be afforded by them. So that to say, revelation is a 
thing superfluous, what there was no need of, and what can 
be of no service, is, I think, to talk quite wildly and at 
random. Nor would it be more extravagant to affirm, that 
mankind is so entirely at ease in the present state, and life 
so completely happy, that it is a contradiction to suppose 
our condition capable of being in any respect better. 

There are other persons not to be ranked with these, who 
seem to be getting into a way of neglecting, and, as it were, 
overlooking revelation as of small importance, provided 
natural religion be kept to. With little regard, either to the 
evidence of the former, or to the objections against it, and 
even upon supposition of its truth, “the only design of it,” 
say they, “ must be to establish a belief of the moral system 
of nature, and to enforce the practice of natural piety and 
virtue. The belief and practice of these things were, per¬ 
haps, much promoted by the first publication of Christian¬ 
ity ; but whether they are believed and practiced, upon the 
evidence and motives of nature or of revelation, is no great 
matter.”(l) This way of considering revelation, though it 
is not the same with the former, yet borders nearly upon it, 
and very much, at length, runs up into it, and requires to 
he particularly considered, with regard to the persons who 
seem to be getting into this way. The consideration of it 

(l)Invenis multos . . . propterea nolle fieri Christianos, 

quia quasi sufficiunt sibi de bona vita sua. Bene vivere opus est, 
ait. Quid mihi praecepturus est Christus? Ut bene vivam? Jam 
bene vivo. Quid mihi necessarius est Christus; nullum homi- 
cidium, nullum furtum, nullam rapinam facio, res alienas non con- 
cupisco, nullo adulterio contaminor? Nam inveniatur in vita mea 
aliquid quod reprehendatur, et qui reprehenderit faciat Christianum. 
Aug. in Psal. xxxi. 


CHAP. I.] OF CHRISTIANITY. 1*75 

will, likewise, farther show the extravagance of the former 
opinion, and the truth of the observations in answer to it, 
just mentioned. And an inquiry into the importance of 
Christianity, cannot be an improper introduction to a trea¬ 
tise concerning the credibility of it. 

Now, if God has given a revelation to mankind, and 
commanded those things which are commanded in Chris¬ 
tianity, it is evident, at first sight, that it cannot in anywise 
be an indifferent matter, whether we obey or disobey those 
commands, unless we are certainly assured, that we know 
all the reasons for them, and that all those reasons are now 
ceased, with regard to mankind in general, or to ourselves 
in particular. And it is absolutely impossible we can be 
assured of this; for our ignorance of these reasons proves 
nothing in the case, since the whole analogy of nature 
shows, what is, indeed, in itself evident, that there may 
be infinite reasons for things, with which we are not ac¬ 
quainted. 

But the importance of Christianity will more distinctly 
appear, by considering it more distinctly: first, as a repub¬ 
lication, and external institution, of natural or essential 
religion, adapted to the present circumstances of mankind, 
and intended to promote natural piety and virtue; and, 
secondly, as containing an account of a dispensation of 
things, not discoverable by reason, in consequence of which 
several distinct precepts are enjoined us. For, though 
natural religion is the foundation and principal part of 
Christianity, it is not, in any sense, the whole of it. 

I. Christianity is a republication of natural religion. It 
instructs mankind in the moral system of the world; that it 
is the work of an infinitely perfect Being, and under his 
government; that virtue is his law; and that he will finally 
judge mankind in righteousness, and render to all according 
to their works, in a future state. And, which is very ma¬ 
terial, it teaches natural religion in its genuine simplicity, 


OF THE IMPORTANCE 


176 


[part II. 


free from those superstitions with which it was totally cor¬ 
rupted, and under which it was in a manner lost. 

Revelation is, farther, an authoritative publication of 
natural religion, and so affords the evidence of testimony 
for the truth of it. Indeed, the miracles and prophecies 
recorded in Scripture, were intended to prove a particular 
dispensation of Providence—the redemption of the world 
by the Messiah; but this does not hinder but that they 
may, also, prove God’s general providence over the world, 
as our moral governor and judge. And they evidently do 
prove it; because this character of the Author of nature is 
necessarily connected with and implied in that particular 
revealed dispensation of things: it is, likewise, continually 
taught expressly and insisted upon, by those persons who 
wrought the miracles and delivered the prophecies. So 
that, indeed, natural religion seems as much proved by the 
Scripture revelation, as it would have been, had the design 
of revelation been nothing else than to prove it. 

But it may possibly be disputed, how far miracles can 
prove natural religion; and notable objections may be urged 
against this proof of it, considered as a matter of specula¬ 
tion ; but, considered as a practical thing, there can be none. 
For, suppose a person to teach natural religion to a nation, 
who had lived in total ignorance or forgetfulness of it, and 
to declare he was commissioned by God so to do—suppose 
him, in proof of his commission, to foretell things future, 
which no human foresight could have guessed at, to divide 
the sea with a word, feed great multitudes with bread from 
heaven, cure all manner of diseases, and raise the dead, 
even himself, to life, would not this give additional credi¬ 
bility to his teaching—a credibility beyond what that of a 
common man would have, and be an authoritative publica¬ 
tion of the law of nature, that is, a new proof of it? It 
would be a practical one, of the strongest kind, perhaps, 
which human creatures are capable of having given them. 


CHAP. I.] OF CHRISTIANITY. 1Y7 

The law of Moses, then, and the Gospel of Christ, are au¬ 
thoritative publications of the religion of nature; they 
afford a proof of God’s general providence, as governor 
of the world, as well as of his particular dispensations 
of providence toward sinful creatures, revealed in the law 
and the Gospel. As they are the only evidence of the 
latter, so they are an additional evidence of the former. 

To show this further, let us suppose a man of the great¬ 
est and most improved capacity, who had never heard of 
revelation, convinced upon the whole, notwithstanding the 
disorders of the world, that it was under the direction and 
moral government of an infinitely perfect Being, but ready 
to question, whether he were not gone beyond the reach of 
his faculties—suppose him brought, by this suspicion, into 
great danger of being carried away by the universal bad 
example of almost every one around him, who appeared 
to have no practical sense at least, of these things; and 
this, perhaps, would be as advantageous a situation, with 
regard to religion, as nature alone ever placed any man in. 
What a confirmation now must it be to such a person, all 
at once to find, that this moral system of things was 
revealed to mankind, in the name of that infinite Being 
whom he had, from principles of reason, believed in; and 
that the publishers of the revelation proved their commis¬ 
sion from him, by making it appear that he had intrusted 
them with a power of suspending and changing the gen¬ 
eral laws of nature. 

Nor must it, by any means, be omitted, for it is a thing 
of the utmost importance, that life and immortality are em¬ 
inently brought to light by the Gospel. The great doc¬ 
trines of a future state, the danger of a course of wicked¬ 
ness, and the efficacy of repentance, are not only confirmed 
in the Gospel, but are taught, especially the last is, with a 
degree of light, to which that of nature is but darkness. 

Farther, as Christianity served these ends and purposes, 


178 OF THE IMPORTANCE [PART II. 

when it was first published, by the miraculous publication 
itself, so it was intended to serve the same purposes, in 
future ages, by means of the settlement of a visible Church; 
of a society, distinguished from common ones, and from the 
rest of the world, by peculiar religious institutions; by an 
instituted method of instruction, and an instituted form of 
external religion. Miraculous powers were given to the 
first preachers of Christianity, in order to their introducing 
it into the world: a visible Church was established, in order 
to continue it, and carry it on successively throughout all 
ages. Had Moses and the prophets, Christ and his apostles, 
only taught, and by miracle proved, religion to their con¬ 
temporaries, the benefits of their instructions would have 
reached but to a small part of mankind. Christianity must 
have been, in a great degree, sunk and forgot in a very few 
ages. To prevent this appears to have been one reason 
why a visible Church was instituted; to be like a city upon 
a hill—a standing memorial to the world of the duty which 
we owe our Maker; to call men continually, both by exam¬ 
ple and instruction, to attend to it, and, by the form of 
religion ever before their eyes, remind them of the reality; 
to be the repository of the oracles of God; to hold up the 
light of revelation in aid to that of nature, and propagate it 
throughout all generations to the end of the world—the 
light of revelation, considered here in no other view, than 
as designed to enforce natural religion. And, in proportion 
as Christianity is professed and taught in the world, relig¬ 
ion, natural or essential religion, is thus distinctly and 
advantageously laid before mankind, and brought again and 
again to their thoughts, as a matter of infinite importance. 
A visible Church has, also, a farther tendency to promote 
natural religion, as being an instituted method of education, 
originally intended to be of more peculiar advantage to 
those who would conform to it. For one end of the insti¬ 
tution was, that, by admonition and reproof, as well as 


OF CHRISTIANITY. 


CHAP. I.] 


m 


instruction—by a general regular discipline, and public 
exercises of religion, the body of Christ , as the Scripture 
speaks, should be edified; that is, trained up in piety and 
virtue, for a higher and better state. This settlement, then, 
appearing thus beneficial, tending, in the nature of the thing, 
to answer, and in some degree actually answering, those 
ends, it is to be remembered, that the very notion of it im¬ 
plies positive institutions; for the visibility of the Church 
consists in them. Take away every thing of this kind, and 
you lose the very notion itself. So that, if the things now 
mentioned are advantages, the reason and importance of 
positive institutions in general is most obvious; since, with¬ 
out them, these advantages could not be secured to the 
world. And, it is mere idle wantonness, to insist upon 
knowing the reasons why such particular ones were fixed 
upon rather than others. 

The benefit arising from this supernatural assistance, 
which Christianity affords to natural religion, is what some 
persons are very slow in apprehending; and yet, it is a thing 
distinct in itself, and a very plain, obvious one. For will 
any, in good earnest, really say, that the bulk of mankind 
in the heathen world were in as advantageous a situation, 
with regard to natural religion, as they are now amongst 
us? that it was laid before them, and enforced upon them, 
in a manner as distinct, and as much tending to influence 
their practice ? 

The objections against all this, from the perversion of 
Christianity, and from the supposition of its having had but 
little good influence, however innocently they may be pro¬ 
posed, yet cannot be insisted upon as conclusive, upon any 
principles but such as lead to downright atheism; because 
the manifestation of the law of nature by reason, which, 
upon all principles of theism, must have been from God, 
has been perverted and rendered ineffectual in the same 
manner. It may, indeed, I think, truly be said that the good 


180 OF THE IMPORTANCE [PART II. 

effects of Christianity have not been small; nor its supposed 
ill effects, any effects at all of it, properly speaking. Per¬ 
haps, too, the things themselves done have been aggravated; 
and if not, Christianity hath been often only a pretense; 
and the same evils, in the main, would have been done upon 
some other pretense. However, great and shocking as the 
corruptions and abuses of it have really been, they cannot 
be insisted upon as arguments against it, upon principles of 
theism. For one cannot proceed one step in reasoning upon 
natural religion, any more than upon Christianity, with¬ 
out laying it down as a first principle, that the dispen¬ 
sations of Providence are not to be judged of by their 
perversions, but by their genuine tendencies—not by what 
they do actually seem to effect, but by what they would 
effect if mankind did their part, that part which is justly 
put and left upon them. It is altogether as much the 
language of one, as of the other: “He that is unjust, 
let him be unjust still; and he that is holy, let him be holy 
still.”(1) The light of reason does not, any more than that 
of revelation, force men to submit to its authority: both 
admonish them of what they ought to do and avoid, together 
with the consequences of each; and, after this, leave them 
at full liberty to act just as they please, till the appointed 
time of judgment. Every moment’s experience shows, that 
this is God’s general rule of government. 

To return, then: Christianity being a promulgation of 
the law of nature; being, moreover, an authoritative pro¬ 
mulgation of it, with new light and other circumstances of 
peculiar advantage, adapted to the wants of mankind; these 
things fully show its importance. And it is to be observed 
farther, that as the nature of the case requires, so all Chris¬ 
tians are commanded to contribute, by their profession of 
Christianity, to preserve it in the world, and render it such 
a promulgation and enforcement of religion. For it is the 
(1) Rev. xxii, 11. 


OF CHRISTIANITY. 


181 


CHAP. I.] 

very scheme of the Gospel, that each Christian should, in 
his degree, contribute toward continuing and carrying it on; 
all by uniting in the public profession, and external practice 
of Christianity; some by instructing, by having the over¬ 
sight, and taking care of this religious community, the 
Church of God. Now, this farther shows the importance 
of Christianity, and, which is what I chiefly intend, its 
importance in a practical sense, or the high obligations we 
are under, to take it into our most serious consideration: 
and the danger there must necessarily be, not only in treat¬ 
ing it despitefully, which I am not now speaking of, but in 
disregarding and neglecting it. For this is neglecting to do 
what is expressly enjoined us, for continuing those benefits 
to the world, and transmitting them down to future times. 
And all this holds, even though the only thing to be con¬ 
sidered in Christianity were its subserviency to natural 
religion. But, 

II. Christianity is to be considered in a further view, as 
containing an account of a dispensation of things, not at all 
discoverable by reason, in consequence of which several 
distinct precepts are enjoined us. Christianity is not only 
an external institution of natural religion, and a new promul¬ 
gation of God’s general providence, as righteous Governor 
and Judge of the world; but it contains, also, a revelation 
of a particular dispensation of Providence, carrying on by 
his Son and Spirit, for the recovery and salvation of man¬ 
kind, who are represented, in Scripture, to be in a state of 
ruin. And, in consequence of this revelation being made, 
we are commanded to be “baptized,” not only “in the name 
of the Father,” but, also, “of the Son, and of the Holy 
Ghost;” and other obligations of duty, unknown before, to 
the Son and the Holy Ghost, are revealed. Now, the 
importance of these duties may be judged of, by observing 
that they arise, not from positive command merely, but, also, 
from the offices which appear, from Scripture, to belong to 
16 


182 OF THE IMPORTANCE [PART II. 

those Divine persons in the Gospel dispensation, or from 
the relations which, we are there informed, they stand in 
to us. By reason is revealed the relation which God, the 
Father, stands in to us. Hence arises the obligation of duty 
which we are under to him. In Scripture are revealed the 
relations which the Son and Holy Spirit stand in to us. 
Hence arise the obligations of duty we are under to them. 
The truth of the case, as one may speak, in each of these 
three respects, being admitted, that God is the Governor of 
the world, upon the evidence of reason; that Christ is the 
Mediator between God and man, and the Holy Ghost our 
Guide and Sanctifier, upon the evidence of revelation—the 
truth of the case, I say, in each of these respects, being 
admitted, it is no more a question, why it should be com¬ 
manded that we be baptized in the name of the Son and of 
the Holy Ghost, than that we be baptized in the name of 
the Father. This matter seems to require to be more fully 
stated. (1) 

Let it be remembered, then, that religion comes under 
the twofold consideration of internal and external; for the 
latter is as real a part of religion, of true religion, as the 
former. Now, when religion is considered under the first 
notion, as an inward principle, to be exerted in such and 
such inward acts of the mind and heart, the essence of 
natural religion may be said to consist in religious regards 
to God, the Father almighty ; and the essence of revealed 
religion, as distinguished from natural, to consist in religious 
regards to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost. And the obliga¬ 
tion we are under, of paying these religious regards to each 
of these Divine persons respectively, arises from the respec¬ 
tive relations which they each stand in to us. How these 
relations are made known, whether by reason or revelation, 
makes no alteration in the case; because the duties arise 

(1) See the Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy of the Christian 
Sacraments, &,c., and Colliber on Revealed Religion, as there quoted. 


CHAP. I.] OF CHRISTIANITY. 183 

out of the relations themselves, not out of the manner in 
which we are informed of them. The Son and Spirit have 
each his proper office in that great dispensation of Provi¬ 
dence, the redemption of the world: the one our Mediator, the 
other our Sanctifier. Does not, then, the duty of religious 
regards to both these Divine persons, as immediately arise 
to the view of reason, out of the very nature of these offices 
and relations, as the inward good-will and kind intention, 
which we owe to our fellow-cteatures, arises out of the 
common relations between us and them? But, it will be 
asked, “What are the inward religious regards, appearing 
thus obviously due to the Son and Holy Spirit, as arising, 
not merely from command in Scripture, but from the very 
nature of the revealed relations which they stand in to us?” 
I answer, the religious regards of reverence, honor, love, 
trust, gratitude, fear, hope. In what external manner this 
inward worship is to be expressed, is a matter of pure 
revealed command; as, perhaps, the external manner in 
which God, the Father, is to be worshiped, may be more so 
than we are ready to think; but the worship, the internal 
worship itself, to the Son and Holy Ghost, is no farther 
matter of pure revealed command, than as the relations 
they stand in to us, are matter of pure revelation; for the 
relations being known, the obligations to such internal 
worship are obligations of reason, arising out of those 
relations themselves. In short, the history of the Gospel as 
immediately shows us the reason of these obligations, as it 
shows us the meaning of the words, Son and Holy Ghost. 

If this account of the Christian religion be just, those 
persons who can speak lightly of it, as of little consequence, 
provided natural religion be kept to, plainly forget, that 
Christianity, even what is peculiarly so called, as distin¬ 
guished from natural religion, has yet somewhat very im¬ 
portant, even of a moral nature. For the office of our 
Lord being made known, and the relations he stands in to 


184 OF THE IMPORTANCE [PART II. 

us, the obligation of religious regards to him is plainly 
moral, as much as charity to mankind is; since this obliga¬ 
tion arises, before external command, immediately out of 
that his office and relation itself. Those persons appear to 
forget, that revelation is to be considered as informing us of 
somewhat new in the state of mankind, and in the govern¬ 
ment of the world; as acquainting us with some relations 
we stand in, which could not otherwise have been known. 
And these relations being real, (though before revelation 
we could be under no obligations from them, yet upon their 
being revealed,) there is no reason to think, but that neglect 
of behaving suitably to them will be attended with the same 
kind of consequences under God’s government, as neglect¬ 
ing to behave suitably to any other relations made known 
to us by reason. And ignorance, whether unavoidable or 
voluntary, so far as we can possibly see, will, just as much, 
and just as little, excuse in one case as in the other; the 
ignorance being supposed equally unavoidable, or equally 
voluntary, in both cases. 

If, therefore, Christ be, indeed, the Mediator between God 
and man, that is, if Christianity be true—if he be, indeed, 
our Lord, our Savior, and our God, no one can say what 
may follow, not only the obstinate, but the careless, disre¬ 
gard to him in those high relations. Nay, no one can say 
what may follow such disregard, even in the way of natural 
consequence.(l) For, as the natural consequences of vice 
in this life are doubtless to be considered as judicial punish¬ 
ments inflicted by God, so likewise, for aught we know, the 
judicial punishments of the future life may be, in a like 
way, or a like sense, the natural consequence of vice ;(2) of 
men’s violating or disregarding the relations which God has 
placed them in here, and made known to them. 

Again, if mankind are corrupted and depraved in their 
moral character, and so are unfit for that state which Christ 
(1) Pages 66, 67, 68. (2) Chap. v. 


OF CHRISTIANITY. 


CHAP. I.] 


185 


is gone to prepare for his disciples; and, if the assistance 
of God’s Spirit be necessary to renew their nature, in a 
degree requisite to their being qualified for that state; all 
which is implied in the express, though figurative, declara¬ 
tion, “ Except a man be born of the Spirit, he cannot enter 
into the kingdom of God:”(l) supposing this, is it possible 
any serious person can think it a slight matter, whether or 
no he makes use of the means, expressly commanded by 
God, for obtaining this Divine assistance? especially since 
the whole analogy of nature shows, that we are not to 
expect any benefits, without making use of the appointed 
means for obtaining or enjoying them. Now reason shows 
us nothing of the particular immediate means of obtaining 
either temporal or spiritual benefits. This, therefore, we 
must learn, either from experience or revelation. And ex¬ 
perience the present case does not admit of. 

The conclusion from all this evidently is, that Christianity 
being supposed either true or credible, it is unspeakable 
irreverence, and really the most presumptuous rashness, to 
treat it as a light matter. It can never justly be esteemed 
of little consequence, till it be positively supposed false. 
Nor do I know a higher and more important obligation 
which we are under, than that of examining most seriously 
into the evidence of it, supposing its credibility, and of em¬ 
bracing it, upon supposition of its truth. 

The two following deductions may be proper to be added, 
in order to illustrate the foregoing observations, and to pre¬ 
vent their being mistaken. 

1. Hence we may clearly see, where lies the distinction 
between what is positive, and what is moral in religion. 
Moral precepts are precepts, the reasons of which we see; 
positive precepts are precepts, the reasons of which we do 
not see. (2) Moral duties arise out of the nature of the 


(1) John iii, 5. 

(2) This is the distinction 


between moral and positive precepts, 
16* 


186 OF THE IMPORTANCE [PART II. 

case itself, prior to external command. Positive duties do 
not arise out of the nature of the case, but from external 
command; nor would they be duties at all, were it not for 
such command received from Him, whose creatures and sub¬ 
jects we are. But the manner in which the nature of the 
case, or the fact of the relation, is made known, this doth 
not denominate any duty, either positive or moral. That 
we be baptized in the name of the Father, is as much a 
positive duty as that we be baptized in the name of the 
Son; because both arise equally from revealed command: 
though the relation which we stand in to God, the Father, 
is made known to us by reason; the relation we stand in to 
Christ, by revelation only. On the other hand, the dispen¬ 
sation of the Gospel admitted, gratitude as immediately 
becomes due to Christ, from his being the voluntary minis¬ 
ter of this dispensation, as it is due to God, the Father, 
from his being the fountain of all good; though the first is 
made known to us by revelation only, the second by reason. 
Hence, also, we may see, and, for distinctness’ sake, it may 
be worth mentioning, that positive institutions come under a 
twofold consideration. They are either institutions founded 
on natural religion, as baptism in the name of the Father; 
though this has, also, a particular reference to the Gospel 
dispensation, for it is in the name of God, as the Father of 
our Lord Jesus Christ; or they are external institutions 
founded on revealed religion, as baptism in the name of the 
Son, and of the Holy Ghost. 

2. From the distinction between what is moral and what 
is positive in religion, appears the ground of that peculiar 

considered respectively as such. But yet, since the latter have 
somewhat of a moral nature, we may see the reason of them, con¬ 
sidered in this view. Moral and positive precepts are, in some 
respects, alike; in other respects, different. So far as they are alike, 
we discern the reasons of both; so far as they are different, we 
discern the reasons of the former, but not of the latter. See p. 
176, &c., and p. 186, &c. 


CHAP. I.] OF CHRISTIANITY. 187 

preference, which the Scripture teaches us to be due to the 
former. 

The reason of positive institutions in general is very ob¬ 
vious, though we should not see the reason why such par¬ 
ticular ones are pitched upon, rather than others. Who¬ 
ever, therefore, instead of caviling at words, will attend to 
the thing itself, may clearly see, that positive institutions in 
general, as distinguished from this or that particular one, 
have the nature of moral commands: since the reasons of 
them appear. Thus, for instance, the external worship of 
God is a moral duty, though no particular mode of it be 
so. Care, then, is to be taken, when a comparison is made 
between positive and moral duties, that they be compared 
no farther than as they are different—no farther than 
as the former are positive, or arise out of mere external 
command, the reasons of which we are not acquainted 
with; and as the latter are moral, or arise out of the 
apparent reason of the case, without such external com¬ 
mand. Unless this caution be observed, we shall run into 
endless confusion. 

Now, this being premised, suppose two standing pre¬ 
cepts enjoined by the same authority; that, in certain con¬ 
junctures, it is impossible to obey both; that the former is 
moral, that is, a precept of which we see the reasons, and 
that they hold in the particular case before us; but that 
the latter is positive, that is, a precept of which we do not 
see the reasons: it is indisputable that our obligations are 
to obey the former, because there is an apparent reason for 
this preference, and none against it. Farther, positive insti¬ 
tutions, I suppose all those which Christianity enjoins, are 
means to a moral end; and the end must be acknowledged 
more excellent than the means. Nor is observance of 
these institutions any religious obedience at all, or of any 
value, otherwise than as it proceeds from a moral princi¬ 
ple. This seems to be the strict logical way of stating 


188 OF THE IMPORTANCE [PART H. 

and determining this matter; but will, perhaps, be found 
less applicable to practice, than may be thought at first 
sight. 

And, therefore, in a more practical, though more lax way 
of consideration, and taking the words, moral law and posi¬ 
tive institutions , in the popular sense, I add, that the whole 
moral law is as much matter of revealed command, as posi¬ 
tive institutions are; for the Scripture enjoins every moral 
virtue. In this respect, then, they are both upon a level. 
But the moral law is, moreover, written upon our hearts, 
interwoven into our very nature. And this is a plain inti¬ 
mation of the Author of it, which is to be preferred, when 
they interfere. 

But there is not altogether so much necessity for the de¬ 
termination of this question as some persons seem to think. 
Nor are we left to reason alone to determine it. For, first, 
though mankind have, in all ages, been greatly prone to 
place their religion in peculiar positive rights, by way of 
equivalent for obedience to moral precepts; yet, without 
making any comparison at all between them, and, conse¬ 
quently, without determining which is to have the prefer¬ 
ence, the nature of the thing abundantly shows all notions 
of that kind to be utterly subversive of true religion; as they 
are, moreover, contrary to the whole general tenor of Scrip¬ 
ture, and, likewise, to the most express, particular declara¬ 
tions of it, that nothing can render us accepted of God, 
without moral virtue. Secondly, upon the occasion of men¬ 
tioning together positive and moral duties, the Scripture 
always puts the stress of religion upon the latter, and never 
upon the former; which, though no sort of allowance to 
neglect the former, when they do not interfere with the 
latter, yet is a plain intimation, that when they do, the 
latter are to be preferred. And, farther, as mankind are 
for placing the stress of their religion any where, rather 
than upon virtue, lest both the reason of the thing, and the 


CHAP. I.] OF CHRISTIANITY. 189 

general spirit of Christianity, appearing in the intimation 
now mentioned, should be ineffectual against this prevalent 
folly, our Lord himself, from whose command alone the 
obligation of positive institutions arises, has taken occasion 
to make the comparison between them and moral precepts; 
when the Pharisees censured him for “eating with publi¬ 
cans and sinnersand, also, when they censured his disci¬ 
ples for “ plucking the ears of corn on the Sabbath day.” 
Upon this comparison he has determined expressly, and in 
form, which shall have the preference when they interfere. 
And by delivering his authoritative determination in a pro¬ 
verbial manner of expression, he has made it general: “I 
will have mercy, and not sacrifice.”(1) The propriety of 
the word 'proverbial is not the thing insisted upon, though, 
I think, the manner of speaking is to be called so. But 
that the manner of speaking very remarkably renders the 
determination general, is surely indisputable. For, had it, 
in the latter case, been said only, that God preferred mercy 
to the rigid observance of the Sabbath, even then, by parity 
of reason, most justly might we have argued, that he pre¬ 
ferred mercy, likewise, to the observance of other ritual 
institutions, and, in general, moral duties to positive ones. 
And thus the determination would have been general, 
though its being so were inferred, and not expressed. But 
as the passage really stands in the Gospel, it is much 
stronger; for the sense, and the very literal words of our 
Lord’s answer, are as applicable to any other instance of a 
comparison, between positive and moral duties, as to this 
upon Avhich they were spoken. And if, in case of compe¬ 
tition, mercy is to be preferred to positive institutions, it will 
scarce be thought, that, justice is to give place to them. 
It is remarkable, too, that, as the words are a quotation 
from the Old Testament, they are introduced, on both of 
the forementioned occasions, with a declaration, that the 
(1) Matt, ix, 13, and xii, 7. 


190 


OF THE IMPORTANCE 


[part II. 

Pharisees did not understand the meaning of them. This, I 
say, is very remarkable; for, since it is scarce possible for 
the most ignorant person not to understand the literal sense 
of the passage in the prophet,(l) and since understanding 
the literal sense would not have prevented their condemning 
the guiltless, (2) it can hardly be doubted, that the thing 
which our Lord really intended in that declaration was, 
that the Pharisees had not learnt from it, as they might, 
wherein the general spirit of religion consists—that it con¬ 
sists in moral piety and virtue, as distinguished from forms 
and ritual observances. However, it is certain we may 
learn this from his divine application of the passage, in the 
Gospel. 

But, as it is one of the peculiar weaknesses of human 
nature, when, upon a comparison of two things, one is 
found to be of greater importance than the other, to con¬ 
sider this other as of scarce any importance at all; it is 
highly necessary that we remind ourselves, how great pre¬ 
sumption it is to make light of any institutions of Divine 
appointment; that our obligations to obey all God’s com¬ 
mands whatever, are absolute and indispensable; and that 
commands merely positive, admitted to be from him, lay us 
under a moral obligation to obey them—an obligation moral 
in the strictest and most proper sense. 

To these things I cannot forbear adding, that the account 
now given of Christianity most strongly shows and enforces 
upon us the obligation of searching the Scriptures, in order 
to see what the scheme of revelation really is, instead of 
determining beforehand, from reason, what the scheme of it 
must be. (3) Indeed, if in revelation there be found any 
passages, the seeming meaning of which is contrary to 
natural religion, we may most certainly conclude such 
seeming meaning not to be the real one. But it is not 
any degree of a presumption against an interpretation of 
(1) Hosea vi. (2) See Matt, xii, 7. (3) See Chap. iii. 


OF CHRISTIANITY. 


191 




CHAP. I.] 


Scripture, that such interpretation contains a doctrine, 
which the light of nature cannot discover,(l) or a pre¬ 
cept, which the law of nature does not oblige to. 

(1) Pages 193,194. 


















192 


OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION 


[PART II. 


CHAPTER II. 

OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST A REVELATION, 
CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS. 

Having shown the importance of the Christian revela¬ 
tion, and the obligations which we are under seriously to 
attend to it, upon supposition of its truth or its credibility; 
the next thing in order is, to consider the supposed pre¬ 
sumptions against revelation in general, which shall be the 
subject of this chapter; and the objections against the 
Christian in particular, which shall be the subject of some 
following ones.(l) For it seems the most natural method 
to remove the prejudices against Christianity, before we 
proceed to the consideration of the positive evidence for it, 
and the objections against that evidence.(2) 

It is, I think, commonly supposed, that there is some pe¬ 
culiar presumption, from the analogy of nature, against the 
Christian scheme of things, at least against miracles; so as 
that stronger evidence is necessary to prove the truth and 
reality of them, than would be sufficient to convince us of 
other events or matters of fact. Indeed, the consideration 
of this supposed presumption cannot but be thought very 
insignificant by many persons; yet, as it belongs to the sub¬ 
ject of this treatise, so it may tend to open the mind, and 
remove some prejudices; however needless the considera¬ 
tion of it be, upon its own account. 

I. I find no appearance of a presumption, from the anal¬ 
ogy of nature, against the general scheme of Christianity, 
that God created and invisibly governs the world by Jesus 
Christ, and by him, also, will hereafter judge it in righteous¬ 
ness, that is, render to every one according to his works; 
and that good men are under the secret influence of his 
Spirit. Whether these things are, or are not, to be called 
(1) Chaps, iii, iv, v, vi. (2) Chap. vii. 


CHAP. II.] AGAINST MIRACLES. 193 

miraculous, is, perhaps, only a question about words; or, 
however, is of no moment in the case. If the analogy of 
nature raises any presumption against this general scheme 
of Christianity, it must be, either because it is not discover¬ 
able by reason or experience, or else because it is unlike 
that course of nature, which is. But analogy raises no 
presumption against the truth of this scheme, upon either 
of these accounts. 

1. There is no presumption, from analogy, against the 
truth of it, upon account of its not being discoverable by 
reason or experience. For, suppose one who never heard 
of revelation, of the most improved understanding, and 
acquainted with our whole system of natural philosophy and 
natural religion; such a one could not but be sensible, that 
it was but a very small part of the natural and moral system 
of the universe, which he was acquainted with. He could 
not but be sensible, that there must be innumerable things, 
in the dispensations of Providence past, in the invisible gov¬ 
ernment over the world at present carrying on, and in what 
is to come, of which he was wholly ignorant,(l) and which 
could not be discovered without revelation. Whether the 
scheme of nature be, in the strictest sense, infinite or not, it 
is evidently vast, even beyond all possible imagination. 
And, doubtless, that part of it which is opened to our view, 
is but as a point, in comparison of the whole plan of Provi¬ 
dence, reaching throughout eternity, past and future; in 
comparison of what is even now going on in the remote parts 
of the boundless universe; nay, in comparison of the whole 
scheme of this world. And, therefore, that things lie be¬ 
yond the natural reach of our faculties, is no sort of pre¬ 
sumption against the truth and reality of them; because 
it is certain, there are innumerable things in the consitu- 
tion and government of the universe, which are thus beyond 
the natural reach of our faculties. 2. Analogy raises no 
(1) Pages 154, 155. 

17 


194 OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION [PART II. 

presumption against any of the things contained in this gen¬ 
eral doctrine of Scripture now mentioned, upon account of 
their being unlike the known course of nature. For there 
is no presumption at all, from analogy, that the whole course 
of things, or Divine government, naturally unknown to us, 
and every thing in it, is like to any thing in that which is 
known; and, therefore, no peculiar presumption against any 
thing in the former, upon account of its being unlike to any 
thing in the latter. And, in the constitution and natural 
government of the world, as well as in the moral govern¬ 
ment of it, we see things, in a great degree, unlike one 
another; and, therefore, ought not to wonder at such un¬ 
likeness between things visible and invisible. However, the 
scheme of Christianity is, by no means, entirely unlike the 
scheme of nature, as will appear in the following part of 
this treatise. 

The notion of a miracle, considered as a proof of a Divine 
mission, has been stated with great exactness by divines, 
and is, I think, sufficiently understood by every one. There 
are, also, invisible miracles; the incarnation of Christ, for 
instance, which, being secret, cannot be alledged as a proof 
of such a mission; but require themselves to be proved by 
visible miracles. Revelation itself, too, is miraculous, and 
miracles are the proof of it; and the supposed presumption 
against these shall presently be considered. All which I 
have been observing here is, that, whether we choose to 
call every thing in the dispensations of Providence, not 
discoverable without revelation, nor like the known course 
of things, miraculous, and, whether the general Christian 
dispensation now mentioned, is to be called so, or not, the 
foregoing observations seem certainly to show, that there is 
no presumption against it, from the analogy of nature. 

II. There is no presumption from analogy, against some 
operations which we should now call miraculous; particu¬ 
larly, none against a revelation at the beginning of the world; 


CHAP. II. J AGAINST MIRACLES. 195 

nothing of such presumptions against it, as is supposed to be 
implied or expressed in the word, miraculous . For a mira¬ 
cle, in its very notion, is relative to a course of nature, and 
implies somewhat different from it, considered as being so. 
Now, either there was no course of nature at the time 
which we are speaking of, or, if there were, we are not 
acquainted what the course of nature is upon the first 
peopling of worlds. And, therefore, the question, whether 
mankind had a revelation made to them at that time, is to 
be considered, not as a question concerning a miracle, but as 
a common question of fact. And we have the like reason, 
be it more or less, to admit the report of tradition concern¬ 
ing this question and concerning common matters of fact of 
the same antiquity; for instance, what part of the earth 
was first peopled. 

Or thus: when mankind was first placed in this state, 
there was a power exerted, totally different from the present 
course of nature. Now, whether this power, thus wholly 
different from the present course of nature, for we cannot 
properly apply to it the word miraculous —whether this 
power stopped immediately after it had made man, or went 
on, and exerted itself farther in giving him a revelation, is 
a question of the same kind, as whether an ordinary power 
exerted itself in such a particular degree and manner, 
or not. 

Or, suppose the power exerted in the formation of the 
world be considered as miraculous, or, rather, be called by 
that name, the case will not be different; since it must be 
acknowledged that such a power was exerted. For, sup¬ 
posing it acknowledged that our Savior spent some years in 
a course of working miracles, there is no more presumption, 
worth mentioning, against his having exerted this miraculous 
power, in a certain degree greater, than in a certain degree 
less; in one or two more instances, than in one or two fewer; 
in this, than in another manner. 


196 OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION [PART II. 

It is evident, then, that there can be no peculiar pre¬ 
sumption, from the analogy of nature, against supposing a 
revelation, when man was first placed upon earth. 

Add, that there does not appear the least intimation in 
history or tradition, that religion was first reasoned out; but 
the whole of history and tradition makes for the other side, 
that it came into the world by revelation. Indeed, the 
state of religion in the first ages, of which we have any 
account, seems to suppose and imply that this was the 
original of it amongst mankind. And these reflections 
together, without taking in the peculiar authority of Scrip¬ 
ture, amount to real and a very material degree of evidence, 
that there was a revelation at the beginning of the world. 
Now this, as it is a confirmation of natural religion, and, 
therefore, mentioned in the former part of this treatise,(l) 
so, likewise, it has a tendency to remove any prejudices 
against a subsequent revelation. 

III. But still it may be objected, that there is some pecu¬ 
liar presumption from analogy, against miracles; particularly 
against revelation, after the settlement and during the con¬ 
tinuance of a course of nature. 

Now, with regard to this supposed presumption, it is to 
be observed in general, that before we can have ground for 
raising what can, with any propriety, be called an argument 
from analogy, for or against revelation considered as some¬ 
what miraculous, we must be acquainted with a similar or 
parallel case. But the history of some other world, seem¬ 
ingly in like circumstances with our own, is no more than a 
parallel case; and, therefore, nothing short of this can be 
so. Yet, could we come at a presumptive proof, for or 
against a revelation, from being informed whether such 
world had one, or not; such a proof, being drawn from one 
single instance only, must be infinitely precarious. More 
particularly, first of all, there is a very strong presumption 
(1) Page 147, &c. 


CHAP. II.] AGAINST MIRACLES. 197 

against common speculative truths, and against the most 
ordinary facts, before the proof of them, which yet is over¬ 
come by almost any proof. There is a presumption of 
millions to one, against the story of Caesar, or of any other 
man. For, suppose a number of common facts so and so 
circumstanced, of which one had no kind of proof, should 
happen to come into one’s thoughts; every one would, 
without any possible doubt, conclude them to be false. 
And the like may be said of a single common fact. And 
from hence, it appears, that the question of importance, as 
to the matter before us, is, concerning the degree of the 
peculiar presumption supposed against miracles; not whether 
there be any peculiar presumption at all against them. For, 
if there be the presumption of millions to one, against the 
most common facts, what can a small presumption, addi¬ 
tional to this, amount to, though it be peculiar? It cannot 
be estimated, and is as nothing. The only material question 
is, whether there be any such presumption against miracles, 
as to render them in any sort incredible? Secondly, if we 
leave out the consideration of religion, we are in such total 
darkness, upon what causes, occasions, reasons, or circum¬ 
stances, the present course of nature depends, that there 
does not appear any improbability for or against supposing, 
that five or six thousand years may have given scope for 
causes, occasions, reasons, or circumstances, from whence 
miraculous interpositions may have arisen. And from this, 
joined with the foregoing observation, it will follow that 
there must be a presumption, beyond all comparison, 
greater, against the particular common facts just now 
instanced in, than against miracles in general; before any 
evidence of either. But, thirdly, take in the consideration 
of religion, or the moral system of the world, and then we 
see distinct particular reasons for miracles; to afford man¬ 
kind instruction additional to that of nature, and to attest 
the truth of it. And this gives a real credibility to the 

17 * 


108 PRESUMPTION AGAINST MIRACLES. [PART II. 

supposition, that it might be part of the original plan of 
things, that there should be miraculous interpositions. Then, 
lastly, miracles must not be compared to common natural 
events; or to events which, though uncommon, are similar 
to what we daily experience; but to the extraordinary 
phenomena of nature. And then the comparison will be, 
between the presumption against miracles, and the pre¬ 
sumption against such uncommon appearances, suppose, as 
comets, and against there being any such powers in nature 
as magnetism and electricity, so contrary to the properties 
of other bodies not endued with these powers. And before 
any one can determine whether there be any peculiar pre¬ 
sumption against miracles, more than against other extraor¬ 
dinary things, he must consider, what, upon first hearing, 
would be the presumption against the last mentioned ap¬ 
pearances and powers, to a person acquainted only with the 
daily, monthly, and annual course of nature respecting this 
earth, and with those common powers of matter which we 
every day see. 

Upon all this I conclude, that there certainly is no such 
presumption against miracles, as to render them in anywise 
incredible; that, on the contrary, our being able to discern 
reasons for them, gives a positive credibility to the history 
of them, in cases where those reasons hold; and that it is 
by no means certain, that there is any peculiar presumption 
at all, from analogy, even in the lowest degree, against 
miracles, as distinguished from other extraordinary phenom¬ 
ena; though it is not worth while to perplex the reader 
with inquiries into the abstract nature of evidence, in order 
to determine a question, which, without such inquiries, we 
see(l) is of no importance. 

(1) Page 196. 


CHAP. III.] REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 


199 


CHAPTER III. 

OF OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING, WHAT WERE TO BE EX¬ 
PECTED IN A REVELATION; AND THE CREDIBILITY FROM 
ANALOGY, THAT IT MUST CONTAIN THINGS APPEARING 
LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 

Besides the objections against the evidence for Chris¬ 
tianity, many are alledged against the scheme of it—against 
the whole manner in which it is put and left with the world, 
as well as against several particular relations in Scripture: 
objections drawn from the deficiencies of revelation; from 
things in it appearing to men foolishness 1) from its con¬ 
taining matters of offense, which have led, and it must 
have been foreseen, would lead, into strange enthusiasm and 
superstition, and be made to serve the purposes of tyranny 
and wickedness; from its not being universal; and, which 
is a thing of the same kind, from its evidence not being so 
convincing and satisfactory as it might have been; for this 
last is sometimes turned into a positive argument against its 
truth.(2) It would be tedious, indeed impossible, to enu¬ 
merate the several particulars comprehended under the 
objections here referred to, they being so various, according 
to the different fancies of men. There are persons, who 
think it a strong objection against the authority of Scripture, 
that it is not composed by rules of art, agreed upon by 
critics, for polite and correct writing. And the scorn is inex¬ 
pressible, with which some of the prophetic parts of Scrip¬ 
ture are treated; partly through the rashness of interpreters, 
but very much, also, on account of the hieroglyphical and 
figurative language in which they are left us. Some of the 
principal things of this sort shall be particularly considered 
in the following chapters. But my design, at present, is to 
observe, in general, with respect to this whole way of 
(1)1 Cor. i. 18. (2) See Chap. vi. 


200 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION [PART II. 

arguing, that, upon supposition of a revelation, it is highly 
credible beforehand, we should be incompetent judges of it, 
to a great degree; and that it would contain many things 
appearing to us liable to great objections, in case we judge 
of it otherwise than by the analogy of nature. And, there¬ 
fore, though objections against the evidence of Christianity 
are most seriously to be considered, yet objections against 
Christianity itself are, in a great measure, frivolous—almost 
all objections against it, excepting those which are alledged 
against the particular proofs of its coming from God. I 
express myself with caution, lest I should be mistaken to 
vilify reason, which is, indeed, the only faculty we have 
wherewith to judge concerning any thing, even revelation 
itself; or be misunderstood to assert, that a supposed reve¬ 
lation cannot be proved false from internal characters. For, 
it may contain clear immoralities or contradictions; and 
either of these would prove it false. Nor will I take upon 
me to affirm, that nothing else can possibly render any 
supposed revelation incredible. Yet, still the observation 
above is, I think, true beyond doubt, that objections against 
Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its 
evidence, are frivolous. To make out this, is the general 
design of the present chapter. And, with regard to the 
whole of it, I cannot but particularly wish, that the proofs 
might be attended to, rather than the assertions caviled at, 
upon account of any unacceptable consequences, whether 
real or supposed, which may be drawn from them. For, 
after all, that which is true, must be admitted; though it 
should show us the shortness of Our faculties, and that we 
are in nowise judges of many things of which we are apt 
to think ourselves very competent ones. Nor will this be 
any objection with reasonable men; at least, upon second 
thought, it will not be any objection with such, against the 
justness of the following observations. 

As God governs the world, and instructs his creatures, 


CHAP. III.] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 201 

according to certain laws or rules in the known course of 
nature, known by reason together with experience; so the 
Scripture informs us of a scheme of Divine providence, 
additional to this. It relates, that God has, by revelation, 
instructed men in things concerning his government, which 
they could not otherwise have known, and reminded them 
of things which they might otherwise know; and attested 
the truth of the whole by miracles. Now, if the natural 
and the revealed dispensations of things are both from God, 
if they coincide with each other, and together make up one 
scheme of Providence, our being incompetent judges of 
one, must render it credible that we may be incompetent 
judges, also, of the other. Since, upon experience, the 
acknowledged constitution and course of nature is found to 
be greatly different from what, before experience, would 
have been expected; and such as, men fancy, there lie 
great objections against. This renders it beforehand highly 
credible, that they may find the revealed dispensation like¬ 
wise, if they judge of it as they do of the constitution of 
nature, very different from expectations formed beforehand; 
and liable, in appearance, to great objections—objections 
against the scheme itself, and against the degrees and 
manners of the miraculous interpositions, by which it was 
attested and carried on. Thus, suppose a prince to govern 
his dominions in the wisest manner possible, by common 
known laws; and that, upon some exigencies, he should 
suspend these laws, and govern, in several instances, in a 
different manner: if one of his subjects were not a compe¬ 
tent judge beforehand, by what common rules the govern¬ 
ment should or would be carried on, it could not be expected 
that the same person would be a competent judge, in what 
exigencies, or in what manner, or to what degree, those 
laws commonly observed would be suspended or deviated 
from. If he were not a judge of the wisdom of the ordi¬ 
nary administration, there is no reason to think he would be 


202 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION [PART II. 

a judge of the wisdom of the extraordinary. If he thought 
he had objections against the former, doubtless, it is highly 
supposable, he might think, also, that he had objections 
against the latter. And thus, as we fall into infinite follies 
and mistakes, whenever we pretend, otherwise than from 
experience and analogy, to judge of the constitution and 
course of nature, it is evidently supposable beforehand, that 
we should fall into as great, in pretending to judge, in like 
manner, concerning revelation. Nor is there any more 
ground to expect that this latter should appear to us clear 
of objections, than that the former should. 

These observations, relating to the whole of Christianity, 
are applicable to inspiration in particular. As we are in no 
sort judges beforehand, by what laws or rules, in what 
degree, or by what means, it were to have been expected 
that God would naturally instruct us; so, upon supposition 
of his affording us light and instruction by revelation, addi¬ 
tional to what he has afforded us by reason and experience, 
we are in no sort judges, by what methods, and in what 
proportion, it were to be expected that this supernatural 
light and instruction would be afforded us. We know not 
beforehand, what degree or kind of natural information it 
were to be expected God would afford men, each by his 
own reason and experience; nor how far he would enable 
and effectually dispose them to communicate it, whatever it 
should be, to each other; nor whether the evidence of it 
would be certain, highly probable, or doubtful; nor whether 
it would be given with equal clearness and conviction to all. 
Nor could we guess, upon any good ground I mean, whether 
natural knowledge, or even the faculty itself by which we 
are capable of attaining it, reason, would be given us at 
once, or gradually. In like manner, we are wholly ignorant, 
what degree of new knowledge, it were to be expected, God 
would give mankind by revelation, upon supposition of his 
affording one; or how far, or in what way, he would 


CHAP. III.] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 203 

interpose miraculously, to qualify them, to whom he should 
originally make the revelation, for communicating the knowl¬ 
edge given by it; and to secure their doing it to the age in 
which they should live, and to secure its being transmitted 
to posterity. We are equally ignorant, whether the evi¬ 
dence of it would be certain, or highly probable, or doubt¬ 
ful ;(l) or whether all who should have any degree of 
instruction from it, and any degree of evidence of its truth, 
would have the same; or whether the scheme would be 
revealed at once, or unfolded gradually. Nay, we are not 
in any sort able to judge, whether it were to have been 
expected, that the revelation should have been committed 
to writing, or left to be handed down, and, consequently, 
corrupted, by verbal tradition, and, at length, sunk under it, 
if mankind so pleased, and during such time as they are 
permitted, in the degree they evidently are, to act as they 
will. 

But it may be said, “that a revelation in some of the 
above-mentioned circumstances, one, for instance, which 
was not committed to writing, and thus secured against 
danger of corruption, would not have answered his pur¬ 
pose.” I ask, what purpose? It would not have answered 
all the purposes which it has now answered, and in the 
same degree; but it would have answered others, or the 
same in different degrees. And which of these were the 
purposes of God, and best fell in with his general govern¬ 
ment, we could not at all have determined beforehand. 

Now, since it has been shown, that we have no principles 
of reason upon which to judge beforehand, how it were to be 
expected revelation should have been left, or what was most 
suitable to the Divine plan of government, in any of the 
forementioned respects, it must be quite frivolous to object 
afterward as to any of them, against its being left in one 
way, rather than another; for this would be to object against 
(1) See Chap. vi. 


204 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION [PART II. 

things, upon account of their being different from expecta¬ 
tions which have been shown to be without reason. And 
thus we see, that the only question concerning the truth of 
Christianity is, whether it be a real revelation; not whether 
it be attended with every circumstance which we should 
have looked for: and concerning the authority of Scripture, 
whether it be what it claims to be; not whether it be a 
book of such sort, and so promulged, as weak men are apt 
to fancy a book containing a Divine revelation should. And, 
therefore, neither obscurity, nor seeming inaccuracy of style, 
nor various readings, nor early disputes about the authors of 
particular parts, nor any other things of the like kind, though 
they had been much more considerable in degree than they 
are, could overthrow the authority of the Scripture; unless 
the prdphets, apostles, or our Lord, had promised, that the 
book, containing the Divine revelation, should be secure 
from those things. Nor, indeed, can any objections over¬ 
throw such a kind of revelation as the Christian claims to 
be, since there are no objections against the morality of 
it,(l) but such as can show, that there is no proof of mira¬ 
cles wrought originally in attestation of it; no appearance 
of any thing miraculous in its obtaining in the world; nor 
any of prophecy, that is, of events foretold, which human 
sagacity could not foresee. If it can be shown, that the 
proof alledged for all these is absolutely none at all, then is 
revelation overturned. But were it allowed, that the proof 
of any one, or all of them, is lower than is allowed; yet 
whilst any proof of them remains, revelation will stand 
upon much the same foot it does at present, as to all the 
purposes of life and practice, and ought to have the like 
influence upon our behavior. 

From the foregoing observations, too, it will follow, and 
those who will thoroughly examine into revelation will find 
it worth remarking, that there are several ways of arguing, 
(1) Page 211. 


CHAP. III.] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 205 

which, though just with regard to other writings, are not 
applicable to Scripture; at least, not to the prophetic parts 
of it. We cannot argue, for instance, that this cannot be 
the sense or intent of such a passage of Scripture; for if it 
had, it would have been expressed more plainly, or have 
been represented under a more apt figure or hieroglyphic; 
yet we may justly argue thus, with respect to common 
books. And the reason of this difference is very evident; 
that in Scripture we are not competent judges, as we are in 
common books, how plainly it were to have been expected, 
what is the true sense should have been expressed, or 
under how apt an image figured. The only question is, 
what appearance there is that this is the sense; and scarce 
at all, how much more determinately or accurately it might 
have been expressed or figured. 

“ But is it not self-evident, that internal improbabilities of 
all kinds, weaken external probable proof?” Doubtless. 
But to what practical purpose can this be alledged here, 
when it has been proved before,(l) that real internal im¬ 
probabilities, which rise even to moral certainty, are over¬ 
come by the most ordinary testimony; and when it now 
has been made appear, that we scarce know what are im¬ 
probabilities, as to the matter we are here considering; as 
it will farther appear from what follows. 

For though, from the observations above made, it is man¬ 
ifest, that we are not in any sort competent judges, what 
supernatural instruction were to have been expected; and 
though it is self-evident, that the objections of an incompe¬ 
tent judgment must be frivolous; yet it may be proper to 
go one step farther, and observe, that if men will be regard¬ 
less of these things, and pretend to judge of the Scripture 
by preconceived expectations, the analogy of nature shows 
beforehand, not only that it is highly credible they may, but 
also probable that they will, imagine they have strong 

(1) Page 195. 

18 


206 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION [PART II. 

objections against it, however really unexceptionable: for so, 
prior to experience, they would think they had, against the 
circumstances, and degrees, and the whole manner of that 
instruction, which is afforded by the ordinary course of 
nature. Were the instruction which God affords to brute 
creatures by instincts and mere propensions, and to man¬ 
kind by these together with reason, matter of probable 
proof, and not of certain observation, it would be rejected 
as incredible, in many instances of it, only upon account 
of the means by which this instruction is given, the seem¬ 
ing disproportions, the limitations, necessary conditions, and 
circumstances of it. For instance, would it not have been 
thought highly improbable, that men should have been 
so much more capable of discovering, even to certainty, 
the general laws of matter, and the magnitudes, paths, 
and revolutions of heavenly bodies, than the occasions 
and cures of distempers, and many other things, in which 
human life seems so much more nearly concerned, than in 
astronomy ? How capricious and irregular a way of infor¬ 
mation, would it be said, is that of invention, by means 
of which nature instructs us in matters of science, and in 
many things upon which the affairs of the world greatly 
depend; that a man should, by this faculty, be made ac¬ 
quainted with the thing in an instant, when, perhaps, he is 
thinking of somewhat else, which he has in vain been 
searching after, it may be, for years. So, likewise, the 
imperfections attending the only method by which nature 
enables and directs us to communicate our thoughts to 
each other, are innumerable. Language is, in its very na¬ 
ture, inadequate, ambiguous, liable to infinite abuse, even 
from negligence; and so liable to it from design, that every 
man can deceive and betray by it. And to mention but 
one instance more, that brutes, without reason, should act, 
in many respects, with a sagacity and foresight vastly 
greater than what men have in those respects, would be 


CHAP. III.] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 207 

thought impossible. Yet it is certain they do act with such 
superior foresight; whether it be their own, indeed, is an¬ 
other question. From these things it is credible before¬ 
hand, that upon supposition God should afford men some 
additional instruction by revelation, it would be with cir¬ 
cumstances, in manners, degrees, and respects, which we 
should be apt to fancy we had great objections against the 
credibility of. Nor are the objections against the Scripture, 
nor against Christianity in general, at all more or greater 
than the analogy of nature would beforehand—not, per¬ 
haps, give ground to expect; for this analogy may not be 
sufficient, in some cases, to ground an expectation upon; 
but no more nor greater, than analogy would show it, 
beforehand, to be supposable and credible, that there might 
seem to lie against revelation. 

By applying these general observations to a particular 
objection, it will be more distinctly seen, how they are 
applicable to others of the like kind; and, indeed, to almost 
all objections against Christianity, as- distinguished from 
objections against its evidence. It appears from Scripture, 
that as it was not unusual, in the apostolic age, for persons, 
upon their conversion to Christianity, to be endued with 
miraculous gifts, so, some of those persons exercised these 
gifts in a strangely irregular and disorderly manner; and 
this is made an objection against their being really miracu¬ 
lous. Now, the foregoing observations quite remove this ob¬ 
jection, how considerable soever it may appear at first sight. 
For, consider a person endued with any of these gifts, for 
instance, that of tongues; it is to be supposed, that he had 
the same power over this miraculous gift, as he would have 
had over it, had it been the effect of habit, of study, and 
use, as it ordinarily is; or the same power over it, as he 
had over any other natural endowment. Consequently, he 
would use it in the same manner he did any other; either 
regularly and upon proper occasions only, or irregularly 


208 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION [PART II. 

and upon improper ones; according to liis sense of de¬ 
cency, and his character of prudence. Where, then, is the 
objection? Why, if this miraculous power was, indeed, 
given to the world to propagate Christianity and attest the 
truth of it, we might, it seems, have expected that other 
sort of persons should have been chosen to be invested 
with it; or that these should, at the same time, have been 
endued with prudence; or that they should have been con¬ 
tinually restrained and directed in the exercise of it; that is, 
that God should have miraculously interposed, if at all, in a 
different manner or higher degree. But from the observa¬ 
tions made above, it is undeniably evident, that we are not 
judges in what degrees and manners it were to have been 
expected he should miraculously interpose; upon supposi¬ 
tion of his doing it in some degree and manner. Nor, in 
the natural course of Providence, are superior gifts of 
memory, eloquence, knowledge, and other talents of great 
influence, conferred only on persons of prudence and de¬ 
cency, or such as are disposed to make the properest use 
of them. Nor is the instruction and admonition naturally 
afforded us for the conduct of life, particularly in our edu¬ 
cation, commonly given in a manner the most suited to 
recommend it; but often with circumstances, apt to preju¬ 
dice us against such instruction. 

One might go on to add, that there is a great resem¬ 
blance between the light of nature and of revelation, in 
several other respects. Practical Christianity, or that faith 
and behavior which renders a man a Christian, is a plain 
and obvious thing; like the common rules of conduct, with 
respect to our ordinary temporal affairs. The more distinct 
and particular knowledge of those things, the study of which 
the apostle calls, “going on unto perfection,’^ 1) and of 
the prophetic parts of revelation, like many parts of natural 
and even civil knowledge, may require very exact thought 
(1) Heb. vi, 1. 


CHAP. III.] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 200 

and careful consideration. The hinderances, too, of natural 
and of supernatural light and knowledge, have been of the 
same kind. And as it is owned the whole scheme of Scrip¬ 
ture is not yet understood, so, if it ever comes to be under¬ 
stood, before the “restitution of all things,”(1) and without 
miraculous interpositions, it must be in the same way as 
natural knowledge is come at; by the continuance and prog¬ 
ress of learning and of liberty, and by particular persons, 
attending to, comparing and pursuing, intimations scattered 
up and down it, which are overlooked and disregarded by 
the generality of the world. For this is the way in which 
all improvements are made; by thoughtful men’s tracing 
on obscure hints, as it were, dropped us by nature acci¬ 
dentally, or which seem to come into our minds by chance. 
Nor is it at all incredible, that a book, which has been so long 
in the possession of mankind, should contain many truths as 
yet undiscovered. For, all the same phenomena, and the 
same faculties of investigation, from which such great dis¬ 
coveries in natural knowledge have been made in the pres¬ 
ent and last age, were equally in the possession of mankind 
several thousand years before. And possibly it might be 
intended, that events, as they come to pass, should open 
and ascertain the meaning of several parts of Scripture. 

It may be objected, that this analogy fails in a mate¬ 
rial respect; for that natural knowledge is of little or no 
consequence. But I have been speaking of the general 
instruction, which nature does or does not afford us. And 
besides, some parts of natural knowledge, in the more 
common restrained sense of the words, are of the greatest 
consequence to the ease and convenience of life. But sup¬ 
pose the analogy did, as it does not, fail in this respect, yet 
it might be abundantly supplied from the whole constitution 
and course of nature; which shows, that God does not dis¬ 
pense his gifts according to our notions of the advantage 

(1) Acts iii, 21. 

18* 


210 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION [PART II. 

and consequence they would be of to us. And this in gen¬ 
era], with his method of dispensing knowledge in particular, 
would together make out an analogy full to the point be¬ 
fore us. 

But it may be objected still farther, and more generally: 
“The Scripture represents the world as in a state of ruin, 
and Christianity as an expedient to recover it, to help in 
these respects where nature fails; in particular to supply 
the deficiencies of natural light. Is it credible, then, that 
so many ages should have been let pass, before a matter of 
such a sort, of so great and so general importance, was made 
known to mankind; and then that it should be made known 
to so small a part of them? Is it conceivable, that this 
supply should be so very deficient; should have the like 
obscurity and doubtfulness; be liable to the like perver¬ 
sions; in short, lie open to all the like objections, as the 
light of nature itself ?”(1) Without determining how far 
this in fact is so, I answer, it is, by no means, incredible 
that it might be so, if the light of nature and of revelation 
be from the same hand. Men are naturally liable to dis¬ 
eases ; for which God, in his good providence, has provided 
natural remedies.(2) But remedies existing in nature have 
been unknown to mankind for many ages; are known but 
to few now; probably many valuable ones are not known 
yet. Great has been, and is, the obscurity and difficulty, 
in the nature and application of them. Circumstances 
seem often to make them very improper, where they are 
absolutely necessary. It is after long labor and study, and 
many unsuccessful endeavors, that they are brought to be 
as useful as they are; after high contempt and absolute 
rejection of the most useful we have; and after disputes 
and doubts, which have seemed to be endless. The best 
remedies, too, when unskillfully, much more if dishonestly 
applied, may produce new diseases; and with the Tightest 
(1) Chap. vi. (2) Chap. v. 


CHAP. III.] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 211 

application, the success of them is often doubtful. Ic 
many cases, they are not at all effectual; where they are, it 
is often very slowly: and the application of them, and the 
necessary regimen accompanying it, is, not uncommonly, so 
disagreeable, that some will not submit to them; and sat¬ 
isfy themselves with the excuse, that if they would, it is 
not certain whether it would be successful. And many 
persons, who labor under diseases, for which there are 
known natural remedies, are not so happy as to be always, 
if ever, in the way of them. In a word, the remedies 
which nature has provided for diseases, are neither certain, 
perfect, nor universal. And, indeed, the same principles 
of arguing, which would lead us to conclude that they 
must be so, would lead us, likewise, to conclude that there 
could be no occasion for them; that is, that there could be 
no diseases at all. And, therefore, our experience that 
there are diseases, shows, that it is credible beforehand, 
upon supposition nature has provided remedies for them, 
that these remedies may be, as by experience we find they 
are, not certain, nor perfect, nor universal; because it shows, 
that the principles upon which we should expect the con¬ 
trary, are fallacious. 

And now, what is the just consequence from all these 
things ? Not that reason is no judge of what is offered to 
us as being of Divine revelation. For this would be to 
infer, that we are unable to judge of any thing, because 
we are unable to judge of all things. Reason can, and it 
ought to judge, not only of the meaning, but, also, of the 
morality and the evidence of revelation. First, it is the prov¬ 
ince of reason to judge of the morality of the Scripture; 
that is, not whether it contains things different from what 
we should have expected from a wise, just, and good 
Being; for objections from hence have been now obviated; 
but whether it contains things plainly contradictory to wis¬ 
dom, justice, or goodness—to what the light of nature 


212 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION [PART II. 

teaches us of God. And I know nothing of this sort ob¬ 
jected against Scripture, excepting such objections as are 
formed upon suppositions, which would equally conclude, 
that the constitution of nature is contradictory to wisdom, 
justice, or goodness; which most certainly it is not. In¬ 
deed, there are some particular precepts in Scripture, given 
to particular persons, requiring actions, which would be 
immoral and vicious, were it not for such precepts. But 
it is easy to see, that all these are of such a kind, as that 
the precept changes the whole nature of the case and of 
the action; and both constitutes and shows that not to be 
unjust or immoral, which, prior to the precept, must have 
appeared and really have been so: which may well be, 
since none of these precepts are contrary to immutable 
morality. If it were commanded, to cultivate the princi¬ 
ples, and act from the spirit of treachery, ingratitude, 
cruelty; the command would not alter the nature of the 
case, or of the action in any of these instances. But it is 
quite otherwise in precepts which require only the doing an 
external action; for instance, taking away the property or 
life of any. For men have no right to either life or prop¬ 
erty, but what arises solely from the grant of God. When 
this grant is revoked, they cease to have any right at all 
in either; and when this revocation is made known, as 
surely it is possible it may be, it must cease to be unjust to 
deprive them of either. And though a course of external 
acts, which, without command, would be immoral, must 
make an immoral habit, yet a few detached commands have 
no such natural tendency. I thought proper to say thus 
much of the few Scripture precepts, which require, not 
vicious actions, but actions which would have been vicious, 
had it not been for such precepts; because they are some¬ 
times weakly urged as immoral, and great weight is laid 
upon objections drawn from them. But to me there seems 
no difficulty at all in these precepts, but what arises from 


CHAP. HI.] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 213 

their being offenses; that is, from their being liable to be 
perverted, as, indeed, they are, by wicked, designing men, 
to serve the most horrid purposes, and, perhaps, to mislead 
the weak and enthusiastic. And objections from this head 
are not objections against revelation, but against the whole 
notion of religion, as a trial; and against the general consti¬ 
tution of nature. Secondly, reason is able to judge, and 
must, of the evidence of revelation, and of the objections 
urged against that evidence; which shall be the subject 
of a following chapter. (1) 

But the consequence of the foregoing observations is, 
that the question upon which the truth of Christianity 
depends, is scarce at all, what objections there are against 
its scheme, since there are none against the morality of it; 
but what objections there are against its evidence; or, what 
proof there remains of it, after due allowances made for the 
objections against that proof: because it has been shown, 
that the objections against Christianity , as distinguished 
from objections against its evidence, are frivolous. For 
surely very little weight, if any at all, is to be laid upon a 
way of arguing and objecting, which, when applied to the 
general constitution of nature, experience shows not to be 
conclusive; and such, I think, is the whole way of object¬ 
ing treated of throughout this chapter. It is resolvable 
into principles, and goes upon suppositions, which mislead 
us to think, that the Author of nature would not act, as we 
experience he does; or would act, in such and such cases, as 
we experience he does not in like cases. But the unrea¬ 
sonableness of this way of objecting will appear yet more 
evidently from hence, that the chief things thus objected 
against, are justified, as shall be farther shown,(2) by dis¬ 
tinct, particular, and full analogies, in the constitution and 
course of nature. 

But it is to be remembered, that as frivolous as objections 
(1) Chap. vii. (2) Chap, iv, latter part, and v, vi 


214 REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. [l»ART II. 

of the foregoing sort against revelation are, yet, when a 
supposed revelation is more consistent with itself, and has a 
more general and uniform tendency to promote virtue, than, 
all circumstances considered, could have been expected, from 
enthusiasm and political views; this is a presumptive proof 
of its not proceeding from them, and so of its truth; be¬ 
cause we are competent judges, what might have been ex¬ 
pected from enthusiasm and political views. 



CHAP. IV.] CHRISTIANITY IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 215 


CHAPTER IV. 

OF CHRISTIANITY, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME OR CONSTITU¬ 
TION, IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 

It hath been now shown,(l) that the analogy of nature 
renders it highly credible beforehand, that, supposing a 
revelation to be made, it must contain many things very 
different from what we should have expected, and such as 
appear open to great objections; and that this observation, 
in good measure, takes off the force of those objections, or, 
rather, precludes them. But it may be alledged, that this 
is a very partial answer to such objections, or a very unsat¬ 
isfactory way of obviating them: because it doth not show 
at all, that the things objected against can be wise, just, 
and good; much less, that it is credible they are so. It 
will, therefore, be proper to show this distinctly, by applying 
to these objections against the wisdom, justice, and goodness 
of Christianity, the answer above (2) given to the like objec¬ 
tions against the constitution of nature; before we consider 
the particular analogies in the latter, to the particular things 
objected against in the former. Now, that which affords a 
sufficient answer to objections against the wisdom, justice, 
and goodness of the constitution of nature, is its being a con¬ 
stitution, a system or scheme, imperfectly comprehended—a 
scheme, in which means are made use of to accomplish ends, 
and which is carried on by general laws. For, from these 
things it has been proved, not only to be possible, but, also, 
to be credible, that those things which are objected against 
may be consistent with wisdom, justice, and goodness; nay, 
may be instances of them: and, even, that the constitution 
and government of nature may be perfect in the highest 
possible degree. If Christianity, then, be a scheme, and 

Cl) In the foregoing Chapter. 

(2) Part 1, Chap, vii, to which this all along refers. 


216 CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME [PART II. 

of the like kind, it is evident the like objections against it 
must admit of the like answer. And, 

I. Christianity is a scheme, quite beyond our compre¬ 
hension. The moral government of God is exercised, by 
gradually conducting things so, in the course of his Provi¬ 
dence, that every one, at length, and upon the whole, shall 
receive according to his deserts; and neither fraud nor 
violence, but truth and right, shall finally prevail. Chris¬ 
tianity is a particular scheme under this general plan of 
Providence, and a part of it, conducive to its completion, with 
regard to mankind; consisting itself, also, of various parts, 
and a mysterious economy, which has been carrying on from 
the time the world came into its present wretched state, 
and is still carrying on, for its recovery, by a Divine person, 
the Messiah, “ who is to gather together in one the children 
of God that are scattered abroad,”(1) and establish “an 
everlasting kingdom, wherein dwelleth righteousness.”(2) 
And in order to it, after various manifestations of things, 
relating to this great and general scheme of Providence, 
through a succession of many ages—“for the Spirit of 
Christ, which was in the prophets, testified beforehand his 
sufferings, and the glory that should follow: unto whom it 
was revealed, that not unto themselves, but unto us, they 
did minister the things which are now reported unto us by 
them that have preached the Gospel; which tilings the 
angels desire to look into” (3)—after various dispensations, 
looking forward and preparatory to this final salvation, “in 
the fullness of time,” when Infinite wisdom thought fit, He, 
“ being in the form of God, made himself of no reputation, 
and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made 
in the likeness of men; and being found in fashion as a 
man, he humbled himself, and became obedient to death, 
even the death of the cross: wherefore God, also, hath 
highly exalted him, and given him a name which is above 
(1) John xi, 52. (2) 2 Peter iii, 13. (3) 1 Peter i, 11, 12. 


CHAP. IV.] IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 217 

every name; that at the name of Jesus every knee should 
bow, of things in heaven, and things in the earth, and things 
under the earth; and that every tongue should confess, that 
Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.”(l) 
Farts, likewise, of this economy, are the miraculous mission 
of the Holy Ghost, and his ordinary assistances given to 
good men; the invisible government which Christ at present 
exercises over his Church; that which he himself refers to 
in these words: “ In my Father’s house are many mansions; 
I go to prepare a place for you;”(2) and his future return 
to “judge the world in righteousness,” and completely re¬ 
establish the kingdom of God. “For the Father judgeth 
no man; but hath committed all judgment unto the Son: 
that all men should honor the Son, even as they honor the 
Father.”(3) “All power is given unto him in heaven and in 
earth.”(4) “And he must reign, till he hath put all enemies 
under his feet. Then cometh the end, when he shall have 
delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father; when 
he shall have put down all rule, and all authority and 
power. And when all things shall be subdued unto him, 
then shall the Son, also, himself be subject unto him that 
put all things under him, that God may be all in all.”(5) 
Now little, surely, need be said to show, that this system, 
or scheme of things, is but imperfectly comprehended by 
us. The Scripture expressly asserts it to be so. And, 
indeed, one cannot read a passage relating to this “great 
mystery of godliness,”(6) but what immediately runs up 
into something which shows us our ignorance in it; as every 
thing in nature shows us our ignorance in the constitution 
of nature. And whoever will seriously consider that part 
of the Christian scheme which is revealed in Scripture, will 
find so much more unrevealed, as will convince him, that, to 
all the purposes of judging and objecting, we know as little 

(1) Phil. ii. (2) John xiv, 2. (3) John v, 22, 23. (4) Matt, 

xxviii, 18. (5) 1 Cor. xv. (6) 1 Tim. iii, 16. 

19 


218 CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME [PART II. 

of it, as of the constitution of nature. Our ignorance, 
therefore, is as much an answer to our objections against 
the perfection of one, as against the perfection of the 
other. (1) 

II. It is obvious, too, that in the Christian dispensation, 
as much as in the natural scheme of things, means are 
made use of to accomplish ends. And the observation of 
this furnishes us with the same answer to objections against 
the perfection of Christianity, as to objections of the like 
kind against the constitution of nature. It shows the cred¬ 
ibility, that the things objected against, how foolish [ 2) 
soever they appear to men, may be the very best means of 
accomplishing the very best ends. And their appearing 
foolishness is no presumption against this, in a scheme so 
greatly beyond our comprehension.(3) 

III. The credibility, that the Christian dispensation may 
have been, all along, carried on by general laws, (4) no less 
than the course of nature, may require to be more distinctly 
made out. Consider, then, upon what ground it is we say, 
that the whole common course of nature is carried on 
according to general foreordained laws. We know, indeed, 
several of the general laws of matter; and a great part of 
the natural behavior of living agents is reducible to general 
laws. But we know, in a manner, nothing, by what laws, 
storms and tempests, earthquakes, famine, pestilence, be¬ 
come the instruments of destruction to mankind. And the 
laws by which persons born into the world at such a time 
and place, are of such capacities, geniuses, tempers; the 
laws by which thoughts come into our mind, in a multitude 
of cases; and by which innumerable things happen, of the 
greatest influence upon the affairs and state of the world: 
these laws are so wholly unknown to us, that we call the 
events, which come to pass by them, accidental; though all 

(1) Page 159, &c. (2) 1 Cor. i, 18, &c. (3) Pages 162, 163 

'4) Pages 165, 166. 


CHAP, rv.] IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 219 

reasonable men know certainly, that there cannot, in reality, 
be any such thing as chance, and conclude that the things 
which have this appearance are the result of general laws, 
and may be reduced into them. It is, then, but an exceed¬ 
ing little way, and in but a very few respects, that we can 
trace up the natural course of things before us, to general 
laws. And it is only from analogy that we conclude the 
whole of it to be capable of being reduced into them—only 
from our seeing, that part is so. It is from our finding that 
the course of nature, in some respects and so far, goes on 
by general laws, that we conclude this of the rest. And 
if that be a just ground for such a conclusion, it is a just 
ground, also, if not to conclude, yet to apprehend—to 
render it supposable and credible, which is sufficient for 
answering objections, that God’s miraculous interpositions 
may have been, all along, in like manner, by general laws 
of wisdom. Thus, that miraculous powers should be ex¬ 
erted at such times, upon such occasions, in such degrees 
and manners, and with regard to such persons, rather than 
others; that the affairs of the world, being permitted to go 
on in their natural course so far, should, just at such a 
point, have a new direction given them by miraculous inter¬ 
positions ; that these interpositions should be exactly in 
such degrees and respects only: all this may have been by 
general laws. These laws are unknown, indeed, to us; but 
no more unknown, than the laws from whence it is, that 
some die as soon as they are born, and others live to 
extreme old age; that one man is so superior to another in 
understanding; with innumerable more things, which, as 
was before observed, we cannot reduce to any laws or rules 
at all, though it is taken for granted, they are as much 
reducible to general ones as gravitation. Now, if the 
revealed dispensations of Providence, and miraculous inter¬ 
positions, be by general laws, as well as God’s ordinary 
government in the course of nature, made known by reason 


220 CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME [PART II. 

and experience; there is no more reason to expect that 
every exigence, as it arises, should be provided for by these 
general laws of miraculous interposition, than that every 
exigence in nature should, by the general laws of nature; 
yet there might be wise and good reasons, that miraculous 
interpositions should be by general laws; and that these 
laws should not be broken in upon, or deviated from, by 
other miracles. 

Upon the whole, then, the appearance of deficiencies 
and irregularities in nature, is owing to its being a scheme 
but in part made known, and of such a certain particular 
kind in other respects. Now, we see no more reason, why 
the frame and course of nature should be such a scheme, 
than why Christianity should. And that the former is such 
a scheme renders it credible, that the latter, upon supposi¬ 
tion of its truth, may be so too. And, as it is manifest that 
Christianity is a scheme revealed but in part, and a scheme 
in which means are made use of to accomplish ends, like to 
that of nature, so the credibility that it may have been all 
along carried on by general laws no less than the course of 
nature, has been distinctly proved. And from all this it is 
beforehand credible, that there might, I think probable that 
there would, be the like appearance of deficiencies and 
irregularities in Christianity as in nature; that is, that Chris¬ 
tianity would be liable to the like objections, as the frame 
of nature. And these objections are answered by these 
observations concerning Christianity; as the like objections 
against the frame of nature, are answered by the like obser¬ 
vations concerning the frame of nature. 


The objections against Christianity, considered as a matter 
of fact,(l) having, in general, been obviated in the preceding 
(1) Page 154, &c. 



CHAP. IVt] IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 221 

chapter; and the same, considered as made against the 
wisdom and goodness of it, having been obviated in this; 
the next thing, according to the method proposed, is to 
show, that the principal objections in particular, against 
Christianity, may be answered by particular and full analo¬ 
gies in nature. And as one of them is made against the 
whole scheme of it together, as just now described, I choose 
to consider it here, rather than in a distinct chapter by 
itself. The thing objected against this scheme of the Gos¬ 
pel is, “That it seems to suppose God was reduced to the 
necessity of a long series of intricate means, in order to 
accomplish his ends, the recovery and salvation of the 
world; in like sort as men, for want of understanding, or 
power, not being able to come at their ends directly, are 
forced to go round-about ways, and make use of many per¬ 
plexed contrivances to arrive at them.” Now, every thing 
which we see shows the folly of this, considered as an 
objection against the truth of Christianity. For, according 
to our manner of conception, God makes use of variety of 
means, what we often think tedious ones, in the natural 
course of Providence, for the accomplishment of all his 
ends. Indeed, it is certain, there is somewhat in this matter 
quite beyond our comprehension; but the mystery is as 
great in nature as in Christianity. We know what we our¬ 
selves aim at, as final ends; and what courses we take, 
merely as means conducing to those ends. But we are 
greatly ignorant, how far things are considered by the 
Author of nature, under the single notion of means and 
ends; so as that it may be said, this is merely an end, and 
that merely means, in his regard. And whether there be 
not some peculiar absurdity in our very manner of concep¬ 
tion concerning this matter, somewhat contradictory, arising 
from our extremely imperfect views of things, it is impos¬ 
sible to say. However, thus much is manifest, that the 
whole natural world and government of it is a scheme, or 
19 * 


222 CHRISTIANITY IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. [PART II. 

system; not a fixed, but a progressive one: a scheme, in 
which the operation of various means takes up a great 
length of time, before the ends they tend to can be attained. 
The change of seasons, the ripening of the fruits of the 
earth, the very history of a flower, is an instance of this; 
and so is human life. Thus, vegetable bodies, and those of 
animals, though possibly formed at once, yet grow up by 
degrees to a mature state. And thus, rational agents, who 
animate these latter bodies, are naturally directed to form, 
each his own manners and character, by the gradual gain¬ 
ing of knowledge and experience, and by a long course of 
action. Our existence is not only successive, as it must be 
of necessity, but one state of our life and being is appointed 
by God to be a preparation for another; and that, to be the 
means of attaining to another succeeding one: infancy to 
childhood, childhood to youth, youth to mature age. Men 
are impatient, and for precipitating things; but the Author 
of nature appears deliberate throughout his operations, 
accomplishing his natural ends by slow successive steps. 
And there is a plan of things beforehand laid out, which, 
from the nature of it, requires various systems of means, 
as well as length of time, in order to the carrying on its 
several parts into execution. Thus, in the daily course of 
natural Providence, God operates in the very same manner 
as in the dispensation of Christianity; making one thing 
subservient to another; this, to somewhat farther; and so 
on, through a progressive series of means, which extend, 
both backward and forward, beyond our utmost view. Of 
this manner of operation, every thing we see in the course 
of nature is as much an instance, as any part of the Chris¬ 
tian dispensation. 


CHAP. V.] A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 


223 


CHAPTER Y. 

OF THE PARTICULAR SYSTEM OF CHRISTIANITY; THE AP¬ 
POINTMENT OF A MEDIATOR, AND THE REDEMPTION OF 

THE WORLD BY HIM. 

There is not, I think, any thing relating to Christianity, 
which has been more objected against, than the mediation 
of Christ, in some or other of its parts. Yet, upon thorough 
consideration, there seems nothing less justly liable to it. 
For, 

I. The whole analogy of nature removes all imagined 
presumption against the general notion of “ a Mediator be¬ 
tween God and man.”(l) For, we find, all living creatures 
are brought into the world, and their life in infancy is pre¬ 
served, by the instrumentality of others; and every satisfac¬ 
tion of it, some way or other, is bestowed by the like means. 
So that the visible government, which God exercises over 
the world, is by the instrumentality and mediation of others. 
And how far his invisible government be or be not so, it is 
impossible to determine at all by reason. And the supposi¬ 
tion, that part of it is so, appears, to say the least, altogether 
as credible as the contrary. There is then no sort of objec¬ 
tion, from the fight of nature, against the general notion of 
a mediator between God and man, considered as a doctrine 
of Christianity, or as an appointment in this dispensation; 
since we find, by experience, that God does appoint me¬ 
diators, to be the instruments of good and evil to us, the 
instruments of his justice and his mercy. And the objection 
here referred to is urged, not against mediation in that high, 
eminent, and peculiar sense, in which Christ is our mediator; 
but absolutely against the whole notion itself of a mediator 
at all. 

II. As we must suppose, that the world is under the 

(1)1 Tim. ii, 5. 


224 THE APPOINTMENT OF [pAP.T II. 

proper moral government of God, or in a state of religion, 
before we can enter into consideration of the revealed doc¬ 
trine concerning the redemption of it by Christ; so that 
supposition is here to be distinctly taken notice of. Now, 
the Divine moral government which religion teaches us, im¬ 
plies, that the consequence of vice shall be misery, in some 
future state, by the righteous judgment of God. That such 
consequent punishment shall take effect by his appointment, 
is necessarily implied. But, as it is not in any sort to be 
supposed, that we are made acquainted with all the ends or 
reasons for which it is fit future punishment should be in¬ 
flicted, or why God has appointed such and such consequent 
misery should follow vice; and as we are altogether in the 
dark, how or in what manner it shall follow, by what imme¬ 
diate occasions, or by the instrumentality of what means; 
there is no absurdity in supposing, it may follow in a way 
analogous to that in which many miseries follow such and 
such courses of action at present—poverty, sickness, infamy, 
untimely death by diseases, death from the hands of civil 
justice. There is no absurdity in supposing future punish¬ 
ment may follow wickedness of course, as we speak, or in the 
way of natural consequence, from God’s original constitu¬ 
tion of the world; from the nature he has given us, and 
from the condition in which he places us: or, in a like manner, 
as a person rashly trifling upon a precipice, in the way of 
natural consequence, falls down; in the way of natural con¬ 
sequence, breaks his limbs, suppose; in the way of natural 
consequence of this, without help, perishes. 

Some good men may, perhaps, be offended, with hearing 
it spoken of as a supposable thing, that the future punish¬ 
ments of wickedness may be in the way of natural conse¬ 
quence; as if this were taking the execution of justice out 
of the hands of God, and giving it to nature. But they 
should remember that, when things come to pass according 
to the course of nature, this does not hinder them from being 


CHAP. V.] A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 225 

his doing, who is the God of nature; and that the Scripture 
ascribes those punishments to Divine justice, which are 
known to be natural; and which must be called so, when 
distinguished from such as are miraculous. But, after all, 
this supposition, or rather this way of speaking, is here 
made use of only by way of illustration of the subject before 
us. For, since it must, be admitted, that the future punish¬ 
ment of wickedness is not a matter of arbitrary appointment, 
but of reason, equity, and justice, it comes, for aught I see, 
to the same thing, whether it is supposed to be inflicted in 
a way analogous to that in which the temporal punishments 
of vice and folly are inflicted, or in any other way. And 
though there were a difference, it is allowable in the present 
case to make this supposition, plainly not an incredible one, 
that future punishment may follow wickedness in the way 
of natural consequence, or according to some general laws 
of government already established in the universe. 

III. Upon this supposition, or even without it, we may 
observe somewhat, much to the present purpose, in the 
constitution of nature, or appointments of Providence: the 
provision which is made, that all the bad natural conse¬ 
quences of men’s actions should not always actually follow; 
or, that such bad consequences, as, according to the settled 
course of things, would inevitably have followed if not pre¬ 
vented, should, in certain degrees, be prevented. We are 
apt, presumptuously, to imagine, that the world might have 
been so constituted, as that there would not have been any 
such thing as misery or evil. On the contrary, we find the 
Author of nature permits it. But then, he has provided re¬ 
liefs, and, in many cases, perfect remedies for it, after some 
pains and difficulties—reliefs and remedies even for that evil, 
which is the fruit of our own misconduct, and which, in the 
course of nature, would have continued, and ended in our 
destruction, but for such remedies. And this is an instance 
both of severity and of indulgence, in the constitution of 


226 THE APPOINTMENT OF [PART II. 

nature. Thus, all the bad consequences, now mentioned, of 
a man’s trifling upon a precipice, might be prevented. And, 
though all were not, yet some of them might, by proper 
interposition, if not rejected; by another’s coming to the 
rash man’s relief, with his own laying hold on that re¬ 
lief, in such sort as the case requires. Persons may do a 
great deal themselves toward preventing the bad conse¬ 
quences of their follies; and more may be done by them¬ 
selves, together with the assistance of others, their fellow- 
creatures ; which assistance nature requires and prompts us 
to. This is the general constitution of the world. Now, 
suppose it had been so constituted, that after such actions 
were done, as were foreseen naturally to draw after them 
misery to the doer, it should have been no more in human 
power to have prevented that naturally consequent misery, 
in any instance, than it is in all; no one can say, whether 
such a more severe constitution of things might not yet have 
been really good. But that, on the contrary, provision is 
made by nature, that we may and do, to so great degree, 
prevent the bad natural effects of our follies; this may be 
called mercy, or compassion, in the original constitution of 
the world—compassion, as distinguished from goodness in 
general. And, the whole known constitution and course of 
things affording us instances of such compassion, it would be 
according to the analogy of nature to hope, that, however 
ruinous the natural consequences of vice might be, from the 
general laws of God’s government over the universe, yet 
provision might be made, possibly might have been origi¬ 
nally made, for preventing those ruinous consequences from 
inevitably following; at least, from following universally, 
and in all cases. 

Many, I am sensible, will wonder at finding this made a 
question, or spoken of as in any degree doubtful. The 
generality of mankind are so far from having that awful 
sense of things, which the present state of vice, and misery. 


CHAP. V.] A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 227 

and darkness, seems to make but reasonable, that they have 
scarce any apprehension, or thought at all, about this matter, 
any way; and some serious persons may have spoken unad¬ 
visedly concerning it. But let us observe, what we expe¬ 
rience to be, and what, from the very constitution of nature, 
cannot but be, the consequences of irregular and disorderly 
behavior—even of such rashness, willfulness, neglects, as we 
scarce call vicious. Now, it is natural to apprehend, that 
the bad consequences of irregularity will be greater, in pro¬ 
portion as the irregularity is so. And there is no comparison 
between these irregularities, and the greater instances of 
vice, or a dissolute profligate disregard to all religion, if 
there be any thing at all in religion. For, consider what it 
is for creatures, moral agents, presumptuously to introduce 
that confusion and misery into the kingdom of God, which 
mankind have, in fact, introduced; to blaspheme the sover¬ 
eign Lord of all; to contemn his authority; to be injurious 
to the degree they are, to their fellow-creatures, the crea¬ 
tures of God. Add, that the effects of vice, in the present 
world, are often extreme misery, irretrievable ruin, and even 
death: and, upon putting all this together, it will appear, 
that as no one can say, in what degree fatal the unprevented 
consequences of vice may be, according to the general rule 
of Divine government; so it is by no means intuitively cer¬ 
tain, how far these consequences could possibly, in the nature 
of the thing, be prevented, consistently with the eternal rule 
of right, or with what is, in fact, the moral constitution of 
nature. However, there would be large ground to hope, 
that the universal government was not so severely strict, but 
that there was room for pardon, or for having those penal 
consequences prevented. Yet, 

IV. There seems no probability, that any thing we could 
do, would alone, and of itself, prevent them—prevent their 
following, or being inflicted. But one would think, at least, it 
were impossible that the contrary should be thought certain. 


228 THE APPOINTMENT OF [PART II. 

For we are not acquainted with the whole of the case. 
We are not informed of all the reasons, which render it fit 
that future punishments should be inflicted; and, therefore, 
cannot know, whether any thing we could do would make 
such an alteration, as to render it fit that they should be 
remitted. We do not know, what the whole natural or 
appointed consequences of vice are, nor in what way they 
would follow, if not prevented; and, therefore, can in no 
sort say, whether we could do any thing, which would be 
sufficient to prevent them. Our ignorance being thus man¬ 
ifest, let us recollect the analogy of nature, or Providence. 
For though this may be but a slight ground to raise a posi¬ 
tive opinion upon ifi this matter, yet it is sufficient to answer 
a mere arbitrary assertion, without any kind of evidence, 
urged by way of objection against a doctrine, the proof of 
which is not reason, but revelation. Consider, then, people 
ruin their fortunes by extravagance; they bring diseases 
upon themselves by excess; they incur the penalties of 
civil laws, and surely civil government is natural: will sor¬ 
row for these follies past, and behaving well for the future, 
alone and of itself, prevent the natural consequences of 
them ? On the contrary, men’s natural abilities of helping 
themselves are often impaired; or, if not, yet they are 
forced to be beholden to the assistance of others, upon 
several accounts, and in different ways—assistance which 
they would have had no occasion for, had it not been for 
their misconduct; but which, in the disadvantageous condi¬ 
tion they had reduced themselves to, is absolutely necessary 
to their recovery, and retrieving their affairs. Now, since 
this is our case, considering ourselves merely as inhabitants 
of this world, and as having a temporal interest here, under 
the natural government of God, which, however, has a 
great deal moral in it; why is it not supposable, that this 
may be our case, also, in our more important capacity, 
as under his perfect moral government, and having a 


CHAP. V.] A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 229 

more general and future interest depending ? If we have 
misbehaved in this higher capacity, and rendered ourselves 
obnoxious to the future punishment which God has annexed 
to vice; it is plainly credible, that behaving well for the 
time to come, may be—not useless, God forbid—but wholly 
insufficient, alone and of itself, to prevent that punishment; 
or to put us in the condition which we should have been in, 
had we preserved our innocence. 

And though we ought to reason with all reverence, when¬ 
ever we reason concerning the Divine conduct, yet it may 
be added, that it is clearly contrary to all our notions of 
government, as well as to what is, in fact, the general con¬ 
stitution of nature, to suppose that doing well for the future, 
should, in all cases, prevent all the judicial bad conse¬ 
quences of having done evil, or all the punishment annexed 
to disobedience. And we have manifestly nothing from 
whence to determine, in what degree, and in what cases, 
reformation would prevent this punishment, even supposing 
that it would in some. And though the efficacy of repent¬ 
ance itself alone, to prevent what mankind had rendered 
themselves obnoxious to, and recover what they had for¬ 
feited, is now insisted upon, in opposition to Christianity; 
yet, by the general prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices 
over the heathen world, this notion, of repentance alone 
being sufficient to expiate guilt, appears to be contrary to 
the general sense of mankind. 

Upon the whole, then, had the laws, the general laws of 
God’s government, been permitted to operate, without any 
interposition in our behalf, the future punishment, for aught 
we know to the contrary, or have any reason to think, must 
inevitably have followed, notwithstanding any thing we could 
have done to prevent it. Now, 

Y. In this darkness, or this light of nature, call it which 
you please, revelation comes in; confirms every doubting 

fear, which could enter into the heart of man. concerning 
20 


230 THE APPOINTMENT OF [PART II. 

the future unprevented consequence of wickedness; sup¬ 
poses the world to be in a state of ruin—a supposition 
which seems the very ground of the Christian dispensation, 
and which, if not provable by reason, yet is in nowise 
contrary to it; teaches us, too, that the rules of Divirie gov¬ 
ernment are such, as not to admit of pardon immediately 
and directly upon repentance, or by the sole efficacy of it; 
but then teaches, at the same time, what nature might 
justly have hoped, that the moral government of the uni¬ 
verse was not so rigid, but that there was room for an 
interposition to avert the fatal consequences of vice; which, 
therefore, by this means, does admit of pardon. Revela¬ 
tion teaches us, that the unknown laws of God’s more 
general government, no less than the particular laws by 
which we experience he governs us at present, are com¬ 
passionate^].) as well as good, in the more general notion 
of goodness; and that he hath mercifully provided, that 
there should be an interposition to prevent the destruction 
of human kind, whatever that destruction unprevented 
would have been. “ God so loved the world, that he gave 
his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth,” not, to be 
sure, in a speculative, but in a practical sense, “that who¬ 
soever believeth in him should not perish ;”(2) gave his Son 
in the same way of goodness to the world, as he affords 
particular persons the friendly assistance of their fellow- 
creatures, when, without it, their temporal ruin would be 
the certain consequence of their follies—in the same way of 
goodness, I say, though in a transcendent and infinitely 
higher degree. And the Son of God “loved us, and gave 
himself for us,” with a love which he himself compares to 
that of human friendship; though, in this case, all compar¬ 
isons must fall infinitely short of the thing intended to be 
illustrated by them. He interposed in such a manner, as 
was necessary and effectual to prevent that execution of 
(1) Page 225, &c. (2) John iii, 16. 


CHAP. V.] A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 281 

justice upon sinners, which God had appointed should 
otherwise have been executed upon them; or, in such a 
manner, as to prevent that punishment from actually fol¬ 
lowing, which, according to the general laws of Divine gov¬ 
ernment, must have followed the sins of the world, had it 
not been for such interposition.(l) 

If any thing here said should appear, upon first thought, 
inconsistent with Divine goodness, a second, I am persuaded, 
will entirely remove that appearance. For, were we to sup¬ 
pose the constitution of things to be such, as that the whole 
creation must have perished, had it not been for somewhat, 
which God had appointed should be in order to prevent that 
ruin; even this supposition would not be inconsistent, in 
any degree, with the most absolutely perfect goodness. But 
still it may be thought, that this whole manner of treating 
the subject before us, supposes mankind to be naturally in 
a very strange state. And truly so it does. But it is not 
Christianity which has put us into this state. Whoever 

(1) It cannot, I suppose, be imagined, even by the most cursory 
reader, that it is, in any sort, affirmed, or implied, in any thing said 
in this chapter, that none can have the benefit of the general redemp¬ 
tion, but such as have the advantage of being made acquainted with 
it in the present life. But it may be needful to mention, that several 
questions, which have been brought into the subject before us, and 
determined, are not in the least entered into here—questions which 
have been, I fear, rashly determined, and, perhaps, with equal rash¬ 
ness, contrary ways. For instance, whether God could have saved 
the world by other means than the death of Christ, consistently 
with the general laws of his government? And, had not Christ 
come into the world, what would have been the future condition 
of the better sort of men—those just persons over the face of the 
earth, for whom Manasses in his prayer asserts, repentance was not 
appointed? The meaning of the first of these questions is greatly 
ambiguous; and neither of them can properly be answered, without 
going upon that infinitely absurd supposition, that we know the 
whole of the case. And, perhaps, the very inquiry, what would have 
followed if God had not done as he has? may have in it some very 
great impropriety; and ought not to be carried on any farther than 
is necessary tq help our partial and inadequate conceptions of things. 


232 THE APPOINTMENT OP [PART II. 

will consider the manifold miseries, and the extreme wicked¬ 
ness of the world; that the best have great wrongnesses 
within themselves, which they complain of, and endeavor to 
amend, but, that the generality grow more profligate and 
corrupt with age; that heathen moralists thought the present 
state to be a state of punishment; and, what might be added, 
that the earth, our habitation, has the appearances of being 
a ruin; whoever, I say, will consider all these, and some 
other obvious things, will think he has little reason to object 
against the Scripture account, that mankind is in a state of 
degradation—against this being the fact: how difficult so- 
soever he may think it to account for, or even to form a 
distinct conception of, the occasions and circumstances of it. 
But that the crime of our first parents was the occasion of 
our being placed in a more disadvantageous condition, is a 
thing throughout, and particularly analogous to what we 
see, in the daily course of natural Providence; as the recov¬ 
ery of the world, by the interposition of Christ, has been 
shown to be so in general. 

VI. The particular manner in which Christ interposed in 
the redemption of the world, or his office as Mediator, in 
the largest sense, between God and man, is thus represented 
to us in the Scripture: “He is the light of the world ;”(1) 
the revealer of the will of God in the most eminent sense: he 
is a propitiatory sacrifice ;(2) “ the Lamb of God ;”(3) and, 
as he voluntarily offered himself up, he is styled our High 
Priest.(4) And, which seems of peculiar weight, he is 
described beforehand in the Old Testament, under the same 
characters of a priest and an expiatory victim.(5) And 
whereas it is objected, that all this is merely by way of 

(1) John i and viii, 12. 

(2) Rom. iii, 25, and v, 11; 1 Cor. v, 7; Eph. v, 2; 1 John ii, 2; 
Matt, xxvi, 28. 

(3) John i, 29, 36, and throughout the book of Revelation. 

(4) Throughout the Epistle to the Hebrews. 

(5) Isa. liii; Dan. ix, 24; Psalm cx, 4. 


CHAP. V.] A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 233 

allusion to the sacrifices of the Mosaic law, the apostle, on the 
contrary, affirms, that the “law was a shadow of good things 
to come, and not the very image of the things ;”(1) and 
that “ the priests that offer gifts according to the law, serve 
unto the example and shadow of heavenly things, as Moses 
was admonished of God, when he was about to make the 
tabernacle. For see, saith he, that thou make all things 
according to the pattern showed to thee in the mount ;”(2) 
that is, the Levitical priesthood was a shadow of the priest¬ 
hood of Christ, in like manner as the tabernacle made by 
Moses was according to that showed him in the mount. 
The priesthood of Christ and the tabernacle in the mount, 
were the originals: of the former of which the Levitical 
priesthood was a type; and of the latter, the tabernacle 
made by Moses was a copy. The doctrine of this epistle, 
then, plainly is, that the legal sacrifices were allusions to 
the great and final atonement to be made by the blood of 
Christ; and not that this was an allusion to those. Nor 
can any thing be more express or determinate, than the 
following passage: “It is not possible that the blood of 
bulls and of goats should take away sin. Wherefore, when 
he cometh into the world, he saith, sacrifice and offering,” 
that is, of bulls and of goats, “thou wouldst not, but a 
body hast thou prepared me. Lo, I come to do thy will, 0 
God. By which will we are sanctified, through the offer¬ 
ing of the body of Jesus Christ once for all.”(3) And to 
add one passage more of the like kind: “ Christ was once 
offered to bear the sins of many; and unto them that look 
for him shall he appear the second time, without sinthat 
is, without bearing sin, as he did at his first coming, by 
being an offering for it; without having our “iniquities” 
again “ laid upon him,” without being any more a sin-offer¬ 
ing: “unto them that look for him shall he appear the 


234 THE APPOINTMENT OP [PART II. 

second time, without sin, unto salvation.”(l) Nor do the 
inspired writers at all confine themselves to this manner of 
speaking concerning the satisfaction of Christ, but declare an 
efficacy in what he did and suffered for us, additional to, and 
beyond mere instruction, example, and government, in great 
variety of expression: “That Jesus should die for that na¬ 
tion,” the Jews; “ and not for that nation only, but that, 
also,” plainly by the efficacy of his death, “ he should gather 
together in one the children of God that were scattered 
abroad;”(2) that “he suffered for sins, the just for the 
unjust;”(3) that “he gave his life, himself, a ransom;”(4) 
that “we are bought, bought with a price;”(5) that “he 
redeemed us with his blood;” “redeemed us from the curse 
of the law, being made a curse for us ;”(6) that he is our “ad¬ 
vocate, intercessor, and propitiation;”(7) that “ he was made 
perfect,” or consummate, “through sufferings;” and being 
thus “ made perfect, he became the author of salvation ;”(8) 
that “ God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself, 
by the death of his Son, by the cross; not imputing their 
trespasses unto them ;”(9) and, lastly, that “ through death 
he destroyed him that had the power of death.” (10) 
Christ, then, having thus “humbled himself, and become 
obedient to death, even the death of the cross, God, also, 
hath highly exalted him, and given him a name which is 
above every name;” “ hath given all things into his hands;” 
“ hath committed all judgment unto him; that all men should 
honor the Son, even as they honor the Father.”(ll) For, 

(I) Heb. ix, 28. (2) John xi, 51, 52. (3) 1 Pet. iii, 18. 

(4) Matt, xx, 28; Mark x, 45; 1 Tim. ii, 6. 

(5) 2 Pet. ii, 1; Rev. xiv, 4; 1 Cor. vi, 20. 

(6) 1 Pet. i, 19; Rev. v, 9; Gal. iii, 13. 

(7) Heb. vii, 25; 1 John ii, 1, 2. (8) Heb. ii, 10, and v, 9. 

(9) 2 Cor. v, 19; Rom. v, 10; Eph. ii, 16. 

(10) Heb. ii, 14; see, also, a remarkable passage in the book of 
Job, xxxiii, 24. 

(II) Phil, ii, 8, 9; John iii, 35, and v, 22, 23. 


CHAP. V.] A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 235 

“ worthy is the Lamb that was slain, to receive power, and 
riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honor, and glory, and 
blessing! And every creature which is in heaven, and on 
the earth, heard I, saying, Blessing, and honor, and glory, 
and power, be unto him that sitteth upon the throne, and 
unto the Lamb, for ever and ever!”(l) 

These passages of Scripture seem to comprehend and 
express the chief parts of Christ’s office, as mediator be¬ 
tween God and man; so far, I mean, as the nature of this, 
his office, is revealed; and it is usually treated of by divines 
under three heads. 

1. He was, by the way of eminence, the Prophet: “that 
Prophet that should come into the world,”(2) to declare the 
Divine will. He published anew the law of nature, which 
men had corrupted; and the very knowledge of which, to 
some degree, was lost among them. He taught mankind, 
taught us authoritatively, to “ live soberly, righteously, and 
godly in this present world,” in expectation of the future 
judgment of God. He confirmed the truth of this moral 
system of nature, and gave us additional evidence of it—the 
evidence of testimony. (3) He distinctly revealed the man¬ 
ner in which God would be worshiped, the efficacy of 
repentance, and the rewards and punishments of a future 
life. Thus he was a prophet in a sense in which no other 
ever was. To which is to be added, that he set us a perfect 
“ example, that we should follow his steps.” 

2. He has a “ kingdom which is not of this world.” He 
founded a church, to be to mankind a standing memorial of 
religion, and invitation to it; which he promised to be with 
always, even to the end. He exercises an invisible govern¬ 
ment over it himself, and by his Spirit; over that part of it 
which is militant here on earth, a government of discipline, 
“for the perfecting of the saints, for the edifying of his 
body; till we all come in the unity of the faith, and of the 

(1) Rev. v, 12, 13. (2) John vi, 14. (3) Page 176, &c. 


236 


THE APPOINTMENT OF 


[part II. 

knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the 
measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ.”(1) Of this 
church, all persons scattered over the world, who live in 
obedience to his laws, are members. For these, he is “gone 
to prepare a place, and will come again to receive them 
unto himself, that where he is, there they may be alsoand 
“reign with him for ever and ever:”(2) and, likewise, “to 
take vengeance on them that know not God, and obey not 
his Gospel.”(3) 

Against these parts of Christ’s office, I find no objections 
but what are fully obviated in the beginning of this chapter. 

Lastly , Christ offered himself a propitiatory sacrifice, and 
made atonement for the sins of the world: which is men¬ 
tioned last, in regard to what is objected against it. Sacri¬ 
fices of expiation were commanded the Jews, and obtained 
amongst most other nations, from tradition, whose original 
probably was revelation. And they were continually re¬ 
peated, both occasionally and at the returns of stated times; 
and made up great part of the external religion of mankind. 
“But now once in the end of the world Christ appeared, to 
put away sin by the sacrifice of himself.”(4) And this 
sacrifice was in the highest degree, and with the most ex¬ 
tensive influence, of that efficacy for obtaining pardon of sin, 
which the heathens may be supposed to have thought their 
sacrifices to have been, and which the Jewish sacrifices really 
were in some degree, and with regard to some persons. 

How, and in what particular way, it had this efficacy, 
there are not wanting persons who have endeavored to ex¬ 
plain ; but I do not find that the Scripture has explained it. 
We seem to be very much in the dark concerning the man¬ 
ner in which the ancients understood atonement to be made, 
that is, pardon to be obtained, by sacrifices. And if the 
Scripture has, as surely it has, left this matter of the satis- 

(1) Eph. iv, 12, 13. (2; John xiv, 2, 3. Rev. iii, 21, and xi, 15 

(3) 2 Thess. i, 8. (4) Heb. ix, 26. 


CHAP. V.] A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 237 

faction of Christ mysterious, left somewhat in it unrevealed, 
all conjectures about it must be, if not evidently absurd, yet 
at least uncertain. Nor has any one reason to complain for 
want of farther information, unless he can show his claim 
to it. 

Some have endeavored to explain the efficacy of what 
Christ has done and suffered for us, beyond what the Scrip¬ 
ture has authorized; others, probably because they could 
not explain it, have been for taking it away, and confining 
his office, as Redeemer of the world, to his instruction, ex¬ 
ample, and government of the Church: whereas, the doctrine 
of the Gospel appears to be, not only that he taught the 
efficacy of repentance, but rendered it of the efficacy of which 
it is, by what he did and suffered for us; that he obtained 
for us the benefit of having our repentance accepted unto 
eternal life: not only that he revealed to sinners, that they 
were in a capacity of salvation, and how they might obtain 
it; but, moreover, that he put them into this capacity of 
salvation, by what he did and suffered for them—put us into 
a capacity of escaping future punishment, and obtaining 
future happiness. And it is our wisdom thankfully to ac¬ 
cept the benefit, by performing the conditions upon which it 
is offered, on our part, without disputing how it was pro¬ 
cured on his. For, 

VII. Since we neither know by what means punishment 
in a future state would have followed wickedness in this; 
nor in what manner it would have been inflicted, had it not 
been prevented; nor all the reasons why its infliction would 
have been needful; nor the particular nature of that state 
of happiness which Christ has gone to prepare for his dis¬ 
ciples ; and since we are ignorant how far any thing which 
we could do, would, alone and of itself, have been effectual 
to prevent that punishment to which we were obnoxious, 
and recover that happiness which we had forfeited; it is 
most evident we are not judges, antecedently to revelation, 


238 THE APPOINTMENT OF [PART II. 

whether a mediator was or was not necessary to obtain those 
ends; to prevent that future punishment, and bring mankind 
to the final happiness of their nature. And for the very 
same reasons, upon supposition of the necessity of a media¬ 
tor, we are no more judges, antecedently to revelation, of 
the whole nature of his office, or the several parts of which 
it consists; of what was fit and requisite to be assigned him, 
in order to accomplish the ends of divine Providence in the 
appointment. And from hence it follows, that to object 
against the expediency or usefulness of particular things, 
revealed to have been done or suffered by him, because we 
do not see how they were conducive to those ends, is highly 
absurd. Yet nothing is more common to be met with than 
this absurdity. But if it be acknowledged beforehand, that 
we are not judges in the case, it is evident that no objection 
can, with any shadow of reason, be urged against any partic¬ 
ular part of Christ’s mediatorial office revealed in Scripture, 
till it can be shown positively, not to be requisite, or con¬ 
ducive, to the ends proposed to be accomplished; or that it 
is in itself unreasonable. 

And there is one objection made against the satisfaction 
of Christ, which looks to be of this positive kind; that the 
doctrine of his being appointed to suffer for the sins of the 
world, represents God as being indifferent whether he pun¬ 
ished the innocent or the guilty. Now, from the foregoing 
observations, we may see the extreme slightness of all such 
objections; and, (though it is most certain all who make 
them do not see the consequence,) that they conclude alto¬ 
gether as much against God’s whole original constitution of 
nature, and the whole daily course of divine Providence, in 
the government of the world, that is, against the whole 
scheme of theism and the whole notion of religion, as against 
Christianity. For the world is a constitution, or system, 
whose parts have a mutual reference to each other; and 
there is a scheme of things gradually carrying on, called the 


CHAP. V.] A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 239 

course of nature, to the carrying on of which God has ap¬ 
pointed us, in various ways, to contribute. And when, in 
the daily course of natural Providence, it is appointed that 
innocent people should suffer for the faults of the guilty, 
this is liable to the very same objection as the instance we 
are now considering. The infinitely greater importance of 
that appointment of Christianity which is objected against, 
does not hinder, but it may be, as it plainly is, an appoint¬ 
ment of the very same kind with what the world affords us 
daily examples of. Nay, if there were any force at all in 
the objection, it would be stronger, in one respect, against 
natural Providence, than against Christianity; because, under 
the former, we are in many cases commanded, and even 
necessitated, whether we will or no, to suffer for the faults 
of others; whereas the sufferings of Christ were voluntary. 
The world’s being under the righteous government of God, 
does indeed imply that, finally, and upon the whole, every 
one shall receive according to his personal deserts; and the 
general doctrine of the whole Scripture is, that this shall be 
the completion of the Divine government. But, during the 
progress, and, for aught we know, even in order to the 
completion of this moral scheme, vicarious punishments may 
be fit, and absolutely necessary. Men, by their follies, run 
themselves into extreme distress; into difficulties which 
would be absolutely fatal to them, were it not for the inter¬ 
position and assistance of others. God commands, by the 
law of nature, that we afford them this assistance, in many 
cases where we cannot do it without very great pains, and 
labor, and sufferings to ourselves. And we see in what 
variety of ways one person’s sufferings contribute to the 
relief of another; and how, or by what particular means, 
this comes to pass, or follows, from the constitution and 
laws of nature, which come under our notice; and being 
familiarized to it, men are not shocked with it. So that the 
reason of their insisting upon objections of the foregoing 


240 THE APPOINTMENT OF [PART II. 

kind, against the satisfaction of Christ, is, either that they 
do not consider God’s settled and uniform appointments as 
his appointments at all, or else they forget that vicarious 
punishment is a Providential appointment of every day’s ex¬ 
perience : and then, from their being unacquainted with the 
more general laws of nature, or Divine government over the 
world, and not seeing how the sufferings of Christ could con¬ 
tribute to the redemption of it, unless by arbitrary and tyran¬ 
nical will, they conclude his sufferings could not contribute to 
it any other way. And yet, what has been often alledged in 
justification of this doctrine, even from the apparent natural 
tendency of this method of our redemption—its tendency to 
vindicate the authority of God’s laws, and deter his creatures 
from sin: this has never yet been answered, and is, I think, 
plainly unanswerable: though I am far from thinking it an 
account of the whole of the case. But without taking this 
into consideration, it abundantly appears, from the observa¬ 
tions above made, that this objection is, not an objection 
against Christianity, but against the whole general constitu¬ 
tion of nature. And if it were to be considered as an objec¬ 
tion against Christianity, or considering it as it is, an objection 
against the constitution of nature, it amounts to no more in 
conclusion than this, that a Divine appointment cannot be 
necessary, or expedient, because the objector does not 
discern it to be so; though he must own that the nature 
of the case is such, as renders him incapable of judging 
whether it be so or not; or of seeing it to be necessary, 
though it were so. 

It is, indeed, a matter of great patience to reasonable 
men, to find people arguing in this manner; objecting 
against the credibility of such particular things revealed in 
Scripture, that they do not see the necessity or expediency 
of them. For, though it is highly right, and the most pious 
exercise of our understanding, to inquire with due reverence 
into the ends and reasons of God’s dispensations; yet, when 


CHAP. V.] A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 241 

those reasons are concealed, to argue from our ignorance, 
that such dispensations cannot be from God, is infinitely 
absurd. The presumption of this kind of objections seems 
almost lost in the folly of them. And the folly of them is 
yet greater, when they are urged, as usually they are, 
against things in Christianity analogous, or like to those 
natural dispensations of Providence, which are matter of 
experience. Let reason be kept to; and, if any part of the 
Scripture account of the redemption of the world by Christ 
can be shown to be really contrary to it, let the Scriptures, 
in the name of God, be given up: but let not such poor 
creatures as we, go on objecting against an infinite scheme, 
that we do not see the necessity or usefulness of all its 
parts, and call this reasoning; and, which still farther 
heightens the absurdity in the present case, parts which we 
are not actively concerned in. For, it may be worth men¬ 
tioning, 

Lastly, That not only the reason of the thing, but the 
whole analogy of nature, should teach us, not to expect to 
have the like information concerning the Divine conduct, as 
concerning our own duty. God instructs us by experience, 
(for it is not reason, but experience, which instructs us,) what 
good or bad consequences will follow from our acting in 
such and such manners; and by this he directs us how we 
are to behave ourselves. But, though we are sufficiently 
instructed for the common purposes of life, yet it is but an 
almost infinitely small part of natural Providence which we 
are at all let into. The case is the same with regard to 
revelation. The doctrine of a mediator between God and 
man, against which it is objected, that the expediency of 
some things in it is not understood, relates only to what was 
done on God’s part in the appointment, and on the Media¬ 
tor’s in the execution of it. For what is required of us, in 
consequence of this gracious dispensation, is another subject, 
in which none can complain for want of information. The 
21 


242 A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. [PART II. 

constitution of the world, and God’s natural government 
over it, is all mystery, as much as the Christian dispensation. 
Yet, under the first, he has given men all things pertaining 
to life; and under the other, all things pertaining unto god¬ 
liness. And, it may be added, that there is nothing hard 
to be accounted for in any of the common precepts of 
Christianity; though, if there were, surely a Divine com¬ 
mand is abundantly sufficient to lay us under the strongest 
obligations to obedience. But the fact is, that the reasons 
of all the Christian precepts are evident. Positive institu¬ 
tions are manifestly necessary to keep up and propagate 
religion amongst mankind. And our duty to Christ, the 
internal and external worship of him; this part of the relig¬ 
ion of the Gospel manifestly arises out of what he has done 
and suffered, his authority and dominion, and the relation 
which he is revealed to stand in to us.(l) 

(1) Page 179, &c. 


CHAP. VI.] WANT OF UNIVERSALITY IN REVELATION. 


243 


CHAPTER VI. 

OF THE WANT OF UNIVERSALITY IN REVELATION J AND OF THE 
SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN THE PROOF OF IT. 

It has been thought, by some persons, that if the evi¬ 
dence of revelation appears doubtful, this itself turns into 
a positive argument against it; because it cannot be sup¬ 
posed, that, if it were true, it would be left to subsist upon 
doubtful evidence. And the objection against revelation, 
from its not being universal, is often insisted upon as of 
great weight. 

Now, the weakness of these opinions may be shown, by 
observing the suppositions on which they are founded, 
which are really such as these: that it cannot be thought 
God would have bestowed any favor at all upon us, unless 
in the degree which, we think, he might, and which, we 
imagine, would be most to our particular advantage; and, 
also, that it cannot be thought he would bestow a favor 
upon any, unless he bestowed the same upon all: supposi¬ 
tions which we find contradicted, not by a few instances, in 
God’s natural government of the world, but by the general 
analogy of nature together. 

Persons who speak of the evidence of religion as doubtful, 
and of this supposed doubtfulness as a positive argument 
against it, should be put upon considering, what that evi¬ 
dence, indeed, is, which they act upon with regard to their 
temporal interests. For, it is not only extremely difficult, 
but, in many cases, absolutely impossible, to balance pleas¬ 
ure and pain, satisfaction, and uneasiness, so as to be able 
to say, on which side the overplus is. There are the like 
difficulties and impossibilities, in making the due allowances 
for a change of temper and taste, for satiety, disgusts, ill- 
health; any of which render men incapable of enjoying, 
after they have obtained, what they most eagerly desired. 


244 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL: [PART II. 

Numberless, too, are the accidents, besides that one of un¬ 
timely death, which may even probably disappoint the best 
concerted schemes; and strong objections are often seen to 
lie against them, not to be removed or answered, but which 
seem overbalanced by reasons on the other side; so as 
that the certain difficulties and dangers of the pursuit 
are, by every one, thought justly disregarded, upon ac¬ 
count of the appearing greater advantages in case of suc¬ 
cess, though there be but little probability of it. Lastly, 
every one observes our liableness, if we be not upon our 
guard, to be deceived by the falsehood of men, and the 
false appearances of things; and this danger must be 
greatly increased, if there be a strong bias within, sup¬ 
pose from indulged passion, to favor the deceit. Hence 
arises that great uncertainty and doubtfulness of proof, 
wherein our temporal interest really consists; what are 
the most probable means of attaining it; and whether 
those means will eventually be successful. And number¬ 
less instances there are, in the daily course of life, in which 
all men think it reasonable to engage in pursuits, though 
the probability is greatly against succeeding; and to make 
such provision for themselves, as it is supposable they may 
have occasion for, though the plain acknowledged probabil¬ 
ity is, that they never shall. Then those who think the ob¬ 
jection against revelation, from its light not being universal, 
to be of weight, should observe, that the Author of nature, 
in numberless instances, bestows that upon some, which he 
does not upon others, who seem equally to stand in need of 
it. Indeed, he appears to bestow all his gifts with the 
most promiscuous variety, among creatures of the same 
species; health and strength, capacities of prudence and 
of knowledge, means of improvement, riches, and all ex¬ 
ternal advantages. And as there are not any two men 
found of exactly like shape and features, so, it is proba¬ 
ble there are not any two of an exactly like constitution, 


245 


CHAP. VI.] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 

temper, and situation, with regard to the goods and evils 
of life. Yet, notwithstanding these uncertainties and va¬ 
rieties, God does exercise a natural government over the 
world; and there is such a thing as a prudent and impru¬ 
dent institution of life, with regard to our health and our 
affairs, under that his natural government. 

As neither the Jewish nor Christian revelation have been 
universal, and as they have been afforded to a greater or 
less part of the world, at different times, so, likewise, at 
different times, both revelations have had different degrees 
of evidence. The Jews who lived during the succession of 
prophets, that is, from Moses till after the captivity, had 
higher evidence of the truth of their religion, than those 
had who lived in the interval between the last-mentioned 
period and the coming of Christ. And the first Christians 
had higher evidence of the miracles wrought in attestation 
of Christianity than what we have now. They had, also, a 
strong presumptive proof of the truth of it, perhaps of 
much greater force, in way of argument, than many think, 
of which we have very little remaining; I mean, the pre¬ 
sumptive proof of its truth from the influence which it had 
upon the lives of the generality of its professors. And 
we, or future ages, may possibly have a proof of it, which 
they could not have, from the conformity between the pro¬ 
phetic history, and the state of the world, and of Chris¬ 
tianity. And farther, if we were to suppose the evidence, 
which some have of religion, to amount to little more than 
seeing that it may be true, but that they remain in great 
doubts and uncertainties about both its evidence and its 
nature, and great perplexities concerning the rule of life; 
others to have a full conviction of the truth of religion, 
with a distinct knowledge of their duty; and others sever¬ 
ally to have all the intermediate degrees of religious light 
and evidence, which lie between those two; if we put the 
case, that for the present it was intended revelation should 


246 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL: [PART II. 

be no more than a small light, in the midst of a world 
greatly overspread, notwithstanding it, with ignorance and 
darkness; that certain glimmerings of the light should ex¬ 
tend, and be directed, to remote distances, in such a man¬ 
ner as that those who really partook of it should not dis¬ 
cern from whence it originally came; that some, in a nearer 
situation to it, should have its light obscured, and, in differ¬ 
ent ways and degrees, intercepted; and that others should 
be placed within its clearer influence, and be much more 
enlivened, cheered, and directed by it; but yet, that even 
to these it should be no more than “a light shining in a 
dark placeall this would be perfectly uniform and of a 
piece with the conduct of Providence, in the distribution of 
its other blessings. If the fact of the case really were, 
that some have received no light at all from the Scripture; 
as many ages and countries in the heathen world: that 
others, though they have, by means of it, had essential or 
natural religion enforced upon their consciences, yet have 
never had the genuine Scripture revelation, with its real 
evidence, proposed to their consideration; and the ancient 
Persians and modern Mohammedans may possibly be in¬ 
stances of people in a situation somewhat like to this: that 
others, though they have had the Scripture laid before 
them as of Divine revelation, yet have had it with the sys¬ 
tem and evidence of Christianity so interpolated, the sys¬ 
tem so corrupted, the evidence so blended with false mira¬ 
cles, as to leave the mind in the utmost doubtfulness and 
uncertainty about the whole; which may be the state of 
some thoughtful men in most of those nations who call 
themselves Christian: and, lastly, that others have had 
Christianity offered to them in its genuine simplicity, and 
with its proper evidence, as persons in countries and 
Churches of civil and Christian liberty; but, however, 
that even these persons are left in great ignorance in many 
respects, and have by no means light afforded them enough 


CHAP. VI.] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 247 

to satisfy their curiosity, but only to regulate their life, to 
teach them their duty, and encourage them in the careful 
discharge of it: I say, if we were to suppose this somewhat 
of a general true account of the degrees of moral and 
religious light and evidence, which were intended to be 
afforded mankind, and of what has actually been and is 
their situation, in their moral and religious capacity, there 
would be nothing in all this ignorance, doubtfulness, and 
uncertainty, in all these varieties and supposed disadvan¬ 
tages of some in comparison of others, respecting religion, 
but may be paralleled by manifest analogies in the natural 
dispensations of Providence at present, and considering our¬ 
selves merely in our moral capacity. 

Nor is there any thing shocking in all this, or which 
would seem to bear hard upon the moral administration in 
nature, if we would really keep in mind, that every one 
shall be dealt equitably with; instead of forgetting this, 
or explaining it away, after it is acknowledged in words. 
All shadow of injustice, and, indeed, all harsh appearances, 
in this various economy of Providence, would be lost, if we 
would keep in mind, that every merciful allowance shall 
be made, and no more be required of any one, than what 
might have been equitably expected of him, from the cir¬ 
cumstances in which he was placed; and not what might 
have been expected, had he been placed in other circum¬ 
stances ; that is, in Scripture language, that every man shall 
be “accepted according to what he had, not according to 
what he had not.”(l) This, however, doth not by any 
means imply, that all persons’ condition here is equally ad¬ 
vantageous with respect to futurity. And Providence’s 
designing to place some in greater darkness with respect to 
religious knowledge, is no more reason why they should not 
endeavor to get out of that darkness, and others to bring 
them out of it, than why ignorant and slow people, in 
(1)2 Cor. viii, 12. 


REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL: 


248 


[part II. 


matters of other knowledge, should not endeavor to learn, 
or should not be instructed. 

It is not unreasonable to suppose, that the same wise and 
good principle, whatever it was, which disposed the Author 
of nature to make different kinds and orders of creatures, 
disposed him, also, to place creatures of like kinds in differ¬ 
ent situations; and that the same principle which disposed 
him to make creatures of different moral capacities, disposed 
him, also, to place creatures of like moral capacities in 
different religious situations; and, even, the same creatures, 
in different periods of their being. And the account or 
reason of this, is, also, most probably the account why the 
constitution of things is such, as that creatures of moral 
natures or capacities, for a considerable part of that dura¬ 
tion in which they are living agents, are not at all subjects 
of morality and religion; but grow up to be so, and grow 
up to be so more and more, gradually, from childhood to 
mature age. 

What, in particular, is the account or reason of these 
things, we must be greatly in the dark, were it only that 
we know so very little even of our own case. Our present 
state may possibly be the consequence of somewhat past, 
which we are wholly ignorant of; as it has a reference to 
somewhat to come, of which we know scarce any more than 
is necessary for practice. A system or constitution, in its 
notion, implies variety; and so complicated a one as this 
world, very great variety. So that were revelation universal, 
yet, from men’s different capacities of understanding, from 
the different lengths of their lives, their different educations 
and other external circumstances, and from their difference 
of temper and bodily constitution, their religious situations 
would be widely different, and the disadvantage of some in 
comparison of others, perhaps, altogether as much as at 
present. And the true account, whatever it be, why man¬ 
kind, or such a part of mankind, are placed in this condition 


CHAP. VI.] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 249 

of ignorance, must be supposed, also, the true account of 
our farther ignorance, in not knowing the reasons why, or 
whence it is, that they are placed in this condition. But 
the following practical reflections may deserve the serious 
consideration of those persons, who think the circumstances 
of mankind, or their own, in the forementioned respects, a 
ground of complaint. 

1. The evidence of religion not appearing obvious, may 
constitute one particular part of some men’s trial in the 
religious sense; as it gives scope for a virtuous exercise, or 
vicious neglect, of their understanding, in examining or not 
examining into that evidence. There seems no possible rea¬ 
son to be given, why we may not be in a state of moral 
probation, with regard to the exercise of our understanding 
upon the subject of religion, as we are with regard to our 
behavior in common affairs. The former is as much a thing 
within our power and choice as the latter. And, I suppose, 
it is to be laid down for certain, that the same character, 
the same inward principle, which, after a man is convinced 
of the truth of religion, renders him obedient to the precepts 
of it, would, were he not thus convinced, set him about 
an examination of it, upon its system and evidence being 
offered to his thoughts; and that, in the latter state, his 
examination would be with an impartiality, seriousness, and 
solicitude, proportionable to what his obedience is in the 
former. And as inattention, negligence, want of all serious 
concern, about a matter of such a nature and importance, 
when offered to men’s consideration, is, before a distinct 
conviction of its truth, as real immoral depravity and disso¬ 
luteness, as neglect of religious practice after such convic¬ 
tion ; so, active solicitude about it, and fair, impartial consid¬ 
eration of its evidence before such conviction, is as really an 
exercise of a morally right temper, as is religious practice 
after. Thus, that religion is not intuitively true, but a matter 
of deduction and inference; that a conviction of its truth is 


250 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL: [PART II. 

not forced upon every one, but left to be, by some, collected 
with heedful attention to premises; this as much constitutes 
religious probation, as much affords sphere, scope, oppor¬ 
tunity, for right and wrong behavior, as any thing what¬ 
ever does. And their manner of treating this subject, 
when laid before them, shows what is in their heart, and is 
an exertion of it. 

2. It appears to be a thing as evident, though it is not 
so much attended to, that if, upon consideration of religion, 
the evidence of it should seem to any persons doubtful in 
the highest supposable degree, even this doubtful evidence 
will, however, put them into a general state of probation, in 
the moral and religious sense. For, suppose a man to be 
really in doubt, whether such a person had not done him 
the greatest favor, or, whether his whole temporal interest 
did not depend upon that person, no one, who had any 
sense of gratitude and of prudence, could possibly consider 
himself in the same situation, with regard to such person, 
as if he had no such doubt. In truth, it is as just to say, 
that certainty and doubt are the same, as to say, the situa¬ 
tions now mentioned would leave a man as entirely at lib¬ 
erty, in point of gratitude or prudence, as he would be, 
were he certain he had received no favor from such person, 
or that he no way depended upon him. And thus, though 
the evidence of religion which is afforded to some men, 
should be little more than that they are given to see the 
system of Christianity, or religion in general, to be suppo¬ 
sable and credible, this ought, in all reason, to beget a serious 
practical apprehension that it may be true. And even this 
will afford matter of exercise for religious suspense and 
deliberation, for moral resolution and self-government; be¬ 
cause the apprehension that religion may be true, does as 
really lay men under obligations, as a full conviction that it 
is true. It gives occasion and motives to consider farther 
the important subject; to preserve attentively upon their 


251 


CHAP. VI.] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 

minds a general implicit sense that they may be under 
Divine moral government, an awful solicitude about religion, 
whether natural or revealed. Such apprehension ought 
to turn men’s eyes to every degree of new light which may 
be had, from whatever side it comes, and induce them to 
refrain, in the mean time, from all immoralities, and live in 
the conscientious practice of every common virtue. Espe¬ 
cially are they bound to keep at the greatest distance from 
all dissolute profaneness; for this the very nature of the 
case forbids; and to treat with highest reverence a mat¬ 
ter upon which their own whole interest and being, and 
the fate of nature, depend. This behavior, and an active 
endeavor to maintain within themselves this temper, is the 
business, the duty, and the wisdom of those persons, who 
complain of the doubtfulness of religion; is what they are 
under the most proper obligations to. And such behavior is 
an exertion of, and has a tendency to improve in them, that 
character, which the practice of all the several duties of 
religion, from a full conviction of its truth, is an exertion of, 
and has a tendency to improve in others—others, I say, to 
whom God has afforded such conviction. Nay, considering 
the infinite importance of religion, revealed as well as nat¬ 
ural, I think it may be said, in general, that whoever will 
weigh the matter thoroughly, may see there is not near so 
much difference as is commonly imagined, between what 
ought in reason to be the rule of life, to those persons who 
are fully convinced of its truth, and to those who have only 
a serious doubting apprehension that it may be true. Their 
hopes, and fears, and obligations, will be in various degrees; 
but as the subject-matter of their hopes and fears is the 
same, so the subject-matter of their obligations, what they 
are bound to do and to refrain from, is not so very unlike. 

It is to be observed farther, that from a character of un¬ 
derstanding, or a situation of influence in the world, some 
persons have it in their power to do infinitely more harm or 


252 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL! [PART II. 

good, by setting an example of profaneness, and avowed 
disregard to all religion, or, on the contrary, of a serious, 
though, perhaps, doubting, apprehension of its truth, and 
of a reverend regard to it under this doubtfulness, than 
they can do by acting well or ill in all the common inter¬ 
courses amongst mankind. And, consequently, they are 
most highly accountable for a behavior, which, they may 
easily foresee is of such importance, and in which there is 
most plainly a right and a wrong; even admitting the evi¬ 
dence of religion to be as doubtful as is pretended. 

The ground of these observations, and that which ren¬ 
ders them just and true, is, that doubting necessarily im¬ 
plies some degree of evidence for that of which we doubt. 
For no person would be in doubt concerning the truth of a 
number of facts so and so circumstanced, which should ac¬ 
cidentally come into his thoughts, and of which he had no 
evidence at all. And though in the case of an even chance, 
and where, consequently, we were in doubt, we should in 
common language say, that we had no evidence at all for 
either side; yet that situation of things which renders it an 
even chance, and no more, that such an event will happen, 
renders this case equivalent to all others, where there is 
such evidence on both sides of a question,(l) as leaves the 
mind in doubt concerning the truth. Indeed, in all these 
cases, there is no more evidence on one side than on the 
other; but there is (what is equivalent to) much more for 
either, than for the truth of a number of facts which come 
into one’s thoughts at random. And thus, in all these 
cases, doubt as much presupposes evidence, lower degrees 
of evidence, as belief presupposes higher, and certainty 
higher still. Any one who will a little attend to the nature 
of evidence, will easily carry this observation on, and see 
that between no evidence at all, and that degree of it which 
affords ground of doubt, there are as many intermediate 
(1) Introduction 


CHAP. VI.] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 253 

degrees, as there are between that degree which is the 
ground of doubt and demonstration. And, though we have 
not faculties to distinguish these degrees of evidence with 
any sort of exactness, yet, in proportion as they are discerned, 
they ought to influence our practice. For it is as real an 
imperfection in the moral character, not to be influenced in 
practice by a lower degree of evidence when discerned, as 
it is in the understanding, not to discern it. And as, in all 
subjects which men consider, they discern the lower as well 
as higher degrees of evidence, proportionably to their ca¬ 
pacity of understanding; so, in practical subjects, they are 
influenced in practice by the lower as well as higher degrees 
of it, proportionably to their fairness and honesty. And as, 
in proportion to defects in the understanding, men are unapt 
to see lower degrees of evidence, are in danger of overlook¬ 
ing evidence when it is not glaring, and are easily imposed 
upon in such cases; so, in proportion to the corruption of 
the heart, they seem capable of satisfying themselves with 
having no regard in practice to evidence acknowledged real, 
if it be not overbearing. From these things it must follow, 
that doubting concerning religion implies such a degree of 
evidence for it, as, joined with the consideration of its import¬ 
ance, unquestionably lays men under the obligations before- 
mentioned, to have a dutiful regard to it in all their behavior. 

3. The difficulties in which the evidence of religion is 
involved, which some complain of, is no more a just ground 
of complaint, than the external circumstances of temptation, 
which others are placed in; or than difficulties in the prac¬ 
tice of it, after a full conviction of its truth. Temptations 
render our state a more improving state of discipline^) than 
it would be otherwise; as they give occasion for a more 
attentive exercise of the virtuous principle, which confirms 
and strengthens it more than an easier or less attentive ex¬ 
ercise of it could. Now, speculative difficulties are, in this 

(1) Part I, Chap, v 
22 


254 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL I [PART II. 

respect, of the very same nature with these external temp¬ 
tations. For the evidence of religion not appearing obvious, 
is, to some persons, a temptation to reject it, without any 
consideration at all; and, therefore, requires such an atten¬ 
tive exercise of the virtuous principle, seriously to consider 
that evidence, as there would be no occasion for, but for 
such temptation. And the supposed doubtfulness of its 
evidence, after it has been in some sort considered, affords 
opportunity to an unfair mind, of explaining away, and de¬ 
ceitfully hiding from itself, that evidence which it might 
see: and, also, for men’s encouraging themselves in vice, 
from hopes of impunity, though they do clearly see thus 
much, at least, that these hopes are uncertain: in like man¬ 
ner as the common temptation to many instances of folly, 
which end in temporal infamy and ruin, is the ground for 
hope of not being detected, and of escaping with impunity; 
that is, the doubtfulness of the proof beforehand, that such 
foolish behavior will thus end in infamy and ruin. On the 
contrary, supposed doubtfulness in the evidence of religion 
calls for a more careful and attentive exercise of the virtuous 
principle, in fairly yielding themselves up to the proper 
influence of any real evidence, though doubtful; and in 
practicing conscientiously all virtue, though under some un¬ 
certainty, whether the government in the universe may not 
possibly be such, as that vice may escape with impunity. 
And, in general, temptation, meaning by this word the les¬ 
ser allurements to wrong, and difficulties in the discharge of 
our duty, as well as the greater ones—temptation, I say, as 
such, and of every kind and degree, as it calls forth some 
virtuous efforts, additional to what would otherwise have 
been wanting, cannot but be an additional discipline and 
improvement of virtue, as well as probation of it, in the 
other senses of that word.(l) So that the very same ac¬ 
count is to be given, why the evidence of religion should be 
, (1) Part I, Chap, iv, and pages 136, 137. 


255 


CHAP. VI.] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 

left in such a manner, as to require, in some, an attentive, so¬ 
licitous, perhaps painful, exercise of their understanding about 
it; as why others should be placed in such circumstances as 
that the practice of its common duties, after a full convic¬ 
tion of the truth of it, should require attention, solicitude, 
and pains: or, why appearing doubtfulness should be per¬ 
mitted to afford matter of temptation to some; as why 
external difficulties and allurements should be permitted to 
afford matter of temptation to others. The same account 
also is to be given, why some should be exercised with 
temptations of both these kinds, as why others should be 
exercised with the latter in such very high degrees, as some 
have been, particularly as the primitive Christians were. 

Nor does there appear any absurdity in supposing, that 
the speculative difficulties in which the evidence of religion 
is involved, may make even the principal part of some per¬ 
sons’ trial. For, as the chief temptations of the generality 
of the world, are, the ordinary motives to injustice or unre¬ 
strained pleasure; or to live in the neglect of religion, from 
that frame of mind, which renders many persons almost 
without feeling as to any thing distant, or which is not the 
object of their senses; so there are other persons without 
this shallowness of temper, persons of a deeper sense as to 
what is invisible and future, who not only see, but have a 
general practical feeling that what is to come will be pre¬ 
sent, and that things are not less real for their not being the 
objects of sense; and who, from their natural constitution of 
body and of temper, and from their external condition, may 
have small temptations to behave ill, small difficulty in be¬ 
having well, in the common course of life. Now, when these 
latter persons have a distinct, full conviction of the truth of 
religion, without any possible doubts or difficulties, the prac¬ 
tice of it is to them unavoidable, unless they will do a constant 
violence to their own minds; and religion is scarce any more 
a discipline to them, than it is to creatures in a state of per- 


256 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL! [PART II. 

fection. Yet these persons may possibly stand in need of 
moral discipline and exercise, in a higher degree, than they 
would have by such an easy practice of religion. Or it 
may be requisite, for reasons unknown to us, that they 
should give some further manifestation(l) what is their 
moral character, to the creation of God, than such a prac¬ 
tice of it would be. Thus, in the great variety of religious 
situations in which men are placed, what constitutes, what 
chiefly and peculiarly constitutes the probation, in all senses, 
of some persons, may be the difficulties in which the evidence 
of religion is involved; and their principal and distinguished 
trial may be, how they will behave under and with respect 
to these difficulties. Circumstances in men’s situation in 
their temporal capacity, analogous in good measure to this, 
respecting religion, are to be observed. We find some per¬ 
sons are placed in such a situation in the world, as that their 
chief difficulty, with regard to conduct, is not the doing 
what is prudent when it is known; for this, in numberless 
cases, is as easy as the contrary: but to some, the principal 
exercise is, recollection, and being upon their guard against 
deceits—the deceits, suppose, of those about them; against 
false appearances of reason and prudence. To persons in 
some situations, the principal exercise, with respect to con¬ 
duct, is attention, in order to inform themselves what is pro¬ 
per—what is really the reasonable and prudent part to act. 

But, as I have hitherto gone upon supposition, that men’s 
dissatisfaction with the evidence of religion, is not owing to 
their neglects or prejudices, it must be added, on the other 
hand, in all common reason, and as what the truth of the 
case plainly requires should be added, that such dissatisfac¬ 
tion possibly may be owing to those, possibly may be men’s 
own fault. For, 

If there are any persons, who never set themselves 
heartily, and in earnest, to be informed in religion; if there 
(1) Pages 136, 137. 


CHAP. VI.] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 257 

are any, who secretly wish it may not prove true, and are 
less attentive to evidence than to difficulties, and more to 
objections than to what is said in answer to them; these 
persons will scarce be thought in a likely way of seeing the 
evidence of religion, though it were most certainly true, and 
capable of being ever so fully proved. If any accustom 
themselves to consider this subject usually in the way of 
mirth and sport; if they attend to forms and representations, 
and inadequate manners of expression, instead of the real 
things intended by them, (for signs often can be no more than 
inadequately expressive of the things signified;) or if they 
substitute human errors in the room of divine truth; why 
may not all, or any of these things, hinder some men from 
seeing that evidence which really is seen by others; as a 
like turn of mind, with respect to matters of common specu¬ 
lation, and practice, does, we find by experience, hinder them 
from attaining that knowledge and right understanding, in 
matters of common speculation and practice, which more fair 
and attentive minds attain to? And the effect will be the 
same, whether their neglect of seriously considering the 
evidence of religion, and their indirect behavior with regard 
to it, proceed from mere carelessness, or from the grosser 
vices; or whether it be owing to this, that forms, and figura¬ 
tive manners of expression, as well as errors, administer oc¬ 
casions of ridicule, when the things intended, and the truth 
itself, would not. Men may indulge a ludicrous turn so far, 
as to lose all sense of conduct and prudence in worldly af¬ 
fairs, and even, as it seems, to impair their faculty of reason. 
And in general, levity, carelessness, passion and prejudice, 
do hinder us from being rightly informed, with respect to 
common things; and they may , in like manner, and perhaps 
in some farther Providential manner, with respect to moral 
and religious subjects, may hinder evidence from being laid 
before us, and from being seen when it is. The Scripture(l) 

(1) Dan. xii, 10: see also Isa. xxix, 13,14; Matt, vi, 23, and xi, 25, 
22 * 


258 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL: [PART II. 

does declare, “that every one shall not understand.” And 
it makes no difference by what Providential conduct this 
comes to pass; whether the evidence of Christianity was, 
originally and with design, put and left so, as that those 
who are desirous of evading moral obligations, should not 
see it, and that honest-minded persons should; or whether 
it comes to pass by any other means. 

Farther, the general proof of natural religion and of 
Christianity, does, I think, lie level to common men; even 
those, the greatest part of whose time, from childhood to 
old age, is taken up with providing, for themselves and their 
families, the common conveniences, perhaps necessaries of 
life—those, I mean, of this rank, who ever think at all of 
asking after proof, or attending to it. Common men, were 
they as much in earnest about religion as about their 
temporal affairs, are capable of being convinced upon real 
evidence, that there is a God who governs the world; and 
they feel themselves to be of a moral nature, and account¬ 
able creatures. And as Christianity entirely falls in with 
this their natural sense of things, so they are capable, not 
only of being persuaded, but of being made to see, that 
there is evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of it, 
and many appearing completions of prophecy. But though 
this proof is real and conclusive, yet it is liable to objections, 
and may be run up into difficulties; which, however, persons 
who are capable, not only of talking of, but of really seeing, 
are capable also of seeing through; that is, not of clearing 

and xiii, 11, 12; John iii, 19, and v, 44; 1 Cor. ii, 14, and 2 Cor. 
iv, 4; 2 Tim. iii, 13 ; and that affectionate, as well as authoritative 
admonition, so very many times inculcated, “ He that hath ears to 
hear, let him hear.” Grotius saw so strongly the thing intended in 
these and other passages of Scripture of the like sense, as to say, that 
the proof given us of Christianity was less than it might have been, 
for this very purpose: Ut ita sermo Emngelii tanquam lapis esset 
Lydius ad quern ingenia sanabilia explorarentur. De Ver. R. C. Lib. ii, 
toward the end. 


CHAP. VI.] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 259 

up and answering them, so as to satisfy their curiosity, for 
of such knowledge we are not capable with respect to any 
one thing in nature; hut capable of seeing that the proof 
is not lost in these difficulties, or destroyed by these objec¬ 
tions. But then a thorough examination into religion, with 
regard to these objections, which cannot be the business of 
every man, is a matter of pretty large compass, and from 
the nature of it, requires some knowledge, as well as time 
and attention, to see how the evidence comes out, upon bal¬ 
ancing one thing with another, and what, upon the whole, 
is the amount of it. Now, if persons who have picked up 
these objections from others, and take for granted they are 
of weight, upon the word of those from whom they received 
them, or, by often retailing of them, come to see, or fancy 
they see, them to be of weight, will not prepare themselves 
for such an examination, with a competent degree of knowl¬ 
edge ; or will not give that time and attention to the sub¬ 
ject, which, from the nature of it, is necessary for attaining 
such information: in this case, they must remain in doubt¬ 
fulness, ignorance or error; in the same way as they must, 
with regard to common sciences, and matters of common 
life, if they neglect the necessary means of being informed 
in them. 

But still, perhaps, it will be objected, that if a prince or 
common master were to send directions to a servant, he 
would take care, that they should always bear the certain 
marks who they came from, and that their sense should be 
always plain; so as that there should be no possible doubt, 
if he could help it, concerning the authority or meaning of 
them. Now, the proper answer to all this kind of objec¬ 
tions is, that wherever the fallacy lies, it is even certain we 
cannot argue thus with respect to Him who is the governor 
of the world; and, particularly, that he does not afford us 
such information, with respect to our temporal affairs and 
interests, as experience abundantly shows. However, there 


260 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL I [PART II. 

is a full answer to this objection, from the very nature of 
religion. For, the reason why a prince would give his 
directions in this plain manner, is, that he absolutely desires 
such an external action should be done, without concerning 
himself with the motive or principle upon which it is done; 
that is, he regards only the external event, or the thing’s 
being done, and not at all, properly speaking, the doing of 
it, or the action. Whereas, the whole of morality and relig¬ 
ion consisting merely in action itself, there is no sort of par¬ 
allel between the cases. But if the prince be supposed to 
regard only the action, that is, only to desire to exercise, 
or in any sense prove, the understanding or loyalty of a 
servant, he would not always give his orders in such a plain 
manner. It may be proper to add, that the will of God, 
respecting morality and religion, may be considered either 
as absolute, or as only conditional. If it be absolute, it 
can only be thus, that we should act virtuously in such 
given circumstances; not that we should be brought to act 
so, by his changing of our circumstances. And if God’s 
will be thus absolute, then it is in our power, in the highest 
and strictest sense, to do or to contradict his will; which is 
a most weighty consideration. Or his will may be consid¬ 
ered only as conditional—that if we act so and so, we shall 
be rewarded; if otherwise, punished: of which conditional 
will of the Author of nature, the whole constitution of it 
affords most certain instances. 

Upon the whole, that we are in a state of religion 
necessarily implies, that we are in a state of probation; 
and the credibility of our being at all in such a state being 
admitted, there seems no peculiar difficulty in supposing 
our probation to be, just as it is, in those respects which 
are above objected against. There seems no pretense, from 
the reason of the thing , to say, that the trial cannot equitably 
be any thing, but whether persons will act suitably to cer¬ 
tain information, or such as admits no room for doubt; so 


CHAP. VI.] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 261 

as that there can be no danger of miscarriage, but either 
from their not attending to what they certainly know, or 
from overbearing passion hurrying them on to act contrary 
to it. For, since ignorance and doubt afford scope for pro¬ 
bation in all senses, as really as intuitive conviction or cer¬ 
tainty, and since the two former are to be put to the same 
account as difficulties in practice, men’s moral probation 
may, also, be, whether they will take due care to inform 
themselves by impartial consideration, and, afterwards, 
whether they will act as the case requires, upon the evi¬ 
dence which they have, however doubtful. And this, we 
find by experience, is frequently our probation,(l) in our 
temporal capacity. For the information which we want, 
with regard to our worldly interests, is by no means always 
given us of course, without any care of our own. And we 
are greatly liable to self-deceit from inward, secret preju¬ 
dices, and, also, to the deceits of others. So that to be able 
to judge what is the prudent part, often requires much and 
and difficult consideration. Then, after we have judged 
the very best we can, the evidence upon which we must 
act, if we will live and act at all, is perpetually doubtful to a 
very high degree. And the constitution and course of the 
world in fact is such, as that want of impartial considera¬ 
tion what we have to do, and venturing upon extravagant 
courses, because it is doubtful what will be the consequence, 
are often naturally, that is, Providentially, altogether as fatal, 
as misconduct occasioned by heedless inattention to what we 
certainly know, or disregarding it from overbearing passion. 

Several of the observations here made may well seem 
strange, perhaps unintelligible, to many good men. But if 
the persons for whose sake they are made, think so—per¬ 
sons who object as above, and throw off all regard to relig¬ 
ion under pretense of want of evidence, I desire them to 
consider again, whether their thinking so, be owing to any 
(1) Pages 73, 253, &c. 


262 WANT OF UNIVERSALITY IN REVELATION. [PART II. 

thing unintelligible in these observations, or to their own 
not having such a sense of religion and serious solicitude 
about it, as even their state of skepticism does in all reason 
require? It ought to be forced upon the reflection of 
these persons, that our nature and condition necessarily 
require us, in the daily course of life, to act upon evidence 
much lower than what is commonly called probable; to 
guard, not only against what we fully believe will, but, also, 
against what we think it supposable may happen; and to 
engage in pursuits when the probability is greatly against 
success, if it be credible that possibly we may succeed in 
them. 


OHAP. VII.] 


EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIANITY. 


263 


CHAPTER VII. 

OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIANITY. 

The presumptions against revelation, and objections against 
the general scheme of Christianity, and particular things re¬ 
lating to it, being removed, there remains to be considered, 
-— what positive evidence we have for the truth of it; chiefly 
in order to see, what the analogy of nature suggests with 
regard to that evidence, and the objections against it; or to 
see what is, and is allowed to be, the plain natural rule of 
judgment and of action, in our temporal concerns, in cases 
where we have the same kind of evidence, and the same kind 
of objections against it, that we have in the case before us. 

Now, in the evidence of Christianity, there seem to be 
several things of great weight, not reducible to the head, 
either of miracles, or the completion of prophecy, in the 
common acceptation of the words. But these two are its 
direct and fundamental proofs; and those other things, 
however considerable they are, yet ought never to be urged 
apart from its direct proofs, but always to be joined with 
them. Thus, the evidence of Christianity will be a long 
series of things, reaching, as it seems, from the beginning 
of the world to the present time, of great variety and com¬ 
pass, taking in both the direct, and, also, the collateral 
proofs, and making up, all of them together, one argument; 
the conviction arising from which kind of proof may be 
compared to what they call the effect in architecture or other 
works of art; a result from a great number of things so 
and so disposed, and taken into one view. I shall, there¬ 
fore, first, make some observations relating to miracles, and 
the appearing completions of prophecy; and consider what 
analogy suggests, in answer to the objections brought against 
this evidence. And, secondly, I shall endeavor to give 
some account of the general argument now mentioned. 


264 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART II 

consisting both of the direct and collateral evidence, con¬ 
sidered as making up one argument; this being the kind of 
proof upon which we determine most questions of difficulty 
concerning common facts, alledged to have happened, or 
seeming likely to happen; especially questions relating to 
conduct. 

First, I shall make some observations upon the direct 
proof of Christianity from miracles and prophecy, and upon 
the objections alledged against it. 

I. Now, the following observations, relating to the his¬ 
torical evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of Chris¬ 
tianity, appear to be of great weight. 

1. The Old Testament affords us the same historical 
evidence of the miracles of Moses and of the prophets, as 
of the common civil history of Moses and the kings of 
Israel; or, as of the affairs of the Jewish nation. And the 
Gospels and the Acts afford us the same historical evidence 
of the miracles of Christ and the apostles, as of the com¬ 
mon matters related in them. This, indeed, could not have 
been affirmed by any reasonable man, if the authors of these 
books, like many other historians, had appeared to make an 
entertaining manner of writing their aim; though they had 
interspersed miracles in their works, at proper distances, 
and upon proper occasions. These might have animated a 
dull relation, amused the reader, and engaged his atten¬ 
tion. And the same account would naturally have been 
given of them, as of the speeches and descriptions of such 
authors; the same account, in a manner, as is to be given, 
why the poets make use of wonders and prodigies. But 
the facts, both miraculous and natural, in Scripture, are 
related in plain, unadorned narratives ; and both of them 
appear, in all respects, to stand upon the same foot of 
historical evidence. Farther, some parts of Scripture, con¬ 
taining an account of miracles fully sufficient to prove the 
truth of Christianity, are quoted as genuine, from the age 


FOR CHRISTIANITY. 


265 


CHAP. VII.] 

in which they are said to be written, down to the present: 
and no other parts of them, material in the present question, 
are omitted to be quoted in such manner, as to afford any 
sort of proof of their not being genuine. And, as com¬ 
mon history, when called in question in any instance, may 
often be greatly confirmed by cotemporary or subsequent 
events more known and acknowledged, and as the common 
Scripture history, like many others, is thus confirmed, so, like¬ 
wise, is the miraculous history of it, not only in particular in¬ 
stances, but in general. For, the establishment of the Jewish 
and Christian religions, which were events cotemporary with 
the miracles related to be wrought in attestation of both, or 
subsequent to them, these events are just what we should 
have expected, upon supposition such miracles were really 
■wrought to attest the truth of those religions. These mira¬ 
cles are a satisfactory account of those events; of which 
no other satisfactory account can be given, nor any account 
at all, but what is imaginary merely and invented. It is to 
be added, that the most obvious, the most easy and direct 
account of this history, how it came to be written and to 
be received in the world, as a true history, is, that it really 
is so; nor can any other account of it be easy and direct. 
Now, though an account, not at all obvious, but very far¬ 
fetched and indirect, may indeed be, and often is, the true 
account of a matter; yet, it cannot be admitted on the 
authority of its being asserted. Mere guess, supposition, 
and possibility, when opposed to historical evidence, prove 
nothing, but that historical evidence is not demonstrative. 

Now, the just consequence from all this, I think, is, that 
the Scripture history, in general, is to be admitted as an 
authentic genuine history, till somewhat positive be alledged 
sufficient to invalidate it. But no man will deny the conse¬ 
quence to be, that it cannot be rejected, or thrown by as 
of no authority, till it can be proved to be of none; even 
though the evidence now mentioned for its authority were 


266 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART II. 

doubtful. This evidence may be confronted by historical 
evidence on the other side, if there be any; or general 
incredibility in the things related, or inconsistence in the 
general turn of the history, would prove it to be of no 
authority. But since, upon the face of the matter, upon a 
first and general view, the appearance is, that it is an 
authentic history, it cannot be determined to be fictitious 
without some proof that it is so. And the following obser¬ 
vations, in support of these and coincident with them, will 
greatly confirm the historical evidence for the truth of 
Christianity. 

2. The Epistles of St. Paul, from the nature of epistolary 
writing, and, moreover, from several of them being written, 
not to particular persons, but to Churches, carry in them 
evidences of their being genuine, beyond what can be, in a 
mere historical narrative, left to the world at large. This 
evidence, joined with that which they have in common with 
the rest of the New Testament, seems not to leave so much 
as any particular pretense for denying their genuineness, 
considered as an ordinary matter of fact, or of criticism—I 
say, particular pretense for denying it; because any single 
fact, of such a kind and such antiquity, may have general 
doubts raised concerning it, from the very nature of human 
affairs and human testimony. There is, also, to be men¬ 
tioned, a distinct and particular evidence of the genuineness 
of the epistle chiefly referred to here, the first to the Corin¬ 
thians, from the manner in which it is quoted by Clemens 
Romanus, in an epistle of his own to that Church.(1) Now, 
these epistles afford a proof of Christianity, detached from 
all others, which is, I think, a thing of weight, and, also, a 
proof of a nature and kind peculiar to itself. For, 

In them the author declares that he received the Gospel 
in general, and the institution of the communion in partic¬ 
ular, not from the rest of the apostles, * or jointly together 
(1) Clem. Rom., Ep. i, c. 47. 


CHAP. VII.] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 267 

with them, but alone from Christ himself; whom he declares, 
likewise, conformably to the history in the Acts, that he 
saw after his ascension.(l) So that the testimony of St. 
Paul is to be considered, as detached from that of the rest 
of the apostles. 

And he declares farther, that he was endued with a power 
of working miracles, as what was publicly known to those 
very people; speaks of frequent and great variety of mirac¬ 
ulous gifts, as then subsisting in those very Churches to 
which he was writing, which he was reproving for several 
irregularities, and where he had personal opposers: he 
mentions these gifts incidentally, in the most easy manner, 
and without effort, by way of reproof to those who had 
them, for their indecent use of them, and by way of depre¬ 
ciating them, in comparison of moral virtues. In short, he 
speaks to these Churches of these miraculous powers, in 
the manner any one would speak to another of a thing, 
which was as familiar, and as much known in common to 
them both, as any thing in the world.(2) And this, as hath 
been observed by several persons, is surely a very consid¬ 
erable thing. 

3. It is an acknowledged historical fact, that Christianity 
offered itself to the world and demanded to be received, 
upon the allegation, that is, as unbelievers would speak, 
upon the pretense of miracles, publicly wrought, to attest 
the truth of it, in such an age; and that it was actually 
received by great numbers in that very age, and upon the 
professed belief of the reality of these miracles. And 
Christianity, including the dispensation of the Old Testa¬ 
ment, seems distinguished by this from all other religions. 
I mean, that this does not appear to be the case with regard 
to any other; for, surely, it will not be supposed to lie upon 

(1) Gal. i; 1 Cor. xi, 23, &c.; 1 Cor. xv, 8. 

(2) Rom. xv, 19; 1 Cor. xii, 8, 9,10—28, &c., and xiii, 1, 2, 8, 
and the whole of chapter xiv; 2 Cor. xii, 12, 13; Gal. iii, 2, 5. 


268 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART II. 

any person, to prove, by positive historical evidence, that it 
was not. It does in no sort appear that Mahommedanism 
was first received in the world upon the foot of supposed 
miracles,(l) that is, public ones: for, as revelation is itself 
miraculous, all pretense to it must necessarily imply some 
pretense of miracles. And it is a known fact, that it was 
immediately, at the very first, propagated by other means. 
And as particular institutions, whether in paganism or Po¬ 
pery, said to be confirmed by miracles after those institutions 
had obtained, are not to the purpose, so, were there what 
might be called historical proof, that any of them were 
introduced by a supposed Divine command, believed to be 
attested by miracles, these would not be in anywise parallel. 
For single things of this sort are easy to be accounted for, 
after parties are formed, and have power in their hands, and 
the leaders of them are in veneration with the multitude, 
and political interests are blended with religious claims and 
religious distinctions. But before any thing of this kind, for 
a few persons, and those of the lowest rank, all at once to 
bring over such numbers to a new religion, and get it to 
be received upon the particular evidence of miracles; this 
is quite another thing. And I think it will be allowed by 
any fair adversary, that the fact now mentioned, taking in 
all the circumstances of it, is peculiar to the Christian relig¬ 
ion. However, the fact itself is allowed, that Christianity 
obtained, that is, was professed to be received in the world, 
upon the belief of miracles, immediately in the age in which 
it is said those miracles were wrought; or that this is what 
its first converts would have alledged, as the reason for their 
embracing it. Now, certainly it is not to be supposed, that 
such numbers of men, in the most distant parts of the world, 
should forsake the religion of their country, in which they 
had been educated; separate themselves from their friends, 
particularly in their festival shows and solemnities, to which 
(1) See the Koran, Chap, xiii, and Chap. xvii. 


CHAP. VII.] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 269 

the common people are so greatly addicted, and which were 
of a nature to engage them much more than any thing of 
that sort amongst us; and embrace a religion which could 
not but expose them to many inconveniences, and, indeed, 
must have been a giving up the world in a great degree, 
even from the very first, and before the empire engaged in 
form against them; it cannot be supposed, that such num¬ 
bers should make so great, and, to say the least, so incon¬ 
venient a change in their whole institution of life, unless 
they were really convinced of the truth of those miracles, 
upon the knowledge or belief of which they professed to 
make it. And it will, I suppose, readily be acknowledged, 
that the generality of the first converts to Christianity must 
have believed them; that as, by becoming Christians, they 
declared to the world they were satisfied of the truth of 
those miracles, so this declaration was to be credited. 
And this their testimony is the same kind of evidence for 
those miracles, as if they had put it in writing, and these 
writings had come down to us. And it is real evidence, 
because it is of facts, which they had capacity and full 
opportunity to inform themselves of. It is, also, distinct 
from the direct or express historical evidence, though it is of 
the same kind; and it would be allowed to be distinct in 
all cases. For, were a fact expressly related by one or 
more ancient historians, and disputed in after ages; that 
this fact is acknowledged to have been believed, by great 
numbers of the age in which the historian says it was done, 
would be allowed an additional proof of such fact, quite 
distinct from the express testimony of the historian. The 
credulity of mankind is acknowledged, and the suspicions 
of mankind ought to be acknowledged too, and their back¬ 
wardness even to believe, and greater still to practice, what 
makes against their interest. And it must particularly be 
remembered, that education and prejudice, and authority, 
were against Christianity, in the age I am speaking of. So 
28* 


270 


OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART II. 

that the immediate conversion of such numbers, is a real 
presumption of somewhat more than human in this matter— 
I say, presumption, for it is alledged as a proof, alone and 
by itself. Nor need any one of the things mentioned in this 
chapter be considered as a proof by itself; and yet all of 
them together may be one of the strongest.(l) 

Upon the whole, as there is large historical evidence, both 
direct and circumstantial, of miracles wrought in attestation 
of Christianity, collected by'those who have writ upon the 
subject, it lies upon unbelievers to show why this evidence 
is not to be credited. This way of speaking is, I think, just, 
and what persons who write in defense of religion naturally 
fall into. Yet, in a matter of such unspeakable importance, 
the proper question is, not whom it lies upon, according to 
the rules of argument, to maintain or confute objections; 
but, whether there really are any against this evidence, 
sufficient, in reason, to destroy the credit of it? However, 
unbelievers seem to take upon them the part of showing 
that there are. 

They alledge, that numberless enthusiastic people, in dif¬ 
ferent ages and countries, expose themselves to the same 
difficulties which the primitive Christians did; and are ready 
to give up their lives for the most idle follies imaginable. 
But it is not very clear, to what purpose this objection is 
brought; for every one, surely, in every case, must dis¬ 
tinguish between opinions and facts. And though testimony 
is no proof of enthusiastic opinions, or of any opinions at all; 
yet, it is allowed, in all other cases, to be a proof of facts. 
And a person’s laying down his life in attestation of facts or 
of opinions, is the strongest proof of his believing them. 
And if the apostles and their cotemporaries did believe the 
facts, in attestation of which they exposed themselves to 
sufferings and death, this their belief, or rather knowledge, 
must be a proof of those facts; for they were such as came 
(1) Page 297, &c. 


CHAP. VII.] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 271 

under the observation of their senses. And though it is not 
of equal weight, yet it is of weight, that the martyrs of the 
next age, notwithstanding they were not eye-witnesses of 
those facts, as were the apostles and their cotemporaries, had, 
however, full opportunity to inform themselves, whether 
they were true or not, and gave equal proof of their believ¬ 
ing them to be true. 

But enthusiasm, it is said, greatly weakens the evidence 
of testimony even for facts, in matters relating to religion; 
some seem to think, it totally and absolutely destroys the 
evidence of testimony upon this subject. And, indeed, the 
powers of enthusiasm, and of diseases, too, which operate in 
a like manner, are very wonderful in particular instances. 
But if great numbers of men, not appearing in any peculiar 
degree weak, nor under any peculiar suspicion of negligence, 
affirm that they saw and heard such things plainly with 
their eyes and their ears, and are admitted to be in earnest, 
such testimony is evidence of the strongest kind we can have 
for any matter of fact. Yet, possibly it may be overcome, 
strong as it is, by incredibility in the things thus attested, or 
by contrary testimony. And in an instance where one 
thought it was so overcome, it might be just to consider, 
how far such evidence could be accounted for by enthu¬ 
siasm ; for it seems as if no other imaginable account were 
to be given of it. But till such incredibility be shown, or 
contrary testimony produced, it cannot surely be expected, 
that so far-fetched, so indirect and wonderful an account of 
such testimony, as that of enthusiasm must be—an account 
so strange, that the generality of mankind can scarce be 
made to understand what is meant by it—it cannot, I say, 
be expected, that such account will be admitted of such 
evidence, when there is this direct, easy, and obvious account 
of it, that people really saw and heard a thing not incredible, 
which they affirm sincerely, and with full assurance, they 
did see and hear. Granting, then, that enthusiasm is not 


272 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART II. 

(strictly speaking) an absurd, but a possible account of 
such testimony, it is manifest that the very mention of it 
goes upon the previous supposition, that the things so at¬ 
tested are incredible, and, therefore, need not be considered 
till they are shown to be so. Much less need it be con¬ 
sidered, after the contrary has been proved. And I think 
it has been proved, to full satisfaction, that there is no 
incredibility in a revelation, in general, or in such a one as 
the Christian in particular. However, as religion is sup¬ 
posed peculiarly liable to enthusiasm, it may just be ob¬ 
served, that prejudices almost without number and without 
name, romance, affectation, humor, a desire to engage 
attention, or to surprise, the party-spirit, custom, little com¬ 
petitions, unaccountable likings and dislikings—these influ¬ 
ence men strongly in common matters. And as these 
prejudices are often scarce known or reflected upon by the 
persons themselves who are influenced by them, they are to 
be considered as influences of a like kind to enthusiasm. 
Yet human testimony in common matters is naturally and 
justly believed notwithstanding. 

It is intimated, farther, in a more refined way of observa¬ 
tion, that though it should be proved, that the apostles and 
first Christians could not in some respects, be deceived 
themselves, and, in other respects, cannot be thought to 
have intended to impose upon the world, yet, it will not 
follow, that their general testimony is to be believed, though 
truly handed down to us; because they might still in part, 
that is, in other respects, be deceived themselves, and in 
part also designedly impose upon others; which, it is added, 
is a thing very credible, from that mixture of real enthusiasm, 
and real knavery, to be met with in the same characters. 
And, I must confess, I think the matter of fact contained in 
this observation upon mankind, is not to be denied; and that 
somewhat very much akin to it, is often supposed in Scrip¬ 
ture as a very common case, and most severely reproved. 


CHAP. VII.] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 2*73 

But it were to have been expected, that persons capable of 
applying this observation as applied in the objection, might 
also frequently have met with the like mixed character, in 
instances where religion was quite out of the case. The 
thing plainly is, that mankind are naturally endued with 
reason, or a capacity of distinguishing between truth and 
falsehood; and as naturally they are endued with veracity, 
or a regard to truth in what they say: but from many occa¬ 
sions, they are liable to be prejudiced, and biased, and de¬ 
ceived themselves, and capable of intending to deceive oth¬ 
ers, in every different degree; insomuch that, as we are 
all liable to be deceived by prejudice, so, likewise, it seems 
to be not an uncommon thing, for persons, who, from their 
regard to truth, would not invent a lie entirely without any 
foundation at all, to propagate it with heightening circum¬ 
stances, after it is once invented and set agoing. And oth¬ 
ers, though they would not propagate a lie, yet, which is a 
lower degree of falsehood, will let it pass without contra¬ 
diction. But, notwithstanding all this, human testimony 
remains still a natural ground of assent; and this assent, a 
natural principle of action. 

It is objected farther, that however it has happened, the 
fact is, that mankind have, in different ages, been strangely 
deluded with pretenses to miracles and wonders. But it is, 
by no means, to be admitted, that they have been oftener, 
or are at all more liable to be deceived by these pretenses, 
than by others. 

It is added, that there is a very considerable degree of 
historical evidence for miracles, which are, on all hands, ac¬ 
knowledged to be fabulous. But suppose there were even the 
like historical evidence for these, to what there is for those 
alledged in proof of Christianity, which yet is in nowise 
allowed; but suppose this; the consequence would not be, 
that the evidence of the latter is not to be admitted. Nor 
is there a man in the world, who, in common cases, would 


274 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART II. 

conclude thus. For what would such a conclusion really 
amount to but this, that evidence, confuted by contrary evi¬ 
dence, or any way overbalanced, destroys the credibility 
of other evidence, neither confuted nor overbalanced ? To 
argue, that because there is, if there were, like evidence 
from testimony, for miracles acknowledged false, as for 
those in attestation of Christianity, therefore, the evidence 
in the latter case is not to be credited; this is the same as 
to argue, that if two men of equally good reputation had 
given evidence in different cases no way connected, and 
one of them had been convicted of perjury, this confuted 
the testimony of the other. 

Upon the whole, then, the general observation that hu¬ 
man creatures are so liable to be deceived, from enthusiasm 
in religion, and principles equivalent to enthusiasm in com¬ 
mon matters, and in both from negligence; and that they 
are so capable of dishonestly endeavoring to deceive others; 
this does, indeed, weaken the evidence of testimony in all 
cases, but does not destroy it in any. And these things 
will appear, to different men, to weaken the evidence of 
testimony, in different degrees—in degrees proportionable 
to the observations they have made, or the notions they 
have any way taken up, concerning the weakness, and 
negligence, and dishonesty of mankind; or concerning the 
powers of enthusiasm, and prejudices equivalent to it. But 
it seems to me, that people do not know what they say, 
who affirm these things to destroy the evidence from testi¬ 
mony, which we have of the truth of Christianity. Noth¬ 
ing can destroy the evidence of testimony in any case, but 
a proof or probability that persons are not competent judges 
of the facts to which they give testimony; or that they are 
actually under some indirect influence in giving it, in such 
particular case. Till this be made out, the natural laws of 
human actions require, that testimony be admitted. It can 
never be sufficient to overthrow direct historical evidence. 


CHAP. VII.] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 2*75 

indolently to say, that there are so many principles, from 
whence men are liable to be deceived themselves and dis¬ 
posed to deceive others, especially in matters of religion, 
that one knows not what to believe. And it is surprising 
persons can help reflecting, that this very manner of speak¬ 
ing supposes, they are not satisfied that there is nothing in 
the evidence, of which they speak thus; or that they can 
avoid observing, if they do make this reflection, that it is, 
on such a subject, a very material one.(l) 

And over against all these objections, is to be set the im¬ 
portance of Christianity, as what must have engaged the 
attention of its first converts, so as to have rendered them 
less liable to be deceived from carelessness, than they would 
in common matters; and, likewise, the strong obligations to 
veracity, which their religion laid them under: so that the 
first and most obvious presumption is, that they could not 
be deceived themselves, nor deceive others. And this pre¬ 
sumption, in this degree, is peculiar to the testimony we 
have been considering. 

In argument, assertions are nothing in themselves, and 
have an air of positiveness, which sometimes is not very 
easy; yet they are necessary, and necessary to be repeated, 
in order to connect a discourse, and distinctly to lay before 
the view of the reader what is proposed to be proved, and 
what is left as proved. Now, the conclusion from the fore¬ 
going observations is, I think, beyond all doubt, this: that 
unbelievers must be forced to admit the external evidence 
for Christianity, that is, the proof of miracles wrought to 
attest it, to be of real weight and very considerable; though 
they cannot allow it to be sufficient to convince them of the 
reality of those miracles. And as they must, in all reason, 
admit this, so it seems to me, that, upon consideration, they 
would, in fact, admit it; those of them, I mean, who know 
any thing at all of the matter: in like manner, as persons, 
(1) See the foregoing Chapter. 


276 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART II. 

in many cases, own, they see strong evidence from testi¬ 
mony, for the truth of things, which yet they cannot be 
convinced are true—cases, suppose, where there is con¬ 
trary testimony, or things which they think, whether with 
or without reason, to be incredible. But there is no testi¬ 
mony contrary to that which we have been considering; 
and it has been fully proved, that there is no incredibility in 
Christianity in general, or in any part of it. 

II. As to the evidence for Christianity from prophecy, I 
shall only make some few general observations, which are 
suggested by the analogy of nature; that is, by the ac¬ 
knowledged natural rules of judging in common matters, 
concerning evidence of a like kind to this from prophecy. 

1. The obscurity or unintelligibleness of one part of a 
prophecy, does not, in any degree, invalidate the proof of 
foresight, arising from the appearing completion of those 
other parts which are understood. For the case is evi¬ 
dently the same, as if those parts, which are not under¬ 
stood, were lost, or not written at all, or written in an 
unknown tongue. Whether this observation be commonly 
attended to or not, it is so evident, that one can scarce 
bring one’s self to set down an instance in common matters, 
to exemplify it. However, suppose a writing, partly in 
cipher, and partly in plain words at length, and that, 
in the part one understood, there appeared mention of 
several known facts, it would never come into any man’s 
thoughts to imagine, that if he understood the whole, per¬ 
haps he might find, that those facts were not, in reality, 
known by the writer. Indeed, both in this example, and 
the thing intended to be exemplified by it, our not under¬ 
standing the whole, (the whole, suppose, of a sentence or a 
paragraph,) might sometimes occasion a doubt, whether one 
understood the literal meaning of such a part; but this 
comes under another consideration. 

For the same reason, though a man should be incapable. 


FOR CHRISTIANITY. 


CHAP. VII.] 


277 


for want of learning, opportunities of inquiry, or from not 
having turned his studies this way, even so much as to 
judge whether particular prophecies have been throughout 
completely fulfilled; yet he may see, in general, that they 
have been fulfilled, to such a degree, as, upon very good 
ground, to be convinced of foresight more than human in 
such prophecies, and of such events being intended by 
them. For the same reason, also, though, by means of the 
deficiencies in civil history, and the different accounts of 
historians, the most learned should not be able to make out 
to satisfaction, that such parts of the prophetic history 
have been minutely and throughout fulfilled; yet a very 
strong proof of foresight may arise from that general com¬ 
pletion of them which is made out—as much proof of fore¬ 
sight, perhaps, as the Giver of prophecy intended should 
ever be afforded by such parts of prophecy. 

2. A long series of prophecy being applicable to such 
and such events, is itself a proof, that it was intended of 
them; as the rules, by which we naturally judge and de¬ 
termine, in common cases parallel to this, will show. This 
observation I make in answer to the common objection 
against the application of the prophecies, that, considering 
each of them distinctly by itself, it does not at all appear> 
that they were intended of those particular events to which 
they are applied by Christians; and, therefore, it is to be sup¬ 
posed, that, if they meant any thing, they were intended of 
other events unknown to us, and not of these at all. 

Now, there are two kinds of writing, which bear a great 
resemblance to prophecy, with respect to the matter before 
us: the mythological and the satirical, where the satire is, 
to a certain degree, concealed. And a man might be as¬ 
sured, that he understood what an author intended by a 
fable or parable, related without any application or moral, 
merely from seeing it to be easily capable of such applica¬ 
tion, and that such a moral might naturally be deduced 
24 


278 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART II. 

from it. And he might be fully assured, that such persons 
and events were intended in a satirical writing, merely from 
its being applicable to them. And, agreeable to the last 
observation, he might be in a good measure satisfied of it, 
though he were not enough informed in affairs, or in the 
story of such persons, to understand half the satire. For, 
his satisfaction, that he understood the meaning, the intended 
meaning, of these writings, would be greater or less, in pro¬ 
portion as he saw the general turn of them to be capable 
of such application, and in proportion to the number of 
particular things capable of it. And thus, if a long series 
of prophecy is applicable to the present state of the Church, 
and to the political situations of the kingdoms of the world, 
some thousand years after these prophecies were delivered, 
and a long series of prophecy delivered before the coming 
of Christ is applicable to him; these things are in them¬ 
selves a proof, that the prophetic history was intended of 
him, and of those events: in proportion as the general turn 
of it is capable of such application, and to the number and 
variety of particular prophecies capable of it. And, though 
in all just way of consideration, the appearing completion 
of prophecies is to be allowed to be thus explanatory of, 
and to determine their meaning; yet it is to be remembered 
farther, that the ancient Jews applied the prophecies to a 
Messiah before his coming, in much the same manner as 
Christians do now; and that the primitive Christians inter¬ 
preted the prophecies respecting the state of the Church 
and of the world in the last ages, in the sense which the 
event seems to confirm and verify. And from these things 
it may be made appear, 

3. That the showing, even to a high probability, if that 
could be, that the prophets thought of some other events, in 
such and such predictions, and not those at all which Chris¬ 
tians alledge to be completions of those predictions; or that 
such and such prophecies are capable of being applied to 


CHAP. VII.] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 279 

other events than those to which Christians apply them— 
that this would not confute or destroy the force of the argu¬ 
ment from prophecy, even with regard to those very in¬ 
stances. For, observe how this matter really is. If one 
knew such a person to be the sole author of such a book, 
and was certainly assured, or satisfied to any degree, that 
one knew the whole of what he intended in it, one should 
be assured or satisfied to such a degree that one knew 
the whole meaning of that book; for the meaning of a 
book is nothing but the meaning of the author. But if one 
knew a person to have compiled a book out of memoirs, 
which he received from another, of vastly superior knowl¬ 
edge in the subject of it, especially if it were a book full 
of great intricacies and difficulties, it would in nowise follow, 
that one knew the whole meaning of the book, from know¬ 
ing the whole meaning of the compiler; for the original 
memoirs, that is, the author of them, might have, and there 
would be no degree of presumption, in many cases, against 
supposing him to have, some farther meaning than the com¬ 
piler saw. To say, then, that the Scriptures and the things 
contained in them can have no other or farther meaning, 
than those persons thought or had, who first recited or 
wrote them, is evidently saying, that those persons were 
the original, proper, and sole authors of those books, that 
is, that they are not inspired; which is absurd, whilst the 
authority of these books is under examination, that is, till 
you have determined they are of no Divine authority at all. 
Till this be determined, it must in all reason be supposed, 
not indeed that they have, for this is taking for granted that 
they are inspired, but that they may have, some farther 
meaning than what the compilers saw or understood. And, 
upon this supposition, it is supposable, also, that this farther 
meaning may be fulfilled. Now, events corresponding to 
prophecies, interpreted in a different meaning from that in 
which the prophets are supposed to have understood them; 


280 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART II. 

this affords, in a manner, the same proof that this different 
sense was originally intended, as it would have afforded, if 
the prophets had not understood their predictions in the 
sense it is supposed they did; because there is no presump¬ 
tion of their sense of them being the whole sense of them. 
And it has been already shown, that the apparent comple¬ 
tions of prophecy must be allowed to be explanatory of its 
meaning. So that the question is, whether a series of 
prophecy has been fulfilled, in a natural or proper, that is, 
in any real sense of the words of it. For such completion 
is equally a proof of foresight more than human, whether 
the prophets are, or are not, supposed to have understood 
it in a different sense. I say, supposed; for, though I think 
it clear, that the prophets did not understand the full mean¬ 
ing of their predictions, it is another question, how far they 
thought they did, and in what sense they understood them. 

Hence may be seen, to how little purpose those persons 
busy themselves, who endeavor to prove that the prophetic 
history is applicable to events of the age in which it was 
written, or of ages before it. Indeed, to have proved this 
before there was any appearance of a farther completion 
of it, might have answered some purpose; for it might 
have prevented the expectation of any such farther com¬ 
pletion. Thus, could Porphyry have shown, that some 
principal parts of the book of Daniel, for instance, the 
seventh verse of the seventh chapter, which the Christians 
interpreted of the latter ages, was applicable to events which 
happened before or about the age of Antiochus Epiphanes; 
this might have prevented them from expecting any farther 
completion of it. And unless there was then, as I think 
there must have been, external evidence concerning that 
book, more than is come down to us, such a discovery might 
have been a stumbling-block in the way of Christianity 
itself; considering the authority which our Savior has given 
to the book of Daniel, and how much the general scheme 


FOR CHRISTIANITY. 


281 


CHAP. VII.] 

of Christianity presupposes the truth of it. But even this 
discovery, had there been any such,(l) would be of very 
little weight with reasonable men now; if this passage, thus 
applicable to events before the age of Porphyry, appears to 
be applicable, also, to events which succeeded the dissolu¬ 
tion of the Roman empire. I mention this, not at all as 
intending to insinuate, that the division of this empire into 
ten parts, for it plainly was divided into about that number, 
were, alone and by itself, of any moment in verifying the 
prophetic history, but only as an example of the thing I 
am speaking of. And thus, upon the whole, the matter of 
inquiry evidently must be, as aboye put, whether the proph¬ 
ecies are applicable to Christ, and to the present state of 
the world and of the Church—applicable in such a degree, 
as to imply foresight; not whether they are capable of any 
other application; though I know no pretense for saying, 
the general turn of them is capable of any other. 

These observations are, I think, just, and the evidence 
referred to in them, real; though there may be people who 
will not accept of such imperfect information from Scripture. 
Some, too, have not integrity and regard enough to truth, 
to attend to evidence, which keeps the mind in doubt, per¬ 
haps perplexity, and which is much of a different sort from 
what they expected. And it plainly requires a degree of 
modesty and fairness, beyond what every one has, for a man 
to say, not to the world, but to himself, that there is a real 
appearance of somewhat of great weight in this matter, 
though he is not able thoroughly to satisfy himself about 
it; but it shall have its influence upon him, in proportion to 

(1) It appears that Porphyry did nothing worth mentioning in 
this way. For Jerome on the place says : Duas posteriores bestias— 
in uno Macedonian regno ponit. And as to the ten kings: Decern 
reges enumerat, quifuerunt scetissimi: ipsosque reges non unins ponit 
regni, verbi gratia, Macedonia, Syria, Asia, et JEgypti; sed de diver sis 
regnis unum efficit regum ordinem. And, in this way of interpreta¬ 
tion, any thing may be made of any thing. 


282 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART II. 

its appearing reality and weight. It is much more easy, 
and more falls in with the negligence, presumption, and 
willfulness of the generality, to determine at once, with a 
decisive air, there is nothing in it. The prejudices arising 
from that absolute contempt and scorn, with which this evi¬ 
dence is treated in the world, I do not mention. For what, 
indeed, can be said to persons, who are weak enough in 
their understandings to think this any presumption against 
it; or, if they do not, are yet weak enough in their temper 
to be influenced by such prejudices, upon such a subject? 

I shall now, secondly, endeavor to give some account of 
the general argument for the truth of Christianity, consisting 
both of the direct and circumstantial evidence, considered 
as making up one argument. Indeed, to state and examine 
this argument fully, would be a work much beyond the 
compass of this whole treatise; nor is so much as a proper 
abridgment of it to be expected here. Yet, the present 
subject requires to have some brief account of it given. 
For it is the kind of evidence upon which most questions of 
difficulty, in common practice, are determined—evidence 
arising from various coincidences, which support and con¬ 
firm each other, and in this manner prove, with more or less 
certainty, the point under consideration. And I choose to 
do it, also, first, because it seems to be of the greatest 
importance, and not duly attended to by every one, that 
the proof of revelation is, not some direct and express 
things only, but a great variety of circumstantial things 
also; and that though each of these direct and circum¬ 
stantial things is, indeed, to be considered separately, yet 
they are afterwards to be joined together; for that the 
proper force of the evidence consists in the result of those 
several things, considered in their respects to each other, 
and united into one view: and, in the next place, because it 
seems to me, that the matters of fact here set down, which 
are acknowledged by unbelievers, must be acknowledged 


CHAP. VII.] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 283 

by them, also, to contain together a degree of evidence of 
great weight, if they could be brought to lay these several 
things before themselves distinctly, and then with attention 
consider them together; instead of that cursory thought of 
them, to which we are familiarized. For, being familiarized 
to the cursory thought of things, as really hinders the 
weight of them from being seen, as from having its due 
influence upon practice. 

The thing asserted, and the truth of which is to be in¬ 
quired into, is this: that over and above our reason and 
affections, which God has given us for the information of 
our judgment and the conduct of our lives, he has, also, by 
external revelation, given us an account of himself and his 
moral government over the world, implying a future state 
of rewards and punishments; that is, hath revealed the 
system of natural religion; for natural religion may be ex¬ 
ternally (1) revealed by God, as the ignorant may be taught 
it by mankind, their fellow-creatures—that God, I say, has 
given us the evidence of revelation as well as the evidence 
of reason, to ascertain this moral system; together with an 
account of a particular dispensation of Providence, which 
reason could no way have discovered, and a particular insti¬ 
tution of religion founded on it, for the recovery of mankind 
out of their present wretched condition, and raising them 
to the perfection and final happiness of their nature. 

This revelation, whether real or supposed, may be con¬ 
sidered as wholly historical. For prophecy is nothing but 
the history of events before they come to pass: doctrines, 
also, are matters of fact; and precepts come under the same 
notion. And the general design of Scripture, which con¬ 
tains in it this revelation, thus considered as historical, may 
be said to be, to give us an account of the world, in this 
one single view, as God’s world; by which it appears essen¬ 
tially distinguished from all other books, so far as I have 
(1) Page 174, &c. 


284 OP THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART II. 

found, except such as are copied from it. It begins with 
an account of God’s creation of the world, in order to 
ascertain and distinguish from all others, who is the object 
of our worship, by what he has done; in order to ascertain 
who he is, concerning whose providence, commands, prom¬ 
ises, and threatenings, this sacred book all along treats; the 
Maker and Proprietor of the world, he whose creatures we 
are, the God of nature: in order, likewise, to distinguish 
him from the idols of the nations, which are either imagi¬ 
nary beings, that is, no beings at all; or else part of that 
creation, the historical relation of which is here given. And 
St. John, not improbably with an eye to this Mosaic account 
of the creation, begins his Gospel with an account of our 
Savior’s pre-existence, and that “ all things were made by 
him, and without him was not any thing made that was 
made;”(l) agreeably to the doctrine of St. Paul, that “God 
created all things by Jesus Christ.”(2) This being pre¬ 
mised, the Scripture, taken together, seems to profess to 
contain a kind of an abridgment of the history of the 
world, in the view just now mentioned; that is, a general 
account of the condition of religion and its professors, 
during the continuance of that apostasy from God, and 
state of wickedness, which it everywhere supposes the world 
to lie in. And this account of the state of religion carries 
with it some brief account of the political state of things, 
as religion is affected by it. Revelation, indeed, considers 
the common affairs of this world, and what is going on in 
it, as a mere scene of distraction, and cannot be supposed 
to concern itself with foretelling at what time Rome, or 
Babylon, or Greece, or any particular place, should be the 
most conspicuous seat of that tyranny and dissoluteness, 
which all places equally aspire to be—cannot, I say, be 
supposed to give an account of this wild scene for its own 
sake. But it seems to contain some very general account 
(1) John i, 3. (2) Eph. iii, 9. 


FOR CHRISTIANITY. 


285 


cnAP. vii.] 

of the chief governments of the world, as the general state 
of religion has been, is, or shall be, affected by them, from 
the first transgression, and during the whole interval of the 
world’s continuing in its present state, to a certain future 
period, spoken of both in the Old and New Testament, very 
distinctly, and in great variety of expression: “The times 
of the restitution of all things;”(1) when “the mystery of 
God shall be finished, as he hath declared to his servants 
the prophets ;”(2) when “ the God of heaven shall set up a 
kingdom, which shall never be destroyed; and the kingdom 
shall not be left to other people,”(3) as it is represented to 
be during this apostasy, but “judgment shall be given to 
the saints,”(4) and “ they shall reign ;”(5) “ and the king¬ 
dom and dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom under 
the whole heaven, shall be given to the people of the saints 
of the Most High.”(6) 

Upon this general view of the Scripture, I would remark 
how great a length of time the whole relation takes up, near 
six thousand years of which are past: and how great a va¬ 
riety of things it treats of; the natural and moral system or 
history of the world, including the time when it was formed, 
all contained in the very first book, and evidently written in 
a rude and unlearned age; and in subsequent books, the 
various common and prophetic history, and the particular 
dispensation of Christianity. Now all this together gives 
the largest scope for criticism; and for confutation of what 
is capable of being confuted, either from reason, or from 
common history, or from any inconsistence in its several 
parts. And it is a thing which deserves, I think, to be 
mentioned, that whereas some imagine, the supposed doubt¬ 
fulness of the evidence for revelation implies a positive 
argument that it is not true; it appears, on the contrary, to 
imply a positive argument that it is true. For, could any 

(1) Acts iii, 21. (2) Rev. x, 7. (3) Dan. ii, 44. 

(4) Dan. vii, 22. (5) Rev. xx, 6. (6) Dan. vii, 27. 


286 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART II. 

common revelation of such antiquity, extent, and variety, (for 
in these things the stress of what I am now observing lies,) be 
proposed to the examination of the world; that it could not, 
in any age of knowledge and liberty, be confuted, or shown 
to have nothing in it, to the satisfaction of reasonable men; 
this would be thought a strong presumptive proof of its 
truth. And, indeed, it must be a proof of it just in propor¬ 
tion to the probability, that if it were false, it might be 
shown to be so; and this, I think, is scarce pretended to be 
shown but upon principles and in ways of arguing which 
have been clearly obviated. (1) Nor does it at all appear, 
that any set of men who believe natural religion, are of the 
opinion, that Christianity has been thus confuted. But, to 
proceed: 

Together with the moral system of the world, the Old 
Testament contains a chronological account of the beginning 
of it, and from thence, an unbroken genealogy of mankind 
for many ages before common history begins; and carried 
on as much farther, as to make up a continued thread of 
history of the length of between three and four thousand 
years. It contains an account of God’s making a covenant 
with a particular nation, that they should be his people, and 
he would be their God, in a peculiar sense; of his often 
interposing miraculously in their affairs; giving them the 
promise, and, long after, the possession, of a particular 
country; assuring them of the greatest national prosperity 
in it, if they would worship him, in opposition to the idols 
which the rest of the world worshiped, and obey his com¬ 
mands; and threatening them with unexampled punish¬ 
ments, if they disobeyed him, and fell into the general 
idolatry: insomuch, that this one nation should continue to 
ber the observation and the wonder of all the world. It de¬ 
clares, particularly, that “ God would scatter them among all 
people, from one end of the earth even unto the other;” but, 
(1) Chap, ii, iii, &c. 


CHAP. VII.] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 287 

that “when they should return unto the Lord their God,” 
“he would have compassion upon them, and gather them, 
from all the nations whither he had scattered them;” that 
“ Israel should be saved in the Lord, with an everlasting sal¬ 
vation, and not be ashamed or confounded, world without 
end.” And as some of these promises are conditional, 
others are as absolute as any thing can be expressed: that 
the time should come, when “the people should be all 
righteous, and inherit the land for ever;” that, “though 
God would make a full end of all nations whither he had 
scattered them, yet would he not make a full end of them;” 
that “ he would bring again the captivity of his people Is¬ 
rael,” “ and plant them upon their land, and they should be no 
more pulled up out of their land;” that “ the seed of Israel 
should not cease from being a nation for ever.”(l) It fore¬ 
tells, that God would raise them up a particular person, in 
whom all his promises should finally be fulfilled; the Mes¬ 
siah, who should be, in a high and eminent sense, their 
anointed Prince and Savior. This was foretold in such a 
manner, as raised a general expectation of such a person in 
the nation, as appears from the New Testament, and is an 
acknowledged fact—an expectation of his coming at such a 
particular time, before any one appeared, claiming to be 
that person, and when there was no ground for such an 
expectation but from the prophecies; which expectation, 
therefore, must, in all reason, be presumed to be explanatory 
of those prophecies, if there were any doubt about their 
meaning. It seems, moreover, to foretell, that this person 
should be rejected by that nation, to whom he had been so 
long promised, and though he was so much desired by 
them. (2) And it expressly foretells, that he should be the 
Savior of the Gentiles; and even that the completion of the 

(1) Deut. xxviii, 64, xxx, 2, 3 ; Isa. xlv, 17, lx, 21; Jer. xxx, 11, 
lxvi, 28; Amos ix, 14, 15 ; Jer. xxxi, 36. 

(2) Isa. viii, 14, 15, xlix, 5, liii; Mai. i, 10, 11, and iii. 


288 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART II. 

scheme, contained in this book, and then begun, and in its 
progress, should be somewhat so great, that, in comparison 
with it, the restoration of the Jews alone would be but of 
small account. “ It is a light thing that thou shouldst be 
my servant, to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore 
the preserved of Israel: I will also give thee for a light to 
the Gentiles, that thou mayest be for salvation unto the end 
of the earth.” And, “ In the last days, the mountain of 
the Lord’s house shall be established in the top of the 
mountains, and shall be exalted above the hills; and all na¬ 
tions shall flow unto it;” “for out of Zion shall go forth the 
law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem; and he shall 
judge among the nations;” “ and the Lord alone shall be 
exalted in that day, and the idols he shall utterly abolish.”(l) 
The Scripture, farther, contains an account, that at the time 
the Messiah was expected, a person rose up, in this nation, 
claiming to be that Messiah, to be the person whom all the 
prophecies referred to, and in whom they should centre; 
that he spent some years in a continued course of miracu¬ 
lous works, and endued his immediate disciples and followers 
with a power of doing the same, as a proof of the truth of 
that religion which he commissioned them to publish; that, 
invested with this authority and power, they made numerous 
converts in the remotest countries, and settled and estab¬ 
lished his religion in the world; to the end of which, the 
Scripture professes to give a prophetic account of the state 
of this religion amongst mankind. 

Let us now suppose a person, utterly ignorant of history, 
to have all this related to him out of the Scripture. Or, 
suppose such a one, having the Scripture put into his 
hands, to remark these things in it, not knowing but that 

(3} Isa. xlix, 6, ii, xi, Ivi, 7; Mai. i, 11: to which must be added, 
the other prophecies of the like kind, several in the New Testament, 
and very many in the Old, which describe what shall be the com¬ 
pletion of the revealed plan of Providence. 


FOR CHRISTIANITY. 


289 


CHAP. VII.] 

the whole, even its civil history, as well as the other parts 
of it, might be, from beginning to end, an entire invention; 
and to ask, What truth was in it, and whether the revelation 
here related was real or a fiction ? And, instead of a direct 
answer, suppose him, all at once, to be told the following 
confessed facts; and then to unite them into one view. 

Let him first be told, in how great a degree the profession 
and establishment of natural religion, the belief that there is 
one God to be worshiped, that virtue is his law, and that 
mankind shall be rewarded and punished hereafter, as they 
obey and disobey it here—in how very great a degree, I 
say, the profession and establishment of this moral system 
in the world, is owing to the revelation, whether real or 
supposed, contained in this book—the establishment of this 
moral system, even in those countries which do not acknowl¬ 
edge the proper authority of the Scripture. (1) Let him be 
told, also, what number of nations do acknowledge its proper 
authority. Let him then take in the consideration, of what 
importance religion is to mankind. And upon these things, 
he might, I think, truly observe, that this supposed revela¬ 
tion’s obtaining and being received in the world, with all 
the circumstances and effects of it, considered together as 
one event, is the most conspicuous and important event in 
the history of mankind: that a book of this nature, and thus 
promulged and recommended to our consideration, demands, 
as if by a voice from heaven, to have its claim most seriously 
examined into; and that, before such examination, to treat 
it with any kind of scoffing and ridicule, is an offense against 
natural piety. But it is to be remembered, that how much 
soever the establishment of natural religion in the world is 
owing to the Scripture revelation, this does not destroy the 
proof of religion from reason, any more than the proof of 
Euclid’s Elements is destroyed, by a man’s knowing or 
thinking that he should never have seen the truth of the 

(1) Page 246 
25 


290 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART II. 

several propositions contained in it, nor had those proposi¬ 
tions come into his thoughts, but for that mathematician. 

Let such a person as we are speaking of, be, in the next 
place, informed of the acknowledged antiquity of the first 
parts of this book; and that its chronology, its account of ' 
the time when the earth, and the several parts of it, were 
first peopled with human creatures, is no way contradicted, 
but is really confirmed, by the natural and civil history of 
the world, collected from common historians, from the state 
of the earth, and from the late invention of arts and sciences. 
And, as the Scripture contains an unbroken thread of com¬ 
mon and civil history, from the creation to the captivity, for 
between three and four thousand years; let the person we 
are speaking of be told, in the next place, that this general 
history, as it is not contradicted, but is confirmed by pro¬ 
fane history, as much as there would be reason to expect, 
upon supposition of its truth, so there is nothing in the whole 
history itself, to give any reasonable ground of suspicion of 
its not being, in the general, a faithful and literally true 
genealogy of men, and series of things. I speak here only 
of the common Scripture history, or of the course of ordi¬ 
nary events related in it, as distinguished from miracles, and 
from the prophetic history. In all the Scripture narrations 
of this kind, following events arise out of foregoing ones, as 
in all other histories. There appears nothing related as 
done in any age, not conformable to the manners of that 
age; nothing in the account of a succeeding age, which, 
one would say, could not be true, or was improbable, from 
the account of things in the preceding one. There is noth¬ 
ing in the characters, which would raise a thought of their 
being feigned; but all the internal marks imaginable of their 
being real. It is to be added, also, that mere genealogies, 
bare narratives of the number of years, which persons called 
by such and such names lived, do not carry the face of fic¬ 
tion; perhaps do carry some presumption of veracity; and 


CHAP. VII.] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 291 

all unadorned narratives, which have nothing to surprise, 
may be thought to carry somewhat of the like presumption 
too. And the domestic and the political history is plainly 
credible. There may be incidents in Scripture, which, taken 
alone in the naked way they are told, may appear strange, 
especially to persons of other manners, temper, education; 
but there are, also, incidents of undoubted truth, in many 
or most persons’ lives, which, in the same circumstances, 
would appear to the full as strange. There may be mis¬ 
takes of transcribers, there may be other real or seeming 
mistakes, not easy to be particularly accounted for; but 
there are certainly no more things of this kind in the Scrip¬ 
ture, than what were to have been expected in books of 
such antiquity; and nothing, in anywise, sufficient to dis¬ 
credit the general narrative. Now, that a history, claiming 
to commence from the creation, and extending in one con¬ 
tinued series, through so great a length of time, and variety 
of events, should have such appearances of reality and 
truth in its whole contexture, is surely a very remarkable 
circumstance in its favor. And as all this is applicable to 
the common history of the New Testament, so there is a far¬ 
ther credibility, and a very high one, given to it by profane 
authors; many of these writing of the same times, and con¬ 
firming the truth of customs and events, which are incident¬ 
ally, as well as more purposely mentioned in it. And this 
credibility of the common Scripture history, gives some 
credibility to its miraculous history; especially as this is 
interwoven with the common, so as that they imply each 
other, and both together make up one relation. 

Let it, then, be more particularly observed to this per¬ 
son, that it is an acknowledged matter of fact, which is 
indeed, implied in the foregoing observation, that there was 
such a nation as the Jews, of the greatest antiquity, whose 
government and general polity was founded on the law, 
here related to be given them by Moses as from Heaven: 


292 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART II. 

that natural religion, though with rites additional, yet no 
way contrary to it, was their established religion, which 
cannot be said of the Gentile world; and that their very 
being, as a nation, depended upon their acknowledgment 
of one God, the God of the universe. For suppose, in 
their captivity in Babylon, they had gone over to the 
religion of their conquerors, there would have remained no 
bond of union, to keep them a distinct people. And whilst 
they were under their own kings, in their own country, a 
total apostasy from God would have been the dissolution 
of their whole government. They, in such a sense, nation¬ 
ally acknowledged and worshiped the Maker of heaven and 
earth, when the rest of the world were sunk in idolatry, as 
rendered them, in fact, the peculiar people of God. And 
this so remarkable an establishment and preservation of 
natural religion amongst them, seems to add some peculiar 
credibility to the historical evidence for the miracles of Mo¬ 
ses and the prophets; because these miracles are a full sat¬ 
isfactory account of this event, which plainly wants to be 
accounted for, and cannot otherwise. 

Let this person, supposed wholly ignorant of history, be 
acquainted farther, that one claiming to be the Messiah, of 
Jewish extraction, rose up at the time when this nation, from 
the prophecies above mentioned, expected the Messiah; that 
he was rejected, as it seemed to have been foretold he 
should, by the body of the people under the direction of 
their rulers; that, in the course of a very few years, he was 
believed on, and acknowledged as the promised Messiah, by 
great numbers among the Gentiles, agreeably to the proph¬ 
ecies of Scripture, yet not upon the evidence of prophecy, 
but of miracles,(l) of which miracles we have also strong 
historical evidence; (by which I mean here no more than 
must be acknowledged by unbelievers; for let pious frauds 
and follies be admitted to weaken, it is absurd to say they 
(1) Page 267, &c. 


CHAP. VII.] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 293 

destroy, our evidence of miracles wrought in proof of Chris¬ 
tianity;) (1) that this religion approving itself to the reason 
of mankind, and carrying its own evidence with it, so far 
as reason is a judge of its system, and being no way con¬ 
trary to reason in those parts of it which require to be 
believed upon the mere authority of its Author; that this 
religion, I say, gradually spread and supported itself, for 
some hundred years, not only without any assistance from 
temporal power, but under constant discouragements, and 
often the bitterest persecutions from it, and then became the 
religion of the world; that, in the meantime, the Jewish 
nation and government were destroyed in a very remarka¬ 
ble manner, and the people carried away captive and dis¬ 
persed through the most distant countries—in which state 
of dispersion they have remained fifteen hundred years; 
and that they remain a numerous people, united among 
themselves, and distinguished from the rest of the world, as 
they were in the days of Moses, by the profession of his 
law, and everywhere looked upon in a manner, which one 
scarce knows how distinctly to express, but in the words of 
the prophetic account of it, given so many ages before it 
came to pass: “Thou shalt become an astonishment, a prov¬ 
erb, and a by-word, among all nations whither the Lord 
shall lead thee. ,, (2) 

The appearance of a standing miracle, in the Jews 
remaining a distinct people in their dispersion, and the 
confirmation which this event appears to give to the truth 
of revelation, may be thought to be answered, by their 
religion’s forbidding them intermarriages with those of any 
other, and prescribing them a great many peculiarities in 
their food, by which they are debarred from the means of 
incorporating with the people in whose countries they live. 
This is not, I think, a satisfactory account of that which 
it pretends to account for. But what does it pretend to 
(1) Page 273, &c. (2) Deut. xxviii, 37. 


294 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART II. 

account for ? The correspondence between this event and the 
prophecies; or the coincidence of both with a long dispen¬ 
sation of Providence, of a peculiar nature, toward that peo¬ 
ple formerly? No. It is only the event itself which is 
offered to be thus accounted for; which single event taken 
alone, abstracted from all such correspondence and coinci¬ 
dence, perhaps would not have appeared miraculous; but 
that correspondence and coincidence may be so, though the 
event itself be supposed not. Thus the concurrence of our 
Savior’s being born at Bethlehem, with a long foregoing 
series of prophecy and other coincidences, is doubtless mi¬ 
raculous, the series of prophecy, and other coincidences, 
and the event, being admitted; though the event itself, 
his birth at that place, appears to have been brought 
about in a natural way; of which, however, no one can be 
certain. 

And as several of these events seem, in some degree, ex¬ 
pressly, to have verified the prophetic history already, so, 
likewise, they may be considered farther, as having a pecu¬ 
liar aspect toward the full completion of it; as affording 
some presumption that the whole of it shall, one time or 
other, be fulfilled. Thus, that the Jews have been so won¬ 
derfully preserved in their long and wide dispersion; which 
is, indeed, the direct fulfilling of some prophecies, but is 
now mentioned only as looking forward to somewhat yet to 
come: that natural religion came forth from Judea, and 
spread in the degree it has done over the world, before lost 
in idolatry: which, together with some other things, have 
distinguished that very place, in like manner as the people 
of it are distinguished: that this great change of religion 
over the earth, was brought about under the profession and 
acknowledgment, that Jesus was the promised Messiah: 
things of this kind naturally turn the thoughts of serious 
men toward the full completion of the prophetic history, 
concerning the final restoration of that people—concerning 


CHAP. VII.] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 295 

the establishment of the everlasting kingdom among them, 
the kingdom of the Messiah; and the future state of the 
world, under this sacred government. Such circumstances 
and events compared with these prophecies, though no com¬ 
pletions of them, yet would not, I think, be spoken of as 
nothing in the argument, by a person upon his first being 
informed of them. They fall in with the prophetic history 
of things still future, give it some additional credibility, 
have the appearance of being somewhat in order to the full 
completion of it. 

Indeed, it requires a good degree of knowledge, and great 
calmness and consideration, to be able to judge, thoroughly, 
of the evidence for the truth of Christianity, from that part 
of the prophetic history which relates to the situation of 
the kingdoms of the world, and to the state of the Church, 
from the establishment of Christianity to the present time. 
But it appears, from a general view of it, to be very mate¬ 
rial. And those persons who have thoroughly examined 
it, and some of them were men of the coolest tempers, 
greatest capacities, and least liable to imputations of preju¬ 
dice, insist upon it as determinately conclusive. 

Suppose, now, a person quite ignorant of history, first to 
recollect the passages above mentioned out of Scripture, 
without knowing but that the whole was a late fiction, then 
to be informed of the correspondent facts now mentioned, 
and to unite them all into one view: that the profession and 
establishment of natural religion in the world, is greatly 
owing, in different ways, to this book, and the supposed 
revelation which it contains; that it is acknowledged to be 
of the earliest antiquity; that its chronology and common 
history are entirely credible; that this ancient nation, the 
Jews, of whom it chiefly treats, appear to have been, in 
fact, the people of God, in a distinguished sense; that as 
there was a national expectation amongst them, raised from 
the prophecies, of a Messiah to appear at such a time, so 


296 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART II. 

one at this time appeared, claiming to be that Messiah; that 
he was rejected by this nation, but received by the Gentiles, 
not upon the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles; that 
the religion he taught supported itself under the greatest 
difficulties, gained ground, and at length became the religion 
of the world; that, in the mean time, the Jewish polity was 
utterly destroyed, and the nation dispersed over the face of 
the earth; that notwithstanding this, they have remained a 
distinct numerous people for so many centuries, even to this 
day; which not only appears to be the express completion 
of several prophecies concerning them, but, also, renders 
it, as one may speak, a visible and easy possibility, that 
the promises made to them as a nation, may yet be fulfilled. 
And to these acknowledged truths, let the person we have 
been supposing add, as I think he ought, whether every 
one will allow it or no, the obvious appearances which there 
are, of the state of the world, in other respects besides 
what relates to the Jews, and of the Christian Church, 
having so long answered, and still answering to the pro¬ 
phetic history. Suppose, I say, these facts set over against 
the things before mentioned out of the Scripture, and seri¬ 
ously compared with them; the joint view of both together, 
must, I think, appear of very great weight to a considerate 
reasonable person—of much greater, indeed, upon having 
them first laid before him* than is easy for us, who are so 
familiarized to them, to conceive, without some particular 
attention for that purpose. 

All these things, and the several particulars contained 
under them, require to be distinctly and most thoroughly 
examined into; that the weight of each may be judged of, 
upon such examination, and such conclusion drawn as results 
from their united force. But this has not been attempted 
here. I have gone no farther than to show, that the 
general imperfect view of them now given, the confessed 
historical evidence for miracles, and the many obvious 


CHAP. VII.] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 297 

appearing completions of prophecy, together with the collat¬ 
eral things (1) here mentioned, and there are several others 
of the like sort; that all this together, which, being fact, 
must be acknowledged by unbelievers, amounts to real 
evidence of somewhat more than human in this matter— 
evidence much more important than careless men, who have 
been accustomed only to transient and partial views of it, 
can imagine, and, indeed, abundantly sufficient to act upon. 
And these things, I apprehend, must be acknowledged by 
unbelievers. For though they may say that the historical 
evidence of miracles, wrought in attestation of Christianity, 
is not sufficient to convince them that such miracles were 
really wrought; they cannot deny, that there is such histor¬ 
ical evidence, it being a known matter of fact that there is. 
They may say, the conformity between the prophecies and 
events, is by accident; but there are many instances in 
which such conformity itself cannot be denied. They may 
say, with regard to such kind of collateral things as those 
above mentioned, that any odd accidental events without 
meaning, will have a meaning found in them by fanciful 
people; and that such as are fanciful in any one certain 
way, will make out a thousand coincidences, which seem to 
favor their peculiar follies. Men, I say, may talk thus; but 
no one who is serious, can possibly think these things to be 
nothing, if he considers the importance of collateral things, 
and even of lesser circumstances, in the evidence of proba¬ 
bility, as distinguished, in nature, from the evidence of 
demonstration. In many cases, indeed, it seems to require 
the truest judgment, to determine with exactness the weight 
of circumstantial evidence; but it is very often altogether 
as convincing, as that which is the most express and direct. 

This general view of the evidence for Christianity, 

(1) All the particular things mentioned in this chapter, not redu¬ 
cible to the head of certain miracles, or determinate completions of 
prophecy. See page 263. 


298 


OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART II. 

considered as making one argument, may, also, serve to rec¬ 
ommend to serious persons, to set down every thing which 
they think may be of any real weight at all in proof of it, 
and particularly the many seeming completions of prophecy ,* 
and they will find, that, judging by the natural rules, by 
which we judge of probable evidence in common matters, 
they amount to a much higher degree of proof, upon 
such a joint review, than could be supposed upon con¬ 
sidering them separately, at different times; how strong 
soever the proof might before appear to them, upon such 
separate views of it. For probable proofs, by being added, 
not only increase the evidence, but multiply it. Nor should 
I dissuade any one from setting down what he thought 
made for the contrary side. But, then, it is to be remem¬ 
bered, not in order to influence his judgment, but his prac¬ 
tice, that a mistake on one side, may be, in its consequences, 
much more dangerous than a mistake on the other. And 
what course is most safe, and what most dangerous, is a 
consideration thought very material, when we deliberate, 
not concerning events, but concerning conduct in our tem¬ 
poral affairs. To be influenced by this consideration in our 
judgment, to believe or disbelieve upon it, is, indeed, as 
much prejudice, as any thing whatever. And, like other 
prejudices, it operates contrary ways in different men. For 
some are inclined to believe what they hope, and others, 
what they fear. And it is manifest unreasonableness, .to 
apply to men’s passions in order to gain their assent. But, 
in deliberations concerning conduct, there is nothing which 
reason more requires to be taken into the account, than 
the importance of it. For, suppose it doubtful, what would 
be the consequence of acting in this, or in a contrary 
manner; still, that taking one side could be attended with 
little or no bad consequence, and taking the other might be 
attended with the greatest, must appear, to unprejudiced 
reason, of the highest moment toward determining how we 


CHAP. VII.] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 209 

are to act. But the truth of our religion, like the truth of 
common matters, is to be judged of by all the evidence 
taken together. And unless the whole series of things 
which may be alledged in this argument, and every partic¬ 
ular thing in it, can reasonably be supposed to have been 
by accident, (for here the stress of the argument for Chris¬ 
tianity lies,) then is the truth of it proved: in like manner 
as if, in any common case, numerous events acknowledged, 
were to be alledged in proof of any other event disputed; 
the truth of the disputed event would be proved, not only 
if any one of the acknowledged ones did of itself clearly 
imply it, but, though no one of them singly did so, if the 
whole of the acknowledged events taken together could 
not in reason be supposed to have happened, unless the 
disputed one were true. 

It is obvious, how much advantage the nature of this 
evidence gives to those persons who attack Christianity, 
especially in conversation. For it is easy to show, in a short 
and lively manner, that such and such things are liable to 
objection, that this and another thing is of little weight in 
itself; but impossible to show, in like manner, the united 
force of the whole argument in one view. 

However, lastly, as it has been made appear, that there 
is no presumption against a revelation as miraculous; that 
the general scheme of Christianity, and the principal parts 
of it, are conformable to the experienced constitution of 
things, and the whole perfectly credible; so the account 
now given of the positive evidence for it, shows that this 
’evidence is such, as, from the nature of it, cannot be 
destroyed, though it should be lessened. 


300 


OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY [PART II. 


CHAPTER VIII. 

OF THE OBJECTIONS WHICH MAY BE MADE AGAINST ARGUING 
FROM THE ANALOGY OF NATURE TO RELIGION. 

If every one would consider, with such attention as they 
are bound, even in point of morality to consider, what they 
judge and give characters of, the occasion of this chapter 
would be, in some good measure at least, superseded. But 
since this is not to be expected; for some we find do not con¬ 
cern themselves to understand even what they write against: 
since this treatise, in common with most others, lies open to 
objections, which may appear very material to thoughtful 
men at first sight; and, besides that, seems peculiarly liable 
to the objections of such as can judge without thinking, and 
of such as can censure without judging; it may not be 
amiss to set down the chief of these objections which occur 
to me, and consider them to their hands. And they are 
such as these; 

“ That it is a poor thing to solve difficulties in revelation, 
by saying, that there are the same in natural religion; when 
what is wanting is to clear both of them, of these their 
common, as well as other their respective, difficulties: but 
that it is a strange way indeed of convincing men of the 
obligations of religion, to show them that they have as little 
reason for their worldly pursuits; and a strange way of vin¬ 
dicating the justice and goodness of the Author of nature, 
and of removing the objections against both, to which the 
system of religion lies open, to show, that the like objections 
lie against natural Providence—a way of answering objec¬ 
tions against religion, without so much as pretending to 
make out, that the system of it, or the particular things in it 
objected against, are reasonable.” Especially, perhaps, some 
may be inattentive enough to add, “ Must this be thought 
strange, when it is confessed that analogy is no answer to 


CHAP. VIII.] OF NATURE TO RELIGION. 301 

such objections; that when this sort of reasoning is carried 
to the utmost length it can be imagined capable of, it will 
yet leave the mind in a very unsatisfied state; and that it 
must be unaccountable ignorance of mankind, to imagine 
they will be prevailed with to forego their present interests 
and pleasures, from regard to religion, upon doubtful evi¬ 
dence.” 

Now, as plausible as this way of talking may appear, that 
appearance will be found in a great measure owing to half¬ 
views, which show but part of an object, yet show that in¬ 
distinctly, and to undeterminate language. By these means, 
weak men are often deceived by others, and ludicrous 
men by themselves. And even those who are serious and 
considerate cannot always readily disentangle, and at once 
clearly see through the perplexities in which subjects them¬ 
selves are involved; and which are heightened by the de¬ 
ficiencies and the abuse of words. To this latter sort of 
persons, the following reply to each part of this objection 
severally, may be of some assistance, as it may also tend a 
little to stop and silence others. 

1. The thing wanted, that is, what men require, is to have 
all difficulties cleared. And this is, or, at least for any thing 
we know to the contrary, it may be, the same, as requiring 
to comprehend the Divine nature, and the whole plan of Prov¬ 
idence from everlasting to everlasting. But it hath always 
been allowed to argue, from what is acknowledged to what 
is disputed. And it is in no other sense a poor thing, to 
argue from natural religion to revealed, in the manner found 
fault with, than it is to argue in numberless other ways of 
probable deduction and inference, in matters of conduct, 
which we are continually reduced to the necessity of doing. 
Indeed, the epithet 'poor may be applied, I fear, as properly 
to great part, or the whole, of human life, as it is to the 
things mentioned in the objection. Is it not a poor thing, 
for a physician to have so little knowledge in the cure of 


302 OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY [pART II. 

diseases, as even the most eminent have? To act upon 
conjecture and guess, where the life of man is concerned? 
Undoubtedly it is: but not in comparison of having no skill 
at all in that useful art, and being obliged to act wholly in 
the dark. 

Further, since it is as unreasonable as it is common, to 
urge objections against revelation, which are of equal weight 
against natural religion; and those who do this, if they are 
not confused themselves, deal unfairly with others, in making 
it seem that they are arguing only against revelation, or 
particular doctrines of it, when in reality they are arguing 
against moral Providence; it is a thing of consequence to 
show, that such objections are as much leveled against 
natural religion, as against revealed. And objections, which 
are equally applicable to both, are, properly speaking, an¬ 
swered, by its being shown that they are so, provided the 
former be admitted to be true. And without taking in the 
Consideration how distinctly this is admitted, it is plainly 
very material to observe, that as the things objected against 
in natural religion are of the same kind with what is certain 
matter of experience in the course of Providence, and in the 
information which God affords us concerning our temporal 
interest under his government; so the objections against the 
system of Christianity and the evidence of it, are of the very 
same kind with those which are made against the system 
and evidence of natural religion. However, the reader, 
upon review, may see that most of the analogies insisted 
upon, even in the latter part of this treatise, do not neces¬ 
sarily require to have more taken for granted than is in the 
former; that there is an Author of nature, or natural Gov¬ 
ernor of the world; and Christianity is vindicated, not from 
its analogy to natural religion, but chiefly, from its analogy 
to the experienced constitution of nature. 

2. Religion is a practical thing, and consists in such a 
determinate course of life, as being what, there is reason to 


CHAP. VIII.] OF NATURE TO RELIGION. 303 

think, is commanded by the Author of nature, and will, 
upon the whale, be our happiness under his government. 
Now, if men can be convinced that they have the like reason 
to believe this, as to believe that taking care of their tem¬ 
poral affairs will be to their advantage; such conviction can¬ 
not but be an argument to them for the practice of religion. 
And if there be really any reason for believing one of these, 
and endeavoring to preserve life, and secure ourselves the 
necessaries and conveniences of it, then there is reason also 
for believing the other, and endeavoring to secure the in¬ 
terest it proposes to us. And if the interest which religion 
proposes to us be infinitely greater than our whole temporal 
interest, then there must be proportionably greater reason 
for endeavoring to secure one, than the other: since by the 
supposition, the probability" of our securing one, is equal to 
the probability of our securing the other. This seems 
plainly unanswerable; and has a tendency to influence fair 
minds, who consider what our condition really is, or upon 
what evidence we are naturally appointed to act; and who 
are disposed to acquiesce in the terms upon which we live, 
and attend to and follow that practical instruction, whatever 
it be, which is afforded us. 

But the chief and proper force of the argument referred 
to in the objection, lies in another place. For it is said, that 
the proof of religion is involved in such inextricable diffi¬ 
culties, as to render it doubtful; and that it cannot be sup¬ 
posed, that if it were true, it would be left upon doubtful 
evidence. Here, then, over and above the force of each 
particular difficulty or objection, these difficulties and objec¬ 
tions, taken together, are turned into a positive argument 
against the truth of religion, which argument would stand 
thus: If religion were true, it would not be left doubtful, 
and open to objections to the degree in which it is; there¬ 
fore, that it is thus left, not only renders the evidence of it 
weak, and lessens its force, in proportion to the weight of 


304 OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY [PART II. 

such objections, but also shows it to be false, or is a general 
presumption of its being so. Now the observation, that 
from the natural constitution and course of things, we must 
in our temporal concerns, almost continually, and in matters 
of great consequence, act upon evidence of a like kind and 
degree to the evidence of religion, is an answer to this argu¬ 
ment ; because it shows, that it is according to the conduct 
and character of the Author of nature to appoint we should 
act upon evidence like to that, which this argument pre¬ 
sumes he cannot be supposed to appoint we should act 
upon: it is an instance, a general one, made up of numerous 
particular ones, of somewhat in his dealing with us, similar 
to what is said to be incredible. And as the force of this 
answer lies merely in the parallel which there is between 
the evidence for religion and for our temporal conduct, the 
answer is equally just and conclusive, whether the parallel 
be made out, by showing the evidence of the former to be 
higher, or the evidence of the latter to be lower. 

3. The design of this treatise is not to vindicate the char¬ 
acter of God, but to show the obligations of men; it is not 
to justify his Providence, but to show what belongs to us 
to do. These are two subjects, and ought not to be con¬ 
founded. And though they may at length run up into each 
other, yet observations may immediately tend to make out 
the latter, which do not appear, by any immediate connec¬ 
tion, to the purpose of the former; which is less our con¬ 
cern than many seem to think. For, first, it is not neces¬ 
sary we should justify the dispensations of Providence 
against objections, any farther than to show, that the things 
objected against may, for aught we know, be consistent with 
justice and goodness. Suppose, then, that there are things 
in the system of this world, and plan of Providence relating 
to it, which, taken alone, would be unjust; yet it has been 
shown unanswerably, that if we could take in the reference 
which these things may have to other things present, past, 


CHAP. VIII.] OF NATURE TO RELIGION. 305 

and to come—to the whole scheme, which the things ob¬ 
jected against are parts of; these very things might, for 
aught we know, be found to be, not only consistent with 
justice, but instances of it. Indeed, it has been shown, by 
the analogy of what we see, not only possible that this 
may be the case, but credible that it is. And thus objec¬ 
tions, drawn from such things, are answered, and Provi¬ 
dence is vindicated, as far as religion makes its vindication 
necessary. Hence, it appears, secondly, that objections 
against the Divine justice and goodness are not endeav¬ 
ored to be removed, by showing that the like objections, 
allowed to be really conclusive, lie against natural Provi¬ 
dence: but those objections being supposed and shown not 
to be conclusive, the things objected against, considered as 
matters of fact, are farther shown to be credible, from their 
conformity to the constitution of nature; for instance, that 
God will reward and punish men for their actions hereafter, 
from the observation that he does reward and punish them 
for their actions here. And this, I apprehend, is of weight. 
And I add, thirdly, it would be of weight, even though 
those objections were not answered. For, there being the 
proof of religion above set down, and religion implying sev¬ 
eral facts; for instance, again, the fact last mentioned, that 
God will reward and punish men for their actions hereafter; 
the observation that his present method of government is 
by rewards and punishments, shows that future fact not to 
be incredible; whatever objections men may think they have 
against it, as unjust or unmerciful, according to their no¬ 
tions of justice and mercy; or as improbable from their be¬ 
lief of necessity. I say, as improbable; for it is evident no 
objection against it, as unjust , can be urged from neces¬ 
sity; since this notion as much destroys injustice, as it 
does justice. Then, fourthly, though objections against 
the reasonableness of the system of religion, cannot, in¬ 
deed, be answered without entering into consideration of 


306 OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY [PART II. 

its reasonableness, yet objections against the credibility 
or truth of it may. Because the system of it is reducible 
into what is properly matter of fact; and the truth, the 
probable truth, of facts, may be shown without considera¬ 
tion of their reasonableness. Nor is it necessary, though, 
in some cases and respects, it is highly useful and proper, 
yet it is not necessary, to give a proof of the reasonable¬ 
ness of every precept enjoined us, and of every particular 
dispensation of Providence, which comes into the system of 
religion. Indeed, the more thoroughly a person of a right 
disposition is convinced of the perfection of the Divine na¬ 
ture and conduct, the farther he will advance toward that 
perfection of religion, which St. John speaks of.(l) But 
the general obligations of religion are fully made out, by 
proving the reasonableness of the practice of it. And 
that the practice of religion is reasonable, may be shown, 
though no more could be proved, than that the system of 
it may be so, for aught we know to the contrary; and even 
without entering into the distinct consideration of this. 
And from hence, fifthly, it is easy to see, that though the 
analogy of nature is not an immediate answer to objections 
against the wisdom, the justice, or goodness, of any doc¬ 
trine or precept of religion; yet it may be, as it is, an im¬ 
mediate and direct answer to what is really intended by 
such objections; which is, to show that the things objected 
against are incredible. 

4. It is most readily acknowledged, that the forego¬ 
ing treatise is by no means satisfactory; very far, indeed, 
from it; but so would any natural institution of life appear, 
if reduced into a system, together with its evidence. Leav¬ 
ing religion out of the case, men are divided in their opin¬ 
ions, whether our pleasures overbalance our pains; and 
whether it be, or be not, eligible to live in this world. 
And were all such controversies settled, which, perhaps, in 
(1) 1 John iv } 18. 


CHAP. VIII.] OF NATURE TO RELIGION. 307 

speculation would be found involved in great difficulties; 
and were it determined, upon the evidence of reason, as 
nature has determined it to our hands, that life is to be pre¬ 
served ; yet still, the rules which God has been pleased to 
afford us, for escaping the miseries of it, and obtaining its 
satisfactions, the rules, for instance, of preserving health 
and recovering it when lost, are not only fallible, and pre¬ 
carious, but very far from being exact. Nor are we in¬ 
formed by nature, in future contingencies and accidents, so 
as to render it all certain, what is the best method of man¬ 
aging our affairs. What will be the success of our tem¬ 
poral pursuits, in the common sense of the word success, is 
highly doubtful. And what will be the success of them, in 
the proper sense of the word, that is, what happiness or 
enjoyment we shall obtain by them, is doubtful in a much 
higher degree. Indeed, the unsatisfactory nature of the 
evidence, with which we are obliged to take up, in the daily 
course of life, is scarce to be expressed. Yet men do not 
throw away life, or disregard the interests of it, upon ac¬ 
count of this doubtfulness. The evidence of religion, then, 
being admitted real, those who object against it, as not sat¬ 
isfactory, that is, as not being what they wish it, plainly 
forget the very condition of our being; for satisfaction, in 
this sense, does not belong to such a creature as man. 
And, which is more material, they forget, also, the very 
nature of religion. For, religion presupposes, in all those 
who will embrace it, a certain degree of integrity and hon¬ 
esty ; which it was intended to try whether men have or 
not, and to exercise in such as have it, in order to its im¬ 
provement, Religion presupposes this as much, and in the 
same sense, as speaking to a man presupposes he under¬ 
stands the language in which you speak; cr as warning a 
man of any danger, presupposes that he hath such a regard 
to himself, as that he will endeavor to avoid it. And, 
therefore, the question is not at all, whether the evidence 


308 OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY [PART II. 

of religion be satisfactory; but, whether it be, in reason, 
sufficient to prove and discipline that virtue which it pre¬ 
supposes? Now, the evidence of it is fully sufficient for all 
those purposes of probation; how far soever it is from be¬ 
ing satisfactory, as to the purposes of curiosity, or any 
other: and, indeed, it answers the purposes of the former 
in several respects, which it would not do, if it were as 
overbearing as is required. One might add farther, that 
whether the motives, or the evidence for any course of ac¬ 
tion, be satisfactory, meaning here, by that word, what sat¬ 
isfies a man, that such a course of action will in event be 
for his good; this need never be, and, I think, strictly 
speaking, never is, the practical question in common mat¬ 
ters. But the practical question in all cases, is, whether 
the evidence for a course of action be such, as taking in all 
circumstances, makes the faculty within us, which is the 
guide and judge of conduct,(l) determine that course of 
action to be prudent? Indeed, satisfaction that it will be 
for our interest or happiness, abundantly determines an ac¬ 
tion to be prudent; but evidence, almost infinitely lower 
than this, determines actions to be so too, even in the 
conduct of every day. 

5. As to the objection concerning the influence which 
this argument, or any part of it, may, or may not, be ex¬ 
pected to have upon men, I observe, as above, that relig¬ 
ion being intended for a trial and exercise of the morality 
of every person’s character, who is a subject of it; and 
there being, as I have shown, such evidence for it, as is suf¬ 
ficient, in reason, to influence men to embrace it; to object, 
that it is not to be imagined mankind will be influenced by 
such evidence, is nothing to the purpose of the foregoing 
treatise. For the purpose of it is not to inquire, what sort 
of creatures mankind are; but what the light and knowledge 
which is afforded them, requires they should be ? to show 
(1) See Dissertation 2. 


CHAP. VIII.] OF NATURE TO RELIGION. 309 

how, in reason, they ought to behave ; not how, in fact, they 
will behave. This depends upon themselves, and is their own 
concern; the personal concern of each man in particular. 
And how little regard the generality have to it, experience, 
indeed, does too fully show. But religion, considered as a 
probation, has had its end upon all persons to whom it has 
been proposed, with evidence sufficient in reason to influence 
their practice; for by this means they have been put into 
a state of probation; let them behave as they will in it. 
And thus, not only revelation, but reason also, teaches us, 
that, by the evidence of religion being laid before men, the 
designs of Providence are carrying on, not only with regard 
to those who will, but likewise with regard to those who 
will not, be influenced by it. However, lastly, the objection 
here referred to, allows the things insisted upon in this 
treatise to be of some weight; and if so, it may be hoped it 
will have some influence. And if there be a probability that 
it will have any at all, there is the same reason in kind, 
though not in degree, to lay it before men, as there would 
be if it were likely to have a greater influence. 

And, farther, I desire it may be considered, with respect 
to the whole of the foregoing objections, that in this treatise 
I have argued upon the principles of others,(1) not my own; 
and have omitted what I think true, and of the utmost import¬ 
ance, because by others thought unintelligible, or not true. 
Thus I have argued upon the principles of the fatalists, 
which I do not believe; and have omitted a thing of the 
utmost importance, which I do believe, the moral fitness and 
unfitness of actions, prior to all will whatever; which I ap¬ 
prehend as certainly to determine the Divine conduct, as 

(1) By arguing upon the principles of others , the reader will observe 
is meant, not proving any thing from those principles, but notwith¬ 
standing them. Thus religion is proved, not from the opinion of 
necessity, which is absurd, but notwithstanding , or even though that 
opinion were admitted to be true. 


310 OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY [PART II. 

speculative truth and falsehood necessarily determine the 
Divine judgment. Indeed, the principle of liberty, and that 
of moral fitness, so force themselves upon the mind, that 
moralists, the ancients as well as modems, have formed their 
language upon it. And probably it may appear in mine, 
though I have endeavored to avoid it: and, in order to avoid 
it, have sometimes been obliged to express myself in a man¬ 
ner which will appear strange to such as do not observe the 
reason for it; but the general argument here pursued does 
not at all suppose, or proceed upon, these principles. Now, 
these two abstract principles of liberty and moral fitness 
being omitted, religion can be considered in no other view 
than merely as a question of fact; and in this view it is here 
considered. It is obvious that Christianity, and the proof 
of it, are both historical. And even natural religion is, 
properly, a matter of fact. For, that there is a righteous 
Governor of the world, is so; and this proposition contains 
the general system of natural religion. But then, several 
abstract truths, and in particular those two principles, are 
usually taken into consideration in the proof of it; whereas, 
it is here treated of only as a matter of fact. To explain 
this: that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two 
right ones, is an abstract truth; but that they appear so to 
our mind, is only a matter of fact. And this last must have 
been admitted, if any thing was, by those ancient skeptics, 
who would not have admitted the former; but pretended to 
doubt, “ Whether there was any such thing as truthor, 
“ Whether we could certainly depend upon our faculties of 
understanding for the knowledge of it in any case.” So 
likewise, that there is, in the nature of things, an original 
standard of right and wrong in actions, independent upon all 
will, but which unalterably determines the will of God, to 
exercise that moral government over the world which relig¬ 
ion teaches, that is, finally, and upon the whole, to reward 
and punish men respectively, as they act right or wrong; 


CHAP. VIII.] OF NATURE TO RELIGION. 311 

this assertion contains an abstract truth, as well as matter 
of fact. But suppose, in the present state, every man, with¬ 
out exception, was rewarded and punished, in exact propor¬ 
tion as he followed or transgressed that sense of right and 
wrong, which God has implanted in the nature of every man; 
this would not be at all an abstract truth, but only a matter 
of fact. And though this fact were acknowledged by every 
one, yet the very same difficulties might be raised, as are 
now, concerning the abstract questions of liberty and moral 
fitness: and we should have a proof, even the certain one 
of experience, that the government of the world was per¬ 
fectly moral, without taking in the consideration of those 
questions ; and this proof would remain, in what way soever 
they were determined. And thus, God having given man¬ 
kind a moral faculty, the object of which is actions, and 
which naturally approves some actions as right and of good 
desert, and condemns others as wrong and of ill desert; that 
he will, finally and upon the whole, reward the former and 
punish the latter, is not an assertion of an abstract truth, but 
of what is as mere a fact as his doing so at present would 
be. This future fact I have not indeed proved, with the 
force with which it might be proved, from the principles of 
liberty and moral fitness; but, without them, have given a 
really conclusive practical proof of it, which is greatly 
strengthened by the general analogy of nature—a proof 
easily caviled at, easily shown not to be demonstrative, for 
it is not offered as such; but impossible, I think, to be 
evaded or answered. And thus the obligations of religion 
are made out, exclusively of the questions concerning liberty 
and moral fitness, which have been perplexed with difficul¬ 
ties and abstruse reasonings, as every thing may. 

Hence, therefore, may be observed distinctly, what is the 
force of this treatise. It will be, to such as are convinced 
of religion, upon the proof arising out of the two last men¬ 
tioned principles, an additional proof and a confirmation of 


312 


OBJECTIONS AGAINST ANALOGY. [PART II. 

it; to such as do not admit those principles, an original 
proof of it, (1) and a confirmation of that proof. Those who 
believe, will here find the scheme of Christianity cleared of 
objections, and the evidence of it in a peculiar manner 
strengthened: those who do not believe, will at least be 
shown the absurdity of all attempts to prove Christianity 
false, the plain, undoubted credibility of it, and, I hope, a 
good deal more. 

And thus, though some, perhaps, may seriously think, 
that analogy, as here urged, has too great stress laid upon 
it; and ridicule, unanswerable ridicule, may be applied, to 
show the argument from it in a disadvantageous light; yet 
there can be no question, but that it is a real one. For re¬ 
ligion, both natural and revealed, implying in it numerous 
facts; analogy being a confirmation of all facts to which it 
can be applied, as it is the only proof of most, cannot but 
be admitted by every one to be a material thing, and truly 
of weight on the side of religion, both natural and revealed; 
and it ought to be particularly regarded by such as profess 
to follow nature, and to be less satisfied with abstract rea¬ 
sonings. 


(1) Page 145. 


PART II.] 


CONCLUSION. 


313 


CONCLUSION. 

Whatever account may be given, of the strange inatten¬ 
tion and disregard, in some ages and countries, to a matter 
of such importance as religion, it would, before experience, 
be incredible, that there should be the like disregard in 
those, who have had the moral system of the world laid 
before them, as it is by Christianity, and often inculcated 
upon them; because this moral system carries in it a good 
degree of evidence for its truth, upon its being barely 
proposed to our thoughts. There is no need of abstruse 
reasonings and distinctions, to convince an unprejudiced 
understanding, that there is a God who made and governs 
the world, and will judge it in righteousness; though they 
may be necessary to answer abstruse difficulties, when 
once such are raised; when the very meaning of those 
words, which* express most intelligibly the general doctrine 
of religion, is pretended to be uncertain, and the clear truth 
of the thing itself is obscured by the intricacies of specula¬ 
tion. But, to an unprejudiced mind, ten thousand thousand 
instances of design, cannot but prove a Designer. And it 
is intuitively manifest, that creatures ought to live under a 
dutiful sense of their Maker; and that justice and charity 
must be his laws, to creatures whom he has made social, 
and placed in society. Indeed, the truth of revealed relig¬ 
ion, peculiarly so called, is not self-evident, but requires 
external proof, in order to its being received. Yet inatten¬ 
tion, among us, to revealed religion, will be found to imply 
the same dissolute immoral temper of mind, as inattention 
to natural religion; because, when both are laid before us, 
in the manner they are in Christian countries of liberty, our 
obligations to inquire into both, and to embrace both upon 
supposition of their truth, are obligations of the same na¬ 
ture. For, revelation claims to be the voice of God; and 

27 


314 


CONCLUSION. 


[part II. 

our obligation to attend to his voice, is, surely, moral in all 
cases. And as it is insisted, that its evidence is conclusive, 
upon thorough consideration of it, so it offers itself to us 
with manifest obvious appearances of having something 
more than human in it; and, therefore, in all reason requires 
to have its claims most seriously examined into. It is to be 
added, that though light and knowledge, in what manner 
soever afforded us, is equally from God; yet a miraculous 
revelation has a peculiar tendency, from the first principles 
of our nature, to awaken mankind, and inspire them with 
reverence and awe: and this is a peculiar obligation, to 
attend to what claims to be so with such appearances of 
truth. It is, therefore, most certain, that our obligations to 
inquire seriously into the evidence of Christianity, and, upon 
supposition of its truth, to embrace it, are of the utmost 
importance, and moral in the highest and most proper sense. 
Let us, then, suppose, that the evidence of religion in gen¬ 
eral, and of Christianity, has been seriously'inquired into 
by all reasonable men among us. Yet, we find many pro¬ 
fessedly to reject both, upon speculative principles of infidel¬ 
ity. And all of them do not content themselves with a 
bare neglect of religion, and enjoying their imaginary 
freedom from its restraints. Some go much beyond this. 
They deride God’s moral government over the world: they 
renounce his protection, and defy his justice: they ridicule 
and vilify Christianity, and blaspheme the Author of it; 
and take all occasions to manifest a scorn and contempt of 
revelation. This amounts to an active setting themselves 
against religion—to what may be considered as a positive 
principle of irreligion, which they cultivate within them¬ 
selves, and, whether they intend this effect or not, render 
habitual, as a good man does the contrary principle. And 
others, who are not chargeable with all this profligateness, 
yet are in avowed opposition to religion, as if discovered to 
be groundless. Now admitting, which is the supposition 


PART II.] CONCLUSION. 315 

we go upon, that these persons act upon what they think 
principles of reason, and otherwise they are not to be 
argued with; it is really inconceivable, that they should 
imagine they clearly see the whole evidence of it, considered 
in itself, to be nothing at all; nor do they pretend this. 
They are far, indeed, from having a just notion of its evi¬ 
dence ; but they would not say its evidence was nothing, if 
they thought the system of it, with all its circumstances, 
were credible, like other matters of science or history. So 
that their manner of treating it must proceed, either from 
such kind of objections against all religion, as have been 
answered or obviated in the former part of this treatise, or 
else from objections and difficulties, supposed more peculiar 
to Christianity. Thus, they entertain prejudices against the 
whole notion of a revelation and miraculous interpositions. 
They find things in Scripture, whether in incidental passages 
or in the general scheme of it, which appear to them un¬ 
reasonable. They take for granted, that if Christianity 
were true, the light of it must have been more general, and 
the evidence of it more satisfactory, or, rather, overbearing; 
that it must and would have been, in some way, otherwise 
put and left, than it is. Now, this is not imagining they 
see the evidence itself to he nothing, or inconsiderable; but 
quite another thing. It is being fortified against the evi¬ 
dence, in some degree acknowledged, by thinking they see 
the system of Christianity, or somewhat which appears to 
them necessarily connected with it, to be incredible or false— 
fortified against that evidence, which might, otherwise, make 
great impression upon them. Or, lastly, if any of these 
persons are, upon the whole, in doubt concerning the truth 
of Christianity, their behavior seems owing to their taking 
for granted, through strange inattention, that such doubting 
is, in a manner, the same thing as being certain against it. 

To these persons, and to this state of opinion concerning 
religion, the foregoing treatise is adapted. For, all the 


316 CONCLUSION. [part II. 

general objections against the moral system of nature hav¬ 
ing been obviated, it is shown that there is not any peculiar 
presumption at all against Christianity, either considered as 
not discoverable by reason, or as unlike to what is so discov¬ 
ered ; nor any worth mentioning, against it as miraculous, if 
any at all: none certainly, which can render it in the least 
incredible. It is shown, that upon supposition of a divine 
revelation, the analogy of nature renders it beforehand 
highly credible, I think probable, that many things in it 
must appear liable to great objections; and that we must 
be incompetent judges of it, to a great degree. This ob¬ 
servation is, I think, unquestionably true, and of the very 
utmost importance: but it is urged, as I hope it will be 
understood, with great caution of not vilifying the faculty 
of reason, which is “the candle of the Lord within us;”(l) 
though it can afford no light, where it does not shine; nor 
judge, where it has no principles to judge upon. The ob¬ 
jections here spoken of, being first answered in the view of 
objections against Christianity as a matter of fact, are, in the 
next place, considered as urged more immediately against 
the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the Christian dipensa- 
tion. And it is fully made out, that they admit of exactly 
the like answer, in every respect, to what the like objections 
against the constitution of nature admit of: that, as partial 
views give the appearance of wrong to things, which, upon 
farther consideration and knowledge of their relations to 
other things, are found just and good; so it is perfectly 
credible, that the things objected against the wisdom and 
goodness of the Christian dispensation, may be rendered 
instances of wisdom and goodness by their reference to 
other things beyond our view: because Christianity is a 
scheme as much above our comprehension, as that of na¬ 
ture; and, like that, a scheme in which means are made use 
of to accomplish ends, and which, as is most credible, may 
(1) Prov. xx, 27. 


PART II.] CONCLUSION. 317 

be carried on by general laws. And it ought to be attended 
to, that this is not an answer taken merely or chiefly from 
our ignorance, but from somewhat positive, which our 
observation shows us. For, to like objections, the like 
answer is experienced to be just, in numberless parallel 
cases. The objections against the Christian dispensation, 
and the method by which it is carried on, having been thus 
obviated, in general and together; the chief of them are 
considered distinctly, and the particular things objected 
to are shown credible, by their perfect analogy, each apart, 
to the constitution of nature. Thus, if man be fallen from 
his primitive state, and to be restored, and infinite Wisdom 
and Power engages in accomplishing our recovery, it were 
to have been expected, it is said, that this should have been 
effected at once, and not by such a long series of means, 
and such a various economy of persons and things; one 
dispensation preparatory to another, this to a farther one, 
and so on through an indefinite number of ages, before the 
end of the scheme proposed can be completely accom¬ 
plished—a scheme conducted by infinite Wisdom, and exe¬ 
cuted by almighty Power. But now, on the contrary, our 
finding that every thing in the constitution and course of 
nature is thus carried on, shows such expectations con¬ 
cerning revelation to be highly unreasonable; and is a 
satisfactoiy answer to them, when urged as objections 
against the credibility, that the great scheme of Providence 
in the redemption of the world, may be of this kind, and 
to be accomplished in this manner. As to the particular 
method of our redemption, the appointment of a Mediator 
between God and man; this has been shown to be most 
obviously analogous to the general conduct of nature; that 
is, the God of nature, in appointing others to be the instru¬ 
ments of his mercy, as we experience in the daily course 
of Providence. The condition of this world which the 
doctrine of our redemption by Christ presupposes, so much 


318 CONCLUSION. [part II. 

falls in with natural appearances, that heathen moralists 
inferred it from those appearances—inferred, that human 
nature was fallen from its original rectitude, and, in conse¬ 
quence of this, degraded from its primitive happiness. Or, 
however this opinion came into the world, these appear¬ 
ances must have kept up the tradition, and confirmed the 
belief of it. And as it was the general opinion, under the 
light of nature, that repentance and reformation, alone and 
by itself, was not sufficient to do away sin, and procure a full 
remission of the penalties annexed to it; and as the reason 
of the thing does not at all lead to any such conclusion; so 
every day’s experience shows us that reformation is not, in 
any sort, sufficient to prevent the present disadvantages and 
miseries, which, in the natural course of things, God has 
annexed to folly and extravagance. Yet there may be 
ground to think, that the punishments, which, by the gen¬ 
eral laws of Divine government, are annexed to vice, may 
be prevented; that provision may have been even originally 
made, that they should be prevented by some means or 
other, though they could not by reformation alone. For 
we have daily instances of such mercy , in the general con¬ 
duct of nature: compassion provided for misery,(1) medi¬ 
cines for diseases, friends against enemies. There is provis¬ 
ion made, in the original constitution of the world, that 
much of the natural bad consequences of our follies, which 
persons themselves alone cannot prevent, may be prevented 
by the assistance of others—assistance, which nature ena¬ 
bles, and disposes, and appoints them to afford. By a 
method of goodness analogous to this, when the world lay 
in wickedness, and, consequently, in ruin, “ God so loved 
the world, that he gave his only begotten Son ” to save it; 
and “ he being made perfect by suffering, became the au¬ 
thor of eternal salvation to all them that obey him.”(2) 
Indeed, neither reason nor analogy would lead us to think, in 
(1) Sermon at the Rolls, p. 106. (2) John iii, 16. Heb. v, 9. 


PART II.] CONCLUSION. 319 

particular, that the interposition of Christ, in the manner in 
which he did interpose, would be of that efficacy for recov¬ 
ery of the world, which the Scripture teaches us it was: 
but neither would reason nor analogy lead us to think that 
other particular means would be of the efficacy, which expe¬ 
rience shows they are, in numberless instances. And, there¬ 
fore, as the case before us does not admit of experience, so 
that neither reason nor analogy can show how, or in what 
particular way, the interposition of Christ, as revealed in 
Scripture, is of that efficacy which it is there represented to 
be; this is no kind nor degree of presumption against its 
being really of that efficacy. Farther, the objections against 
Christianity, from the light of it not being universal, nor its 
evidence so strong as might possibly be given us, have been 
answered by the general analogy of nature. That God has 
made such variety of creatures, is, indeed, an answer to the 
former; but that he dispenses his gifts in such variety, both 
of degrees and kinds, amongst creatures of the same spe¬ 
cies, and even to the same individuals at different times, is a 
more obvious and full answer to it. And it is so far from 
being the method of Providence, in other cases, to afford us 
such overbearing evidence as some require in proof of 
Christianity, that, on the contrary, the evidence upon which 
we are naturally appointed to act in common matters, 
throughout a very great part of life, is doubtful in a high 
degree. And, admitting the fact, that God has afforded to 
some no more than doubtful evidence of religion, the same 
account may be given of it, as of difficulties and tempta¬ 
tions with regard to practice. But as it is not impossible,(l) 
surely, that this alledged doubtfulness may be men’s own 
fault, it deserves their most serious consideration, whether it 
be not so. However, it is certain that doubting implies a 
degree of evidence for that of which we doubt, and that 
(1) Page 256, &c. 


CONCLUSION. 


320 


[part II. 


this degree of evidence as really lays us under obligations 
as demonstrative evidence. 

The whole, then, of religion is throughout credible; nor 
is there, I think, any thing relating to the revealed dispen¬ 
sation of things more different from the experienced consti¬ 
tution and course of nature, than some parts of the consti¬ 
tution of nature are from other parts of it. And if so, the 
only question which remains is, what positive evidence can 
be alledged for the truth of Christianity. This, too, in 
general, has been considered, and the objections against it 
estimated. Deduct, therefore, what is to be deducted from 
that evidence, upon account of any weight which may be 
thought to remain in these objections, after what the an¬ 
alogy of nature has suggested in answer to them; and 
then consider what are the practical consequences from all 
this, upon the most skeptical principles one can argue upon, 
(for I am writing to persons who entertain these principles:) 
and, upon such consideration, it will be obvious, that immo¬ 
rality, as little excuse as it admits of in itself, is greatly ag¬ 
gravated, in persons who have been made acquainted with 
Christianity, whether they believe it or not; because the 
moral system of nature, or natural religion, which Chris¬ 
tianity lays before us, approves itself, almost intuitively, to 
a reasonable mind, upon seeing it proposed. In the next 
place, with regard to Christianity it will be observed, that 
there is a middle, between a full satisfaction of the truth of 
it, and a satisfaction of the contrary. The middle state 
of mind between these two Consists m a serious apprehen¬ 
sion that it may be true, joined with doubt, whether it be 
so. And this, upon the best judgment I am able to make, 
is as far toward speculative infidelity, as any skeptic can at 
all be supposed to go, who has had true Christianity, with 
the proper evidence of it, laid before him, and has, in any 
tolerable measure, considered them. For I would not be 


PART II.] CONCLUSION. 321 

mistaken to comprehend all who have ever heard of it; be¬ 
cause it seems evident, that, in many countries called Chris¬ 
tian, neither Christianity, nor its evidence, are fairly laid be¬ 
fore men. And in places where both are, there appear to be 
some who have very little attended to either, and who reject 
Christianity with a scorn proportionate to their inattention; 
and yet are by no means without understanding in other 
matters. Now it has been shown, that a serious apprehen¬ 
sion that Christianity may be true, lays persons under the 
strictest obligations of a serious regard to it, throughout 
the whole of their life—a regard not the same exactly, but 
in many respects nearly the same, with what a full convic¬ 
tion of its truth would lay them under. Lastly, it will ap¬ 
pear, that blasphemy and profaneness, I mean with regard 
to Christianity, are absolutely without excuse. For there is 
no temptation to it, but from the wantonness of vanity or 
mirth; and these, considering the infinite importance of the 
subject, are no such temptations as to afford any excuse for 
it. If this be a just account of things, and yet men can 
go on to vilify or disregard Christianity, which is to talk 
and act as if they had a demonstration of its falsehood; 
there is no reason to think they would alter their behavior 
to any purpose, though there were a demonstration of its 
truth. 



* 





ADVERTISEMENT. 

. N '» ^ "> *• 

In the first copy of these papers, I had inserted the two following 
Dissertations into the chapters, “Of a Future Life,” and, “Of the 
Moral Government of God;” with which they are closely con¬ 
nected. But as they do not directly fall under the title of the fore¬ 
going treatise, and would have kept the subject of it too long out of 
sight, it seemed more proper to place them by themselves. 


TWO BRIEF 


DISSEBTATIONS. 

DISSERTATION I. 

OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 

Whether we are to live in a future state, as it is the most 
important question which can possibly be asked, so it is the 
most intelligible one which can be expressed in language. 
Yet strange perplexities have been raised about the mean¬ 
ing of that identity, or sameness of person, which is im¬ 
plied in the notion of our living now and hereafter, or in 
any two successive moments. And the solution of these 
difficulties hath been stranger than the difficulties them¬ 
selves. For, personal identity has been explained so by 
some, as to render the inquiry concerning a future life of no 
consequence at all to us, the persons who are making it. 
And though few men can be misled by such subtilties, yet 
it may be proper a little to consider them. 

Now, when it is asked wherein personal identity consists, 
the answer should be the same as if it were asked, wherein 
consists similitude or equality; that all attempts to define, 
would but perplex it. Yet there is no difficulty at all in 
ascertaining the idea. For as, upon two triangles being 
compared or viewed together, there arises to the mind the 
idea of similitude; or upon twice two and four, the idea of 
equality; so, likewise, upon comparing the consciousness 
of one’s self, or one’s own existence in any two moments, 
there as immediately arises to the mind the idea of personal 
identity. And as the two former comparisons not only give 
the ideas of similitude and equality, but also show us, that 
two triangles are alike, and twice two and four are equal; so 
the latter comparison not only gives us the idea of personal 


324 


OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 


[diss. I. 

identity, but, also, shows us the identity of ourselves in 
those two moments; the present, suppose, and that imme¬ 
diately past; or the present, and that a month, a year, or 
twenty years past. Or, in other words, by reflecting upon 
that which is myself now, and that which was myself twenty 
years ago, I discern they are not two, but one and the same 
self. 

But though consciousness of what is past does thus ascer¬ 
tain our personal identity to ourselves, yet, to say that it 
makes personal identity, or is necessary to our being the 
same persons, is to say, that a person has not existed a 
single moment, nor done one action, but what he can re¬ 
member ; indeed, none but what he reflects upon. And one 
should really think it self-evident, that consciousness of per¬ 
sonal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, 
personal identity, any more than knowledge, in any other 
case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes. 

This wonderful mistake may possibly have arisen from 
hence, that to be endued with consciousness, is inseparable 
from the idea of a person, or intelligent being. For, this 
might be expressed inaccurately thus: that consciousness 
makes personality; and from hence it might be concluded 
to make personal identity. But though present conscious¬ 
ness of what we at present do and feel, is necessary to s our 
being the persons we now are; yet present consciousness of 
past actions, or feelings, is not necessary to our being the 
same persons who performed those actions, or had those 
feelings. 

The inquiry, what makes vegetables the same in the com¬ 
mon acceptation of the word, does not appear to have any 
relation to this of personal identity; because the word same, 
when applied to them and to person, is not only applied to 
different subjects, but it is also used in different senses. 
For when a man swears to the same tree, as having stood 
fifty years in the same place, he means only the same as to 


OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 


325 


DISS. I.] 

all the purposes of property and uses of common life, and 
not that the tree has been all that time the same, in the 
strict philosophical sense of the word. For he does not know 
whether any one particle of the present tree be the same 
with any one particle of the tree which stood in the same 
place fifty years ago. And if they have not one common 
particle of matter, they cannot be the same tree, in the 
proper philosophic sense of the word same; it being evidently 
a contradiction in terms, to say they are, when no part of 
their substance, and no one of their properties, is the same— 
no part of their substance, by the supposition—no one of 
their properties, because it is allowed that the same property 
cannot be transferred from one substance to another. And, 
therefore, when we say, the identity or sameness of a plant 
consists in a continuation of the same life, communicated 
under the same organization, to a number of particles of 
matter, whether the same or not, the word same , when ap¬ 
plied to life and to organization, cannot possibly be under¬ 
stood to signify, what it signifies in this very sentence, when 
applied to matter. In a loose and popular sense, then, the 
life, and the organization, and the plant, are justly said to 
be the same, notwithstanding the perpetual change of the 
parts. But, in a strict and philosophical manner of speech, 
no man, no being, no mode of being, no any thing, can be 
the same with that with which it has indeed nothing the 
same. Now, sameness is used in this latter sense when 
applied to persons. The identity of these, therefore, cannot 
subsist with diversity of substance. 

The thing here considered, and demonstratively, as I 
think, determined, is proposed by Mr. Locke in these words, 
“ Whether it , that is, the same self or person, be the same 
identical substance?” And he has suggested what is a 
much better answer to the question than that which he gives 
it in form. For he defines person, “a thinking , intelligent 
being ,” &c., and personal identity, “ the sameness of a rational 
28 


326 OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. [DISS. I. 

being .”{\) The question then is, whether the same rational 
being is the same substance; which heeds no answer, be¬ 
cause being and substance, in this place, stand for the same 
idea. The ground of the doubt, whether the same person 
be the same substance, is said to be this; that the conscious¬ 
ness of our own existence in youth and in old age, or in any 
two joint successive moments, is not the same individual 
action ,(2) that is, not the same consciousness, but different 
successive consciousnesses. Now, it is strange that this 
should have occasioned such perplexities. For it is surely 
conceivable, that a person may have a capacity of knowing 
some object or other to be the same now, which it was when 
he contemplated it formerly; yet, in this case, where, by 
the supposition, the object is perceived to be the same, the 
perception of it in any two moments cannot be one and the 
same perception. And thus, though the successive con¬ 
sciousnesses which we have of our own existence are not the 
same, yet are they consciousnesses of one and the same 
thing or object—of the same person, self, or living agent. 
The person, of whose existence the consciousness is felt now, 
and was felt an hour or a year ago, is discerned to be, not 
two persons, but one and the same person; and, therefore, 
is one and the same. 

Mr. Locke’s observations upon this subject appear hasty; 
and he seems to profess himself dissatisfied with supposi¬ 
tions, which he has made relating to it.(3) But some of 
those hasty observations have been carried to a strange 
length by others; whose notion, when traced and examined 
to the bottom, amounts, I think, to this:(4) “That person¬ 
ality is not a permanent, but a transient thing: that it lives 
and dies, begins and ends, continually: that no one can any 

(1) Locke’s Works, vol. i, p. 146. 

(2) Locke, p. 146, 147. (3) Locke, p. 152. 

(4) See an answer to Dr. Clarke’s third defence of his letter to Mr. 
Dodwell, 2d edit., p. 44, 56, &c. 


DISS. I.] OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 327 

more remain one and the same person two moments together, 
than two successive moments can be one and the same 
moment: that our substance is indeed continually chang¬ 
ing ; but whether this be so or not, is, it seems, nothing to 
the purpose; since it is not substance, but consciousness 
alone, which constitutes personality; which consciousness, 
being successive, cannot be the same in any two moments, 
nor, consequently, the personality constituted by it.” And 
from hence it must follow, that it is a fallacy upon ourselves, 
to charge our present selves with any thing we did, or to 
imagine our present selves interested in any thing which 
befell us yesterday, or that our present self will be interested 
in what will befall us to-morrow; since our present self is 
not, in reality, the same with the self of yesterday, but 
another like self or person coming in its room, and mistaken 
for it; to which another self will succeed to-morrow. This, 
I say, must follow: for if the self or person of to-day, and 
that of to-morrow, are not the same, but only like persons, 
the person of to-day is really no more interested in what 
will befall the person of to-morrow, than in what will befall 
any other person. It may be thought, perhaps, that this is 
not a just representation of the opinion we are speaking of; 
because those who maintain it allow, that a person is the 
same as far back as his remembrance reaches. And, indeed, 
they do use the words, identity and same person. Nor will 
language permit these words to be laid aside; since if they 
were, there must be, I know not what, ridiculous periphrasis 
substituted in the room of them. But they cannot, consist¬ 
ently with themselves, mean, that the person is really the 
same. For it is self-evident, that the personality cannot be 
really the same, if, as they expressly assert, that in which it 
consists is not the same. And as, consistently with them¬ 
selves, they cannot, so I think, it appears they do not, mean, 
that the person is really the same, but only that he is so in a 
fictitious sense: in such a sense only as they assert; for this 


328 


OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 


[DISS. I. 

they do assert, that any number of persons whatever may 
be the same person. The bare unfolding this notion, and 
laying it thus naked and open, seems the best confutation 
of it. However, since great stress is said to be put upon it, 
I add the following things: 

1. This notion is absolutely contradictory to that certain 
conviction which necessarily, and every moment, rises within 
us, when we turn our thoughts upon ourselves; when we 
reflect upon what is past, and look forward upon what is to 
come. All imagination of a daily change of that living 
agent which each man calls himself, for another, or of any 
such change throughout our whole present life, is entirely 
borne down by our natural sense of things. Nor is it pos¬ 
sible for a person in his wits to alter his conduct, with 
regard to his health or affairs, from a suspicion, that though 
he should live to-morrow, he should not, however, be the 
same person he is to-day. And yet, if it be reasonable to 
act, with respect to a future life, upon this notion, that per¬ 
sonality is transient, it is reasonable to act upon it, with 
respect to the present. Here, then, is a notion equally 
applicable to religion and to our temporal concerns, and 
every one sees and feels the inexpressible absurdity of it in 
the latter case. If, therefore, any can take up with it in the 
former, this cannot proceed from the reason of the thing, 
but must be owing to an inward unfairness, and secret cor¬ 
ruption of heart. 

2. It is not an idea, or abstract notion, or quality, but a 
being only which is capable of life and action, of happiness 
and misery. Now, all beings confessedly continue the 
same, during the whole time of their existence. Consider, 
then, a living being now existing, and which has existed 
for any time alive: this living being must have done, and 
suffered, and enjoyed, what it has done, and suffered, and 
enjoyed formerly, (this living being, I say, and not an¬ 
other,) as really as it does, and suffers, and enjoys, what it 


DISS. I.] OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 329 

does, and suffers, and enjoys this instant. All these succes¬ 
sive actions, enjoyments and sufferings, are actions, enjoy¬ 
ments, and sufferings, of the same living being. And they 
are so, prior to all consideration of its remembering or 
forgetting; since remembering or forgetting can make no 
alteration in the truth of past matter of fact. And suppose 
this being endued with limited powers of knowledge and 
memory, there is no more difficulty in conceiving it to have 
a power of knowing itself to be the same living being which 
it was some time ago, of remembering some of its actions, 
sufferings, and enjoyments, and forgetting others, than in 
conceiving it to know, or remember, or forget any thing 
else. 

3. Every person is conscious, that he is now the same 
person or self he was, as far back as his remembrance 
reaches; since, when any one reflects upon a past action of 
his own, he is just as certain of the person who did that 
action, namely, himself, the person who now reflects upon 
it, as he is certain that the action was at all done. Nay, 
very often a person’s assurance of an action having been 
done, of which he is absolutely assured, arises wholly from 
the consciousness that he himself did it. And this he, per¬ 
son, or self, must either be a substance, or the property of 
some substance. If he, if person, be a substance, then 
consciousness that he is the same person, is consciousness 
that he is the same substance. If the person, or he, be the 
property of a substance, still consciousness that he is the 
same property, is as certain a proof that his substance re¬ 
mains the same, as consciousness that he remains the same 
substance would be; since the same property cannot be 
transferred from one substance to another. 

But, though we are thus certain that we are the same 
agents, living beings, or substances, now, which we were 
as far back as our remembrance reaches, yet, it is asked, 
whether we may not possibly be deceived in it ? And this 


330 


OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 


.question may be asked at the end of any demonstration 
whatever; because it is a question concerning the truth of 
perception by memory. And he who can doubt, whether 
perception by memory can, in this case, be depended upon, 
may doubt, also, whether perception by deduction and rea¬ 
soning, which, also, include memory, or, indeed, whether 
intuitive perception can. Here, then, we can go no farther. 
For it is ridiculous to attempt to prove the truth of those 
perceptions, whose truth we can no otherwise prove than 
by other perceptions of exactly the same kind with them, 
and which there is just the same ground to suspect; or to 
attempt to prove the truth of our faculties, which can no 
otherwise be proved, than by the use or means of those 
very suspected faculties themselves. 


DISS. II.] 


OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 


331 


DISSERTATION II. 

OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 

That which renders beings capable of moral government, 
is their having a moral nature, and moral faculties of per¬ 
ception and of action. Brute creatures are impressed and 
actuated by various instincts and propensions: so, also, are 
we. But, additional to this, we have a capacity of reflect¬ 
ing upon actions and characters, and making them an object 
to our thought; and, on doing this, we naturally and una¬ 
voidably approve some actions, under the peculiar view of 
their being virtuous and of good desert; and disapprove 
others, as vicious and of ill-desert. That we have this 
moral approving and disapproving (1) faculty, is certain 
from our experiencing it in ourselves, and recognizing it in 
each other. It appears from our exercising it unavoidably, 
in the approbation and disapprobation even of feigned char¬ 
acters : from the words, right and wrong, odious and amia¬ 
ble, base and worthy, with many others of like signification 
in all languages, applied to actions and characters: from 
the many written systems of morals which suppose it; since 
it cannot be imagined, that all these authors, throughout all 
these treatises, had absolutely no meaning at all to their 

(1) This way of speaking is taken from Epictetus,* and is made 
use of as seeming the most full, and least liable to cavil. And the 
moral faculty may be understood to have these two epithets, fom- 
(awtim and faroS'oHiy.z.T'UM) upon a double account; because, upon a 
survey of actions, whether before or after they are done, it deter¬ 
mines them to be good or evil; and, also, because it determines 
itself to be the guide of action and of life, in contradistinction from 
all other faculties, or natural principles of action; in the very same 
manner as speculative reason directly and naturally judges of specu¬ 
lative truth and falsehood; and, at the same time, is attended with a 
consciousness upon reflection, that the natural right to judge of 
them belongs to it. 

* Arr. Epict., Lib. i, Cap. 1. 


332 OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. [dISS. II. 

words, or a meaning merely chimerical: from our natural 
sense of gratitude, which implies a distinction between 
merely being the instrument of good, and intending it: from 
the like distinction, every one makes, between injury and 
mere harm, which Hobbes says, is peculiar to mankind; and 
between injury and just punishment, a distinctiori plainly 
natural, prior to the consideration of human laws. It is 
manifest, great part (1) of common language, and of common 
behavior over the world, is formed upon supposition of such 
a moral faculty; whether called conscience, moral reason, 
moral sense, or divine reason; whether considered as a 
sentiment of the understanding, or as a perception of the 
heart, or, which seems the truth, as including both. Nor is 
it at all doubtful in the general, what course of action this 
faculty, or practical discerning power within us, approves, 
and what it disapproves. For, as much as it has been dis¬ 
puted wherein virtue consists, or whatever ground for doubt 
there may be about particulars, yet, in general, there is in 
reality a universally acknowledged standard of it. It is 
that, which all ages and all countries have made profession 
of in public; it is that, which every man you meet, puts on 
the show of; it is that, which the primary and fundamental 
laws of all civil constitutions, over the face of the earth, 
make it their business and endeavor to enforce the practice 
of upon mankind; namely, justice, veracity, and regard to 
common good. It being manifest, then, in general, that we 
have such a faculty or discernment as this, it may be of use 
to remark some things, more distinctly concerning it. 

1. It ought to be observed, that the object of this faculty 
is actions,(2) comprehending under that name, active or 
practical principles; those principles from which men would 
act, if occasions and circumstances gave them power; and 

(1) Arr. Epic., Lib. i, Cap. 1. 

(2) OlS't » dg«r« km KoLKict — tv Trtiiru, &KKa mpytiet, M. Anton. Lib. ix, 
16. Virtutis laus omnis in actione consistit. Cic. Off., Lib. i, Cap. 6. 


DISS. II.] OP THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 333 

which, when fixed and habitual in any person, we call his 
character. It does not appear that brutes have the least 
reflex sense of actions, as distinguished from events; or that 
will and design, which constitute the very nature of actions, 
as such, are at all an object to their perception. But to 
ours they are; and they are the object, and the only one, 
of the approving and disapproving faculty. Acting, con¬ 
duct, behavior, abstracted from all regard to what is, in 
fact and event, the consequence of it, is itself the natural 
object of the moral discernment, as speculative truth and 
falsehood is of speculative reason. Intention of such and 
such consequences, indeed, is always included; for it is part 
of the action itself; but though the intended good or bad 
consequences do not follow, we have exactly the same sense 
of the action as if they did. In like manner, we think well 
or ill of characters, abstracted from all consideration of the 
good or the evil, which persons of such characters have it 
actually in their power to do. We never, in the moral way, 
applaud or blame either ourselves or others, for what we 
enjoy or what we suffer, or for having impressions made 
upon us which we consider as altogether out of our power; 
but only for what we do, or would have done, had it been 
in our power; or for what we leave undone which we might 
have done, or would have left undone though we could have 
done it. 

2. Our sense or discernment of actions, as morally good 
or evil, implies in it a sense or discernment of them as of 
good or ill discernment. It may be difficult to explain this 
perception, so as to answer all the questions which may be 
asked concerning it; but every one speaks of such and such 
actions as deserving punishment; and it is not, I suppose, 
pretended, that they have absolutely no meaning at all to 
the expression. Now, the meaning plainly is, not that we 
conceive it for the good of society, that the doer of such 
actions should be made to suffer. For if, unhappily, it were 


334 OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. [dISS. II. 

resolved that a man who, by some innocent action, was 
infected with the plague, should be left to perish, lest, by 
other people’s coming near him, the infection should spread, 
no one would say he deserved this treatment. Innocence 
and ill desert are inconsistent ideas. Ill desert always sup¬ 
poses guilt; and if one be no part of the other, yet they 
are evidently and naturally connected in our mind. The 
sight of a man in misery raises our compassion toward him; 
and, if this misery be inflicted on him by another, our indig¬ 
nation against the author of it. But when we are informed 
that the sufferer is a villain, and is punished only for his 
treachery or cruelty, our compassion exceedingly lessens, 
and, in many instances, our indignation wholly subsides. 
Now, what produces this effect, is the conception of that in 
the sufferer, which we call ill desert. Upon considering, 
then, or viewing together, our notion of vice and that of mis¬ 
ery, there results a third, that of ill desert. And thus there 
is in human creatures an association of the two ideas, natural 
and moral evil, wickedness and punishment. If this asso¬ 
ciation were merely artificial or accidental, it were nothing; 
but, being most unquestionably natural, it greatly concerns 
us to attend to it, instead of endeavoring to explain it away. 

It may be observed farther, concerning our perception of 
good and of ill desert, that the former is very weak with 
respect to common instances of virtue. One reason of 
which may be, that it does not appear to a spectator, how 
far such instances of virtue proceed from a virtuous princi¬ 
ple, or in what degree this principle is prevalent; since a 
very weak regard to virtue may be sufficient to make men 
act well in many common instances. And on the other 
hand, our perception of ill desert in vicious actions lessens 
in proportion to the temptations men are thought to have 
had to such vices. For, vice in human creatures consisting 
chiefly in the absence or want of the virtuous principle, 
though a man be overcome, suppose, by tortures, it does 


DISS. II.] OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 335 

not from thence appear, to what degree the virtuous princi¬ 
ple was wanting. All that appears is, that he had it not in 
such a degree, as to prevail over the temptation; but possi¬ 
bly he had it in a degree, which would have rendered him 
proof against common temptations. 

3. Our perception of vice and ill deserts arises from, and 
is the result of, a comparison of actions with the nature and 
capacities of the agent. For, the mere neglect of doing 
what we ought to do, would, in many cases, be determined 
by all men to be in the highest degree vicious. And this 
determination must arise from such comparison, and be the 
result of it; because such neglect would not be vicious in 
creatures of other natures and capacities, as brutes. And 
it is the same, also, with respect to positive vices, or such as 
consist in doing what we ought not. For, every one has a 
different sense of harm done by an idiot, madman, or child, 
and by one of mature and common understanding; though 
the action of both, including the intention, which is part of the 
action, be the same: as it may be, since idiots and madmen, 
as well as children, are capable, not only of doing mischief, 
but, also, of intending it. Now, this difference must arise 
from somewhat discerned in the nature or capacities of 
one, which renders the action vicious; and the want of 
which in the other, renders the same action innocent, or less 
vicious; and this plainly supposes a comparison, whether 
reflected upon or not, between the action and capacities of 
the agent, previous to our determining an action to be 
vicious. And hence, arises a proper application of the epi¬ 
thets, incongruous, unsuitable, disproportionate, unfit, to ac¬ 
tions which our moral faculty determines to be vicious. 

4. It deserves to be considered, whether men are more at 
liberty, in point of morals, to make themselves miserable 
without reason, than to make other people so; or disso¬ 
lutely to neglect their own greater good, for the sake of a 
present lesser gratification, than they are to neglect the 


336 OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. [l>ISS. II. 

good of others, whom nature has committed to their care. 
It should seem, that a due concern about our own interest 
or happiness, and a reasonable endeavor to secure and pro¬ 
mote it, which is, I think, very much the meaning of the 
word prudence in our language—it should seem, that this is 
virtue, and the contrary behavior faulty and blamable; 
since, in the calmest way of reflection, we approve of the 
first, and condemn the other conduct, both in ourselves and 
others. This approbation and disapprobation are altogether 
different from mere desire of our own, or of their happi¬ 
ness, and from sorrow upon missing it. For the object or 
occasion of this last kind of perception, is satisfaction or 
uneasiness; whereas, the object of the first is active behav¬ 
ior. In one case, what our thoughts fix upon is our condi¬ 
tion; in the other, our conduct. It is true, indeed, that 
nature has not given us so sensible a disapprobation of im¬ 
prudence and folly, either in ourselves or others , as of false¬ 
hood, injustice, and cruelty; I suppose, because that con¬ 
stant habitual sense of private interest and good, which we 
always carry about with us, renders such sensible disappro¬ 
bation less necessary, less wanting, to keep us from impru¬ 
dently neglecting our own happiness, and foolishly injuring 
ourselves, than it is necessary and wanting to keep us from 
injuring others, to whose good we cannot have so strong 
and constant a regard; and also, because imprudence and 
folly, appearing to bring its own punishment, more imme¬ 
diately and constantly than injurious behavior, it less needs 
the additional punishment which would be inflicted upon it 
by others, had they the same sensible indignation against it, 
as against injustice, and fraud, and cruelty. Besides, un¬ 
happiness being in itself the natural object of compassion, 
the unhappiness which people bring upon themselves, though 
it be willfully, excites in us some pity for them; and this, of 
course, lessens our displeasure against them. But still it is 
matter of experience, that we are formed so as to reflect 


OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 


337 


DISS. II.] 

very severely upon the greater instances of imprudent neg¬ 
lect and foolish rashness, both in ourselves and others. In 
instances of this kind, men often say of themselves with 
remorse, and of others with some indignation, that they 
deserve to suffer such calamities, because they brought them 
upon themselves, and would not take warning. Particularly, 
when persons come to poverty and distress, by a long course 
of extravagance, and after frequent admonitions, though 
without falsehood or injustice; we plainly do not regard 
such people as like objects of compassion with those who 
are brought into the same condition by unavoidable accidents. 
From these things it appears, that prudence is a species of 
virtue, and folly of vice; meaning by folly , sonTewhat dif¬ 
ferent from mere incapacity—a thoughtless want of that 
regard and attention to our own happiness, which we had 
capacity for. And this the word properly includes, and, as 
it seems, in its usual acceptation; for we scarcely apply it to 
brute creatures. 

However, if any person be disposed to dispute the matter, 
I shall very willingly give him up the words virtue and vice, 
as not applicable to prudence and folly; but must beg leave 
to insist, that the faculty within us, which is the judge of 
actions, approves of prudent actions and disapproves im¬ 
prudent ones—I say, prudent and imprudent actions as such, 
and considered distinctly from the happiness or misery which 
they occasion. And, by the way, this observation may help 
to determine, what justness there is in that objection against 
religion, that it teaches us to be interested and selfish. 

5. Without inquiring how far, and in what sense, virtue is 
resolvable into benevolence, and vice into the want of it, it 
may be prop'er to observe, that benevolence, and the want 
of it, singly considered, are in no sort the whole of ■virtue 
and vice. For if this were the case, in the review of one’s 
own character, or that of others, our moral understanding 
and moral sense would be indifferent to every thing, but the 
29 


338 OP THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. [dISS. II, 

degrees in which benevolence prevailed, and the degrees in 
which it was wanting. That is, we should never approve 
of benevolence to some persons rather than to others, nor 
disapprove injustice and falsehood upon any other account, 
than merely as an overbalance of happiness was foreseen 
likely to be produced by the first, and of misery by the 
second. But now, on the contrary, suppose two men com¬ 
petitors for any thing whatever, which would be of equal 
advantage to each of them; though nothing, indeed, would 
be more impertinent than for a stranger to busy himself to 
get one of them preferred to the other; yet such endeavor 
would be virtue, in behalf of a friend or benefactor, ab¬ 
stracted from all consideration of distant consequence: as 
that examples of gratitude, and the cultivation of friendship, 
would be of general good to the world. Again, suppose 
one man should, by fraud or violence, take from another the 
fruit of his labor, with intent to give it to a third, who, he 
thought, would have as much pleasure from it as would 
balance the pleasure which the first possessor would have 
had in the enjoyment, and his vexation in the loss of it: 
suppose also, that no bad consequences would follow; yet 
such an action would surely be vicious. Nay, farther, were 
treachery, violence, and injustice, no otherwise vicious than 
as foreseen likely to produce an overbalance of misery to 
society; then, if in any case a man could procure to himself 
as great advantage by an act of injustice, as the whole 
foreseen inconvenience, likely to be brought upon others by 
it, would amount to, such a piece of injustice would not be 
faulty or vicious at all; because it would be no more than, 
in any other case, for a man to prefer his own satisfaction to 
another’s in equal degrees. The fact, then, appears to be, 
that we are constituted so as to condemn falsehood, unpro¬ 
voked violence, injustice, and to approve of benevolence to 
some preferably to others, abstracted from all consideration 
which conduct is likeliest to produce an overbalance of 


DISS. II.] OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 339 

happiness or misery. And, therefore, were the Author of 
nature to propose nothing to himself as an end but the pro¬ 
duction of happiness, were his moral character merely that 
of benevolence, yet ours is not so. Upon that supposition, 
indeed, the only reason of his giving us < the above-mentioned 
approbation of benevolence to some persons rather than 
others, and disapprobation of falsehood, unprovoked violence, 
and injustice, must be, that he foresaw this constitution of 
our nature would produce more happiness, than forming us 
with a temper of mere general benevolence. But still, since 
this is our constitution, falsehood, violence, injustice, must 
be vice in us, and benevolence to some preferably to others, 
virtue, abstracted from all consideration of the overbalance 
of evil or good which they may appear likely to produce. 

Now, if human creatures are endued with such a moral 
nature as we have been explaining, or with a moral faculty, 
the natural object of which is actions; moral government 
must consist in rendering them happy and unhappy, in 
rewarding and punishing them, as they follow, neglect, or 
depart from, the moral rule of action interwoven in their 
nature, or suggested and enforced by this moral faculty ;(1) 
in rewarding and punishing them upon account of their so 
doing. 

I. am not sensible that I have, in this fifth observation, 
contradicted what any author designed to assert. But some 
of great and distinguished merit have, I think, expressed 
themselves in a manner, which may occasion some danger 
to careless readers, of imagining the whole of virtue to con¬ 
sist in singly aiming, according to the best of their judgment, 
at promoting the happiness of mankind in the present state; 
and the whole of vice, in doing what they foresee, or might 
foresee, is likely to produce an overbalance of unhappiness in 
it; than which mistakes, none can be conceived more terrible. 
For it is certain that some of the most shocking instances of 
(1) Page 150. 


340 OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. [dISS. II. 

injustice, adultery, murder, perjury, and even of persecution, 
may, in many supposable cases, not have the appearance 
of being likely to produce an overbalance of misery in the 
present state; perhaps sometimes may have the contrary 
appearance. For this reflection might easily be carried on; 
but I forbear. The happiness of the world is the concern 
of Him who is the Lord and the proprietor of it; nor do 
we know what we are about, when we endeavor to promote 
the good of mankind in any ways but those which he has 
directed; that is, indeed, in all ways not contrary to veracity 
and justice. I speak thus upon supposition of persons really 
endeavoring, in some sort, to do good without regard to 
these. But the truth seems to be, that such supposed 
endeavors proceed, almost always, from ambition, the spirit 
of party, or some indirect principle, concealed, perhaps, in 
great measure from persons themselves. And though it is 
our business and our duty to endeavor, within the bounds of 
veracity and justice, to contribute to the ease, convenience, 
and even cheerfulness and diversion of our fellow-creatures; 
yet, from our short views, it is greatly uncertain whether 
this endeavor will, in particular instances, produce an over¬ 
balance of happiness upon the whole; since so many and 
distant things must come into the account. And that 
which makes it our duty, is, that there is some appearance 
that it will, and no positive appearance sufficient to balance 
this on the contrary side; and also, that such benevolent 
endeavor is a cultivation of that most excellent of all vir¬ 
tuous principles, the active principle of benevolence. 

However, though veracity, as well as justice, is to be our 
rule of life, it must be added, otherwise a snare will be laid 
in the way of some plain men, that the use of common forms 
of speech generally understood, cannot be falsehood; and, 
in general, that there can be no designed falsehood without 
designing to deceive. It must likewise be observed, that, 
in numberless cases, a man may be under the strictest 


DISS. II.] OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 341 

obligations to what he foresees will deceive, without his 
intending it. For it is impossible not to foresee, that the 
words and actions of men in different ranks and employ¬ 
ments, and of different educations, will perpetually be mis¬ 
taken by each other; and it cannot but be so, whilst they 
will judge with the utmost carelessness, as they daily do, 
of what they are not, perhaps, enough informed to be com¬ 
petent judges of, even though they considered it with great 
attention. 


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